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Groups > comp.mobile.android > #146914 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2025-03-03 12:27 +0000 |
| Last post | 2025-03-15 08:48 -0400 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 123 — 14 participants |
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"'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-03 12:27 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-03 10:47 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" David Rance <david@SPAMOFF.invalid> - 2025-03-03 17:13 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-03 17:33 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" David Rance <david@SPAMOFF.invalid> - 2025-03-03 18:20 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-03 15:54 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-03 17:25 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-03 17:38 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-03 14:04 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-03 19:28 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-03 21:36 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-03 21:35 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-03 17:35 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-04 02:49 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-04 08:07 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-03 22:58 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-04 02:50 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-03 21:23 -0700
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-04 06:43 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-04 09:22 -0700
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-04 16:40 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-04 10:21 -0700
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-04 18:37 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-04 14:46 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-03 21:38 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-03 17:31 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-04 08:13 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-04 08:09 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-04 16:22 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-04 21:09 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-04 19:43 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-05 05:34 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-05 08:22 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-05 16:15 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" David Wade <dave@g4ugm.invalid> - 2025-03-05 09:44 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-05 13:15 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-05 08:47 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Abandoned Trolley <that.bloke@microsoft.com> - 2025-03-05 14:27 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-05 10:42 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-05 16:51 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Abandoned Trolley <that.bloke@microsoft.com> - 2025-03-05 17:21 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-05 12:37 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-05 18:03 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-05 16:00 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" David Wade <dave@g4ugm.invalid> - 2025-03-05 22:07 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-06 15:42 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-06 19:28 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Abandoned Trolley <that.bloke@microsoft.com> - 2025-03-05 18:23 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-05 16:01 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Abandoned Trolley <that.bloke@microsoft.com> - 2025-03-05 21:03 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-05 18:40 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" David Wade <dave@g4ugm.invalid> - 2025-03-05 18:02 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-05 21:04 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-05 08:12 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-05 13:29 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" David Wade <dave@g4ugm.invalid> - 2025-03-05 17:38 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Abandoned Trolley <that.bloke@microsoft.com> - 2025-03-05 17:25 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" David Wade <dave@g4ugm.invalid> - 2025-03-05 21:44 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-05 18:45 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-05 13:25 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-05 13:25 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-05 14:57 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> - 2025-03-05 14:10 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-05 16:26 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-05 14:33 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-05 21:08 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-03 19:25 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-03 19:43 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-03 21:40 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-03 21:26 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-03 21:38 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-03 20:54 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-04 07:19 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-03 21:31 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Brian Gregory <void-invalid-dead-dontuse@email.invalid> - 2025-03-06 01:56 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-06 13:54 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Tweed <usenet.tweed@gmail.com> - 2025-03-06 14:57 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-06 11:09 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-06 11:17 -0700
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-07 09:12 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-07 09:35 -0700
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-06 18:24 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-06 19:36 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-07 09:17 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-07 16:16 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-08 10:30 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Brian Gregory <void-invalid-dead-dontuse@email.invalid> - 2025-03-06 16:37 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-06 19:53 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Chris <ithinkiam@gmail.com> - 2025-03-07 07:37 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-07 10:46 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-07 13:24 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-07 09:38 -0500
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-07 15:35 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-07 15:46 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> - 2025-03-14 18:49 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-15 09:53 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-15 11:46 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-15 08:35 -0400
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-15 17:53 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> - 2025-03-15 19:27 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-15 23:30 -0400
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" AJL <noemail@none.com> - 2025-03-16 05:01 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-16 08:47 -0400
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-16 13:47 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> - 2025-03-16 15:13 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-16 16:04 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> - 2025-03-16 18:00 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-17 08:53 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-17 13:53 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-17 14:53 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-17 18:44 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-20 10:42 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-20 12:48 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-20 13:18 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-20 13:27 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> - 2025-03-20 14:28 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> - 2025-03-20 16:02 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-20 13:00 -0400
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-16 11:54 -0400
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> - 2025-03-16 16:09 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Frank Slootweg <this@ddress.is.invalid> - 2025-03-16 19:23 +0000
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2025-03-16 23:10 +0100
Re: "'Scammers stole £40k after EDF gave out my number" Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-03-15 08:48 -0400
Page 6 of 7 — ← Prev page 1 2 3 4 5 [6] 7 Next page →
| From | Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-15 23:30 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <vr5git$t0ll$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147167 |
On 3/15/2025 1:53 PM, Java Jive wrote:
> On 2025-03-15 12:35, Newyana2 wrote:
>> On 3/15/2025 7:46 AM, Java Jive wrote:
>>> On 2025-03-14 18:49, Theo wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Speculating, I would guess they started with the SIM swap.
