Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using

From	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Newsgroups	linux.kernel
Subject	Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using
Date	2017-06-07 19:30 +0200
Message-ID	<tPMWl-17W-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References	(4 earlier) <tPeBj-42I-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <tPlWb-lw-57@gated-at.bofh.it> <tPq9t-3eA-29@gated-at.bofh.it> <tPuZr-6kh-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <tPMD0-11z-15@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization	linux.* mail to news gateway

Show all headers | View raw

On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 01:00:25PM -0400, Daniel Micay wrote:
> > On the better bootloaders, an initramfs segment can be loaded
> > independently (and you can have as many as required), which makes an
> > early_initramfs a more palatable vector to inject large amounts of
> > entropy into the next boot than, say, modifying the kernel image
> > directly at every boot/shutdown to stash entropy in there somewhere.

[...]

> I didn't really understand the device tree approach and mentioned a
> few times before. Passing via the kernel cmdline is a lot simpler than
> modifying the device tree in-memory and persistent modification isn't
> an option unless verified boot is missing anyway.

I might be missing something here, but the command line is inside of the
device tree, at /chosen/bootargs, so modifying the kernel command line
*is* modifying the device tree in-memory.

For arm64, we have a /chosen/kaslr-seed property that we hope
FW/bootloaders fill in, and similar could be done for some initial
entropy, provided appropriate HW/FW support.

Thanks,
Mark.

Thread

[PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> - 2017-06-06 03:00 +0200
  Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before  using Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2017-06-06 05:10 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> - 2017-06-06 06:00 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> - 2017-06-06 06:50 +0200
        Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> - 2017-06-06 14:40 +0200
          Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> - 2017-06-06 17:30 +0200
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> - 2017-06-06 19:30 +0200
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> - 2017-06-06 19:40 +0200
          Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2017-06-06 19:10 +0200
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> - 2017-06-06 19:30 +0200
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2017-06-06 20:00 +0200
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> - 2017-06-06 20:10 +0200
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br> - 2017-06-07 00:20 +0200
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2017-06-07 01:20 +0200
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before using Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2017-06-07 07:10 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br> - 2017-06-07 16:50 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2017-06-07 23:30 +0200
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-06-07 19:10 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> - 2017-06-07 19:30 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-06-08 06:00 +0200
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that  the RNG is ready before using Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> - 2017-06-07 19:40 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v3 04/13] crypto/rng: ensure that the RNG is ready before  using Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org> - 2017-06-08 14:10 +0200

csiph-web