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Groups > sci.logic > #335319 > unrolled thread
| Started by | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2024-06-09 10:36 -0500 |
| Last post | 2024-06-09 14:57 -0400 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 63 — 3 participants |
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Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 10:36 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 12:18 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 14:08 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 13:13 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 14:29 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 13:40 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 14:54 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 14:08 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 15:36 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 21:47 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 22:56 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 22:12 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-10 07:16 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-10 11:09 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-10 23:32 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-11 12:30 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-11 19:22 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-11 20:43 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-11 22:34 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-11 21:58 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-11 23:01 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-11 22:20 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 07:33 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 10:40 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 19:49 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 19:44 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 20:57 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 20:37 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 21:53 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 21:01 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 22:21 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 21:32 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 22:42 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 21:53 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 23:15 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 22:17 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 23:51 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 23:01 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-13 07:30 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-13 08:32 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-13 22:45 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-13 22:50 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-14 07:39 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-14 08:58 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-10 09:52 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 23:00 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-11 11:06 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-11 21:44 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-11 20:57 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-11 22:37 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-11 22:17 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 07:33 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 08:05 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 19:55 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-12 20:16 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-12 21:48 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems joes <noreply@example.com> - 2024-06-09 17:40 +0000
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 12:52 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 14:08 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 13:10 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 14:31 -0400
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-06-09 13:48 -0500
Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-06-09 14:57 -0400
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-13 22:45 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <v4gas3$3tn6r$4@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335475 |
On 6/13/24 9:32 AM, olcott wrote: > On 6/13/2024 6:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >> On 6/13/24 12:01 AM, olcott wrote: >>> On 6/12/2024 10:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>> On 6/12/24 11:17 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>> On 6/12/2024 10:15 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>> On 6/12/24 10:53 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>> On 6/12/2024 9:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>> On 6/12/24 10:32 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>> On 6/12/2024 9:21 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>> On 6/12/24 10:01 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> On 6/12/2024 8:53 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/12/24 9:37 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 6/12/2024 7:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Nope. The concept and definition of natural numbers exist, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but doesn't derive from any part of the "universe". >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Note, they don't "exist" as a substance, only as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> concept, and the universe is substance. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> OF EVERYTHING IF THERE IS NOTHING THAT MAKES AN EXPRESSION >>>>>>>>>>>>> OF LANGUAGE X TRUE THENN (THEN AND ONLY THEN) X HAS NO >>>>>>>>>>>>> TRUTH-MAKER. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> And how can we tell that there is nothing that makes the >>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language true? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What makes the expression: "a frog" true? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't know, what makes the expression: "a frog" true? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It could be if put besides the picture of a frog, or a cage >>>>>>>>>> holding one, or a box with a disection kit. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Do you mean that Russel's Teapot has a truth-maker, because >>>>>>>>>>>> we can not show that there is nothing that makes it true? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Truth need not be known. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Then why do you insisit it must be provable? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If of EVERYTHING there is NOTHING that makes an expression >>>>>>>>>>> of language X true then X is untrue. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Does that only include things in that universe, or of any >>>>>>>>>> universe? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I changed my freaking words because you had trouble with the other >>>>>>>>> words. WHEN I CHANGE THE WORDS TO MAKE THEM CLEARER I AM NOT >>>>>>>>> FREAKING >>>>>>>>> USING THE ORIGINAL FREAKING WORDS. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And thus show that you don't have the mental ability to properly >>>>>>>> communicate. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That is your excuse for not freaking paying attention? >>>>>>> IT WAS YOU THAT DID NOT PAY ATTENTION. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I changed the words in my paper based on your feedback. >>>>>>> I have always used the term UNIVERSE to exactly mean EVERYTHING. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If of EVERYTHING there is NOTHING that makes an expression >>>>>>> of language X true then X is untrue. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> WHich just means you have the problem of Naive Set Theory. There >>>>>> is not one "Universe" that is everything. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *THERE IS A FREAKING EVERYTHING* >>>>> >>>> >>>> But you can't just accept everything. That is what Russel proved >>>> about Naive Set Theory. >>>> >>>> No finite logic can handle the magnatude of a theory that actually >>>> tries to encompase EVERYTHING. >>> >>> So you disagree that there is an EVERYTHING. >>> IS THAT ALL YOU KNOW HOW TO DO IS DISAGREE? >>> >> >> No, there is a concept of "Everything" but it is not very usable as a >> single unified object because parts of it are inconsistant with other >> parts of it. >> > > If of EVERYTHING there is NOTHING that does X then X cannot be done. The problem is that the logic of "everything" can't do as much as the logic of a restricted set, if anything at all. For example, in the mahematic of finite numbers (a+b)+c = a+(b+c). When we add infintes to the mix, we loose that rule. Thus, when you try to make a system include EVERYTHING, you lose a lot of the rules you want to use for the more normal cases. This is one of the things that broke Naive Set Theory, by allowing a set to be anything, we lost all the rules to keep things organized. Thus, trying to make a SINGLE UNIFIED logic of everything doesn't work, as the individual pieces of everything mignt be inconsistant with other pieces of that everything. > >> You just don't seem to be able to understand these sorts of abstract >> concepts, which is why you have your problems. > > I understand them at a higher level of abstraction than you are > currently capable of and you have no correct reasoning to show > otherwise. I don't think so, or you would be able to start to break down you statement to things finer. You are stuck at just one level and can't move. > > Most of the best experts in truth-maker theory make this same mistake > because they define their terms to have subtle incoherence that is > too abstract to be noticed by them. > > *These definitions prove that every truth has a truthmaker* > > When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? > The generic answer is whatever makes an expression of language true <is> > its truthmaker. Except that not all things CAN have a truth maker as you eventually get to a root idea that doesn't have a truthmaker, not even a statement that makes it its own truth maker, as THAT statement needs a truth make. > > If of everything there is nothing that makes expression of language X > true then X is untrue. > > X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker. > > If neither X nor ~X has a truthmaker then X is not a truth-bearer. > > So, what makes the truthmakers truthmakers, you need a more fundamental truth maker, which take you to infinite depth.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-13 22:50 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v4gemo$2nim8$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335492 |
On 6/13/2024 9:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 6/13/24 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 6/13/2024 6:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 6/13/24 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>> So you disagree that there is an EVERYTHING.
>>>> IS THAT ALL YOU KNOW HOW TO DO IS DISAGREE?
>>>>
>>>
>>> No, there is a concept of "Everything" but it is not very usable as a
>>> single unified object because parts of it are inconsistant with other
>>> parts of it.
>>>
>>
>> If of EVERYTHING there is NOTHING that does X then X cannot be done.
>
> The problem is that the logic of "everything" can't do as much as the
> logic of a restricted set, if anything at all.
>
It is how truth itself generically works.
If no physical or conceptual thing makes expression X true
then expression X is not true.
> For example, in the mahematic of finite numbers (a+b)+c = a+(b+c).
>
> When we add infintes to the mix, we loose that rule.
>
> Thus, when you try to make a system include EVERYTHING, you lose a lot
> of the rules you want to use for the more normal cases.
>
> This is one of the things that broke Naive Set Theory, by allowing a set
> to be anything, we lost all the rules to keep things organized.
