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Groups > sci.electronics.design > #488750 > unrolled thread
| Started by | bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-12-19 07:00 -0500 |
| Last post | 2017-12-23 15:09 -0500 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 175 — 17 participants |
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OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-19 07:00 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets amdx <nojunk@knology.net> - 2017-12-19 08:37 -0600
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 09:49 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-19 10:00 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-19 09:56 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highlandtechnology.com> - 2017-12-19 08:53 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 12:20 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 14:27 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-19 15:24 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 18:39 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-19 20:53 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-20 10:08 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 13:19 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Lasse Langwadt Christensen <langwadt@fonz.dk> - 2017-12-20 10:32 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-20 12:11 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-20 21:52 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-21 10:56 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-21 19:24 -0500
Re: Muppets "Tim Williams" <tiwill@seventransistorlabs.com> - 2017-12-19 16:48 -0600
Re: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-19 18:08 -0500
Re: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-19 18:26 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-19 15:01 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 18:46 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-19 15:56 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 19:25 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-19 16:44 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 20:01 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-20 07:59 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 13:07 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 10:31 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-21 14:33 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 12:00 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-21 16:06 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets John Robertson <spam@flippers.com> - 2017-12-21 12:14 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-21 17:58 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-22 12:58 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-22 15:21 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-22 16:12 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Steve Wilson <no@spam.com> - 2017-12-20 01:32 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-19 20:40 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-20 08:02 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Steve Wilson <no@spam.com> - 2017-12-20 16:47 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 13:16 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 10:50 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 14:17 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-20 22:00 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 08:08 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-20 08:09 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highlandtechnology.com> - 2017-12-20 09:17 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 13:26 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 10:37 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-21 10:58 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 11:17 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 14:14 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 14:18 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 14:48 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 16:04 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 16:55 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 16:59 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 18:30 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 19:40 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-20 22:03 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 10:41 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-20 22:03 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Michael A Terrell <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 22:38 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 10:52 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-21 14:53 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 12:32 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-21 19:30 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-21 16:37 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-22 08:57 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-22 10:23 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Michael A Terrell <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> - 2017-12-22 17:23 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-22 14:53 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-22 18:57 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-22 20:10 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Michael A Terrell <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> - 2017-12-22 20:57 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-22 19:07 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-22 19:04 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-23 07:39 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-23 15:03 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-23 12:09 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-23 15:17 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-23 15:27 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-23 20:49 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-24 07:50 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-24 16:56 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-24 14:37 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-24 17:51 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-24 15:15 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-24 18:41 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-24 23:33 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-25 05:48 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-25 09:57 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-25 17:29 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Joseph Gwinn <joegwinn@comcast.net> - 2017-12-25 20:38 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-25 21:23 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-25 18:47 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-25 19:09 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Michael A Terrell <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> - 2017-12-26 00:33 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-26 15:13 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-25 22:10 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-25 07:18 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-25 18:25 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Jasen Betts <jasen@xnet.co.nz> - 2017-12-29 02:01 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-28 21:42 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-28 19:47 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-29 01:04 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-28 23:56 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-25 10:55 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Jasen Betts <jasen@xnet.co.nz> - 2017-12-28 21:41 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-24 18:39 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> - 2017-12-24 07:46 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-24 12:23 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-25 21:57 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-23 20:47 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 13:31 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-20 18:36 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 14:10 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-20 12:13 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 16:41 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 16:42 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-20 14:16 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Steve Wilson <no@spam.com> - 2017-12-20 22:56 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 15:12 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highland_snip_technology.com> - 2017-12-20 15:26 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-20 23:37 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 18:42 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 16:26 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets John Larkin <jjlarkin@highlandtechnology.com> - 2017-12-21 08:45 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-21 09:29 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets John Robertson <spam@flippers.com> - 2017-12-20 15:30 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-20 22:08 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 18:36 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-20 22:09 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 15:28 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-20 14:02 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-20 16:33 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-20 21:09 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-20 22:55 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-21 09:38 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-21 18:06 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-21 21:59 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-22 02:56 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-22 11:45 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-22 18:02 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-22 22:39 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-22 23:01 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-23 09:05 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-23 10:04 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Michael A Terrell <mike.terrell@earthlink.net> - 2017-12-23 14:00 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets krw@notreal.com - 2017-12-23 20:51 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-23 06:15 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-23 14:38 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-23 17:43 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-23 21:25 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-24 09:58 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-24 08:29 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-24 06:06 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-24 17:53 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-24 03:41 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-24 09:12 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-24 15:32 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-23 08:52 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-23 14:40 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-23 19:49 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-23 14:55 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2017-12-23 20:03 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-23 17:53 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets Jasen Betts <jasen@xnet.co.nz> - 2017-12-22 20:49 +0000
Re: OT: Muppets rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2017-12-22 16:26 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> - 2017-12-22 15:36 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-23 08:19 -0500
Re: OT: Muppets bill.sloman@ieee.org - 2017-12-23 06:30 -0800
Re: OT: Muppets bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> - 2017-12-23 15:09 -0500
Page 2 of 9 — ← Prev page 1 [2] 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next page →
| From | bitrex <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 18:26 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Muppets |
| Message-ID | <7fh_B.3414$_b6.1577@fx43.iad> |
| In reply to | #488812 |
On 12/19/2017 06:08 PM, bitrex wrote: > On 12/19/2017 05:48 PM, Tim Williams wrote: >> "bitrex" <bitrex@de.lete.earthlink.net> wrote in message >> news:Eb7_B.2465$oE2.529@fx33.iad... >>> In Japan an engineer would probably be fired and imprisoned for 60 >>> days for making an error like that. >>> >>> <http://www.milforddailynews.com/news/20170512/keolis-workers-sound-off-on-commuter-rail-contractor> >>> >>> >>> Bunch of lowest-bidder muppets >> >> Please. Japan isn't the US. >> >> Be grateful they provide unprofitable services at all: >> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mbEfzuCLoAQ >> >> If they had the wide open spaces we do, they'd have the same problems >> we do. If we had the same high density they do, well... we'd have a >> shitload of problems because that's a few Earths of people in one >> country... but at least we'd have good train service?! >> >> Tim >> > > They suck for the same reason most public-infrastructure things suck in > the US; there's no popular will to make it better. If there was it would > be different. > > But there isn't because Americans who aren't millionaires are all > temporarily down-on-their-luck millionaires, there's little point in > working (or campaigning on such a platform as a politician) for better > "legacy" ground transit, which is for poors, when you could be voting > for investment in hyperloops, hypersonic passenger jets, point to point > rocket travel, flying Uber taxis, and all the other nice things that > await after you make it big, real soon now. > > Bad train and bus service is a good motivator to "work hard", imagine > how many more "parasites" there'd be if it were inexpensive and pleasant! That is to say the US has lousy train service because the US wasn't designed to be a place that would ever have European-style train service irrespective of distance issues; it's like being in Five Guys and wondering why they aren't serving up filet mignon. It's not America's thing. If someone doesn't like the fact it isn't serving filet mignon it's way more productive to think about how to go somewhere that does than try to force a square peg into a round hole.
