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Groups > linux.kernel > #1353201
| From | Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] |
| Date | 2016-03-08 17:40 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <rasPU-3kP-19@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (1 earlier) <rafzk-2X8-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <r8ZwB-8vJ-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <r8ZwC-8vJ-27@gated-at.bofh.it> <rapyG-1hW-19@gated-at.bofh.it> <rasmS-37R-31@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On 16-03-08 16:07:00, David Howells wrote: > Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> wrote: > > > > How about I change it to a choice-type item, with the following options: > > > > > > (1) No addition. > > > > > > (2) Addition restricted by built-in keyring. > > > > > > (3) Addition restricted by secondary keyring + built-in keyring. > > > > > > where the second and third options then depend on the appropriate keyrings > > > being enabled. > > > > I would suggest leaving (1) and (3). Since secondary keyring only accepts > > keys signed by certificate in the system keyring I think (2) is redundant. > > It adds extra complexity (Kconfig is vague enough already) while it doesn't > > increase the overall security by much. > > If I remove option (2), that would mean that if you want to allow keys to be > added to .ima if they're signed by the built-in keyring, then you also allow > keys to be added to .ima if they're signed by the secondary keyring if > enabled. Exactly. The primary difference between the built-in and secondary keyring is that the latter is R/W. Chances are the user want either no addition or need dynamic key add/remove. I don't have strong opinions against (2). This is more of a discussion whether we should sacrifice in favor of simplicity or flexibility. > Remember - these keyrings aren't necessarily restricted to IMA. I am well aware of that. At some point (perhaps not now) i'd like to discuss allowing kernel module loading based on keys in the secondary keyring. It is a niche feature for those machines that have uptime measured in years. I certainly don't expect it to be something the regular desktop or embedded users need. Another issue that we left unresolved is the system-wide blacklist keyring. It is at the same hierarchy level as the secondary keyring and serves a similar purpose although in opposite direction. Petko
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[RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
[RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
[RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 03:30 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 14:10 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:40 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 15:50 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 16:50 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 17:10 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 17:40 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 23:10 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
[RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
[RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 03:10 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 14:20 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> - 2016-03-08 15:20 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 15:40 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 15:50 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 16:10 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-08 16:40 +0100
Re: [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically [ver #2] Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-03-08 17:20 +0100
[RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
[RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
[RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
[RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to use [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
[RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED [ver #2] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2016-03-04 16:10 +0100
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