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Groups > comp.programming > #5612
| From | Johannes Bauer <dfnsonfsduifb@gmx.de> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | comp.programming |
| Subject | Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV |
| Date | 2015-08-08 15:25 +0200 |
| Organization | albasani.net |
| Message-ID | <mq5008$6ev$1@news.albasani.net> (permalink) |
| References | <mq1nsl$b1r$1@news.albasani.net> <20150807074449.236@kylheku.com> <mq2p8j$99k$1@news.albasani.net> <mq4dlh$4os$1@news.albasani.net> <mq4f1o$72l$1@news.albasani.net> |
On 08.08.2015 10:36, Mok-Kong Shen wrote: > Oh, I don't remember to have ever claimed that "somehow an RSA-CSPRNG > would be a prerequisite or the only way to generate RSA keys"!! Could > you please quote me? "there would have been a vicious circle in implementation" No. There isn't. Because RSA-CSPRNG is not the only way to generate RSA keys. Therefore no "vicious cycle". > You seem also to be an expert in issues of entropy. Could you please > read my answer to Kylheku, just sent, and eventually provide answers > to points that he may not sufficiently cover in his next post? The posting is so full of errors that it makes my stomach turn. It starts with the fact that you don't even know what the blocksize of AES-128 vs. AES-256 is. Hint: They're identical. Then you continue to say that the output entropy would be half the output bits. How do you arrive at this conclusion? It is clearly an obviosly false. If AES were an ideal block cipher, the amount of output entropy would be the output blocksize. 128 bits for AES. Then you seem to assume that nonces are reused. They is not. CTR mode of operation is not safe when nonces are reused, this is a blantly obvious fact. One that even stands in every textbook should you ever read one. If counters are not reused and AES were a perfect block cipher, there is no correlation between outputs. Your whole conclusion therefore makes zero sense. Your amateurish understanding of cryptography combined with the stubborness on completely obvious topics makes for a dangerous combination. Cheers, Johannes -- >> Wo hattest Du das Beben nochmal GENAU vorhergesagt? > Zumindest nicht öffentlich! Ah, der neueste und bis heute genialste Streich unsere großen Kosmologen: Die Geheim-Vorhersage. - Karl Kaos über Rüdiger Thomas in dsa <hidbv3$om2$1@speranza.aioe.org>
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JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-07 09:48 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Johannes Bauer <dfnsonfsduifb@gmx.de> - 2015-08-07 09:57 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-07 14:03 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Kaz Kylheku <kaz@kylheku.com> - 2015-08-07 15:05 +0000
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-07 18:20 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Kaz Kylheku <kaz@kylheku.com> - 2015-08-07 14:51 +0000
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-07 19:18 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Kaz Kylheku <kaz@kylheku.com> - 2015-08-07 21:57 +0000
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-08 10:25 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Johannes Bauer <dfnsonfsduifb@gmx.de> - 2015-08-08 19:57 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-08 22:14 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Johannes Bauer <dfnsonfsduifb@gmx.de> - 2015-08-09 12:23 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-09 22:04 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-09 22:08 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Richard Heathfield <rjh@cpax.org.uk> - 2015-08-11 17:15 +0100
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Johannes Bauer <dfnsonfsduifb@gmx.de> - 2015-08-08 10:12 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-08 10:36 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Johannes Bauer <dfnsonfsduifb@gmx.de> - 2015-08-08 15:25 +0200
Re: JTRIG, SIGDEV Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@t-online.de> - 2015-08-08 22:15 +0200
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