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| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 15:01 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <f9tk2cF2cmoU1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #488750 |
On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: > <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> > > $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few > bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. > The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been around and successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even brings trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not rocket science. Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are supposed to "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and most obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such "system" designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. [...] -- Regards, Joerg http://www.analogconsultants.com/
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| From | rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 18:46 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <p1c8dc$98e$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #488811 |
Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: > On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: >> <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> >> >> $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few >> bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. >> > > The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been around and > successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it > Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even brings > trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not rocket > science. > > Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are supposed to > "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and most > obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such "system" > designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. The DC metro was fully automated until the accident that killed nine people by a train hitting a stopped train that wasn't seen by the system. One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how much sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should never see another, stopped or not. I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next train from coming to pick us up. -- Rick C Viewed the eclipse at Wintercrest Farms, on the centerline of totality since 1998
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| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 15:56 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <f9tn95F32h0U1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #488819 |
On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: > Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: >>> <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> >>> >>> $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few >>> bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. >>> >> >> The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been >> around and >> successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it >> Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even brings >> trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not rocket >> science. >> >> Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are supposed to >> "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and most >> obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such "system" >> designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. > > The DC metro was fully automated until the accident that killed nine > people by a train hitting a stopped train that wasn't seen by the > system. Did they ever find out why the system did not register the stopped train? One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes > until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other > train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how much > sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should never > see another, stopped or not. > That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. It disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will not be allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or not. If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system overrides. I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator would be required to do some explaining. It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line sections without this automation but it would have prevented most of the serious train wrecks we had in the US. > I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see > the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next > train from coming to pick us up. > Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that are on Flintstonian technology. -- Regards, Joerg http://www.analogconsultants.com/
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| From | rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 19:25 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <p1camf$lvq$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #488822 |
Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: > On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: >> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >>> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: >>>> <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> >>>> >>>> $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few >>>> bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. >>>> >>> >>> The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been >>> around and >>> successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it >>> Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even brings >>> trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not rocket >>> science. >>> >>> Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are supposed to >>> "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and most >>> obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such "system" >>> designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. >> >> The DC metro was fully automated until the accident that killed nine >> people by a train hitting a stopped train that wasn't seen by the >> system. > > > Did they ever find out why the system did not register the stopped train? I posted that in another comment. The device in that block had a weird rapid intermittent that the system didn't recognize as a failure, but it didn't report the train. Maybe the system should provide some feedback to the train operator so if the system looses track of a train, at least the operator knows and can alert someone to manually flag it's position. That is what is different between train dispatch and air traffic control, at least with an automated system. The train dropped off the map and the system didn't flag an error. I think it operates at a more fundamental level based on always knowing when a train is in a block and not letting traffic into that block or any adjacent block. No thought to tracking anything. > One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how much >> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should never >> see another, stopped or not. >> > > That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. It > disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will not be > allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or not. > If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system overrides. > I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator would be > required to do some explaining. How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was described in the paper. > It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line sections > without this automation but it would have prevented most of the serious > train wrecks we had in the US. How does a German system prevent US wrecks? >> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see >> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next >> train from coming to pick us up. >> > > Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that are on > Flintstonian technology. They still have a great safety record. It's only being discussed here because it is sensational. The real disaster is autos. But everyone accepts that. Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days later 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives it a thought. They were still glued to the Boston story. It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational. The shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a real clue how to do them better. -- Rick C Viewed the eclipse at Wintercrest Farms, on the centerline of totality since 1998
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| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 16:44 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <f9tq3uF3k7dU1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #488824 |
On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote: > Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: >> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: >>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >>>> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: >>>>> <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> >>>>> >>>>> $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few >>>>> bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been >>>> around and >>>> successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it >>>> Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even brings >>>> trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not >>>> rocket >>>> science. >>>> >>>> Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are >>>> supposed to >>>> "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and >>>> most >>>> obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such "system" >>>> designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. >>> >>> The DC metro was fully automated until the accident that killed nine >>> people by a train hitting a stopped train that wasn't seen by the >>> system. >> >> >> Did they ever find out why the system did not register the stopped train? > > I posted that in another comment. Must have been in another thread. > ... The device in that block had a weird > rapid intermittent that the system didn't recognize as a failure, but it > didn't report the train. Maybe the system should provide some feedback > to the train operator so if the system looses track of a train, at least > the operator knows and can alert someone to manually flag it's position. > There are better ways than that, see further below. > That is what is different between train dispatch and air traffic > control, at least with an automated system. The train dropped off the > map and the system didn't flag an error. I think it operates at a more > fundamental level based on always knowing when a train is in a block and > not letting traffic into that block or any adjacent block. No thought > to tracking anything. > That is a serious system design error. > >> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how much >>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should never >>> see another, stopped or not. >>> >> >> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. It >> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will >> not be >> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or >> not. >> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system >> overrides. >> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator would be >> required to do some explaining. > > How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was > described in the paper. > As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II movies where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train system (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can see the big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with lights in them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer described it to me. > >> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line sections >> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the serious >> train wrecks we had in the US. > > How does a German system prevent US wrecks? > If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed not to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train traveling through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to "GO" until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to engage the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a double-safety. This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people dying. > >>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see >>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next >>> train from coming to pick us up. >>> >> >> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that >> are on >> Flintstonian technology. > > They still have a great safety record. It's only being discussed here > because it is sensational. Many train wrecks were avoidable with rather simpe, technology. Like this one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Chatsworth_train_collision > ... The real disaster is autos. But everyone > accepts that. True. That's in part because our nation is glued to the automobile and in part because most people don't have any other options. > ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I > had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days later > 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives it a > thought. They were still glued to the Boston story. > > It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational. The > shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we > aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a real > clue how to do them better. > Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since more than half a century. -- Regards, Joerg http://www.analogconsultants.com/
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| From | rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 20:01 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <p1ccoc$ve$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #488825 |
Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM: > On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote: >> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: >>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: >>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >>>>> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: >>>>>> <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> >>>>>> >>>>>> $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few >>>>>> bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been >>>>> around and >>>>> successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it >>>>> Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even brings >>>>> trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not >>>>> rocket >>>>> science. >>>>> >>>>> Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are >>>>> supposed to >>>>> "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and >>>>> most >>>>> obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such "system" >>>>> designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. >>>> >>>> The DC metro was fully automated until the accident that killed nine >>>> people by a train hitting a stopped train that wasn't seen by the >>>> system. >>> >>> >>> Did they ever find out why the system did not register the stopped train? >> >> I posted that in another comment. > > > Must have been in another thread. > > >> ... The device in that block had a weird >> rapid intermittent that the system didn't recognize as a failure, but it >> didn't report the train. Maybe the system should provide some feedback >> to the train operator so if the system looses track of a train, at least >> the operator knows and can alert someone to manually flag it's position. >> > > There are better ways than that, see further below. > > >> That is what is different between train dispatch and air traffic >> control, at least with an automated system. The train dropped off the >> map and the system didn't flag an error. I think it operates at a more >> fundamental level based on always knowing when a train is in a block and >> not letting traffic into that block or any adjacent block. No thought >> to tracking anything. >> > > That is a serious system design error. You are claiming a "serious design" error based on my speculation? >>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how much >>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should never >>>> see another, stopped or not. >>>> >>> >>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. It >>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will >>> not be >>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or >>> not. >>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system >>> overrides. >>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator would be >>> required to do some explaining. >> >> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was >> described in the paper. >> > > As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II movies > where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train system > (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can see the > big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with lights in > them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer described > it to me. They had one of those boards in the dispatchers office when my dad worked in Camden Yards. Now it's a ball field and they control the entire CSX system (it was B&O, then C&O when my dad worked there) from Gainesville, FL I believe. You didn't answer my question about what is different between the systems that you think the German system can't have a failure. >>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line sections >>> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the serious >>> train wrecks we had in the US. >> >> How does a German system prevent US wrecks? >> > > If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed not > to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train traveling > through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to "GO" > until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to engage > the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a double-safety. > This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people dying. What about trains traveling the other direction in sector 17 entering sector 16 on the same track? Not only is this not uncommon on dual track, many railroads are single track with traffic in both directions. Sounds ot me like it is exactly the same. >>>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see >>>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next >>>> train from coming to pick us up. >>>> >>> >>> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that >>> are on >>> Flintstonian technology. >> >> They still have a great safety record. It's only being discussed here >> because it is sensational. > > > Many train wrecks were avoidable with rather simpe, technology. Like this one: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Chatsworth_train_collision > > >> ... The real disaster is autos. But everyone >> accepts that. > > > True. That's in part because our nation is glued to the automobile and in > part because most people don't have any other options. No, it's because people aren't rational in their response to issues. They become desensitized to the common traffic accidents but the infrequent rail and air disasters are big headlines. >> ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I >> had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days later >> 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives it a >> thought. They were still glued to the Boston story. >> >> It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational. The >> shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we >> aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a real >> clue how to do them better. >> > > Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since more > than half a century. As is often the case, you seem to be talking through your hat. We also can do better on nuclear safety, but it's not a priority with anyone. -- Rick C Viewed the eclipse at Wintercrest Farms, on the centerline of totality since 1998
