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Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random

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On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 09:04:02AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 7:04 AM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote:
> > On machines with sizeof(unsigned long)==8, this ensures that the more
> > significant 32 bits of stack_canary are random, too.
> > stack_canary is defined as unsigned long, all the architectures with stack
> > protector support already pick the stack_canary of init as a random
> > unsigned long, and get_random_long() should be as fast as get_random_int(),
> > so there seems to be no good reason against this.
> >
> > This should help if someone tries to guess a stack canary with brute force.
> >
> > (This change has been made in PaX already, with a different RNG.)
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
> 
> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> 
> (A separate change might be to make sure that the leading byte is
> zeroed. Entropy of the value, I think, is less important than blocking
> canary exposures from unbounded str* functions. Brute forcing kernel
> stack canaries isn't like it bruting them in userspace...)

Yeah, makes sense. Especially on 64bit, 56 bits of entropy ought to be
enough anyway.

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[PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 15:10 +0100
  Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-10-31 17:10 +0100
    Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 17:30 +0100
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 21:50 +0100
        Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 22:00 +0100
        Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:00 +0100
          Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:10 +0100
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 22:20 +0100
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 22:40 +0100
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary  random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 23:10 +0100
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 23:20 +0100

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