>
> Thus, trying to make a SINGLE UNIFIED logic of everything doesn't work,
> as the individual pieces of everything mignt be inconsistant with other
> pieces of that everything.
>
>>
>>> You just don't seem to be able to understand these sorts of abstract
>>> concepts, which is why you have your problems.
>>
>> I understand them at a higher level of abstraction than you are
>> currently capable of and you have no correct reasoning to show
>> otherwise.
>
> I don't think so, or you would be able to start to break down you
> statement to things finer. You are stuck at just one level and can't move.
>
>>
>> Most of the best experts in truth-maker theory make this same mistake
>> because they define their terms to have subtle incoherence that is
>> too abstract to be noticed by them.
>>
>> *These definitions prove that every truth has a truthmaker*
>>
>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker?
>> The generic answer is whatever makes an expression of language true <is>
>> its truthmaker.
>
> Except that not all things CAN have a truth maker
Only expressions of language that are true can have a truthmaker
and ALL expressions of language that are true must have some
physical or conceptual thing that makes them true or they are not true.
> as you eventually get
> to a root idea that doesn't have a truthmaker, not even a statement that
> makes it its own truth maker, as THAT statement needs a truth make.
>
As I have told you hundreds of times the foundation of the truth
of all expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning}
is a connection to their meaning.
How do we know that kittens are living things and not fifteen
story office buildings? A stipulated set of connections between
finite strings tells us so.
>>
>> If of everything there is nothing that makes expression of language X
>> true then X is untrue.
>>
>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
>>
>> If neither X nor ~X has a truthmaker then X is not a truth-bearer.
>>
>>
>
> So, what makes the truthmakers truthmakers, you need a more fundamental
> truth maker, which take you to infinite depth.
>
The problem with all of the research in the field is that it is
either too specific, too vague or ambiguous. When I expand the
scope to every physical thing and every conceptual thing then
if no thing makes an expression true it is determined to be untrue.
At least half of the experts in the field that seem to comprise
the received view is that there are some truths that no thing
makes them true and they are somehow true anyway.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-14 07:39 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <v4ha61$3v16r$1@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335497 |
On 6/13/24 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 6/13/2024 9:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 6/13/24 9:32 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 6/13/2024 6:30 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 6/13/24 12:01 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> So you disagree that there is an EVERYTHING.
>>>>> IS THAT ALL YOU KNOW HOW TO DO IS DISAGREE?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, there is a concept of "Everything" but it is not very usable as
>>>> a single unified object because parts of it are inconsistant with
>>>> other parts of it.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If of EVERYTHING there is NOTHING that does X then X cannot be done.
>>
>> The problem is that the logic of "everything" can't do as much as the
>> logic of a restricted set, if anything at all.
>>
>
> It is how truth itself generically works.
> If no physical or conceptual thing makes expression X true
> then expression X is not true.
But truth needs a source, and the source can't just be the system.
ALL systems need either some "first truths" that are unmade in the
system, that all others derived from, or al; truths come from an
infinite (possible circular) chain of reasoning.
For a given system, those "first truths" might come from something
outside, like the maker of the formal system, but when you try to make
the system everything, you get stuck in the loop.
>
>> For example, in the mahematic of finite numbers (a+b)+c = a+(b+c).
>>
>> When we add infintes to the mix, we loose that rule.
>>
>> Thus, when you try to make a system include EVERYTHING, you lose a lot
>> of the rules you want to use for the more normal cases.
>>
>> This is one of the things that broke Naive Set Theory, by allowing a
>> set to be anything, we lost all the rules to keep things organized.
>>
>> Thus, trying to make a SINGLE UNIFIED logic of everything doesn't
>> work, as the individual pieces of everything mignt be inconsistant
>> with other pieces of that everything.
>>
>>>
>>>> You just don't seem to be able to understand these sorts of abstract
>>>> concepts, which is why you have your problems.
>>>
>>> I understand them at a higher level of abstraction than you are
>>> currently capable of and you have no correct reasoning to show
>>> otherwise.
>>
>> I don't think so, or you would be able to start to break down you
>> statement to things finer. You are stuck at just one level and can't
>> move.
>>
>>>
>>> Most of the best experts in truth-maker theory make this same mistake
>>> because they define their terms to have subtle incoherence that is
>>> too abstract to be noticed by them.
>>>
>>> *These definitions prove that every truth has a truthmaker*
>>>
>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker?
>>> The generic answer is whatever makes an expression of language true <is>
>>> its truthmaker.
>>
>> Except that not all things CAN have a truth maker
>
> Only expressions of language that are true can have a truthmaker
> and ALL expressions of language that are true must have some
> physical or conceptual thing that makes them true or they are not true.
Nope, because "expressions of language" follow the same limitation. They
don't have any meaning without the first establishment of "first words"
whose definition can't be expressed from other previously defined words.
>
>> as you eventually get to a root idea that doesn't have a truthmaker,
>> not even a statement that makes it its own truth maker, as THAT
>> statement needs a truth make.
>>
>
> As I have told you hundreds of times the foundation of the truth
> of all expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning}
> is a connection to their meaning.
And it doesn't work, as the "first truths" can't have a "truthmaker".
>
> How do we know that kittens are living things and not fifteen
> story office buildings? A stipulated set of connections between
> finite strings tells us so.
Right, and if you pull the thread, you will ultimately reach the first
truths of the system which have no truthmaker in the system.
>
>>>
>>> If of everything there is nothing that makes expression of language X
>>> true then X is untrue.
>>>
>>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
>>>
>>> If neither X nor ~X has a truthmaker then X is not a truth-bearer.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> So, what makes the truthmakers truthmakers, you need a more
>> fundamental truth maker, which take you to infinite depth.
>>
>
> The problem with all of the research in the field is that it is
> either too specific, too vague or ambiguous. When I expand the
> scope to every physical thing and every conceptual thing then
> if no thing makes an expression true it is determined to be untrue.
No, you don't understand the reasearch.
This is your problem, if you don't understand it, you assume it to be
wrong, instead of just over your head.
>
> At least half of the experts in the field that seem to comprise
> the received view is that there are some truths that no thing
> makes them true and they are somehow true anyway.
>
Because, that is a necessity, at least in one way of looking at it.
To have your stipulated axiom set, you need something with the power to
stipulate them, and that ability can't come from the system.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-14 08:58 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v4hian$2sdqr$6@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335500 |
On 6/14/2024 6:39 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 6/13/24 11:50 PM, olcott wrote:
>>
>> It is how truth itself generically works.
>> If no physical or conceptual thing makes expression X true
>> then expression X is not true.
>
> But truth needs a source, and the source can't just be the system.
>
The cat in your living room is the truthmaker for
"there is a cat in my living room}.
The definition of the ordered set of natural numbers
is the truthmaker for 5 > 3.
> ALL systems need either some "first truths" that are unmade in the
> system, that all others derived from, or al; truths come from an
> infinite (possible circular) chain of reasoning.
>
No actual circles are ever involved.
(a) Expressions stipulated to be true: "cats are animals"
(b) Expressions derived by applying truth preserving operations to (a).