>>>
>>> The original report suggests that they started with an email hack,
>>> and used that to facilitate the SIM swap.
>>
>> That's not what it said.
>
> Look back directly up thread to my post of 2025-03-06 19:53, where I
> quote the single sentence in the original report that stated that an
> email hack had occurred before the SIM-swap scam was done.
>
You read it wrong.
"O2 Virgin Media confirmed the scammer telephoned its call centre
requesting a new Sim and had hacked Stephen's emails."
Both things happened. Nowhere does it say or imply that
hacking the email preceded the SIM swap. That wouldn't
make sense.
"
EDF explained the fraudster had his name and email address and had asked
EDF to give them his mobile number, which the company did. ... The call
from the fraudster to EDF happened three hours before O2 received a
request to move his number in the Sim-swap scam. ...
"
So they called EDF with name and email, asking for their phone
number. With that they called O2 and asked to swap SIMs.
Once the SIM was swapped they could log in to email and say
the lost their password. They then have a password change
link sent via email or text... which they now control.
As the article then states: "Criminals do it to bypass two-factor
authentication to change passwords and access anything else
you need a code from a text message for."
Hacking his email wouldn't have got the scammers a way to
bypass 2FA via cellphone, but a SIM swap would. So if the man
had not been using 2FA it's unlikely that he could have been
scammed.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | AJL <noemail@none.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 05:01 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr5lv5$14qqr$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147170 |
On 3/15/25 8:30 PM, Newyana2 wrote: >On 3/15/2025 1:53 PM, Java Jive wrote: >> On 2025-03-15 12:35, Newyana2 wrote: >>> On 3/15/2025 7:46 AM, Java Jive wrote: >>>> On 2025-03-14 18:49, Theo wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Speculating, I would guess they started with the SIM swap. >>>> >>>> The original report suggests that they started with an email hack, >>>> and used that to facilitate the SIM swap. >>> >>> That's not what it said. >> >> Look back directly up thread to my post of 2025-03-06 19:53, where I >> quote the single sentence in the original report that stated that an >> email hack had occurred before the SIM-swap scam was done. >> > You read it wrong. > >"O2 Virgin Media confirmed the scammer telephoned its call centre >requesting a new Sim and had hacked Stephen's emails." > > Both things happened. Nowhere does it say or imply that >hacking the email preceded the SIM swap. That wouldn't >make sense. > >" >EDF explained the fraudster had his name and email address and had asked >EDF to give them his mobile number, which the company did. ... The call >from the fraudster to EDF happened three hours before O2 received a >request to move his number in the Sim-swap scam. ... >" > >So they called EDF with name and email, asking for their phone >number. With that they called O2 and asked to swap SIMs. >Once the SIM was swapped they could log in to email and say >the lost their password. They then have a password change >link sent via email or text... which they now control. > >As the article then states: "Criminals do it to bypass two-factor >authentication to change passwords and access anything else >you need a code from a text message for." > > Hacking his email wouldn't have got the scammers a way to >bypass 2FA via cellphone, but a SIM swap would. So if the man >had not been using 2FA it's unlikely that he could have been >scammed. My phone company has my pin on file and is not 'supposed' to make ANY changes without me giving it. Course that's no guarantee but at least it's one more obstacle...
