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Groups > alt.comp.os.windows-10 > #181614
| From | Paul <nospam@needed.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | alt.comp.os.windows-10 |
| Subject | Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 |
| Date | 2025-01-20 14:32 -0500 |
| Organization | A noiseless patient Spider |
| Message-ID | <vmm8c4$3clor$1@dont-email.me> (permalink) |
| References | <vmlk1t$35lk3$1@dont-email.me> <vmlokq$37d3t$1@dont-email.me> |
On Mon, 1/20/2025 10:04 AM, Newyana2 wrote: > > An interesting side note: Windows Update Blocker does a good > job of stopping Windows Update, despite the built-in tricks to > re-enable it. I'm not sure how it works, but I suspect it's changing > permissions on the Registry keys, so that only Administrators > can change them. The highest level of permission, is a Registry key owned by TrustedInstaller. That is the owner that malware uses, when it injects a key into your Registry. That's how you know "kwality", is when a malware does a thing, it must be double-plus-good way of doing it :-) Administrator or SYSTEM account ownership of keys, might be considered a tiny bit weaker. The purpose of Administrator, is to "impersonate" other accounts. administrator is not royalty, it's merely "our man in Istanbul". A useful account to know. Now the bad news. Security has been improved on the OS. Sysinternals "psexec" no longer works. Similarly, the two utilities I have, one of which elevates a Command Prompt window to the TrustedInstaller token, those no longer work either. This means, if someone asks you to remove a malware registry entry today, there's no way to do it! Unless you know someone who has hacked a new version of such code. the simplest explanation for this, is some privilege of the Administrator Group has been modified, as it's not obvious that Windows Defender is running interference on this issue. It's not a heuristic gun battle. the machine is relatively quiet when these "features" fail to work. The TrustedInstaller token is copied from msiexec or something. To utilize the TrustedInstaller capability, you have to start the installer service, and within five seconds or so, run the utility that will copy the token. The utility can then elevate a new process such as cmd.exe and it then runs with the actual highest permissions on the machine. That, at least, is how it used to work. I that cmd.exe, you could type "regedit" and then reach in and remove a malware key protected by TrustedInstaller. (These are decorative keys which no longer do anything, but the presence of the key might set off AVG and it raises a stink unless you remove the key. That is a typical reason for removing a Malware key. There is no point removing a Malware key if the malware is resident and in control of the machine.) If they keep gunning down these utilities, if they keep plugging osk.exe holes, then the OS really will be a "secure piece of crap". Then the scenario will arise, where you'll be locked out of the machine via a local account problem, and there will be no recovery path for you. I helped someone in another group, recover their administrator (they had a "problem" they had trouble explaining to me, where suddenly they had no administrator account), and I used one of those osk.exe methods to get them a cmd.exe that was running as real administrator, and from there it was possible to make a regular account belong to the Administrator Group and that put them back in control of their machine. Well, if I want to do that today, there may be one remaining method, but I'm certainly not going to tell you what that method is, even if I knew, in a public space. That would be an email recipe only We cannot raise the profile of these methods, or Microsoft will expunge them. You can still use Kali to crack a local account, as far as I know. Or use one of the other recipes for flattening a password. but if you've lost all your Administrator accounts, all the password flattening in the world is not going to help you then. Only if the Real Administrator was enabled, would you have "something to crack" :-) The OS has changed significantly, in the last couple of years, in terms of security posture. The casual insecurity is almost gone. They've been cleaning up the driver exploits too. I was told by Defender to remove Asus Ai Suite driver, which I did. As no purpose is served in the OS, by leaving malware-exploitable drivers in System32 area. Paul
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More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 "John C." <r9jmg0@yahoo.com> - 2025-01-20 05:45 -0800
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-01-20 10:04 -0500
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 Paul <nospam@needed.invalid> - 2025-01-20 14:32 -0500
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-01-20 17:22 -0500
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 Paul <nospam@needed.invalid> - 2025-01-20 21:24 -0500
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-01-20 22:28 -0500
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 wasbit <wasbit@nowhere.com> - 2025-01-21 09:41 +0000
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 Newyana2 <newyana@invalid.nospam> - 2025-01-21 08:21 -0500
Re: More on disabling unneeded services in Windows 10 Marion <marion@facts.com> - 2025-01-20 16:35 +0000
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