> For a given system, those "first truths" might come from something
> outside, like the maker of the formal system, but when you try to make
> the system everything, you get stuck in the loop.
>
Never.
<snip>
>>
>> Only expressions of language that are true can have a truthmaker
>> and ALL expressions of language that are true must have some
>> physical or conceptual thing that makes them true or they are not true.
>
> Nope, because "expressions of language" follow the same limitation. They
> don't have any meaning without the first establishment of "first words"
> whose definition can't be expressed from other previously defined words.
>
How may times do I have to tell you the exact same thing
until you can remember it from one message to the next?
(a) Expressions stipulated to be true: "cats are animals"
(b) Expressions derived by applying truth preserving operations to (a).
>>
>>> as you eventually get to a root idea that doesn't have a truthmaker,
>>> not even a statement that makes it its own truth maker, as THAT
>>> statement needs a truth make.
>>>
>>
>> As I have told you hundreds of times the foundation of the truth
>> of all expressions that are {true on the basis of their meaning}
>> is a connection to their meaning.
>
> And it doesn't work, as the "first truths" can't have a "truthmaker".
>
The assignment of relations between arbitrary finite
strings assigns semantic meaning to these otherwise
meaningless finite strings.
The construction of Human language proves this:
cats are animals <translated to> 猫是动物
猫是动物 <translated to> cats are animals
>>
>> How do we know that kittens are living things and not fifteen
>> story office buildings? A stipulated set of connections between
>> finite strings tells us so.
>
>
> Right, and if you pull the thread, you will ultimately reach the first
> truths of the system which have no truthmaker in the system.
>
The assignment of relations between arbitrary finite
strings assigns semantic meaning to these otherwise
meaningless finite strings.
>>
>>>>
>>>> If of everything there is nothing that makes expression of language X
>>>> true then X is untrue.
>>>>
>>>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>> If neither X nor ~X has a truthmaker then X is not a truth-bearer.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, what makes the truthmakers truthmakers, you need a more
>>> fundamental truth maker, which take you to infinite depth.
>>>
>>
>> The problem with all of the research in the field is that it is
>> either too specific, too vague or ambiguous. When I expand the
>> scope to every physical thing and every conceptual thing then
>> if no thing makes an expression true it is determined to be untrue.
>
> No, you don't understand the reasearch.
>
You can only be a naysayer that makes assertions
entirely bereft of any supporting reasoning.
> This is your problem, if you don't understand it, you assume it to be
> wrong, instead of just over your head.
>
>>
>> At least half of the experts in the field that seem to comprise
>> the received view is that there are some truths that no thing
>> makes them true and they are somehow true anyway.
>>
>
> Because, that is a necessity, at least in one way of looking at it.
>
> To have your stipulated axiom set, you need something with the power to
> stipulate them, and that ability can't come from the system.
That is not the actual case
M: This sentence has no truthmaker
Milne argues that M is true and therefore is a truth without a truthmaker.
No one is arguing that "cats are animals" has no truthmaker.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-10 09:52 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v47402$ggn5$4@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335344 |
On 6/10/2024 2:19 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-06-10 02:47:07 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 6/9/2024 2:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 6/9/24 3:08 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 6/9/24 2:40 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 6/9/24 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 6/9/24 1:18 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 10:36 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> *This has direct application to undecidable decision problems*
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic
>>>>>>>>>>> answer is
>>>>>>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its
>>>>>>>>>>> truthmaker. This
>>>>>>>>>>> entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>>>>>>> expression X
>>>>>>>>>>> true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a
>>>>>>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>>>> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X
>>>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>>> truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I have been working in this same area as a non-academician
>>>>>>>>>>> for a few
>>>>>>>>>>> years. I have only focused on expressions of language that
>>>>>>>>>>> are {true on
>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Now that truthmaker and truthbearer are fully anchored it is
>>>>>>>>>> easy to see
>>>>>>>>>> that self-contradictory expressions are simply not truthbearers.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> “This sentence is not true” can't be true because that would
>>>>>>>>>> make it
>>>>>>>>>> untrue and it can't be false because that would make it true.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Within the the definition of truthmaker specified above: “this
>>>>>>>>>> sentence
>>>>>>>>>> has no truthmaker” is simply not a truthbearer. It can't be
>>>>>>>>>> true within
>>>>>>>>>> the above specified definition of truthmaker because this
>>>>>>>>>> would make it
>>>>>>>>>> false. It can't be false because that makes
>>>>>>>>>> it true.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Unless the system is inconsistent, in which case they can be.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Note,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When I specify the ultimate foundation of all truth then this
>>>>>>>> does apply to truth in logic, truth in math and truth in science.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nope. Not for Formal system, which have a specific definition of
>>>>>>> its truth-makers, unless you let your definition become trivial
>>>>>>> for Formal logic where a "truth-makers" is what has been defined
>>>>>>> to be the "truth-makers" for the system.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Formal systems are free to define their own truthmakers.
>>>>>> When these definitions result in inconsistency they are
>>>>>> proved to be incorrect.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, you admit that your definition is just inconsistant, as it says
>>>>> FOR ALL and then you admit it isn't FOR ALL
>>>>>
>>>>> And a formal system proven inconsistant isn't necessarily
>>>>> incorrect, just inconsistent.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> To the extent that they define inconsistency they
>>>> are not truth-makers.
>>>
>>>
>>> YOU hae a TYPE ERROR in your statement.
>>>
>>> That just proves that YOUR logic is incorrect.
>>>
>>> How can a SYSTEM be a propsition?
>>>
>>
>> *Stopping at your first big mistake*
>>
>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>
>> A cat in your living room is not a proposition yet makes the
>> sentence: "there is a cat in my living room" true, thus <is> its
>> truthmaker.
>
> With that interpretation an inconsistent system is a truthmaker as it
> makes the sentence "the system is inconsistent" true. And so is everything
> else that one can mention so the word "truthmaker" does not really mean
> anything.
>
"the system is inconsistent" TWO ISOMORPHIC EXAMPLES ARE PROVIDED
When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
“This sentence is not true” can't be true because that would make it
untrue and it can't be false because that would make it true.
Within the definition of truthmaker specified above: “this sentence has
no truthmaker” is simply not a truthbearer. It can't be true within the
above specified definition of truthmaker because this would make it
false. It can't be false because that makes it true.
"the system is inconsistent" is too vague, what system?