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 08:47 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <vr6h6h$1q8pd$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147171 |
On 3/16/2025 1:01 AM, AJL wrote: >> Hacking his email wouldn't have got the scammers a way to >> bypass 2FA via cellphone, but a SIM swap would. So if the man >> had not been using 2FA it's unlikely that he could have been >> scammed. > > My phone company has my pin on file and is not 'supposed' to make ANY > changes without me giving it. Course that's no guarantee but at least it's > one more obstacle... > That sounds like a good idea. Though it's hard to see where all this goes going forward. As everything becomes computerized, with little human element, most interactions don't involve people, businesses increasingly move online and offer only automated support, and you even need a portable computer to prove your identity... Identity theft is already rampant. Will we have life theft, where a hacker calls the police to complain that your house has been broken into by you, as they take over your bank account... and you have no recourse as you try to argue with software that says you don't exist? I'm increasingly impressed by Charlie Chaplin's foresight in "Modern Times", from 1936.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 13:47 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr6kqh$1t946$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147170 |
On 2025-03-16 03:30, Newyana2 wrote: > On 3/15/2025 1:53 PM, Java Jive wrote: >> On 2025-03-15 12:35, Newyana2 wrote: >>> On 3/15/2025 7:46 AM, Java Jive wrote: >>>> On 2025-03-14 18:49, Theo wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Speculating, I would guess they started with the SIM swap. >>>> >>>> The original report suggests that they started with an email hack, >>>> and used that to facilitate the SIM swap. >>> >>> That's not what it said. >> >> Look back directly up thread to my post of 2025-03-06 19:53, where I >> quote the single sentence in the original report that stated that an >> email hack had occurred before the SIM-swap scam was done. >> > You read it wrong. > > "O2 Virgin Media confirmed the scammer telephoned its call centre > requesting a new Sim and had hacked Stephen's emails." > > Both things happened. Nowhere does it say or imply that > hacking the email preceded the SIM swap. That wouldn't > make sense. It makes perfect sense, what you are claiming makes no sense, and shows that you have lost the chronological sequence of events. For one thing, the use of the word 'had' implies that the hack was already in place at the time of scammer's phone call, otherwise they would have said something like "... and hacked ..." or "... used it to hack ..." or "... and went on to hack ...". Further, if you reread the original report in its entirety, how would he have persuaded EDF to give up the victim's mobile number without personal identifying information that came from access to his emails? Next, how would he have been able to confirm the request for a replacement SIM without being able to reply to the confirmatory email? -- Fake news kills! I may be contacted via the contact address given on my website: www.macfh.co.uk
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 15:13 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <cuh*FQB9z@news.chiark.greenend.org.uk> |
| In reply to | #147178 |
In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: > It makes perfect sense, what you are claiming makes no sense, and shows > that you have lost the chronological sequence of events. For one thing, > the use of the word 'had' implies that the hack was already in place at > the time of scammer's phone call, otherwise they would have said > something like "... and hacked ..." or "... used it to hack ..." or "... > and went on to hack ...". Further, if you reread the original report in > its entirety, how would he have persuaded EDF to give up the victim's > mobile number without personal identifying information that came from > access to his emails? Next, how would he have been able to confirm the > request for a replacement SIM without being able to reply to the > confirmatory email? When I've had to do a SIM swap (some time ago) it was all done on security questions, there was no confirmatory email. I don't think the mobile networks required an email address, and if you're on PAYG they still don't. I think there is not enough information to be clear about the sequencing, especially since emails and mobile are provided by the same company. Theo
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| From | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 16:04 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr6src$23f7c$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147181 |
On 2025-03-16 15:13, Theo wrote: > In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >> >> It makes perfect sense, what you are claiming makes no sense, and shows >> that you have lost the chronological sequence of events. For one thing, >> the use of the word 'had' implies that the hack was already in place at >> the time of scammer's phone call, otherwise they would have said >> something like "... and hacked ..." or "... used it to hack ..." or "... >> and went on to hack ...". Further, if you reread the original report in >> its entirety, how would he have persuaded EDF to give up the victim's >> mobile number without personal identifying information that came from >> access to his emails? Next, how would he have been able to confirm the >> request for a replacement SIM without being able to reply to the >> confirmatory email? > > When I've had to do a SIM swap (some time ago) it was all done on security > questions, there was no confirmatory email. I don't think the mobile > networks required an email address, and if you're on PAYG they still > don't. > > I think there is not enough information to be clear about the sequencing, > especially since emails and mobile are provided by the same company. No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish everything that followed. -- Fake news kills! I may be contacted via the contact address given on my website: www.macfh.co.uk
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| From | Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 18:00 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <duh*2rC9z@news.chiark.greenend.org.uk> |
| In reply to | #147183 |
In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: > On 2025-03-16 15:13, Theo wrote: > > In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: > >> > >> It makes perfect sense, what you are claiming makes no sense, and shows > >> that you have lost the chronological sequence of events. For one thing, > >> the use of the word 'had' implies that the hack was already in place at > >> the time of scammer's phone call, otherwise they would have said > >> something like "... and hacked ..." or "... used it to hack ..." or "... > >> and went on to hack ...". Further, if you reread the original report in > >> its entirety, how would he have persuaded EDF to give up the victim's > >> mobile number without personal identifying information that came from > >> access to his emails? Next, how would he have been able to confirm the > >> request for a replacement SIM without being able to reply to the > >> confirmatory email? > > > > When I've had to do a SIM swap (some time ago) it was all done on security > > questions, there was no confirmatory email. I don't think the mobile > > networks required an email address, and if you're on PAYG they still > > don't. > > > > I think there is not enough information to be clear about the sequencing, > > especially since emails and mobile are provided by the same company. > > No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to > enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the > SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original > article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap > and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish > everything that followed. Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I don't know whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same security details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set of details gives access to both mobile and emails. Theo
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| From | Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-17 08:53 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr8nul$3mi0m$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147187 |
