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Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2]

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On Tue, 2016-03-08 at 18:37 +0200, Petko Manolov wrote:
> On 16-03-08 16:07:00, David Howells wrote:
> > Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> wrote:
> > 
> > > > How about I change it to a choice-type item, with the following options:
> > > > 
> > > >  (1) No addition.
> > > > 
> > > >  (2) Addition restricted by built-in keyring.
> > > > 
> > > >  (3) Addition restricted by secondary keyring + built-in keyring.
> > > > 
> > > > where the second and third options then depend on the appropriate keyrings 
> > > > being enabled.
> > > 
> > > I would suggest leaving (1) and (3).  Since secondary keyring only accepts
> > > keys signed by certificate in the system keyring I think (2) is redundant.
> > > It adds extra complexity (Kconfig is vague enough already) while it doesn't
> > > increase the overall security by much.
> > 
> > If I remove option (2), that would mean that if you want to allow keys to be 
> > added to .ima if they're signed by the built-in keyring, then you also allow 
> > keys to be added to .ima if they're signed by the secondary keyring if 
> > enabled.
> 
> Exactly.  The primary difference between the built-in and secondary keyring is 
> that the latter is R/W.  Chances are the user want either no addition or need 
> dynamic key add/remove.

Option 1 will prevent ANY keys from being added to the IMA keyring that
were not builtin and loaded by the kernel, similar to the existing
system certificate list.  The keyring itself would need to allow the
builtin keys to be added with the "KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION"
override.

Option 2 only allows certificates signed by a key on the builtin keyring
to be added to the IMA keyring.  (This should be the default.)

> I don't have strong opinions against (2).  This is more of a discussion whether 
> we should sacrifice in favor of simplicity or flexibility.

I disagree.  There is a major difference between option 2 and 3.

Mimi

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[RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings  [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to  asymmetric_type.c [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead  of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
    Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 03:30 +0100
      Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 14:10 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:40 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 15:50 +0100
            Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 16:50 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 17:10 +0100
            Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 17:40 +0100
              Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 23:10 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its  own file [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be  added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
    Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 03:10 +0100
      Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 14:20 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can  be added to dynamically [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:40 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 15:50 +0100
            Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 16:10 +0100
              Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 16:40 +0100
                Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 17:20 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()  [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to  __key_link() [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on  contents of trust keyring [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct  key * to use [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and  KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100

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