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Groups > linux.kernel > #1619482
| From | Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down |
| Date | 2017-04-09 13:20 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tuj2V-24s-1@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tsZzj-7hF-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <tsZzl-7hF-39@gated-at.bofh.it> <ttzjr-5Oz-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <ttBEC-7cJ-17@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 3:50 PM, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> wrote: > >> > From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> >> > >> > We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given >> > machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be >> > manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the >> > kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if the >> > kernel is locked down. >> >> > + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) >> > + return -EPERM; >> >> It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel >> can't serve become a driver burden. >> Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead? > > Fix it with debugfs how? We can't offload the decision to userspace. I mean to do at least similar like you have done for module parameters. So, instead of putting above code to each attribute in question make a special (marked) attribute instead and debugfs framework will know how to deal with that. -- With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko
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[PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> - 2017-04-06 14:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-04-06 14:50 +0200
[PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> - 2017-04-07 12:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 15:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> - 2017-04-09 13:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-10 15:20 +0200
[PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 05:10 +0200
[PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
[PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
[PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 01:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> - 2017-04-06 08:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-06 11:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com> - 2017-04-08 05:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-06 09:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: Disable when the kernel is locked down "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-04-06 22:20 +0200
[PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-05 22:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 05:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 05:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 08:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 09:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 09:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 10:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 10:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 09:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 10:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 09:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 09:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-07 11:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2017-04-07 14:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-04-10 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2017-04-07 18:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Justin Forbes <jmforbes@linuxtx.org> - 2017-04-07 18:40 +0200
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