On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: > In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >> >> No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to >> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the >> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original >> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap >> and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish >> everything that followed. > > Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I don't know > whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same security > details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set of details > gives access to both mobile and emails. "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a new Virgin Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin
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| From | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-17 13:53 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr99gp$8osv$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147197 |
On 2025-03-17 08:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: > On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: >> In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >>> >>> No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to >>> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the >>> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original >>> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap >>> and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish >>> everything that followed. >> >> Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I don't >> know >> whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same security >> details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set of >> details >> gives access to both mobile and emails. > > "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a new > Virgin Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." > > https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin But Theo's own transcription of events from the BBC Radio documentary makes clear that he had not done so (first and last entries from this excerpt): In brief: - received a text from O2 (mobile operator) saying he'd changed his password - contacted O2 straight away and told SIM had been swapped - told they'd stop that and send out a new SIM card, emailed to confirm - next morning, email from EDF (energy supplier) asking for feedback on recent contact with customer services - called EDF, told they'd pass it on to the fraud section and get back to him - nothing happened for over a week - called O2 again to make sure everything was stopped, put through to fraud department - just after received an email saying new SIM card had been sent out, connected to a different number. Queried with fraud department, said didn't know, need to go to an O2 shop - O2 shop couldn't do much as account had been stopped, couldn't look at it - told them to check his emails - contacted Virgin Media (ISP, merged with O2), told he'd changed his password, had to go through changing password back again, told they'd pass it to the fraud section It's difficult to deduce from this the exact ordering of events ... Because he had to contact VM to find out that he'd changed his email password, rather than them contacting him at the time he did so, we can't tell when his email password was actually changed. Further, the scammer could have been reading his emails for a while before actually deciding that, as unfolding events began to suggest that the scam was in danger of being closed down, that it was time to change the password in an attempt to prolong it. Most probably his email account would have been compromised around the same time as all the other stages of the scam, yet "nothing happened for over a week" before he discovered it, and, in between, he received emails from both EDF and O2. However, I still think that some identifying personal information would have been necessary to enable the SIM swap, and most probably this came from the email hack occurring earlier. A search for "what is the minimum personal information required to be a victim of a SIM swap scam" using both DuckDuckGo and Google didn't yield anything definitive or that probably most of us didn't know already, but did yield preventative advice ... From the Met: https://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/force-content/met/campaigns/fraud/cyber-protect_protect-yourself-from-sim-swap-fraud.pdf From Which: https://www.which.co.uk/news/article/sim-swap-fraud-doubles-year-on-year-how-scammers-steal-your-phone-number-aB0TF1O6hUrv -- Fake news kills! I may be contacted via the contact address given on my website: www.macfh.co.uk
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| From | Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-17 14:53 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr9d22$3mi0m$3@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147205 |
On 17/03/2025 13:53, Java Jive wrote: > On 2025-03-17 08:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >> On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: >>> In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >>>> >>>> No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to >>>> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the >>>> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original >>>> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap >>>> and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish >>>> everything that followed. >>> >>> Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I don't know >>> whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same security >>> details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set of details >>> gives access to both mobile and emails. >> >> "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a new Virgin >> Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." >> >> https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin > > But Theo's own transcription of events from the BBC Radio documentary makes > clear that he had not done so (first and last entries from this excerpt): That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 password as well as a VM/O2 password). > In brief: > - received a text from O2 (mobile operator) saying he'd changed his password > - contacted O2 straight away and told SIM had been swapped > - told they'd stop that and send out a new SIM card, emailed to confirm > - next morning, email from EDF (energy supplier) asking for feedback on > recent contact with customer services > - called EDF, told they'd pass it on to the fraud section and get back to him > - nothing happened for over a week > - called O2 again to make sure everything was stopped, put through to fraud > department > - just after received an email saying new SIM card had been sent out, > connected to a different number. Queried with fraud department, said > didn't know, need to go to an O2 shop > - O2 shop couldn't do much as account had been stopped, couldn't look at it > - told them to check his emails > - contacted Virgin Media (ISP, merged with O2), told he'd changed his > password, had to go through changing password back again, told they'd pass > it to the fraud section > > It's difficult to deduce from this the exact ordering of events ... > > Because he had to contact VM to find out that he'd changed his email 'his password' may be 'his account password' rather than 'his email app password'. > password, rather than them contacting him at the time he did so, we can't > tell when his email password was actually changed. Further, the scammer > could have been reading his emails for a while before actually deciding > that, as unfolding events began to suggest that the scam was in danger of > being closed down, that it was time to change the password in an attempt to > prolong it. Most probably his email account would have been compromised > around the same time as all the other stages of the scam, yet "nothing > happened for over a week" before he discovered it, and, in between, he > received emails from both EDF and O2. > > However, I still think that some identifying personal information would > have been necessary to enable the SIM swap, and most probably this came > from the email hack occurring earlier.