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| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-20 07:59 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <f9vfm3Ff6ncU1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #488826 |
On 2017-12-19 17:01, rickman wrote: > Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM: >> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote: >>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: >>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: >>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >>>>>> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: >>>>>>> <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few >>>>>>> bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been >>>>>> around and >>>>>> successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it >>>>>> Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even >>>>>> brings >>>>>> trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not >>>>>> rocket >>>>>> science. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are >>>>>> supposed to >>>>>> "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and >>>>>> most >>>>>> obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such >>>>>> "system" >>>>>> designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. >>>>> >>>>> The DC metro was fully automated until the accident that killed nine >>>>> people by a train hitting a stopped train that wasn't seen by the >>>>> system. >>>> >>>> >>>> Did they ever find out why the system did not register the stopped >>>> train? >>> >>> I posted that in another comment. >> >> >> Must have been in another thread. >> >> >>> ... The device in that block had a weird >>> rapid intermittent that the system didn't recognize as a failure, but it >>> didn't report the train. Maybe the system should provide some feedback >>> to the train operator so if the system looses track of a train, at least >>> the operator knows and can alert someone to manually flag it's position. >>> >> >> There are better ways than that, see further below. >> >> >>> That is what is different between train dispatch and air traffic >>> control, at least with an automated system. The train dropped off the >>> map and the system didn't flag an error. I think it operates at a more >>> fundamental level based on always knowing when a train is in a block and >>> not letting traffic into that block or any adjacent block. No thought >>> to tracking anything. >>> >> >> That is a serious system design error. > > You are claiming a "serious design" error based on my speculation? > No, on what was reported in the news. The train was rolling at well above 2x the legal speed limit without any positive trail control enabled. That does constitute a serious design error in my book. Design includes the enabling or disabling of features that should have been available. > >>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how >>>>> much >>>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should never >>>>> see another, stopped or not. >>>>> >>>> >>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. It >>>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will >>>> not be >>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or >>>> not. >>>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system >>>> overrides. >>>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator >>>> would be >>>> required to do some explaining. >>> >>> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was >>> described in the paper. >>> >> >> As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II >> movies >> where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train system >> (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can see the >> big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with >> lights in >> them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer >> described >> it to me. > > They had one of those boards in the dispatchers office when my dad > worked in Camden Yards. Now it's a ball field and they control the > entire CSX system (it was B&O, then C&O when my dad worked there) from > Gainesville, FL I believe. > > You didn't answer my question about what is different between the > systems that you think the German system can't have a failure. > See below. I never said it is 100% fail-safe. No system ever is but it is much safer versus what we have in the US (or rather, don't have ...) > >>>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line sections >>>> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the serious >>>> train wrecks we had in the US. >>> >>> How does a German system prevent US wrecks? >>> >> >> If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed >> not >> to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train traveling >> through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to "GO" >> until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to >> engage >> the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a >> double-safety. >> This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people >> dying. > > What about trains traveling the other direction in sector 17 entering > sector 16 on the same track? Not only is this not uncommon on dual > track, many railroads are single track with traffic in both directions. > Sounds ot me like it is exactly the same. > It normally won't even let a train onto the track in opposite direction anywhere close to another. It'll stop it. > >>>>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see >>>>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next >>>>> train from coming to pick us up. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that >>>> are on >>>> Flintstonian technology. >>> >>> They still have a great safety record. It's only being discussed here >>> because it is sensational. >> >> >> Many train wrecks were avoidable with rather simpe, technology. Like >> this one: >> >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Chatsworth_train_collision >> >> >>> ... The real disaster is autos. But everyone >>> accepts that. >> >> >> True. That's in part because our nation is glued to the automobile and in >> part because most people don't have any other options. > > No, it's because people aren't rational in their response to issues. > They become desensitized to the common traffic accidents but the > infrequent rail and air disasters are big headlines. > To some extent, yes. However, not when witnessed personally. Most people cannot forget a gruesome accident scene even if it was decades ago. I still remember one from my childhood days, in detail. > >>> ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I >>> had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days later >>> 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives it a >>> thought. They were still glued to the Boston story. >>> >>> It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational. The >>> shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we >>> aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a real >>> clue how to do them better. >>> >> >> Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since more >> than half a century. > > As is often the case, you seem to be talking through your hat. We also > can do better on nuclear safety, but it's not a priority with anyone. > My philosophy is that if we can do better in some area then we ought to. -- Regards, Joerg http://www.analogconsultants.com/
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| From | rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-20 13:07 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <p1e8se$cu3$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #488861 |
Joerg wrote on 12/20/2017 10:59 AM: > On 2017-12-19 17:01, rickman wrote: >> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM: >>> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote: >>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: >>>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: >>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: >>>>>>>> <https://jalopnik.com/what-causes-amtrak-trains-to-derail-1821404755> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> $800 million spent on the project you'd think they could spend a few >>>>>>>> bucks on a crew that knew how to slow down going around a curve. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The really sad news is that the technology to avoid this has been >>>>>>> around and >>>>>>> successfully used in Germany since before World War II. They call it >>>>>>> Inductive Train Safeguarding or Indusi. That slows down and even >>>>>>> brings >>>>>>> trains to a full stop, overriding an offending operator. It is not >>>>>>> rocket >>>>>>> science. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yet we have all those so-called "licensed engineers" who are >>>>>>> supposed to >>>>>>> "safeguard the public" and blah-blah, then fail on the simplest and >>>>>>> most >>>>>>> obvious points. They should never have signed and stamped such >>>>>>> "system" >>>>>>> designs. Yet they did and that has killed people over and over again. >>>>>> >>>>>> The DC metro was fully automated until the accident that killed nine >>>>>> people by a train hitting a stopped train that wasn't seen by the >>>>>> system. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Did they ever find out why the system did not register the stopped >>>>> train? >>>> >>>> I posted that in another comment. >>> >>> >>> Must have been in another thread. >>> >>> >>>> ... The device in that block had a weird >>>> rapid intermittent that the system didn't recognize as a failure, but it >>>> didn't report the train. Maybe the system should provide some feedback >>>> to the train operator so if the system looses track of a train, at least >>>> the operator knows and can alert someone to manually flag it's position. >>>> >>> >>> There are better ways than that, see further below. >>> >>> >>>> That is what is different between train dispatch and air traffic >>>> control, at least with an automated system. The train dropped off the >>>> map and the system didn't flag an error. I think it operates at a more >>>> fundamental level based on always knowing when a train is in a block and >>>> not letting traffic into that block or any adjacent block. No thought >>>> to tracking anything. >>>> >>> >>> That is a serious system design error. >> >> You are claiming a "serious design" error based on my speculation? >> > > No, on what was reported in the news. The train was rolling at well above 2x > the legal speed limit without any positive trail control enabled. That does > constitute a serious design error in my book. Design includes the enabling > or disabling of features that should have been available. Ok, I should have known. You didn't read what I've posted and are not talking about the same accident. >>>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >>>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >>>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how >>>>>> much >>>>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should never >>>>>> see another, stopped or not. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. It >>>>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will >>>>> not be >>>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or >>>>> not. >>>>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system >>>>> overrides. >>>>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator >>>>> would be >>>>> required to do some explaining. >>>> >>>> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was >>>> described in the paper. >>>> >>> >>> As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II >>> movies >>> where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train system >>> (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can see the >>> big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with >>> lights in >>> them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer >>> described >>> it to me. >> >> They had one of those boards in the dispatchers office when my dad >> worked in Camden Yards. Now it's a ball field and they control the >> entire CSX system (it was B&O, then C&O when my dad worked there) from >> Gainesville, FL I believe. >> >> You didn't answer my question about what is different between the >> systems that you think the German system can't have a failure. >> > > See below. I never said it is 100% fail-safe. No system ever is but it is > much safer versus what we have in the US (or rather, don't have ...) You still didn't answer the question about what is *DIFFERENT* between the two systems. You are going on about how much better the German system is without saying what is different!!! >>>>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line sections >>>>> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the serious >>>>> train wrecks we had in the US. >>>> >>>> How does a German system prevent US wrecks? >>>> >>> >>> If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed >>> not >>> to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train traveling >>> through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to "GO" >>> until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to >>> engage >>> the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a >>> double-safety. >>> This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people >>> dying. >> >> What about trains traveling the other direction in sector 17 entering >> sector 16 on the same track? Not only is this not uncommon on dual >> track, many railroads are single track with traffic in both directions. >> Sounds ot me like it is exactly the same. >> > > It normally won't even let a train onto the track in opposite direction > anywhere close to another. It'll stop it. You aren't reading the conversation. The question is how does it stop a train traveling in the opposite direction if it doesn't know the stopped train is there? >>>>>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see >>>>>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next >>>>>> train from coming to pick us up. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that >>>>> are on >>>>> Flintstonian technology. >>>> >>>> They still have a great safety record. It's only being discussed here >>>> because it is sensational. >>> >>> >>> Many train wrecks were avoidable with rather simpe, technology. Like >>> this one: >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Chatsworth_train_collision >>> >>> >>>> ... The real disaster is autos. But everyone >>>> accepts that. >>> >>> >>> True. That's in part because our nation is glued to the automobile and in >>> part because most people don't have any other options. >> >> No, it's because people aren't rational in their response to issues. >> They become desensitized to the common traffic accidents but the >> infrequent rail and air disasters are big headlines. >> > > To some extent, yes. However, not when witnessed personally. Most people > cannot forget a gruesome accident scene even if it was decades ago. I still > remember one from my childhood days, in detail. Fortunately, and unfortunately, very few people get to see any serious accidents. So they think accidents won't happen to them. >>>> ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I >>>> had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days later >>>> 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives it a >>>> thought. They were still glued to the Boston story. >>>> >>>> It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational. The >>>> shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we >>>> aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a real >>>> clue how to do them better. >>>> >>> >>> Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since more >>> than half a century. >> >> As is often the case, you seem to be talking through your hat. We also >> can do better on nuclear safety, but it's not a priority with anyone. >> > > My philosophy is that if we can do better in some area then we ought to. Yes, I think that applies to nearly everything we do. We can always do better, but not if we take the attitude that we are doing good enough. The part of the North Anna nuclear reactor event that impacted me the most was to realize that the power plant had single points of failure in critical safety systems. The one that caused a generator failure was a defective procedure in installing a head gasket. We were very lucky that the generators ran as well as they did. Since the procedure impacts *all* the generators it could have caused them all to fail. -- Rick C Viewed the eclipse at Wintercrest Farms, on the centerline of totality since 1998
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-21 10:31 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <fa2cvuF5iofU1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #488871 |
On 2017-12-20 10:07, rickman wrote:
> Joerg wrote on 12/20/2017 10:59 AM:
>> On 2017-12-19 17:01, rickman wrote:
>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM:
>>>> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote:
>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM:
>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote:
[...]