Truthmakers simultaneously refer the entire universe of
all true statements. I already handled the key most important
counter-example in all of the literature on Truthmaker Maximalism:
“this sentence has no truthmaker”
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-09 23:00 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <v45q93$3h641$8@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335337 |
On 6/9/24 3:08 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 6/9/2024 1:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 6/9/24 2:40 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 6/9/2024 1:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 6/9/24 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/9/24 1:18 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 10:36 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> *This has direct application to undecidable decision problems*
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic
>>>>>>>> answer is
>>>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its
>>>>>>>> truthmaker. This
>>>>>>>> entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>>>> expression X
>>>>>>>> true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a
>>>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>>> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X is a
>>>>>>>> truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I have been working in this same area as a non-academician for a
>>>>>>>> few
>>>>>>>> years. I have only focused on expressions of language that are
>>>>>>>> {true on
>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning}.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Now that truthmaker and truthbearer are fully anchored it is easy
>>>>>>> to see
>>>>>>> that self-contradictory expressions are simply not truthbearers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> “This sentence is not true” can't be true because that would make it
>>>>>>> untrue and it can't be false because that would make it true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Within the the definition of truthmaker specified above: “this
>>>>>>> sentence
>>>>>>> has no truthmaker” is simply not a truthbearer. It can't be true
>>>>>>> within
>>>>>>> the above specified definition of truthmaker because this would
>>>>>>> make it
>>>>>>> false. It can't be false because that makes
>>>>>>> it true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unless the system is inconsistent, in which case they can be.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Note,
>>>>>
>>>>> When I specify the ultimate foundation of all truth then this
>>>>> does apply to truth in logic, truth in math and truth in science.
>>>>
>>>> Nope. Not for Formal system, which have a specific definition of its
>>>> truth-makers, unless you let your definition become trivial for
>>>> Formal logic where a "truth-makers" is what has been defined to be
>>>> the "truth-makers" for the system.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Formal systems are free to define their own truthmakers.
>>> When these definitions result in inconsistency they are
>>> proved to be incorrect.
>>
>> So, you admit that your definition is just inconsistant, as it says
>> FOR ALL and then you admit it isn't FOR ALL
>>
>> And a formal system proven inconsistant isn't necessarily incorrect,
>> just inconsistent.
>>
>
> To the extent that they define inconsistency they
> are not truth-makers.
>
>> Note, some Formal Logic system specifically DEFINE how to handle
>> inconsistant statements (typically uses a non-binary logic system,
>> which makes the term "inconsistant" somewhat of a poorly defined term).
>>
>
> If they do not reject inconsistent axioms then they are wrong.
>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Three laws of logic apply to all propositions*
>>>>> ¬(p ∧ ¬p) Law of non-contradiction
>>>>> (p ∨ ¬p) Law of excluded middle
>>>>> p = p Law of identity
>>>>
>>>> Nope, only for systems that accept those requirements.
>>>>
>>>> There are (typically non-binary) systems that do not include one or
>>>> both of the first two "laws".
>>>>
>>>
>>> I personally construe those as nonsense.
>>> True, False and not a truth-bearer are the only ones
>>> that I consider correct.
>>>
>>
>>
>> So, you admit that you logic system isn't the classical binary system,
>> and thus not applicable for most classical logic based on binary
>> logic, and that you mind is just unimaginative enough to handle
>> broader systems of logic.
>>
>
> Classic logic makes sure to ignore that some expressions
> of language are not truth-bearers.
Not "ignore" but restrict out of the system.
>
>> I guess you just admitted that your definiton of
>
> I defined the foundation of ALL truth, when logic diverges
> from this then logic is incorrect.
Not allowed.
You may want to, but you can't.
Logic systems have been defined without your rules, and you can't force
them to take them. You just automatically kick yourself out of them.
>
> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker?
> The generic answer is whatever makes an expression of
> language true <is> its truthmaker. This entails that
> if there is nothing in the universe that makes expression
> X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
But that doesn't work in some systems.
Note, "the universe" doesn't matter in formal systems, unless you define
"the universe" to BE the formal system.
>
>> a "Foundation of Logic" has just defined yourself out of all the
>> fields you want to talk about, since they do NOT have the logic value
>> of "not a truth-bearer".
>>
>>
>
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-11 11:06 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v49sla$14ek5$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335333 |
On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>
>> On 6/10/2024 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-06-09 18:40:16 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 6/9/24 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>> On 6/9/24 1:18 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 10:36 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> *This has direct application to undecidable decision problems*
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic
>>>>>>>>> answer is
>>>>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its
>>>>>>>>> truthmaker. This
>>>>>>>>> entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>>>>> expression X
>>>>>>>>> true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a
>>>>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X is a
>>>>>>>>> truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I have been working in this same area as a non-academician for
>>>>>>>>> a few
>>>>>>>>> years. I have only focused on expressions of language that are
>>>>>>>>> {true on
>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Now that truthmaker and truthbearer are fully anchored it is
>>>>>>>> easy to see
>>>>>>>> that self-contradictory expressions are simply not truthbearers.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> “This sentence is not true” can't be true because that would
>>>>>>>> make it
>>>>>>>> untrue and it can't be false because that would make it true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Within the the definition of truthmaker specified above: “this
>>>>>>>> sentence
>>>>>>>> has no truthmaker” is simply not a truthbearer. It can't be true
>>>>>>>> within
>>>>>>>> the above specified definition of truthmaker because this would
>>>>>>>> make it
>>>>>>>> false. It can't be false because that makes
>>>>>>>> it true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Unless the system is inconsistent, in which case they can be.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When I specify the ultimate foundation of all truth then this
>>>>>> does apply to truth in logic, truth in math and truth in science.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope. Not for Formal system, which have a specific definition of
>>>>> its truth-makers, unless you let your definition become trivial for
>>>>> Formal logic where a "truth-makers" is what has been defined to be
>>>>> the "truth-makers" for the system.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Formal systems are free to define their own truthmakers.
>>>> When these definitions result in inconsistency they are
>>>> proved to be incorrect.
>>>
>>> A formal system can be inconsistent without being incorrect.
>>
>> *Three laws of logic apply to all propositions*
>> ¬(p ∧ ¬p) Law of non-contradiction
>> (p ∨ ¬p) Law of excluded middle
>> p = p Law of identity
>> *No it cannot*
>
> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system specifies
> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those. Besides, a the
> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the specification
> of a formal system.
>
*This is the way that truth actually works*
*People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
Now we have the means to unequivocally define truthbearer. X is a
truthbearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>> People are free to stipulate the value of PI as exactly
>> 3.0 and they are simply wrong.
>
> But they are free to use the small greek letter pi for other purposes.
>
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-11 21:44 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4auhn$3nf9m$1@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335375 |
On 6/11/24 12:06 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> On 6/10/2024 2:13 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-06-09 18:40:16 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/9/24 2:13 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 1:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 6/9/24 1:18 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 6/9/2024 10:36 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> *This has direct application to undecidable decision problems*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic
>>>>>>>>>> answer is
>>>>>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its
>>>>>>>>>> truthmaker. This
>>>>>>>>>> entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>>>>>> expression X
>>>>>>>>>> true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a
>>>>>>>>>> truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>>> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X
>>>>>>>>>> is a
>>>>>>>>>> truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I have been working in this same area as a non-academician for
>>>>>>>>>> a few
>>>>>>>>>> years. I have only focused on expressions of language that are
>>>>>>>>>> {true on
>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Now that truthmaker and truthbearer are fully anchored it is
>>>>>>>>> easy to see
>>>>>>>>> that self-contradictory expressions are simply not truthbearers.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> “This sentence is not true” can't be true because that would
>>>>>>>>> make it
>>>>>>>>> untrue and it can't be false because that would make it true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Within the the definition of truthmaker specified above: “this
>>>>>>>>> sentence
>>>>>>>>> has no truthmaker” is simply not a truthbearer. It can't be
>>>>>>>>> true within
>>>>>>>>> the above specified definition of truthmaker because this would
>>>>>>>>> make it
>>>>>>>>> false. It can't be false because that makes
>>>>>>>>> it true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Unless the system is inconsistent, in which case they can be.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Note,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When I specify the ultimate foundation of all truth then this
>>>>>>> does apply to truth in logic, truth in math and truth in science.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nope. Not for Formal system, which have a specific definition of
>>>>>> its truth-makers, unless you let your definition become trivial
>>>>>> for Formal logic where a "truth-makers" is what has been defined
>>>>>> to be the "truth-makers" for the system.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Formal systems are free to define their own truthmakers.
