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Groups > linux.kernel > #1679116
| From | Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID |
| Date | 2017-06-30 22:30 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tYaI9-1Ck-11@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tY9M6-13z-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <tY9VL-16Y-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <tYa5r-1ah-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <tYaf7-1dM-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
Florian, Am 30.06.2017 um 21:55 schrieb Florian Westphal: >>> Why not use a hash of the address? >> >> Would also work. Or xor it with a random number. >> >> On the other hand, for user space it would be more useful when the conntrack id >> does not repeat that often. That's why I favor the good old counter method. >> Currently the conntrack id is reused very fast. >> e.g. in one of our applications we use the conntack id via NFQUEUE and watch the >> destroy events via conntrack. It happens regularly that a new connection has the >> same id than a different connection we saw some moments before, before we receive >> the destroy event from the conntrack socket. > > Perhaps we can place that in a new extension (its not needed in any > fastpath ops)? To get rid of the infoleak we have to re-introduce the id field in struct nf_conn and struct nf_conntrack_expect. Otherwise have nothing to compare against in the conntrack/expect remove case. So the only question is what to store, IMHO a counter that can wrap around is the cheapest method and would also not harm the fast-path. Thanks, //richard
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nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> - 2017-06-30 21:30 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> - 2017-06-30 21:40 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> - 2017-06-30 21:50 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> - 2017-06-30 22:00 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> - 2017-06-30 22:30 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> - 2017-07-01 11:50 +0200
Re: nf_conntrack: Infoleak via CTA_ID and CTA_EXPECT_ID Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> - 2017-07-01 12:40 +0200
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