Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using

From	Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Newsgroups	linux.kernel
Subject	Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Date	2017-06-08 06:00 +0200
Message-ID	<tPWM1-7mY-3@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
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On Wed, 2017-06-07 at 18:26 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 01:00:25PM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
> > > On the better bootloaders, an initramfs segment can be loaded
> > > independently (and you can have as many as required), which makes
> > > an
> > > early_initramfs a more palatable vector to inject large amounts of
> > > entropy into the next boot than, say, modifying the kernel image
> > > directly at every boot/shutdown to stash entropy in there
> > > somewhere.
> 
> [...]
>  
> > I didn't really understand the device tree approach and mentioned a
> > few times before. Passing via the kernel cmdline is a lot simpler
> > than
> > modifying the device tree in-memory and persistent modification
> > isn't
> > an option unless verified boot is missing anyway.
> 
> I might be missing something here, but the command line is inside of
> the
> device tree, at /chosen/bootargs, so modifying the kernel command line
> *is* modifying the device tree in-memory.
> 
> For arm64, we have a /chosen/kaslr-seed property that we hope
> FW/bootloaders fill in, and similar could be done for some initial
> entropy, provided appropriate HW/FW support.
> 
> Thanks,
> Mark.

I was assuming it was simpler since bootloaders are already setting it,
but it seems I'm wrong about that.

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Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-06-07 19:10 +0200
  Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> - 2017-06-07 19:30 +0200
    Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-06-08 06:00 +0200

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