>>>>> When these definitions result in inconsistency they are
>>>>> proved to be incorrect.
>>>>
>>>> A formal system can be inconsistent without being incorrect.
>>>
>>> *Three laws of logic apply to all propositions*
>>> ¬(p ∧ ¬p) Law of non-contradiction
>>> (p ∨ ¬p) Law of excluded middle
>>> p = p Law of identity
>>> *No it cannot*
>>
>> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system specifies
>> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those. Besides, a the
>> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the specification
>> of a formal system.
>>
>
> *This is the way that truth actually works*
> *People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
Nope, YOU are simply wrong, because you don't understand how big logic
actualy is, because, it seems, your mind is to small.
>
> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>
But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of language"
in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>
> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truthbearer. X is a
> truthbearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>
>
>>> People are free to stipulate the value of PI as exactly
>>> 3.0 and they are simply wrong.
>>
>> But they are free to use the small greek letter pi for other purposes.
>>
>
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-11 20:57 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4ava2$1apao$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335386 |
On 6/11/2024 8:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 6/11/24 12:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>>>
>>> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system specifies
>>> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those. Besides, a the
>>> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the
>>> specification
>>> of a formal system.
>>>
>>
>> *This is the way that truth actually works*
>> *People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
>
> Nope, YOU are simply wrong, because you don't understand how big logic
> actualy is, because, it seems, your mind is to small.
>
Every expression of language X that is
{true on the basis of its meaning}
algorithmically requires a possibly infinite sequence of
finite string transformation rules from its meaning to X.
>>
>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>
>
> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of language"
> in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>
Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of language"
>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>
> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>
That is more than nothing in the universe.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-11 22:37 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4b1l7$3nf9m$9@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335388 |
On 6/11/24 9:57 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 6/11/2024 8:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 6/11/24 12:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system
>>>> specifies
>>>> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those. Besides, a
>>>> the
>>>> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the
>>>> specification
>>>> of a formal system.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *This is the way that truth actually works*
>>> *People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
>>
>> Nope, YOU are simply wrong, because you don't understand how big logic
>> actualy is, because, it seems, your mind is to small.
>>
>
> Every expression of language X that is
> {true on the basis of its meaning}
> algorithmically requires a possibly infinite sequence of
> finite string transformation rules from its meaning to X.
Unless it is just true as its nature.
>
>>>
>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>>
>>
>> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of language"
>> in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>>
>
> Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of language"
And not all things are finite strings.
>
>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>
>> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>>
>
> That is more than nothing in the universe.
>
but what makes the definition "true"? What is its truth-maker?
Not everything has a truth-maker, because it might be a truth-maker itself.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-11 22:17 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4b40r$1f89t$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335393 |
On 6/11/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 6/11/24 9:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 6/11/2024 8:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 6/11/24 12:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system
>>>>> specifies
>>>>> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those. Besides,
>>>>> a the
>>>>> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the
>>>>> specification
>>>>> of a formal system.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *This is the way that truth actually works*
>>>> *People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
>>>
>>> Nope, YOU are simply wrong, because you don't understand how big
>>> logic actualy is, because, it seems, your mind is to small.
>>>
>>
>> Every expression of language X that is
>> {true on the basis of its meaning}
>> algorithmically requires a possibly infinite sequence of
>> finite string transformation rules from its meaning to X.
>
> Unless it is just true as its nature.
>
Which Mendelson would encode as: ⊢𝒞
A {cat} <is defined as a type of> {animal}.
>>
>>>>
>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of
>>> language" in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>>>
>>
>> Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of language"
>
> And not all things are finite strings.
>
Every expression of language that is {true on the basis of its meaning}
is a finite string that is connected to the expressions of language that
express its meaning.
>>
>>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>
>>> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>>>
>>
>> That is more than nothing in the universe.
>>
>
> but what makes the definition "true"? What is its truth-maker?
>
> Not everything has a truth-maker, because it might be a truth-maker itself.
Basic facts are stipulated to be true.
"A cat is an animal" is the same basic fact expressed
in every human language and their mathematically
formalized versions.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-12 07:33 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4c12n$3oop0$1@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335396 |
On 6/11/24 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 6/11/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 6/11/24 9:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 6/11/2024 8:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 6/11/24 12:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system
>>>>>> specifies
>>>>>> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those. Besides,
>>>>>> a the
>>>>>> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the
>>>>>> specification
>>>>>> of a formal system.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *This is the way that truth actually works*
>>>>> *People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
>>>>
>>>> Nope, YOU are simply wrong, because you don't understand how big
>>>> logic actualy is, because, it seems, your mind is to small.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Every expression of language X that is
>>> {true on the basis of its meaning}
>>> algorithmically requires a possibly infinite sequence of
>>> finite string transformation rules from its meaning to X.
>>
>> Unless it is just true as its nature.
>>
>
> Which Mendelson would encode as: ⊢𝒞
> A {cat} <is defined as a type of> {animal}.
So, what is that statements truth-maker?
And the truth-maker of that?
You need a set of "first truth-makers" that do not themselves have
something more fundamental at their truth-makers.
>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of
>>>> language" in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of language"
>>
>> And not all things are finite strings.
>>
>
> Every expression of language that is {true on the basis of its meaning}
> is a finite string that is connected to the expressions of language that
> express its meaning.
And that just gets you into circles, as the expression of language that
expresses its meaning needs a truth-maker too, and that need one for it,
and so one.
You need a primative base that is accepted without proof, as there is
nothing to prove it, and that base defines the logic system you are
going to work in.
>
>>>
>>>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>
>>>> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>>>>
>>>
>>> That is more than nothing in the universe.
>>>
>>
>> but what makes the definition "true"? What is its truth-maker?
>>
>> Not everything has a truth-maker, because it might be a truth-maker
>> itself.
>
> Basic facts are stipulated to be true.
> "A cat is an animal" is the same basic fact expressed
> in every human language and their mathematically
> formalized versions.
>
So, basic facts do not have a truth-maker in their universe.
But "A cat is an animal" is NOT a statement that is true in every
system, as some systems might not HAVE a concept of "cat" in it at all,
so that would be a non-sense expression, or might even define it to be
something else.
YOu still keep on running into the problem that youu mind clearly
doesn't understand that expresability of logic, and you are stuck just
not understanding how abstractions work.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-12 08:05 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4c6e9$1lec5$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335402 |
On 6/12/2024 6:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 6/11/24 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 6/11/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 6/11/24 9:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 6/11/2024 8:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>> On 6/11/24 12:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system
>>>>>>> specifies
>>>>>>> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those.
