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Groups > linux.kernel > #1635796
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary |
| Date | 2017-05-04 16:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tDq5b-4H2-11@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tDp97-43E-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <tDpCa-4uB-27@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 7:04 AM, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> wrote: > On Thu, 2017-05-04 at 09:32 -0400, Daniel Micay wrote: >> The stack canary is an unsigned long and should be fully initialized >> to >> random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. >> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >> Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> >> > Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Thanks! Ingo, should this go via tip? Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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[PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-05-04 15:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> - 2017-05-04 16:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] use get_random_long for the per-task stack canary Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-04 16:40 +0200
[tip:core/urgent] stackprotector: Increase the per-task stack canary's random range from 32 bits to 64 bits on 64-bit platforms tip-bot for Daniel Micay <tipbot@zytor.com> - 2017-05-05 10:20 +0200
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