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Groups > linux.debian.security > #5818

Re: arbitrary code execution on unformatted usb stick

From Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org>
Newsgroups linux.debian.security
Subject Re: arbitrary code execution on unformatted usb stick
Date 2020-05-02 17:00 +0200
Message-ID <A21Mu-2uw-1@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
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Am 25.04.20 um 15:38 schrieb Elmar Stellnberger:
> Dear readers of the debian-security mailing list
> 
>    The first time I had lost my new coreboot i7 notebook when I plugged 
> a vfat formatted usb stick into the notebook run merely offline where I 
> developed the a̅tea. Suddenly low level operating system errors appeared 
> and since a power off/power on it refuses to boot from any media: 
> internal m2 and usb. The notebook is thus unusable. I have sent the 
> computer for repair but I got it back in the exactly the same condition. 
> If you like you can read https://www.elstel.org/uploads/laptop-note.pdf. 
> It contains an error description (I have written it with my typewriter 
> and the company scanned the document).
>    Consequently I thought that there would be an arbitrary code 
> execution bug in the vfat file system. I prepared an USB stick, created 
> an msdos partition table with 7 partitions and used tar to read and 
> write from the partitions (20-blueusb.rules). However it turned out 
> sooner and later that this also caused arbitrary code executions. It 
> made my offline Debian installation where I run an Apache server to 
> create content for elstel.org several times unusable. I simply could not 
> believe it. A program as simple as tar should not contain an arbitrary 
> code execution bug! There was no other way the system could get in touch 
> with the outside so the usb stick was definitely at fault.
>    Today I have finally used cat and dd to stitch three text files 
> together and read them back from a partition. That way I have avoided to 
> use tar. It was on my most secure system which normally does not have 
> any contact to other computers at all because the system with the Apache 
> server for elstel.org was unsuable for another time. And see there I got 
> the exactly same result without tar: After unexplainable operating 
> system errors the system does not boot as soon as any SATA drive is 
> attached. Flashing the BIOS does not help against this kind of error as 
> there is also other firmware. I have seen 3 of my Kingston USB readers 
> manipulated to not read a certain sdcard while 3 other readers of the 
> same type and same shipping locked in a box did still read it (sdcard 
> blue ray image to install a clean Debian10). Obviously the firmware of 
> that device was altered. As with the USB card reader a computer has many 
> devices each with its own firmware which can be altered to damage a 
> computer.
>    This time I am at loss. If I can not plug in an USB stick there is 
> apparently ¿almost? no safe way to communicate with that computer. There 
> needs to be an arbitrary code execution bug hidden in the kernel which 
> gets executed as soon as a partition table is read in. As I do not have 
> any filesystem on that USB stick and I have automounting disabled that 
> should not be due to filesystem probing. As my experience with bug 
> reporting at the Firefox browser I am quite sure at least some of them 
> are bought by secret services due to their unwillingness to fix flagrant 
> bugs. However I would never have believed this could be the case with 
> the Linux kernel. A kernel developer could perhaps help me if he said 
> what code exactly got executed on plugging in an USB stick. Finally I 
> would need to use another operating system but I can´t as there is no 
> other distribution than Debian which offers a blue ray image for offline 
> installation. Downloading singleton files in a batch via tor is 
> conspicuous to secret services and thus not viable. They would simply 
> alter the download as they have done many times. I wonder how the people 
> at the Iranian nuclear progam do their things?
> 
> Yours Sincerely,
> Elmar Stellnberger


   On from the beginning I had been in doubt about the conclusion of 
what I reported in my last email. Such a bug in the usb mass storage 
driver of the Linux kernel would be extremely hard to hide. From what I 
believe now that supposed bug does not exist. Very likely they have a 
remote control of that offline PC used to maintain elstel.org. They are 
badgering me there too. I already had that with a previous offline 
computer which is of another model/make. I know it for sure with that 
computer since they have hindered me there to program a̅tea. I know it 
from other occasions as well. They knew on my online computer what I was 
doing offline before. Impossible if they have no connection. It is for 
them exactly the way as if that computer were online connected with a 
LAN cable or Wifi. They can do everything there. There was nothing 
apparently visible on the mainboard but electronic components are small 
and a component could have been replaced. This time it was most likely 
before I have received the mainboard and assembled my computer.
   Consequently as there is no one who would help me and even no one 
whom I can meet in person who would be interested in what I have to tell 
from 2011 I will have to give up my security related engagement. Just 
telling other people about what has happened could help a lot (You 
remember my German email from last time?). There is for sure a bug in 
the vfat driver. My System76 notebook was clean as otherwise they would 
never have left me develop a̅tea on it up to the state in which the tool 
is at the present time. However there are some things that would need to 
be done for a̅tea. That DoH/DoT shit in libunbound has an arbitrary code 
execution bug which concerns a̅tea every time you do not state the 
server certificate on the command line. You can download the server 
certificate securely with dig or drill so the tool is basically already 
fully functional. I would replace libunbound with direct system calls 
for DNS and verify the trust chain up to the final RRSIG manually by the 
program. If that condition was met, a̅tea would be fully secure and 
functional. We have also been talking about missing DANE support for web 
browsers. I know an easy-to-implement workaround: A https proxy with a 
Firefox-local configured certification authority. It would forward 
DANE-enabled sites 1:1 with self-generated certificates. Something that 
would work for all browsers you can think of. Unfortunately I have no 
way to implement that as the ultimate defenders of our freedom would 
simply turn my computer off if I attempted to program anything the like. 
This is bitter truth!

