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Groups > linux.kernel > #1617337
| From | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode |
| Date | 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tsZzk-7hF-31@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tsZzj-7hF-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 |
UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware will
only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may also
require that all kernel modules also be signed. Add a configuration option
that to lock down the kernel - which includes requiring validly signed
modules - if the kernel is secure-booted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 8 +++++++-
2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index cc98d5a294ee..21f39855661d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1817,6 +1817,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
If unsure, say N.
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+ def_bool n
+ depends on EFI
+ prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+ ---help---
+ UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+ will only load signed bootloaders and kernels. Certain use cases may
+ also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
+ userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
+ image. Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
+ system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
config SECCOMP
def_bool y
prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 396285bddb93..85dfa745c442 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include <linux/crash_dump.h>
#include <linux/tboot.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <video/edid.h>
@@ -1185,7 +1186,12 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
break;
case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
- pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
+ lock_kernel_down();
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down\n");
+ } else {
+ pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+ }
break;
default:
pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");
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[PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> - 2017-04-06 14:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-04-06 14:50 +0200
[PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> - 2017-04-07 12:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 15:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> - 2017-04-09 13:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-10 15:20 +0200
[PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 05:10 +0200
[PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
[PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 01:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> - 2017-04-06 08:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-06 11:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com> - 2017-04-08 05:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-06 09:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 05:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 05:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 08:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 09:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 09:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 10:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 10:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 09:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 10:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 09:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 09:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 11:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 14:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-10 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2017-04-07 18:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Justin Forbes <jmforbes@linuxtx.org> - 2017-04-07 18:40 +0200
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