>>>>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes
>>>>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other
>>>>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how
>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should
>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>> see another, stopped or not.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system
>>>>>> prevents. It
>>>>>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will
>>>>>> not be
>>>>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or
>>>>>> not.
>>>>>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system
>>>>>> overrides.
>>>>>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator
>>>>>> would be
>>>>>> required to do some explaining.
>>>>>
>>>>> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was
>>>>> described in the paper.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II
>>>> movies
>>>> where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train
>>>> system
>>>> (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can
>>>> see the
>>>> big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with
>>>> lights in
>>>> them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer
>>>> described
>>>> it to me.
>>>
>>> They had one of those boards in the dispatchers office when my dad
>>> worked in Camden Yards. Now it's a ball field and they control the
>>> entire CSX system (it was B&O, then C&O when my dad worked there) from
>>> Gainesville, FL I believe.
>>>
>>> You didn't answer my question about what is different between the
>>> systems that you think the German system can't have a failure.
>>>
>>
>> See below. I never said it is 100% fail-safe. No system ever is but it is
>> much safer versus what we have in the US (or rather, don't have ...)
>
> You still didn't answer the question about what is *DIFFERENT* between
> the two systems. You are going on about how much better the German
> system is without saying what is different!!!
>
I had explained it within this thread. Why don't you first read before
typing such stuff? There isn't much available in English language but
here are more details, it is a ground based system with inductive
coupling, not radio-operated or GPS:
http://www.sh1.org/eisenbahn/rindusi.htm
But that's not my point, the US system can also work very well. My point
is, they _implemented_ it more than half a decade ago while we are still
talking and talking and talking. Meantime people are dying needlessly.
>
>>>>>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line
>>>>>> sections
>>>>>> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the
>>>>>> serious
>>>>>> train wrecks we had in the US.
>>>>>
>>>>> How does a German system prevent US wrecks?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed
>>>> not
>>>> to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train
>>>> traveling
>>>> through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to
>>>> "GO"
>>>> until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to
>>>> engage
>>>> the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a
>>>> double-safety.
>>>> This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people
>>>> dying.
>>>
>>> What about trains traveling the other direction in sector 17 entering
>>> sector 16 on the same track? Not only is this not uncommon on dual
>>> track, many railroads are single track with traffic in both directions.
>>> Sounds ot me like it is exactly the same.
>>>
>>
>> It normally won't even let a train onto the track in opposite direction
>> anywhere close to another. It'll stop it.
>
> You aren't reading the conversation.The question is how does it stop a
> train traveling in the opposite direction if it doesn't know the stopped
> train is there?
>
The system will interlock. The only time when that doesn't happen is in
deliberate "wrong direction travel" ("Falschfahrbetrieb") on a line that
isn't equipped for both-direction interlock. This can happen if, for
example, the regular direction track is closed for construction
activities or track maintenance. Then they travel with written
instructions, typically at low speed and with extra caution.
>
>>>>>>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just
>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the
>>>>>>> next
>>>>>>> train from coming to pick us up.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that
>>>>>> are on
>>>>>> Flintstonian technology.
>>>>>
>>>>> They still have a great safety record. It's only being discussed here
>>>>> because it is sensational.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Many train wrecks were avoidable with rather simpe, technology. Like
>>>> this one:
>>>>
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Chatsworth_train_collision
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> ... The real disaster is autos. But everyone
>>>>> accepts that.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> True. That's in part because our nation is glued to the automobile
>>>> and in
>>>> part because most people don't have any other options.
>>>
>>> No, it's because people aren't rational in their response to issues.
>>> They become desensitized to the common traffic accidents but the
>>> infrequent rail and air disasters are big headlines.
>>>
>>
>> To some extent, yes. However, not when witnessed personally. Most people
>> cannot forget a gruesome accident scene even if it was decades ago. I
>> still
>> remember one from my childhood days, in detail.
>
> Fortunately, and unfortunately, very few people get to see any serious
> accidents. So they think accidents won't happen to them.
>
The older one gets the more one sees. I have seen several serious ones,
with fatalities. The first one as a child made me very aware that one
shall use provided safety equipment at all times. A guy wasn't buckled
in, flipped his car, went through the windshield and died.
When I got my first car it was an old model budget-class car which was
prepared for but not equipped with safety belts. My first action after
restoring its engine was the installation of safety belts. Before I even
test-drove it.
>
>>>>> ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I
>>>>> had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days
>>>>> later
>>>>> 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives
>>>>> it a
>>>>> thought. They were still glued to the Boston story.
>>>>>
>>>>> It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational.
>>>>> The
>>>>> shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we
>>>>> aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a real
>>>>> clue how to do them better.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since
>>>> more
>>>> than half a century.
>>>
>>> As is often the case, you seem to be talking through your hat. We also
>>> can do better on nuclear safety, but it's not a priority with anyone.
>>>
>>
>> My philosophy is that if we can do better in some area then we ought to.
>
> Yes, I think that applies to nearly everything we do. We can always do
> better, but not if we take the attitude that we are doing good enough.
>
> The part of the North Anna nuclear reactor event that impacted me the
> most was to realize that the power plant had single points of failure in
> critical safety systems. The one that caused a generator failure was a
> defective procedure in installing a head gasket. We were very lucky
> that the generators ran as well as they did. Since the procedure
> impacts *all* the generators it could have caused them all to fail.
>
I hope we all learn from such white-knuckle events. However, mostly
mankind is quite learning-resistant. For example, in the hills near
Fukushima there are stone markers from hundreds of years ago reading
something like "Do not build anything valuable below here because
eventually the sea will take it away" (quite obviously referring to
tsunamis). Then, they built a nuclear power station way down there and
didn't even place the emergency generators high enough or up into the
hills. We all know how that ended.
--
Regards, Joerg
http://www.analogconsultants.com/
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-21 14:33 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <p1h29l$b97$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #488966 |
Joerg wrote on 12/21/2017 1:31 PM:
> On 2017-12-20 10:07, rickman wrote:
>> Joerg wrote on 12/20/2017 10:59 AM:
>>> On 2017-12-19 17:01, rickman wrote:
>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM:
>>>>> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote:
>>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM:
>>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote:
>
> [...]
>
>
>>>>>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes
>>>>>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other
>>>>>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how
>>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should
>>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>>> see another, stopped or not.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system
>>>>>>> prevents. It
>>>>>>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train will
>>>>>>> not be
>>>>>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or
>>>>>>> not.
>>>>>>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system
>>>>>>> overrides.
>>>>>>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator
>>>>>>> would be
>>>>>>> required to do some explaining.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was
>>>>>> described in the paper.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II
>>>>> movies
>>>>> where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train
>>>>> system
>>>>> (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can
>>>>> see the
>>>>> big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with
>>>>> lights in
>>>>> them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer
>>>>> described
>>>>> it to me.
>>>>
>>>> They had one of those boards in the dispatchers office when my dad
>>>> worked in Camden Yards. Now it's a ball field and they control the
>>>> entire CSX system (it was B&O, then C&O when my dad worked there) from
>>>> Gainesville, FL I believe.
>>>>
>>>> You didn't answer my question about what is different between the
>>>> systems that you think the German system can't have a failure.
>>>>
>>>
>>> See below. I never said it is 100% fail-safe. No system ever is but it is
>>> much safer versus what we have in the US (or rather, don't have ...)
>>
>> You still didn't answer the question about what is *DIFFERENT* between
>> the two systems. You are going on about how much better the German
>> system is without saying what is different!!!
>>
>
> I had explained it within this thread. Why don't you first read before
> typing such stuff?
The thread has some 100 posts in it. This sub thread is about the two
systems. If you don't wish to be clear, fine. I'm not search in 100 posts
for what you say you have written which likely isn't an answer to my
question anyway. If you don't wish to discuss it fine.
> There isn't much available in English language but here
> are more details, it is a ground based system with inductive coupling, not
> radio-operated or GPS:
>
> http://www.sh1.org/eisenbahn/rindusi.htm
This is not the issue. The issue is what happens when a detector has a
fault. In the US case we have been discussing the fault was a very strange
fault that escaped the safeguards to prevent a fault from allowing a train
to be missed.
> But that's not my point, the US system can also work very well. My point is,
> they _implemented_ it more than half a decade ago while we are still talking
> and talking and talking. Meantime people are dying needlessly.