>>>>>>> Besides, a the
>>>>>>> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the
>>>>>>> specification
>>>>>>> of a formal system.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *This is the way that truth actually works*
>>>>>> *People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope, YOU are simply wrong, because you don't understand how big
>>>>> logic actualy is, because, it seems, your mind is to small.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Every expression of language X that is
>>>> {true on the basis of its meaning}
>>>> algorithmically requires a possibly infinite sequence of
>>>> finite string transformation rules from its meaning to X.
>>>
>>> Unless it is just true as its nature.
>>>
>>
>> Which Mendelson would encode as: ⊢𝒞
>> A {cat} <is defined as a type of> {animal}.
>
> So, what is that statements truth-maker?
>
> And the truth-maker of that?
>
> You need a set of "first truth-makers" that do not themselves have
> something more fundamental at their truth-makers.
I have always had that and told you about it dozens of times.
Some otherwise meaningless finite strings are stipulated to be
true thus providing these finite strings with meaning.
https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
If there really is nothing anywhere that makes expression
of language X true then X is untrue.
This covers every truth that can possibly exist, true by
definition, true by entailment, true by observation, true
by an infinite sequence of truth preserving operations.
If nothing makes X true then X is untrue.
>>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of
>>>>> language" in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of language"
>>>
>>> And not all things are finite strings.
>>>
>>
>> Every expression of language that is {true on the basis of its meaning}
>> is a finite string that is connected to the expressions of language that
>> express its meaning.
>
> And that just gets you into circles,
A tree of knowledge has no cycles. Willard Van Orman Quine
was too stupid to see this.
https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
> as the expression of language that
> expresses its meaning needs a truth-maker too, and that need one for it,
> and so one.
>
Some expressions of language are stipulated to be true
thus giving them meaning. Rudolf Carnap may have been
the first to formalize this with his meaning Postulates.
https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
> You need a primative base that is accepted without proof, as there is
> nothing to prove it, and that base defines the logic system you are
> going to work in.
>
>>
>>>>
>>>>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is more than nothing in the universe.
>>>>
>>>
>>> but what makes the definition "true"? What is its truth-maker?
>>>
>>> Not everything has a truth-maker, because it might be a truth-maker
>>> itself.
>>
>> Basic facts are stipulated to be true.
>> "A cat is an animal" is the same basic fact expressed
>> in every human language and their mathematically
>> formalized versions.
>>
>
> So, basic facts do not have a truth-maker in their universe.
True by definition is their truthmaker.
>
> But "A cat is an animal" is NOT a statement that is true in every
> system, as some systems might not HAVE a concept of "cat" in it at all,
> so that would be a non-sense expression, or might even define it to be
> something else.
>
*That has already been covered by this*
When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
> YOu still keep on running into the problem that youu mind clearly
> doesn't understand that expresability of logic, and you are stuck just
> not understanding how abstractions work.
Not at all. The problem is that you have not yet paid
100% complete attention to ALL of my words.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-12 19:55 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4dch4$3qbnc$6@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335406 |
On 6/12/24 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 6/12/2024 6:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 6/11/24 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 6/11/2024 9:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 6/11/24 9:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 6/11/2024 8:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>> On 6/11/24 12:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 6/11/2024 2:45 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-06-10 14:43:34 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Those laws do not constrain formal systems. Each formal system
>>>>>>>> specifies
>>>>>>>> its own laws, which include all or some or none of those.
>>>>>>>> Besides, a the
>>>>>>>> word "proposition" need not be and often is not used in the
>>>>>>>> specification
>>>>>>>> of a formal system.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *This is the way that truth actually works*
>>>>>>> *People are free to disagree and simply be wrong*
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nope, YOU are simply wrong, because you don't understand how big
>>>>>> logic actualy is, because, it seems, your mind is to small.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Every expression of language X that is
>>>>> {true on the basis of its meaning}
>>>>> algorithmically requires a possibly infinite sequence of
>>>>> finite string transformation rules from its meaning to X.
>>>>
>>>> Unless it is just true as its nature.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Which Mendelson would encode as: ⊢𝒞
>>> A {cat} <is defined as a type of> {animal}.
>>
>> So, what is that statements truth-maker?
>>
>> And the truth-maker of that?
>>
>> You need a set of "first truth-makers" that do not themselves have
>> something more fundamental at their truth-makers.
>
> I have always had that and told you about it dozens of times.
> Some otherwise meaningless finite strings are stipulated to be
> true thus providing these finite strings with meaning.
> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
> Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
But that doesn't fit your defintion of a Truth having a truth maker.
>
> If there really is nothing anywhere that makes expression
> of language X true then X is untrue.
>
> This covers every truth that can possibly exist, true by
> definition, true by entailment, true by observation, true
> by an infinite sequence of truth preserving operations.
> If nothing makes X true then X is untrue.
So a "true by definition" or "stipulated truth" needs a truth maker.
What makes that definition or stuplation "true", what is its truth-maker?
>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic
>>>>>>> answer is
>>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of
>>>>>> language" in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of language"
>>>>
>>>> And not all things are finite strings.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Every expression of language that is {true on the basis of its meaning}
>>> is a finite string that is connected to the expressions of language that
>>> express its meaning.
>>
>> And that just gets you into circles,
>
> A tree of knowledge has no cycles. Willard Van Orman Quine
> was too stupid to see this.
> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
And then what is at is root? Show me a word that can be "defined"
without using any other words.
>
>> as the expression of language that expresses its meaning needs a
>> truth-maker too, and that need one for it, and so one.
>>
>
> Some expressions of language are stipulated to be true
> thus giving them meaning. Rudolf Carnap may have been
> the first to formalize this with his meaning Postulates.
But what gives the meaning to the stipulation?
A stipulation is just a piece of language, what gives it meaning other
than the words it uses, which need definitions.
>
> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
> Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
>
>> You need a primative base that is accepted without proof, as there is
>> nothing to prove it, and that base defines the logic system you are
>> going to work in.
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That is more than nothing in the universe.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> but what makes the definition "true"? What is its truth-maker?
>>>>
>>>> Not everything has a truth-maker, because it might be a truth-maker
>>>> itself.
>>>
>>> Basic facts are stipulated to be true.
>>> "A cat is an animal" is the same basic fact expressed
>>> in every human language and their mathematically
>>> formalized versions.
>>>
>>
>> So, basic facts do not have a truth-maker in their universe.
>
> True by definition is their truthmaker.
Not by your definition.
>
>>
>> But "A cat is an animal" is NOT a statement that is true in every
>> system, as some systems might not HAVE a concept of "cat" in it at
>> all, so that would be a non-sense expression, or might even define it
>> to be something else.
>>
>
> *That has already been covered by this*
> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>
> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
But what them makes the truthmaker true? You said there were no cycles.
>
>> YOu still keep on running into the problem that youu mind clearly
>> doesn't understand that expresability of logic, and you are stuck just
>> not understanding how abstractions work.
>
> Not at all. The problem is that you have not yet paid
> 100% complete attention to ALL of my words.
>
so, what makes the truthmakers true?