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| From | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-17 18:44 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr9qiq$nfdi$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147210 |
On 2025-03-17 14:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: > On 17/03/2025 13:53, Java Jive wrote: >> On 2025-03-17 08:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>> On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: >>>> In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to >>>>> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the >>>>> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original >>>>> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap >>>>> and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish >>>>> everything that followed. >>>> >>>> Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I >>>> don't know >>>> whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same security >>>> details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set of >>>> details >>>> gives access to both mobile and emails. >>> >>> "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a new >>> Virgin Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." >>> >>> https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin >> >> But Theo's own transcription of events from the BBC Radio documentary >> makes clear that he had not done so (first and last entries from this >> excerpt): > > That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 password > as well as a VM/O2 password). I disagree, your own quote shows that if it was a joint account for both, he'd only have needed the one password, whereas the Theo's transcription makes it plain that there were two. >> In brief: >> - received a text from O2 (mobile operator) saying he'd changed his >> password >> - contacted O2 straight away and told SIM had been swapped >> - told they'd stop that and send out a new SIM card, emailed to confirm >> - next morning, email from EDF (energy supplier) asking for feedback >> on recent contact with customer services >> - called EDF, told they'd pass it on to the fraud section and get back >> to him >> - nothing happened for over a week >> - called O2 again to make sure everything was stopped, put through to >> fraud department >> - just after received an email saying new SIM card had been sent out, >> connected to a different number. Queried with fraud department, said >> didn't know, need to go to an O2 shop >> - O2 shop couldn't do much as account had been stopped, couldn't look >> at it >> - told them to check his emails >> - contacted Virgin Media (ISP, merged with O2), told he'd changed his >> password, had to go through changing password back again, told they'd >> pass it to the fraud section >> >> It's difficult to deduce from this the exact ordering of events ... >> >> Because he had to contact VM to find out that he'd changed his email > > 'his password' may be 'his account password' rather than 'his email > app password'. If it is 'his account password', then that completely supports my argument, not yours, and 'his email app password' doesn't make any sense, perhaps you mean 'his email password', but, unless he has multiple email addresses under a single account with VM, of which there is no mention, why would he need a separate email password? >> password, rather than them contacting him at the time he did so, we >> can't tell when his email password was actually changed. Further, the >> scammer could have been reading his emails for a while before actually >> deciding that, as unfolding events began to suggest that the scam was >> in danger of being closed down, that it was time to change the >> password in an attempt to prolong it. Most probably his email account >> would have been compromised around the same time as all the other >> stages of the scam, yet "nothing happened for over a week" before he >> discovered it, and, in between, he received emails from both EDF and O2. >> >> However, I still think that some identifying personal information >> would have been necessary to enable the SIM swap, and most probably >> this came from the email hack occurring earlier. > -- Fake news kills! I may be contacted via the contact address given on my website: www.macfh.co.uk
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| From | Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-20 10:42 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vrgree$190g9$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147225 |
On 17/03/2025 18:44, Java Jive wrote: > On 2025-03-17 14:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >> On 17/03/2025 13:53, Java Jive wrote: >>> On 2025-03-17 08:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>>> On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: >>>>> In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to >>>>>> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the >>>>>> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original >>>>>> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap >>>>>> and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish >>>>>> everything that followed. >>>>> >>>>> Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I don't >>>>> know >>>>> whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same security >>>>> details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set of >>>>> details >>>>> gives access to both mobile and emails. >>>> >>>> "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a new >>>> Virgin Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." >>>> >>>> https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin >>> >>> But Theo's own transcription of events from the BBC Radio documentary >>> makes clear that he had not done so (first and last entries from this >>> excerpt): >> >> That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 password >> as well as a VM/O2 password). > > I disagree, your own quote shows that if it was a joint account for both, > he'd only have needed the one password, whereas the Theo's transcription > makes it plain that there were two. He would still have an O2 password, as well as a VM/02 password. (See the O2 website) >>> In brief: >>> - received a text from O2 (mobile operator) saying he'd changed his >>> password >>> - contacted O2 straight away and told SIM had been swapped >>> - told they'd stop that and send out a new SIM card, emailed to confirm >>> - next morning, email from EDF (energy supplier) asking for feedback on >>> recent contact with customer services >>> - called EDF, told they'd pass it on to the fraud section and get back >>> to him >>> - nothing happened for over a week >>> - called O2 again to make sure everything was stopped, put through to >>> fraud department >>> - just after received an email saying new SIM card had been sent out, >>> connected to a different number. Queried with fraud department, said >>> didn't know, need to go to an O2 shop >>> - O2 shop couldn't do much as account had been stopped, couldn't look at it >>> - told them to check his emails >>> - contacted Virgin Media (ISP, merged with O2), told he'd changed his >>> password, had to go through changing password back again, told they'd >>> pass it to the fraud section >>> >>> It's difficult to deduce from this the exact ordering of events ... >>> >>> Because he had to contact VM to find out that he'd changed his email >> >> 'his password' may be 'his account password' rather than 'his email app >> password'. > > If it is 'his account password', then that completely supports my argument, > not yours, and 'his email app password' doesn't make any sense, perhaps you > mean 'his email password', but, unless he has multiple email addresses > under a single account with VM, of which there is no mention, why would he > need a separate email password? VM use the term 'email app password' (see their website).