You don't make sense. The US system has had many safeguards. The link you
provide above is similar to the US system in what it does, preventing
collisions of trains by knowing where they are. The PTC system the US has
not completed is an entirely different level of protection which will stop
or slow a train when the operator has not done so. Inductive sensing is not
about this at all. There are many ways to sense the train and the US system
has that. That isn't what PTC is about.
>>>>>>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line
>>>>>>> sections
>>>>>>> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the
>>>>>>> serious
>>>>>>> train wrecks we had in the US.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How does a German system prevent US wrecks?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed
>>>>> not
>>>>> to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train
>>>>> traveling
>>>>> through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to
>>>>> "GO"
>>>>> until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to
>>>>> engage
>>>>> the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a
>>>>> double-safety.
>>>>> This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people
>>>>> dying.
>>>>
>>>> What about trains traveling the other direction in sector 17 entering
>>>> sector 16 on the same track? Not only is this not uncommon on dual
>>>> track, many railroads are single track with traffic in both directions.
>>>> Sounds ot me like it is exactly the same.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It normally won't even let a train onto the track in opposite direction
>>> anywhere close to another. It'll stop it.
>>
>> You aren't reading the conversation.The question is how does it stop a
>> train traveling in the opposite direction if it doesn't know the stopped
>> train is there?
>>
>
> The system will interlock. The only time when that doesn't happen is in
> deliberate "wrong direction travel" ("Falschfahrbetrieb") on a line that
> isn't equipped for both-direction interlock. This can happen if, for
> example, the regular direction track is closed for construction activities
> or track maintenance. Then they travel with written instructions, typically
> at low speed and with extra caution.
Saying "the system will interlock" doesn't explain it. You laid out an
example in detail and you can't explain how it will prevent this type of
accident.
>>>>>>>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just
>>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the
>>>>>>>> next
>>>>>>>> train from coming to pick us up.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that
>>>>>>> are on
>>>>>>> Flintstonian technology.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They still have a great safety record. It's only being discussed here
>>>>>> because it is sensational.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Many train wrecks were avoidable with rather simpe, technology. Like
>>>>> this one:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_Chatsworth_train_collision
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> ... The real disaster is autos. But everyone
>>>>>> accepts that.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> True. That's in part because our nation is glued to the automobile
>>>>> and in
>>>>> part because most people don't have any other options.
>>>>
>>>> No, it's because people aren't rational in their response to issues.
>>>> They become desensitized to the common traffic accidents but the
>>>> infrequent rail and air disasters are big headlines.
>>>>
>>>
>>> To some extent, yes. However, not when witnessed personally. Most people
>>> cannot forget a gruesome accident scene even if it was decades ago. I
>>> still
>>> remember one from my childhood days, in detail.
>>
>> Fortunately, and unfortunately, very few people get to see any serious
>> accidents. So they think accidents won't happen to them.
>>
>
> The older one gets the more one sees. I have seen several serious ones, with
> fatalities. The first one as a child made me very aware that one shall use
> provided safety equipment at all times. A guy wasn't buckled in, flipped his
> car, went through the windshield and died.
>
> When I got my first car it was an old model budget-class car which was
> prepared for but not equipped with safety belts. My first action after
> restoring its engine was the installation of safety belts. Before I even
> test-drove it.
>
>>
>>>>>> ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I
>>>>>> had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days
>>>>>> later
>>>>>> 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives
>>>>>> it a
>>>>>> thought. They were still glued to the Boston story.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational.
>>>>>> The
>>>>>> shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we
>>>>>> aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a real
>>>>>> clue how to do them better.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since
>>>>> more
>>>>> than half a century.
>>>>
>>>> As is often the case, you seem to be talking through your hat. We also
>>>> can do better on nuclear safety, but it's not a priority with anyone.
>>>>
>>>
>>> My philosophy is that if we can do better in some area then we ought to.
>>
>> Yes, I think that applies to nearly everything we do. We can always do
>> better, but not if we take the attitude that we are doing good enough.
>>
>> The part of the North Anna nuclear reactor event that impacted me the
>> most was to realize that the power plant had single points of failure in
>> critical safety systems. The one that caused a generator failure was a
>> defective procedure in installing a head gasket. We were very lucky
>> that the generators ran as well as they did. Since the procedure
>> impacts *all* the generators it could have caused them all to fail.
>>
>
> I hope we all learn from such white-knuckle events. However, mostly mankind
> is quite learning-resistant. For example, in the hills near Fukushima there
> are stone markers from hundreds of years ago reading something like "Do not
> build anything valuable below here because eventually the sea will take it
> away" (quite obviously referring to tsunamis). Then, they built a nuclear
> power station way down there and didn't even place the emergency generators
> high enough or up into the hills. We all know how that ended.
They didn't design the plant blindly, they designed the plant to suit their
analysis of the hazards. But many errors were made including a
misunderstanding of the hazards. The problem we continually repeat is to
factor the costs of over designing without fully considering the
catastrophic consequences of failing to adequately design.
--
Rick C
Viewed the eclipse at Wintercrest Farms,
on the centerline of totality since 1998
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-21 12:00 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <fa2i5oF6pd1U1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #488974 |
On 2017-12-21 11:33, rickman wrote:
> Joerg wrote on 12/21/2017 1:31 PM:
>> On 2017-12-20 10:07, rickman wrote:
>>> Joerg wrote on 12/20/2017 10:59 AM:
>>>> On 2017-12-19 17:01, rickman wrote:
>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM:
>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote:
>>>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM:
>>>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>
>>>>>>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes
>>>>>>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other
>>>>>>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out
>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should
>>>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>>>> see another, stopped or not.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system
>>>>>>>> prevents. It
>>>>>>>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train
>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>> not be
>>>>>>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present,
>>>>>>>> moving or
>>>>>>>> not.
>>>>>>>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system
>>>>>>>> overrides.
>>>>>>>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator
>>>>>>>> would be
>>>>>>>> required to do some explaining.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was
>>>>>>> described in the paper.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II
>>>>>> movies
>>>>>> where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train
>>>>>> system
>>>>>> (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can
>>>>>> see the
>>>>>> big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with
>>>>>> lights in
>>>>>> them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer
>>>>>> described
>>>>>> it to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> They had one of those boards in the dispatchers office when my dad
>>>>> worked in Camden Yards. Now it's a ball field and they control the
>>>>> entire CSX system (it was B&O, then C&O when my dad worked there) from
>>>>> Gainesville, FL I believe.
>>>>>
>>>>> You didn't answer my question about what is different between the
>>>>> systems that you think the German system can't have a failure.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> See below. I never said it is 100% fail-safe. No system ever is but
>>>> it is
>>>> much safer versus what we have in the US (or rather, don't have ...)
>>>
>>> You still didn't answer the question about what is *DIFFERENT* between
>>> the two systems. You are going on about how much better the German
>>> system is without saying what is different!!!
>>>
>>
>> I had explained it within this thread. Why don't you first read before
>> typing such stuff?
>
> The thread has some 100 posts in it. This sub thread is about the two
> systems. If you don't wish to be clear, fine. I'm not search in 100
> posts for what you say you have written which likely isn't an answer to
> my question anyway. If you don't wish to discuss it fine.
>
I don't wish to repeat everything.
>
>> There isn't much available in English language but here
>> are more details, it is a ground based system with inductive coupling,
>> not
>> radio-operated or GPS:
>>
>> http://www.sh1.org/eisenbahn/rindusi.htm
>
> This is not the issue. The issue is what happens when a detector has a
> fault. In the US case we have been discussing the fault was a very
> strange fault that escaped the safeguards to prevent a fault from
> allowing a train to be missed.
>
>
>> But that's not my point, the US system can also work very well. My
>> point is,
>> they _implemented_ it more than half a decade ago while we are still
>> talking
>> and talking and talking. Meantime people are dying needlessly.
>
> You don't make sense. The US system has had many safeguards.
But it wasn't turned on.
> ... The link
> you provide above is similar to the US system in what it does,
> preventing collisions of trains by knowing where they are. The PTC
> system the US has not completed is an entirely different level of
> protection which will stop or slow a train when the operator has not
> done so. Inductive sensing is not about this at all. There are many
> ways to sense the train and the US system has that. That isn't what PTC
> is about.
>
>
>>>>>>>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line
>>>>>>>> sections
>>>>>>>> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the
>>>>>>>> serious
>>>>>>>> train wrecks we had in the US.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How does a German system prevent US wrecks?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is
>>>>>> assumed
>>>>>> not
>>>>>> to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train
>>>>>> traveling
>>>>>> through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to
>>>>>> "GO"
>>>>>> until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to
>>>>>> engage
>>>>>> the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a
>>>>>> double-safety.
>>>>>> This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people
>>>>>> dying.
>>>>>
>>>>> What about trains traveling the other direction in sector 17 entering
>>>>> sector 16 on the same track? Not only is this not uncommon on dual
>>>>> track, many railroads are single track with traffic in both
>>>>> directions.
