Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]


Groups > linux.kernel > #1353090

Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2]

From Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2]
Date 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
Message-ID <raqEq-1XQ-31@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References <rafzk-2X8-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <r8ZwB-8vJ-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <r8ZwC-8vJ-27@gated-at.bofh.it> <rapyG-1hW-19@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization linux.* mail to news gateway

Show all headers | View raw


On 16-03-08 13:08:36, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > Only certificates signed by a key on the system keyring were added to
> > the IMA keyring, unless IMA_MOK_KEYRING was configured.  Then, the
> > certificate could be signed by a either a key on the system or ima_mok
> > keyrings.  To replicate this behavior, the default behavior should be to
> > only permit certificates signed by a key on the builtin keyring, unless
> > this new Kconfig is enabled.  Only then, permit certificates signed by a
> > key on either the builtin or secondary keyrings to be added to the IMA
> > keyring.
> 
> How about I change it to a choice-type item, with the following options:
> 
>  (1) No addition.
> 
>  (2) Addition restricted by built-in keyring.
> 
>  (3) Addition restricted by secondary keyring + built-in keyring.
> 
> where the second and third options then depend on the appropriate keyrings 
> being enabled.

I would suggest leaving (1) and (3).  Since secondary keyring only accepts keys 
signed by certificate in the system keyring I think (2) is redundant.  It adds 
extra complexity (Kconfig is vague enough already) while it doesn't increase the 
overall security by much.


cheers,
Petko

Back to linux.kernel | Previous | NextPrevious in thread | Next in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread


Thread

[RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings  [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to  asymmetric_type.c [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead  of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
    Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 03:30 +0100
      Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 14:10 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:40 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 15:50 +0100
            Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 16:50 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 17:10 +0100
            Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 17:40 +0100
              Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 23:10 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings  instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its  own file [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be  added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
    Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 03:10 +0100
      Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 14:20 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can  be added to dynamically [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
        Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:40 +0100
          Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 15:50 +0100
            Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 16:10 +0100
              Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 16:40 +0100
                Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that  can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 17:20 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()  [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to  __key_link() [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on  contents of trust keyring [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct  key * to use [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
  [RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and  KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100

csiph-web