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| From | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-20 12:48 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vrh2r9$38m3v$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147311 |
On 2025-03-20 10:42, Nick Finnigan wrote: > On 17/03/2025 18:44, Java Jive wrote: >> On 2025-03-17 14:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>> On 17/03/2025 13:53, Java Jive wrote: >>>> On 2025-03-17 08:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>>>> On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: >>>>>> In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to >>>>>>> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original >>>>>>> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM >>>>>>> swap >>>>>>> and provided the initial personal information necessary to >>>>>>> accomplish >>>>>>> everything that followed. >>>>>> >>>>>> Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I >>>>>> don't know >>>>>> whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same >>>>>> security >>>>>> details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set >>>>>> of details >>>>>> gives access to both mobile and emails. >>>>> >>>>> "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a new >>>>> Virgin Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." >>>>> >>>>> https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin >>>> >>>> But Theo's own transcription of events from the BBC Radio >>>> documentary makes clear that he had not done so (first and last >>>> entries from this excerpt): >>> >>> That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 >>> password as well as a VM/O2 password). >> >> I disagree, your own quote shows that if it was a joint account for >> both, he'd only have needed the one password, whereas the Theo's >> transcription makes it plain that there were two. > > He would still have an O2 password, as well as a VM/02 password. > (See the O2 website) So I did ... https://www.virginmedia.com/support/help/linked-virgin-media-o2-id "... once you’ve done this you’ll only need to use your new Virgin Media O2 details to sign in to both My Virgin Media and My O2 (and any other online spaces you’d usually use your My Virgin Media or My O2 details to sign in to)." The above and their their login page in conjunction with Theo's transcription makes it clear that in this instance he had two separate logins for two separate accounts, because with the O2 one he was advised by a text that his password had been changed, whereas with the VM one he wasn't advised at all that his password had been changed until he tried to contact them, whereas if he's been using a single account for both, one one or the other would have applied, not both. Further, when he corrected the change of password with the first, O2, it would have applied automatically to the second, VM, as simply it would have been the same account. -- Fake news kills! I may be contacted via the contact address given on my website: www.macfh.co.uk
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| From | Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-20 13:18 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vrh4k0$190g9$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147312 |
On 20/03/2025 12:48, Java Jive wrote: > On 2025-03-20 10:42, Nick Finnigan wrote: >> On 17/03/2025 18:44, Java Jive wrote: >>> On 2025-03-17 14:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>>> On 17/03/2025 13:53, Java Jive wrote: >>>>> On 2025-03-17 08:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>>>>> On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: >>>>>>> In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No, how would he have known the answers to the security questions to >>>>>>>> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, while the >>>>>>>> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the original >>>>>>>> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the SIM swap >>>>>>>> and provided the initial personal information necessary to accomplish >>>>>>>> everything that followed. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I >>>>>>> don't know >>>>>>> whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same security >>>>>>> details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set of >>>>>>> details >>>>>>> gives access to both mobile and emails. >>>>>> >>>>>> "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a new >>>>>> Virgin Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." >>>>>> >>>>>> https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin >>>>> >>>>> But Theo's own transcription of events from the BBC Radio documentary >>>>> makes clear that he had not done so (first and last entries from this >>>>> excerpt): >>>> >>>> That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 password >>>> as well as a VM/O2 password). >>> >>> I disagree, your own quote shows that if it was a joint account for >>> both, he'd only have needed the one password, whereas the Theo's >>> transcription makes it plain that there were two. >> >> He would still have an O2 password, as well as a VM/02 password. >> (See the O2 website) > > So I did ... > > https://www.virginmedia.com/support/help/linked-virgin-media-o2-id > > "... once you’ve done this you’ll only need to use your new Virgin Media O2 > details to sign in to both My Virgin Media and My O2 (and any other online > spaces you’d usually use your My Virgin