>>>>> Sounds ot me like it is exactly the same.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It normally won't even let a train onto the track in opposite direction
>>>> anywhere close to another. It'll stop it.
>>>
>>> You aren't reading the conversation.The question is how does it stop a
>>> train traveling in the opposite direction if it doesn't know the stopped
>>> train is there?
>>>
>>
>> The system will interlock. The only time when that doesn't happen is in
>> deliberate "wrong direction travel" ("Falschfahrbetrieb") on a line that
>> isn't equipped for both-direction interlock. This can happen if, for
>> example, the regular direction track is closed for construction
>> activities
>> or track maintenance. Then they travel with written instructions,
>> typically
>> at low speed and with extra caution.
>
> Saying "the system will interlock" doesn't explain it. You laid out an
> example in detail and you can't explain how it will prevent this type of
> accident.
>
<sigh>
The system relies on two layers. One is the inductive xfer which is
secondary, only applies if human error comes into play. The main system
also relies on what theyu call blocks. Train does not show up in
expected block at expected time -> alarm -> everything will be stopped
on that line. You need to have a double-fault for a crash to happen
unless the track isn't equipped with Indusi (there are some).
They still have nasty crashes but those are usually cause by things like
equipment failure at high speed.
[...]
>>>>>>> ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I
>>>>>>> had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days
>>>>>>> later
>>>>>>> 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives
>>>>>>> it a
>>>>>>> thought. They were still glued to the Boston story.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational.
>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>> shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we
>>>>>>> aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a
>>>>>>> real
>>>>>>> clue how to do them better.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since
>>>>>> more
>>>>>> than half a century.
>>>>>
>>>>> As is often the case, you seem to be talking through your hat. We
>>>>> also
>>>>> can do better on nuclear safety, but it's not a priority with anyone.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My philosophy is that if we can do better in some area then we ought
>>>> to.
>>>
>>> Yes, I think that applies to nearly everything we do. We can always do
>>> better, but not if we take the attitude that we are doing good enough.
>>>
>>> The part of the North Anna nuclear reactor event that impacted me the
>>> most was to realize that the power plant had single points of failure in
>>> critical safety systems. The one that caused a generator failure was a
>>> defective procedure in installing a head gasket. We were very lucky
>>> that the generators ran as well as they did. Since the procedure
>>> impacts *all* the generators it could have caused them all to fail.
>>>
>>
>> I hope we all learn from such white-knuckle events. However, mostly
>> mankind
>> is quite learning-resistant. For example, in the hills near Fukushima
>> there
>> are stone markers from hundreds of years ago reading something like
>> "Do not
>> build anything valuable below here because eventually the sea will
>> take it
>> away" (quite obviously referring to tsunamis). Then, they built a nuclear
>> power station way down there and didn't even place the emergency
>> generators
>> high enough or up into the hills. We all know how that ended.
>
> They didn't design the plant blindly, they designed the plant to suit
> their analysis of the hazards. But many errors were made including a
> misunderstanding of the hazards.
Understanding would have merely required taking to heart the warnings
that the forefathers gave. They didn't go through the extra effort and
cost of engraving it in stone for nothing. They obviously wanted these
warnings to be visible to our generation and beyond. Yet our generation
ignored them.
> ... The problem we continually repeat is
> to factor the costs of over designing without fully considering the
> catastrophic consequences of failing to adequately design.
>
It was quite obvious here. The backup power generators were not
sufficiently protected, 12 of the 13 flooded, consequently could no
longer start, thus the emergency cooling system could not function, and
then the disaster unfolded.
--
Regards, Joerg
http://www.analogconsultants.com/
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| From | rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-21 16:06 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <p1h7p9$jc8$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #488976 |
Joerg wrote on 12/21/2017 3:00 PM:
> On 2017-12-21 11:33, rickman wrote:
>> Joerg wrote on 12/21/2017 1:31 PM:
>>> On 2017-12-20 10:07, rickman wrote:
>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/20/2017 10:59 AM:
>>>>> On 2017-12-19 17:01, rickman wrote:
>>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM:
>>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote:
>>>>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM:
>>>>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote:
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes
>>>>>>>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other
>>>>>>>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out
>>>>>>>>>> how
>>>>>>>>>> much
>>>>>>>>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should
>>>>>>>>>> never
>>>>>>>>>> see another, stopped or not.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system
>>>>>>>>> prevents. It
>>>>>>>>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train
>>>>>>>>> will
>>>>>>>>> not be
>>>>>>>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present,
>>>>>>>>> moving or
>>>>>>>>> not.
>>>>>>>>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system
>>>>>>>>> overrides.
>>>>>>>>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator
>>>>>>>>> would be
>>>>>>>>> required to do some explaining.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was
>>>>>>>> described in the paper.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II
>>>>>>> movies
>>>>>>> where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train
>>>>>>> system
>>>>>>> (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can
>>>>>>> see the
>>>>>>> big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards with
>>>>>>> lights in
>>>>>>> them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train engineer
>>>>>>> described
>>>>>>> it to me.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They had one of those boards in the dispatchers office when my dad
>>>>>> worked in Camden Yards. Now it's a ball field and they control the
>>>>>> entire CSX system (it was B&O, then C&O when my dad worked there) from
>>>>>> Gainesville, FL I believe.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You didn't answer my question about what is different between the
>>>>>> systems that you think the German system can't have a failure.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> See below. I never said it is 100% fail-safe. No system ever is but
>>>>> it is
>>>>> much safer versus what we have in the US (or rather, don't have ...)
>>>>
>>>> You still didn't answer the question about what is *DIFFERENT* between
>>>> the two systems. You are going on about how much better the German
>>>> system is without saying what is different!!!
>>>>
>>>
>>> I had explained it within this thread. Why don't you first read before
>>> typing such stuff?
>>
>> The thread has some 100 posts in it. This sub thread is about the two
>> systems. If you don't wish to be clear, fine. I'm not search in 100
>> posts for what you say you have written which likely isn't an answer to
>> my question anyway. If you don't wish to discuss it fine.
>>
>
> I don't wish to repeat everything.
You aren't repeating it to me. You've never written it to me. You simply
say I should go digging without even a hint as to where I might find it.
I'm done asking...
>>> There isn't much available in English language but here
>>> are more details, it is a ground based system with inductive coupling,
>>> not
>>> radio-operated or GPS:
>>>
>>> http://www.sh1.org/eisenbahn/rindusi.htm
>>
>> This is not the issue. The issue is what happens when a detector has a
>> fault. In the US case we have been discussing the fault was a very
>> strange fault that escaped the safeguards to prevent a fault from
>> allowing a train to be missed.
>>
>>
>>> But that's not my point, the US system can also work very well. My
>>> point is,
>>> they _implemented_ it more than half a decade ago while we are still
>>> talking
>>> and talking and talking. Meantime people are dying needlessly.
>>
>> You don't make sense. The US system has had many safeguards.
>
>
> But it wasn't turned on.
More nonsense. You don't know diddly about the US systems. The only
improvement to US rail safety in the works is PTC. There are many other
safety systems. I"m tired of you ignoring the facts. Discuss this with
someone else.
>> ... The link
>> you provide above is similar to the US system in what it does,
>> preventing collisions of trains by knowing where they are. The PTC
>> system the US has not completed is an entirely different level of
>> protection which will stop or slow a train when the operator has not
>> done so. Inductive sensing is not about this at all. There are many
>> ways to sense the train and the US system has that. That isn't what PTC
>> is about.
>>
>>
>>>>>>>>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line
>>>>>>>>> sections
>>>>>>>>> without this automation but it would have prevented most of the
>>>>>>>>> serious
>>>>>>>>> train wrecks we had in the US.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> How does a German system prevent US wrecks?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is
>>>>>>> assumed
>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>> to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train
>>>>>>> traveling
>>>>>>> through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be set to
>>>>>>> "GO"
>>>>>>> until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator fails to
>>>>>>> engage
>>>>>>> the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort of a
>>>>>>> double-safety.
>>>>>>> This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is better than people
>>>>>>> dying.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What about trains traveling the other direction in sector 17 entering
>>>>>> sector 16 on the same track? Not only is this not uncommon on dual
>>>>>> track, many railroads are single track with traffic in both
>>>>>> directions.
>>>>>> Sounds ot me like it is exactly the same.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It normally won't even let a train onto the track in opposite direction
>>>>> anywhere close to another. It'll stop it.
>>>>
>>>> You aren't reading the conversation.The question is how does it stop a
>>>> train traveling in the opposite direction if it doesn't know the stopped
>>>> train is there?
>>>>
>>>
>>> The system will interlock. The only time when that doesn't happen is in
>>> deliberate "wrong direction travel" ("Falschfahrbetrieb") on a line that
>>> isn't equipped for both-direction interlock. This can happen if, for
>>> example, the regular direction track is closed for construction
>>> activities
>>> or track maintenance. Then they travel with written instructions,
>>> typically
>>> at low speed and with extra caution.
