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Groups > linux.kernel > #1386075
| From | Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach |
| Date | 2016-04-25 10:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rrJB0-20d-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <rqj5U-6Uw-13@gated-at.bofh.it> <rqmwP-1cP-31@gated-at.bofh.it> <rqoyD-2LH-33@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 5:16 PM, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> wrote: >> > ... DRBG is “minimally” seeded with 112^6 bits of entropy. >> > This is commonly achieved even before user space is initiated. >> >> Unfortunately one of the issues of the /dev/urandom interface is the >> fact that it may start providing random numbers even before the >> seeding is complete. From the above quote, I understand that this >> issue is not addressed by the new interface. That's a serious >> limitation (of the current and inherited by the new implementation), >> since most/all newly deployed systems from "cloud" images generate >> keys using /dev/urandom (for sshd for example) on boot, and it is >> unknown to these applications whether they operate with uninitialized >> seed. > One more item to consider: If you do not want to change to use getrandom(2), > the LRNG provides you with another means. The main problem is not about willing to switch to getrandom() or not, but finding any system where getrandom() exists. Today due to libc not having the call, we can only use /dev/urandom and applications would most likely continue to do so long time after getrandom() is introduced to libc. regards, Nikos
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[RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-21 11:30 +0200
[PATCH 4/6] crypto: LRNG - enable compile Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-21 11:30 +0200
[PATCH 5/6] crypto: LRNG - hook LRNG into interrupt handler Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-21 11:30 +0200
[PATCH 1/6] crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-21 11:30 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-21 15:10 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> - 2016-04-21 15:10 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-21 17:20 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> - 2016-04-25 10:00 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-25 10:10 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org> - 2016-04-25 10:30 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-04-26 03:20 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-04-22 05:00 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-22 07:10 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com> - 2016-04-22 15:20 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2016-04-24 17:30 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-24 19:40 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2016-04-24 23:30 +0200
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/6] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-04-25 07:20 +0200
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