Media or My O2 details to sign in > to)." ... "We’re on a journey to becoming one company – Virgin Media O2. Temporarily your old My O2 sign in details will still work" > > The above and their their login page in conjunction with Theo's > transcription makes it clear that in this instance he had two separate > logins for two separate accounts, because with the O2 one he was advised by > a text that his password had been changed, whereas with the VM one he > wasn't advised at all that his password had been changed until he tried to > contact them, whereas if he's been using a single account for both, one one > or the other would have applied, not both. Further, when he corrected the > change of password with the first, O2, it would have applied automatically > to the second, VM, as simply it would have been the same account. >
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| From | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-20 13:27 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vrh54q$3ao67$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147313 |
On 2025-03-20 13:18, Nick Finnigan wrote: > On 20/03/2025 12:48, Java Jive wrote: >> On 2025-03-20 10:42, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>> On 17/03/2025 18:44, Java Jive wrote: >>>> On 2025-03-17 14:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>>>> On 17/03/2025 13:53, Java Jive wrote: >>>>>> On 2025-03-17 08:53, Nick Finnigan wrote: >>>>>>> On 16/03/2025 18:00, Theo wrote: >>>>>>>> In uk.telecom.mobile Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> No, how would he have known the answers to the security >>>>>>>>> questions to >>>>>>>>> enable the SIM swap, and his emails were from Virgin Media, >>>>>>>>> while the >>>>>>>>> SIM was from O2. Although not initially, my reading of the >>>>>>>>> original >>>>>>>>> article is now unambiguously that the email hack preceded the >>>>>>>>> SIM swap >>>>>>>>> and provided the initial personal information necessary to >>>>>>>>> accomplish >>>>>>>>> everything that followed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Virgin Media O2 are one company - VM and O2 merged June 2021. I >>>>>>>> don't know >>>>>>>> whether they have merged customer accounts such that the same >>>>>>>> security >>>>>>>> details are used for both. In which case it may be that one set >>>>>>>> of details >>>>>>>> gives access to both mobile and emails. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "If you've linked your Virgin Media and O2 details to create a >>>>>>> new Virgin Media O2 ID, sign in with it here." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> https://accounts.o2.co.uk/signin >>>>>> >>>>>> But Theo's own transcription of events from the BBC Radio >>>>>> documentary makes clear that he had not done so (first and last >>>>>> entries from this excerpt): >>>>> >>>>> That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 >>>>> password as well as a VM/O2 password). >>>> >>>> I disagree, your own quote shows that if it was a joint account for >>>> both, he'd only have needed the one password, whereas the Theo's >>>> transcription makes it plain that there were two. >>> >>> He would still have an O2 password, as well as a VM/02 password. >>> (See the O2 website) >> >> So I did ... >> >> https://www.virginmedia.com/support/help/linked-virgin-media-o2-id >> >> "... once you’ve done this you’ll only need to use your new Virgin >> Media O2 details to sign in to both My Virgin Media and My O2 (and any >> other online spaces you’d usually use your My Virgin Media or My O2 >> details to sign in to)." > > ... "We’re on a journey to becoming one company – Virgin Media O2. > Temporarily your old My O2 sign in details will still work" Sure, but that general statement doesn't say anything about this particular case. The facts of this particular case show that he had two separate accounts with two separate logins, as in ... >> The above and their their login page in conjunction with Theo's >> transcription makes it clear that in this instance he had two separate >> logins for two separate accounts, because with the O2 one he was >> advised by a text that his password had been changed, whereas with the >> VM one he wasn't advised at all that his password had been changed >> until he tried to contact them, whereas if he's been using a single >> account for both, one one or the other would have applied, not both. >> Further, when he corrected the change of password with the first, O2, >> it would have applied automatically to the second, VM, as simply it >> would have been the same account. ... and I note that you do not attempt to answer this point. Expect any further replies to be ignored unless you can come up with something both relevant and convincing for this particular case. -- Fake news kills! I may be contacted via the contact address given on my website: www.macfh.co.uk
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| From | Nick Finnigan <nix@genie.co.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-20 14:28 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vrh8mu$190g9$3@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147314 |
On 20/03/2025 13:27, Java Jive wrote: >>>>>> That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 >>>>>> password as well as a VM/O2 password). > Expect any further replies to be ignored unless you can come up with > something both relevant and convincing for this particular case. There is nothing convincing, that was my point.