>>
>> Saying "the system will interlock" doesn't explain it. You laid out an
>> example in detail and you can't explain how it will prevent this type of
>> accident.
>>
>
> <sigh>
>
> The system relies on two layers. One is the inductive xfer which is
> secondary, only applies if human error comes into play. The main system also
> relies on what theyu call blocks. Train does not show up in expected block
> at expected time -> alarm -> everything will be stopped on that line. You
> need to have a double-fault for a crash to happen unless the track isn't
> equipped with Indusi (there are some).
>
> They still have nasty crashes but those are usually cause by things like
> equipment failure at high speed.
What is the mechanism for everything being stopped on that line? You said
they had this system in place decades ago which would have been before
modern electronics. Was this a relay based system?
The real point is that the example you gave does not protect against this
problem. But you refuse to discuss that. I guess we can give up on this
part of the conversation as well.
>>>>>>>> ... Just like the Boston bombing, people in the deli where I
>>>>>>>> had to get my Internet access were glued to the TV. But two days
>>>>>>>> later
>>>>>>>> 5 times as many die in a plant explosion in Texas and no one gives
>>>>>>>> it a
>>>>>>>> thought. They were still glued to the Boston story.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's not about what is important, it is about what is sensational.
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>> shade tree mechanics here can wax on about how bad others do jobs we
>>>>>>>> aren't tasked with (you know who I mean John) but we don't have a
>>>>>>>> real
>>>>>>>> clue how to do them better.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since
>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>> than half a century.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As is often the case, you seem to be talking through your hat. We
>>>>>> also
>>>>>> can do better on nuclear safety, but it's not a priority with anyone.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> My philosophy is that if we can do better in some area then we ought
>>>>> to.
>>>>
>>>> Yes, I think that applies to nearly everything we do. We can always do
>>>> better, but not if we take the attitude that we are doing good enough.
>>>>
>>>> The part of the North Anna nuclear reactor event that impacted me the
>>>> most was to realize that the power plant had single points of failure in
>>>> critical safety systems. The one that caused a generator failure was a
>>>> defective procedure in installing a head gasket. We were very lucky
>>>> that the generators ran as well as they did. Since the procedure
>>>> impacts *all* the generators it could have caused them all to fail.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I hope we all learn from such white-knuckle events. However, mostly
>>> mankind
>>> is quite learning-resistant. For example, in the hills near Fukushima
>>> there
>>> are stone markers from hundreds of years ago reading something like
>>> "Do not
>>> build anything valuable below here because eventually the sea will
>>> take it
>>> away" (quite obviously referring to tsunamis). Then, they built a nuclear
>>> power station way down there and didn't even place the emergency
>>> generators
>>> high enough or up into the hills. We all know how that ended.
>>
>> They didn't design the plant blindly, they designed the plant to suit
>> their analysis of the hazards. But many errors were made including a
>> misunderstanding of the hazards.
>
>
> Understanding would have merely required taking to heart the warnings that
> the forefathers gave. They didn't go through the extra effort and cost of
> engraving it in stone for nothing. They obviously wanted these warnings to
> be visible to our generation and beyond. Yet our generation ignored them.
Lol! "Beyond here monsters lie!" Not much to design a power plant by. You
fail to acknowledge they had multiple power plants on the coast. Only this
one did not stand up to the tsunami. Just as in earthquakes the degree of
vibration depends on many things, with a tsunami the wave height depends on
many things.
>> ... The problem we continually repeat is
>> to factor the costs of over designing without fully considering the
>> catastrophic consequences of failing to adequately design.
>>
>
> It was quite obvious here. The backup power generators were not sufficiently
> protected, 12 of the 13 flooded, consequently could no longer start, thus
> the emergency cooling system could not function, and then the disaster
> unfolded.
Yes, that is great hindsight. Now, look at the US power plants and tell me
which one will fail catastrophically.
--
Rick C
Viewed the eclipse at Wintercrest Farms,
on the centerline of totality since 1998
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| From | John Robertson <spam@flippers.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-21 12:14 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <X_adncmLa-2si6HHnZ2dnUU7-bfNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #488966 |
On 2017/12/21 10:31 AM, Joerg wrote: > On 2017-12-20 10:07, rickman wrote: >> Joerg wrote on 12/20/2017 10:59 AM: >>> On 2017-12-19 17:01, rickman wrote: >>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 7:44 PM: >>>>> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote: >>>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: >>>>>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: > > [...] > > >>>>>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >>>>>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >>>>>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how >>>>>>>> much >>>>>>>> sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should >>>>>>>> never >>>>>>>> see another, stopped or not. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system >>>>>>> prevents. It >>>>>>> disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train >>>>>>> will >>>>>>> not be >>>>>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, >>>>>>> moving or >>>>>>> not. >>>>>>> If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system >>>>>>> overrides. >>>>>>> I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the operator >>>>>>> would be >>>>>>> required to do some explaining.... ... > > I hope we all learn from such white-knuckle events. However, mostly > mankind is quite learning-resistant. For example, in the hills near > Fukushima there are stone markers from hundreds of years ago reading > something like "Do not build anything valuable below here because > eventually the sea will take it away" (quite obviously referring to > tsunamis). Then, they built a nuclear power station way down there and > didn't even place the emergency generators high enough or up into the > hills. We all know how that ended. > Not fake news: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/century-old-warnings-against-tsunamis-dot-japans-coastline-180956448/ While I couldn't find a direct reference to Fukushima it stands to reason that engineers should have been aware of tsunami risk... Just need some foresight. John
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| From | whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-21 17:58 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <4058639d-be1b-4df9-928c-55d4c02ad7b1@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #488979 |
On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 12:14:51 PM UTC-8, John Robertson wrote: > On 2017/12/21 10:31 AM, Joerg wrote: > > mankind is quite learning-resistant. For example, in the hills near > > Fukushima there are stone markers from hundreds of years ago reading > > something like "Do not build anything valuable below here because > > eventually the sea will take it away" (quite obviously referring to > > tsunamis). Then, they built a nuclear power station way down there and > > didn't even place the emergency generators high enough or up into the > > hills. We all know how that ended. > https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/century-old-warnings-against-tsunamis-dot-japans-coastline-180956448/ > > While I couldn't find a direct reference to Fukushima it stands to > reason that engineers should have been aware of tsunami risk... > > Just need some foresight. There WAS awareness at Fukushima, thus there was a seawall. It just wasn't high enough. There was redundancy, too, but multiple failures. Seismologists didn't know from a century of data that the fault was capable of such a large quake (foresight, we've always known, is not as accurate as hindsight). There's no sign that learning resistance is the problem with the train crash, either: PTC is mandated, and could have prevented it, if delays hadn't been requested and granted. So, should we learn not to request delays? Not grant them? It wasn't learning at fault, it was railway do-ers not heeding learners.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-22 12:58 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <fa59uuFq44uU1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #489009 |
On 2017-12-21 17:58, whit3rd wrote: > On Thursday, December 21, 2017 at 12:14:51 PM UTC-8, John Robertson wrote: >> On 2017/12/21 10:31 AM, Joerg wrote: > >>> mankind is quite learning-resistant. For example, in the hills near >>> Fukushima there are stone markers from hundreds of years ago reading >>> something like "Do not build anything valuable below here because >>> eventually the sea will take it away" (quite obviously referring to >>> tsunamis). Then, they built a nuclear power station way down there and >>> didn't even place the emergency generators high enough or up into the >>> hills. We all know how that ended. > >> https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/century-old-warnings-against-tsunamis-dot-japans-coastline-180956448/ >> >> While I couldn't find a direct reference to Fukushima it stands to >> reason that engineers should have been aware of tsunami risk... >> >> Just need some foresight. > > There WAS awareness at Fukushima, thus there was a seawall. It just wasn't high enough. > There was redundancy, too, but multiple failures. Seismologists didn't know from a century of data > that the fault was capable of such a large quake (foresight, we've always known, is > not as accurate as hindsight). > Sure they knew. Or should have: http://pubmedcentralcanada.ca/pmcc/articles/PMC3621565/ Quote "... 1896 by a giant local tsunami of the highest run-up height of 38 m that claimed 22,000 lives". There were more. > There's no sign that learning resistance is the problem with the train crash, either: PTC is > mandated, and could have prevented it, if delays hadn't been requested and granted. > So, should we learn not to request delays? Not grant them? > > It wasn't learning at fault, it was railway do-ers not heeding learners. > Learning includes required or prudent safety measures and that is where there was a clear lack of learning. Train accidents are very well documented and it does not take a rocket scientist to figure out the myriad train wrecks that could have been prevented by external train control. It's the same with EEs. I should have absolutely no business in medical device design if I would not have thoroughly engrained EN60601 and UL60601 in my brain. University did not teach me that, I did. And no, I did not wait until something happened or until some rule became law. For example, when a company wanted to scale back a design to non-defibrillator-proof level because it was not legally required I told them in no uncertain terms that I would refuse and bow out of the project. So the design was done defibrillator-proof. Only a few months after introduction of the product a cardiologist made the cardinal mistake and applied the paddles without disconnecting our gear. It can happen, unexpected cardiac arrest in a patient can cause somewhat of a panic in younger docs. A SW engineer of the company happened to be there and he wiped the sweat off his forehead. -- Regards, Joerg http://www.analogconsultants.com/