If they make themselves true, then you have a cycle, which you said you
didn't.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-12 20:16 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4dh90$1tsdf$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335429 |
On 6/12/2024 6:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 6/12/24 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 6/12/2024 6:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 6/11/24 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Which Mendelson would encode as: ⊢𝒞
>>>> A {cat} <is defined as a type of> {animal}.
>>>
>>> So, what is that statements truth-maker?
>>>
>>> And the truth-maker of that?
>>>
>>> You need a set of "first truth-makers" that do not themselves have
>>> something more fundamental at their truth-makers.
>>
>> I have always had that and told you about it dozens of times.
>> Some otherwise meaningless finite strings are stipulated to be
>> true thus providing these finite strings with meaning.
>> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
>> Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
>
> But that doesn't fit your defintion of a Truth having a truth maker.
>
OK then you disagree that cats are animals.
As I have told you many hundreds of times DEFINITION
is the foundational basis of every expression that
is {true on the basis of its meaning.
>>
>> If there really is nothing anywhere that makes expression
>> of language X true then X is untrue.
>>
>> This covers every truth that can possibly exist, true by
>> definition, true by entailment, true by observation, true
>> by an infinite sequence of truth preserving operations.
>> If nothing makes X true then X is untrue.
>
> So a "true by definition" or "stipulated truth" needs a truth maker.
>
DEFINITION is the foundational TRUTH-MAKER
for every expression that is
{true on the basis of its meaning.
> What makes that definition or stuplation "true", what is its truth-maker?
>
What is it about a cat that makes it not
a fifteen story officen building?
>>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic
>>>>>>>> answer is
>>>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of
>>>>>>> language" in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of language"
>>>>>
>>>>> And not all things are finite strings.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Every expression of language that is {true on the basis of its meaning}
>>>> is a finite string that is connected to the expressions of language
>>>> that
>>>> express its meaning.
>>>
>>> And that just gets you into circles,
>>
>> A tree of knowledge has no cycles. Willard Van Orman Quine
>> was too stupid to see this.
>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>
> And then what is at is root? Show me a word that can be "defined"
> without using any other words.
>
The Cyc project has {thing} at its root.
>>
>>> as the expression of language that expresses its meaning needs a
>>> truth-maker too, and that need one for it, and so one.
>>>
>>
>> Some expressions of language are stipulated to be true
>> thus giving them meaning. Rudolf Carnap may have been
>> the first to formalize this with his meaning Postulates.
>
> But what gives the meaning to the stipulation?
>
How do you know that a cat is not a fifteen story office building?
> A stipulation is just a piece of language, what gives it meaning other
> than the words it uses, which need definitions.
>
There are a set of relations that exist.
Their encoding in the various human languages is arbitrary.
That is the stipulated part.
>>
>> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
>> Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
>>
>>> You need a primative base that is accepted without proof, as there is
>>> nothing to prove it, and that base defines the logic system you are
>>> going to work in.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is more than nothing in the universe.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> but what makes the definition "true"? What is its truth-maker?
>>>>>
>>>>> Not everything has a truth-maker, because it might be a truth-maker
>>>>> itself.
>>>>
>>>> Basic facts are stipulated to be true.
>>>> "A cat is an animal" is the same basic fact expressed
>>>> in every human language and their mathematically
>>>> formalized versions.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, basic facts do not have a truth-maker in their universe.
>>
>> True by definition is their truthmaker.
>
> Not by your definition.
>
When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker?
The generic answer is whatever makes an expression
of language true <is> its truthmaker.
When I say ALL THINGS you and most people in truthmaker theory
misinterpret EVERYTHING to mean a few things of a certain type.
>>
>>>
>>> But "A cat is an animal" is NOT a statement that is true in every
>>> system, as some systems might not HAVE a concept of "cat" in it at
>>> all, so that would be a non-sense expression, or might even define it
>>> to be something else.
>>>
>>
>> *That has already been covered by this*
>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>
>>
>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>
> But what them makes the truthmaker true? You said there were no cycles.
>
It is like a consistent set of axioms.
{A cat is an animal} no matter what human language
that is encoded within.
>>
>>> YOu still keep on running into the problem that youu mind clearly
>>> doesn't understand that expresability of logic, and you are stuck
>>> just not understanding how abstractions work.
>>
>> Not at all. The problem is that you have not yet paid
>> 100% complete attention to ALL of my words.
>>
>
> so, what makes the truthmakers true?
>
What makes {cats} not {fifteen story office buildings} ?
it is merely the conventions of language ?
> If they make themselves true, then you have a cycle, which you said you
> didn't.
>
There is no cycle. It is all one huge tree of knowledge.
I used to be able to link to the Cyc project's tree of
knowledge. I have an offline copy of it.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-12 21:48 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Truthmaker Maximalism and undecidable decision problems --- the way truth really works |
| Message-ID | <v4dj4u$3qbnd$4@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335435 |
On 6/12/24 9:16 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 6/12/2024 6:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 6/12/24 9:05 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 6/12/2024 6:33 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 6/11/24 11:17 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Which Mendelson would encode as: ⊢𝒞
>>>>> A {cat} <is defined as a type of> {animal}.
>>>>
>>>> So, what is that statements truth-maker?
>>>>
>>>> And the truth-maker of that?
>>>>
>>>> You need a set of "first truth-makers" that do not themselves have
>>>> something more fundamental at their truth-makers.
>>>
>>> I have always had that and told you about it dozens of times.
>>> Some otherwise meaningless finite strings are stipulated to be
>>> true thus providing these finite strings with meaning.
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
>>> Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
>>
>> But that doesn't fit your defintion of a Truth having a truth maker.
>>
>
> OK then you disagree that cats are animals.
> As I have told you many hundreds of times DEFINITION
> is the foundational basis of every expression that
> is {true on the basis of its meaning.
But what MAKES cats animals?
And the problem with your definition, is every definition needs its
words defined, so definition by words is not the fundamental basis for
truth.
The fundamentals of a system must come from outside the system.
>
>>>
>>> If there really is nothing anywhere that makes expression
>>> of language X true then X is untrue.
>>>
>>> This covers every truth that can possibly exist, true by
>>> definition, true by entailment, true by observation, true
>>> by an infinite sequence of truth preserving operations.
>>> If nothing makes X true then X is untrue.
>>
>> So a "true by definition" or "stipulated truth" needs a truth maker.
>>
>
> DEFINITION is the foundational TRUTH-MAKER
> for every expression that is
> {true on the basis of its meaning.
And how do you determine the meaning of the definition within the system.
>
>> What makes that definition or stuplation "true", what is its truth-maker?
>>
>
> What is it about a cat that makes it not
> a fifteen story officen building?
Nothing I know of, why do you think it is?
>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic
>>>>>>>>> answer is
>>>>>>>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But logic systems don't necessaily deal with "expressions of
>>>>>>>> language" in the sense you seem to be thinking of it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Finite strings are the most generic form of "expressions of
>>>>>>> language"
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And not all things are finite strings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Every expression of language that is {true on the basis of its
>>>>> meaning}
>>>>> is a finite string that is connected to the expressions of language
>>>>> that
>>>>> express its meaning.