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Thread

Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just paranoid? "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2019-08-13 09:40 +0200
  Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just paranoid? Paul Wise <pabs@debian.org> - 2019-08-14 07:10 +0200
  Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-08-14 17:40 +0200
    Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2019-08-15 23:20 +0200
      Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Davide Prina <davide.prina@gmail.com> - 2019-08-16 10:40 +0200
        Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? CMH <chouck@binghamton.edu> - 2019-08-16 14:20 +0200
        Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just paranoid? Andrei Grosu <andrei_grosu@fastmail.net> - 2019-08-16 19:20 +0200
        Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-08-16 19:20 +0200
      Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-08-16 19:10 +0200
      Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-08-16 19:30 +0200
      Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-08-16 21:20 +0200
        Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2019-08-17 11:50 +0200
          Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-08-17 13:20 +0200
            Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2019-08-23 09:30 +0200
              Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the act? Or am I just  paranoid? Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-08-23 21:00 +0200
                debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-11-15 17:20 +0100
                Verified Boot, Secure Boot, dm-verity, debcheckroot Patrick Schleizer <adrelanos@riseup.net> - 2019-11-16 14:00 +0100
                Re: Verified Boot, Secure Boot, dm-verity, debcheckroot Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-11-16 15:30 +0100
                Re: Verified Boot, Secure Boot, dm-verity, debcheckroot Sylvain Beucler <beuc@beuc.net> - 2019-11-16 15:40 +0100
                Re: Verified Boot, Secure Boot, dm-verity, debcheckroot Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-11-16 15:40 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Patrick Schleizer <adrelanos@riseup.net> - 2019-11-19 13:40 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-11-20 12:30 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Patrick Schleizer <adrelanos@riseup.net> - 2019-11-25 12:40 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-11-25 18:00 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-12-10 17:40 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2019-11-27 12:10 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Cindy Sue Causey <butterflybytes@gmail.com> - 2020-01-17 14:40 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-01-17 17:00 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-01-17 17:20 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-03-04 20:20 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-03-04 20:50 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-03-04 21:00 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-03-04 21:00 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-03-23 17:10 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Paul Wise <pabs@debian.org> - 2020-03-24 04:40 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Paul Wise <pabs@debian.org> - 2020-03-24 11:20 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-03-24 15:50 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Paul Wise <pabs@debian.org> - 2020-03-25 03:00 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-03-25 11:30 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-03-26 11:10 +0100
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released "vince@vheuser.com" <vince@vheuser.com> - 2020-04-01 20:10 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Paul Wise <pabs@debian.org> - 2020-04-02 02:00 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Lewis Yarema <lewisyarema91@gmail.com> - 2020-04-02 11:20 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-02 17:00 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-03 13:40 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-02 16:50 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-04 09:50 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released William Gagnebé <william.gagnebe@gmail.com> - 2020-04-05 12:20 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released l0f4r0@tuta.io - 2020-04-05 12:30 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-07 17:50 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released "Niall O'Reilly" <Niall.oReilly+lists@no8.be> - 2020-04-02 18:30 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Lee <ler762@gmail.com> - 2020-04-02 21:00 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-02 21:40 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-03 13:50 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Lee <ler762@gmail.com> - 2020-04-04 00:50 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-04 09:40 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> - 2020-04-14 09:30 +0200
                arbitrary code execution on unformatted usb stick Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-25 15:40 +0200
                Re: arbitrary code execution on unformatted usb stick Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-04-25 15:50 +0200
                Re: arbitrary code execution on unformatted usb stick Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-05-02 17:00 +0200
                Re: arbitrary code execution on unformatted usb stick Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-05-02 17:10 +0200
                Fwd: Re: arbitrary code execution on unformatted usb stick estellnb@elstel.org - 2020-05-02 20:50 +0200
                Re: debcheckroot v2.0 released Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@gmail.com> - 2020-03-21 17:40 +0100
      Probably a false alarm Re: Have I caught a firmware attack in the  act? Or am I just paranoid? "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2019-08-24 18:50 +0200

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