Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1512677
| Path | csiph.com!weretis.net!feeder4.news.weretis.net!news.mixmin.net!aioe.org!gothmog.csi.it!bofh.it!news.nic.it!robomod |
|---|---|
| From | Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> |
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random |
| Date | Mon, 31 Oct 2016 17:30:01 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <synDb-4Pf-9@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <sylrH-3r1-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <synjQ-4H2-31@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| X-Original-To | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
| Dkim-Signature | v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=thejh.net; s=s2016; t=1477931361; bh=oUojc8U3q54kNZyYF9Tm2xMrQst4MP/KALXitr88MmU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=e6zVgqFpF+5Lgk0rKTWAQiAHD+3yXXjPoxwphvMQ7O62a7sWi7JrHcUKIjkIT9fTM yxo/k2IfBUy1SfdmAceWREhr9lDA4Gnk/B0e+PU9qRS5arCTaftqxantLmgoB5q5AO FiJ5jjXED6mbgtoMFxZ1B1QTN5oaA0JQ2ZLH4bvBjqwYNREroOwpL/KKKLGLG7Gl/W CakC7y0qwjYvl5qD4a+7LEvKXnqjLDctDMTiyWPTNwTcZeBUMLgCaIaS/mdkxbM4ES ixKTp95Em+7kGZQXniNq8Ve2aIu00fazZEop5r8JuAiAQ2pL/pN41ywJvzSJF9oBG4 hVwAPQMuFnGqA== |
| MIME-Version | 1.0 |
| Content-Type | multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="82I3+IH0IqGh5yIs" |
| Content-Disposition | inline |
| User-Agent | Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) |
| Sender | robomod@news.nic.it |
| List-ID | <linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org> |
| X-Mailing-List | linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org |
| Approved | robomod@news.nic.it |
| Lines | 58 |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
| X-Original-Cc | Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> |
| X-Original-Date | Mon, 31 Oct 2016 17:29:18 +0100 |
| X-Original-Message-ID | <20161031162918.GA2994@pc.thejh.net> |
| X-Original-References | <1477922641-2221-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net> <CAGXu5j+Hz=AmmTAh3+QOv1wTG3HA60LPK0Dq6F8uybNQ5e+sHw@mail.gmail.com> |
| X-Original-Sender | linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org |
| Xref | csiph.com linux.kernel:1512677 |
Show key headers only | View raw
[Multipart message — attachments visible in raw view] - view raw
On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 09:04:02AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Mon, Oct 31, 2016 at 7:04 AM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote: > > On machines with sizeof(unsigned long)==8, this ensures that the more > > significant 32 bits of stack_canary are random, too. > > stack_canary is defined as unsigned long, all the architectures with stack > > protector support already pick the stack_canary of init as a random > > unsigned long, and get_random_long() should be as fast as get_random_int(), > > so there seems to be no good reason against this. > > > > This should help if someone tries to guess a stack canary with brute force. > > > > (This change has been made in PaX already, with a different RNG.) > > > > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> > > Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > (A separate change might be to make sure that the leading byte is > zeroed. Entropy of the value, I think, is less important than blocking > canary exposures from unbounded str* functions. Brute forcing kernel > stack canaries isn't like it bruting them in userspace...) Yeah, makes sense. Especially on 64bit, 56 bits of entropy ought to be enough anyway.
Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Next in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread
[PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 15:10 +0100
Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-10-31 17:10 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 17:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 21:50 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 22:00 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:00 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:10 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 22:20 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 22:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 22:40 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-10-31 23:10 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de> - 2016-10-31 23:20 +0100
csiph-web