>>>>
>>>> And that just gets you into circles,
>>>
>>> A tree of knowledge has no cycles. Willard Van Orman Quine
>>> was too stupid to see this.
>>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>
>> And then what is at is root? Show me a word that can be "defined"
>> without using any other words.
>>
>
> The Cyc project has {thing} at its root.
And what can you define from just {thing}?
>
>>>
>>>> as the expression of language that expresses its meaning needs a
>>>> truth-maker too, and that need one for it, and so one.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Some expressions of language are stipulated to be true
>>> thus giving them meaning. Rudolf Carnap may have been
>>> the first to formalize this with his meaning Postulates.
>>
>> But what gives the meaning to the stipulation?
>>
>
> How do you know that a cat is not a fifteen story office building?
How do you know it isn't?
>
>> A stipulation is just a piece of language, what gives it meaning other
>> than the words it uses, which need definitions.
>>
>
> There are a set of relations that exist.
From where?
> Their encoding in the various human languages is arbitrary.
> That is the stipulated part.
But what makes some relations "right" and some "wrong"?
>
>>>
>>> https://liarparadox.org/Meaning_Postulates_Rudolf_Carnap_1952.pdf
>>> Bachelor(x) <entails> ~Married(x)
>>>
>>>> You need a primative base that is accepted without proof, as there
>>>> is nothing to prove it, and that base defines the logic system you
>>>> are going to work in.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>>>>>>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Unless it just is true because it is a truthmaker by definition.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is more than nothing in the universe.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> but what makes the definition "true"? What is its truth-maker?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Not everything has a truth-maker, because it might be a
>>>>>> truth-maker itself.
>>>>>
>>>>> Basic facts are stipulated to be true.
>>>>> "A cat is an animal" is the same basic fact expressed
>>>>> in every human language and their mathematically
>>>>> formalized versions.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, basic facts do not have a truth-maker in their universe.
>>>
>>> True by definition is their truthmaker.
>>
>> Not by your definition.
>>
>
> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker?
> The generic answer is whatever makes an expression
> of language true <is> its truthmaker.
Which doesn't always have an answer
>
> When I say ALL THINGS you and most people in truthmaker theory
> misinterpret EVERYTHING to mean a few things of a certain type.
So, in the Cyc project what defines {thing}
For your truthmaker idea, what makes the truthmaker true? If ALL THINGS
have a truthmaker, what is the truthmaker's truthmaker?
>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But "A cat is an animal" is NOT a statement that is true in every
>>>> system, as some systems might not HAVE a concept of "cat" in it at
>>>> all, so that would be a non-sense expression, or might even define
>>>> it to be something else.
>>>>
>>>
>>> *That has already been covered by this*
>>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker.
>>
>>>
>>> This entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes
>>> expression X true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>>
>> But what them makes the truthmaker true? You said there were no cycles.
>>
>
> It is like a consistent set of axioms.
> {A cat is an animal} no matter what human language
> that is encoded within.
And what defines which axioms are used?
These are basic questions which you don't seem to understand, because
you can't think abstract enough,
>
>>>
>>>> YOu still keep on running into the problem that youu mind clearly
>>>> doesn't understand that expresability of logic, and you are stuck
>>>> just not understanding how abstractions work.
>>>
>>> Not at all. The problem is that you have not yet paid
>>> 100% complete attention to ALL of my words.
>>>
>>
>> so, what makes the truthmakers true?
>>
>
> What makes {cats} not {fifteen story office buildings} ?
> it is merely the conventions of language ?
So, what makes that true?
>
>> If they make themselves true, then you have a cycle, which you said
>> you didn't.
>>
>
> There is no cycle. It is all one huge tree of knowledge.
> I used to be able to link to the Cyc project's tree of
> knowledge. I have an offline copy of it.
>
So what gives meaning to the root? and from 1 root (since you say it is
one tree) how do you provide a description of the difference to move
from the root to the next layer down?
Yes, I am being intentionally difficult to show you that you have over
simplified what needs to be done to define such a system, because your
mind just can't conceive of the issues.
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| From | joes <noreply@example.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-09 17:40 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <v44pe7$3g17f$2@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335319 |
Am Sun, 09 Jun 2024 10:36:32 -0500 schrieb olcott: > When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is > whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker. This > entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes expression X > true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue. What even is a truthmaker? > X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker. > Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X is a > truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker. What if both or none have a truthmaker? -- joes
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-09 12:52 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v44q4r$3lsrh$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335322 |
On 6/9/2024 12:40 PM, joes wrote: > Am Sun, 09 Jun 2024 10:36:32 -0500 schrieb olcott: >> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is >> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker. This >> entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes expression X >> true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue. > What even is a truthmaker? > I just defined its precise scope. It is what-so-ever makes an expression of language true. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/ The cat in your living room makes "There is a cat in my living room" true. The definition of arithmetic makes 2 + 3 = 5 true. >> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker. >> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X is a >> truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker. > > What if both or none have a truthmaker? > I already answered for none. When X and ~X have no truthmaker then X is not a truthbearer. *The answer of both is proven impossible by* *Three laws of logic apply to all propositions* ¬(p ∧ ¬p) Law of non-contradiction (p ∨ ¬p) Law of excluded middle p = p Law of identity -- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-09 14:08 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <v44r28$3egpa$4@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #335319 |
On 6/9/24 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
> *This has direct application to undecidable decision problems*
>
> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker. This
> entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes expression X
> true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
I guess you don't understand Formal Logic then.
If Formal logic, the logic system starts with an explicit listing of
statements and definitions that are considered "True" and logical
operations that are considered VALID.
>
> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X is a
> truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>
> I have been working in this same area as a non-academician for a few
> years. I have only focused on expressions of language that are {true on
> the basis of their meaning}.
>
Which seems to mean you have focused on general Philosophy, and NOT
formal logic, which has a much broader definition of "truth", and thus
room to argue it.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-06-09 13:10 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v44r6c$3m841$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #335324 |
On 6/9/2024 1:08 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 6/9/24 11:36 AM, olcott wrote:
>> *This has direct application to undecidable decision problems*
>>
>> When we ask the question: What is a truthmaker? The generic answer is
>> whatever makes an expression of language true <is> its truthmaker. This
>> entails that if there is nothing in the universe that makes expression X
>> true then X lacks a truthmaker and is untrue.
>
> I guess you don't understand Formal Logic then.
>
> If Formal logic, the logic system starts with an explicit listing of
> statements and definitions that are considered "True" and logical
> operations that are considered VALID.
>
>>
>> X may be untrue because X is false. In that case ~X has a truthmaker.
>> Now we have the means to unequivocally define truth-bearer. X is a
>> truth-bearer iff (if and only if) X or ~X has a truthmaker.
>>
>> I have been working in this same area as a non-academician for a few
>> years. I have only focused on expressions of language that are {true on
>> the basis of their meaning}.
>>
>
> Which seems to mean you have focused on general Philosophy, and NOT
> formal logic, which has a much broader definition of "truth", and thus
> room to argue it.
When I specify the ultimate foundation of all truth then this
does apply to truth in logic, truth in math and truth in science.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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