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Groups > linux.kernel > #1635737 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-05-04 15:40 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-05-05 10:20 +0200 |
| Articles | 4 — 4 participants |
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[PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-05-04 15:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> - 2017-05-04 16:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-04 16:40 +0200
[tip:core/urgent] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms tip-bot for Daniel Micay <tipbot@zytor.com> - 2017-05-05 10:20 +0200
| From | Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-04 15:40 +0200 |
| Subject | [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary |
| Message-ID | <tDp97-43E-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized to random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 56d85fd81411..ff84ff82f56a 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); #endif /* -- 2.12.2
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| From | Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-04 16:10 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary |
| Message-ID | <tDpCa-4uB-27@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1635737 |
On Thu, 2017-05-04 at 09:32 -0400, Daniel Micay wrote: > The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized > to > random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> > Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
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| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-04 16:40 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary |
| Message-ID | <tDq5b-4H2-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1635756 |
On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 7:04 AM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote: > On Thu, 2017-05-04 at 09:32 -0400, Daniel Micay wrote: >> The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized >> to >> random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. >> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >> Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> >> > Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Thanks! Ingo, should this go via tip? Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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| From | tip-bot for Daniel Micay <tipbot@zytor.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-05 10:20 +0200 |
| Subject | [tip:core/urgent] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms |
| Message-ID | <tDGCZ-7zW-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1635737 |
Commit-ID: 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 Author: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> AuthorDate: Thu, 4 May 2017 09:32:09 -0400 Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> CommitDate: Fri, 5 May 2017 08:05:13 +0200 stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmicay@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 3a4343c..d681f8f 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); #endif /*
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