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| From | Andy Burns <usenet@andyburns.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-20 16:02 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <m42shcFqo2qU2@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #147316 |
On 20/03/2025 14:28, Nick Finnigan wrote: > On 20/03/2025 13:27, Java Jive wrote: > >>>>>>> That does not make it clear to me (he would still have an O2 >>>>>>> password as well as a VM/O2 password). > >> Expect any further replies to be ignored unless you can come up with >> something both relevant and convincing for this particular case. > > There is nothing convincing, that was my point. Hasn't this thread reached a point yet where everybody realises they'll never know what actually happened?
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| From | Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-20 13:00 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <vrhhi2$3li94$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147319 |
On 3/20/2025 12:02 PM, Andy Burns wrote:
>
> Hasn't this thread reached a point yet where everybody realises they'll
> never know what actually happened?
>
I keep thinking that, too. I wonder whether maybe the story
was deliberately obfuscated so as not to provide clear instructions
to scammers.
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| From | Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 11:54 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <vr6s5s$2303s$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147178 |
On 3/16/2025 9:47 AM, Java Jive wrote:
> and went on to hack ...". Further, if you reread the original report in
> its entirety, how would he have persuaded EDF to give up the victim's
> mobile number without personal identifying information that came from
> access to his emails?
"
EDF explained the fraudster had his name and email address and had asked
EDF to give them his mobile number, which the company did.
"I said, 'Why would you do that?' They said the person had gone through
security. 'With a name and email address', I asked?," he said.
"EDF said, 'Yes' - and then offered me a £50 goodwill gesture to close
the case.
"
You seem determined to not know the facts. So that you
can feel safe using 2FA?
> Next, how would he have been able to confirm the
> request for a replacement SIM without being able to reply to the
> confirmatory email?
>
As far as I can see, that part is not in the article. O2 never
details exactly how the SIM swap happened. The article is not
clear about all the details. Did the scammer have access to
security question answers? Was he just a smooth talker? I
don't see anyplace where that's mentioned. It's possible the email
was hacked first, but that's never stated. The implication is that
based on having some personal data, the scammer was able to
do a SIM swap. Once that's done, getting into the email is easy
because 2FA is a weak link.
There are lots of holes in these operations. Last year, twice
someone tried to get a credit card in my name. They were only
stopped because my credit record is frozen. So Chase bank
wrote me a letter saying, "Your new card is reay as soon as
you unfreeze your creidt record." I wondered how this could work.
How does the scammer actually get the card using my name and
address? I was told that once the card is approved they call up
and say they've changed their address. And the bank allows
that! So the card gets sent to them.
I think that's the critical point here: Security and convenience
are at odds with each other. If you lose your phone then you
want to get a new one quick. If you forget your email password
then you want to get around that quick. Ditto for CCs. So companies
are faced with finding a compromise between security and
convenience.
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| From | Java Jive <java@evij.com.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2025-03-16 16:09 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <vr6t49$23f7c$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #147182 |
On 2025-03-16 15:54, Newyana2 wrote: > On 3/16/2025 9:47 AM, Java Jive wrote: > >> and went on to hack ...". Further, if you reread the original report >> in its entirety, how would he have persuaded EDF to give up the >> victim's mobile number without personal identifying information that >> came from access to his emails? > > " > EDF explained the fraudster had his name and email address and had asked > EDF to give them his mobile number, which the company did. > > "I said, 'Why would you do that?' They said the person had gone through > security. 'With a name and email address', I asked?," he said. > > "EDF said, 'Yes' - and then offered me a £50 goodwill gesture to close > the case. > " Which supports my ordering of events. >> Next, how would he have been able to confirm the request for a >> replacement SIM without being able to reply to the confirmatory email? Theo has replied about this, I accept that there may not have been a confirmatory email, but there must have been some other identifying information available to enable the SIM swap scam to occur. > I think that's the critical point here: Security and convenience > are at odds with each other. If you lose your phone then you > want to get a new one quick. If you forget your email password > then you want to get around that quick. Ditto for CCs. So companies > are faced with finding a compromise between security and > convenience. Yes, we can agree on that. -- Fake news kills! I may be contacted via the contact address given on my website: www.macfh.co.uk
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