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Groups > linux.kernel > #1679079
| From | Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID |
| Date | 2017-06-30 21:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tY9VL-16Y-3@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tY9M6-13z-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote: > Hi! > > I noticed that nf_conntrack leaks kernel addresses, it uses the memory address > as identifier used for generating conntrack and expect ids.. > Since these ids are also visible to unprivileged users via network namespaces > I suggest reverting these commits: Why not use a hash of the address?
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nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> - 2017-06-30 21:30 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> - 2017-06-30 21:40 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> - 2017-06-30 21:50 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> - 2017-06-30 22:00 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> - 2017-06-30 22:30 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> - 2017-07-01 11:50 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> - 2017-07-01 12:40 +0200
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