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| From | whit3rd <whit3rd@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-22 15:21 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <220364c3-c884-4f4b-8afa-d83e8dc770a3@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #489064 |
On Friday, December 22, 2017 at 12:58:11 PM UTC-8, Joerg wrote: > On 2017-12-21 17:58, whit3rd wrote: > > [about Fukushima] Seismologists didn't know from a century of data > > that the fault was capable of such a large quake (foresight, we've always known, is > > not as accurate as hindsight). > Sure they knew. Or should have: > > http://pubmedcentralcanada.ca/pmcc/articles/PMC3621565/ > > Quote "... 1896 by a giant local tsunami of the highest run-up height of > 38 m that claimed 22,000 lives". There were more. Not comparable data. The 'highest run-up' is a topology-dependent measure of water movement, and not a seismic energy estimate. Seawalls were expected to be sufficient because the seismic magnitude was beyond previous measured events.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-22 16:12 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <fa5lc1FsjsuU1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #489080 |
On 2017-12-22 15:21, whit3rd wrote: > On Friday, December 22, 2017 at 12:58:11 PM UTC-8, Joerg wrote: >> On 2017-12-21 17:58, whit3rd wrote: > >>> [about Fukushima] Seismologists didn't know from a century of data >>> that the fault was capable of such a large quake (foresight, we've always known, is >>> not as accurate as hindsight). > >> Sure they knew. Or should have: >> >> http://pubmedcentralcanada.ca/pmcc/articles/PMC3621565/ >> >> Quote "... 1896 by a giant local tsunami of the highest run-up height of >> 38 m that claimed 22,000 lives". There were more. > > Not comparable data. The 'highest run-up' is a topology-dependent measure of water movement, > and not a seismic energy estimate. Seawalls were expected to be sufficient because > the seismic magnitude was beyond previous measured events. > They had several earthquakes around 8.5 around Japan, with subsequent tsunamis which would have over-powered the sea wall. Anticipating that it won't happen again, that there will never be a worse one or one where the tsunami trigger mechanism is worst case is seriously flawed engineering. https://news.usc.edu/86362/fukushima-disaster-was-preventable-new-study-finds/ In med-tech such stuff can land engineers in court. -- Regards, Joerg http://www.analogconsultants.com/
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| From | Steve Wilson <no@spam.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-20 01:32 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <XnsA850D0E698EEEidtokenpost@69.16.179.23> |
| In reply to | #488825 |
Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> wrote: > On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote: >> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: >>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: >>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >>>>> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: [...] >> ... The device in that block had a weird >> rapid intermittent that the system didn't recognize as a failure, but >> it didn't report the train. Maybe the system should provide some >> feedback to the train operator so if the system looses track of a >> train, at least the operator knows and can alert someone to manually >> flag it's position. > There are better ways than that, see further below. >> That is what is different between train dispatch and air traffic >> control, at least with an automated system. The train dropped off the >> map and the system didn't flag an error. I think it operates at a more >> fundamental level based on always knowing when a train is in a block >> and not letting traffic into that block or any adjacent block. No >> thought to tracking anything. > That is a serious system design error. >>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how >>>> much sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should >>>> never see another, stopped or not. >>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. >>> It disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train >>> will not be >>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or >>> not. If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system >>> overrides. I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the >>> operator would be required to do some explaining. >> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was >> described in the paper. > As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II > movies where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train > system (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can > see the big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards > with lights in them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train > engineer described it to me. >>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line >>> sections without this automation but it would have prevented most of >>> the serious train wrecks we had in the US. >> How does a German system prevent US wrecks? > If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed > not to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train > traveling through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be > set to "GO" until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator > fails to engage the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort > of a double-safety. This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is > better than people dying. >>>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see >>>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next >>>> train from coming to pick us up. >>> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that >>> are on >>> Flintstonian technology. [...] > Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since > more than half a century. I recall a system where the blocks were electrically isolated from each other. The resistance between the rails was monitored. When a train entered the block, the axles shorted the rails together and the resistance dropped. You could tell which direction the train was moving by watching the resistance increase or decrease. You could tell how long the train was by seeing how many blocks were shorted. This seems to be an ideal way to detect where the train is, which direction it is moving, and how fast. I wonder if this system was ever used, and what happened to it.
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| From | rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-12-19 20:40 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <p1cf2t$cun$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #488828 |
Steve Wilson wrote on 12/19/2017 8:32 PM: > Joerg <news@analogconsultants.com> wrote: > >> On 2017-12-19 16:25, rickman wrote: >>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:56 PM: >>>> On 2017-12-19 15:46, rickman wrote: >>>>> Joerg wrote on 12/19/2017 6:01 PM: >>>>>> On 2017-12-19 04:00, bitrex wrote: > > [...] > >>> ... The device in that block had a weird >>> rapid intermittent that the system didn't recognize as a failure, but >>> it didn't report the train. Maybe the system should provide some >>> feedback to the train operator so if the system looses track of a >>> train, at least the operator knows and can alert someone to manually >>> flag it's position. > >> There are better ways than that, see further below. > >>> That is what is different between train dispatch and air traffic >>> control, at least with an automated system. The train dropped off the >>> map and the system didn't flag an error. I think it operates at a more >>> fundamental level based on always knowing when a train is in a block >>> and not letting traffic into that block or any adjacent block. No >>> thought to tracking anything. > >> That is a serious system design error. > >>>> One of the nine was the operator who didn't put on the brakes >>>>> until the train was less than 500 feet from the back of the other >>>>> train. I didn't follow the series of Post articles to find out how >>>>> much sooner she could have seen the stopped train. One train should >>>>> never see another, stopped or not. > >>>> That is one of the accidents that the German Indusi system prevents. >>>> It disects pretty much their whole rail system into blocks. A train >>>> will not be >>>> allowed to enter a block in which another train is present, moving or >>>> not. If the operator won't apply the brakes in time the Indusi system >>>> overrides. I believe nowadays that event is being recorded and the >>>> operator would be required to do some explaining. > >>> How is this different from the US system? Sounds just like what was >>> described in the paper. > >> As I said it divides a track into blocks of sections. There are WW-II >> movies where the resistance and sabotage groups mess with the Nazi train >> system (which they had partly equipped with this Indusi system). You can >> see the big screens that show where the trains were. Big white boards >> with lights in them. That's pretty much how my grandpa who was a train >> engineer described it to me. > >>>> It is not 100% fail-safe and there are some lonely single-line >>>> sections without this automation but it would have prevented most of >>>> the serious train wrecks we had in the US. > >>> How does a German system prevent US wrecks? > >> If a detector into sector 16 misses a train then this train is assumed >> not to have left sector 15 even if it did. That means that a train >> traveling through sector 14 will be stopped via a sign which cannot be >> set to "GO" until sector 15 is signaled as clear. If the train operator >> fails to engage the brakes the train will be stopped automatically. Sort >> of a double-safety. This can result in a huge traffic clog but that is >> better than people dying. > >>>>> I recall riding the subway and looking up the tunnel I could just see >>>>> the tail of a train that left the station and was preventing the next >>>>> train from coming to pick us up. > >>>> Subways often have good automation in the US. It's the railroads that >>>> are on >>>> Flintstonian technology. > > [...] > >> Well, in this case we do have a clue how to do the job better. Since >> more than half a century. > > I recall a system where the blocks were electrically isolated from each > other. > > The resistance between the rails was monitored. When a train entered the > block, the axles shorted the rails together and the resistance dropped. > You could tell which direction the train was moving by watching the > resistance increase or decrease. You could tell how long the train was by > seeing how many blocks were shorted. > > This seems to be an ideal way to detect where the train is, which > direction it is moving, and how fast. > > I wonder if this system was ever used, and what happened to it. That's the technology they were moving away from in the early 70's when I worked there. They didn't measure resistance, but it used a power source and relay contacts. If anything opened the relay dropped out. If anything shorted the relay dropped out. Failsafe... until it isn't. lol I don't think safety was an issue with that hundred year old technology, but it required cutting the rail where you wanted to put in a block and some locations were getting so populated the block for one crossing needed to overlap the next block. They used a simple "RF" signal (more likely audio but I don't recall) on the rail which the train would short out. The advantage was different blocks could be on different frequencies and the ranges could overlap. Mostly they didn't like getting out the track crew to mangle the rails to put in a new block. I don't know what the DC metro uses for train detectors. -- Rick C Viewed the eclipse at Wintercrest Farms, on the centerline of totality since 1998
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