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Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box

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  Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2025-11-28 20:41 -0600
    Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Kaz Kylheku <046-301-5902@kylheku.com> - 2025-11-29 02:58 +0000
      Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2025-11-28 21:25 -0600
        Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Kaz Kylheku <046-301-5902@kylheku.com> - 2025-11-29 04:17 +0000
          Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2025-11-28 23:05 -0600
            Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Kaz Kylheku <046-301-5902@kylheku.com> - 2025-11-29 05:52 +0000
              Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2025-11-29 08:20 -0600
                Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Kaz Kylheku <046-301-5902@kylheku.com> - 2025-11-29 20:39 +0000
                  Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2025-11-29 14:56 -0600
                    Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Richard Damon <Richard@Damon-Family.org> - 2025-11-29 16:34 -0500
                      Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box dart200 <user7160@newsgrouper.org.invalid> - 2025-11-29 14:16 -0800
                        Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Richard Damon <Richard@Damon-Family.org> - 2025-11-29 20:05 -0500
                    Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Kaz Kylheku <046-301-5902@kylheku.com> - 2025-11-29 21:53 +0000
                      Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2025-11-29 16:01 -0600
                        Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Kaz Kylheku <046-301-5902@kylheku.com> - 2025-11-29 22:57 +0000
                          Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2025-11-29 17:24 -0600
                            Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Richard Damon <Richard@Damon-Family.org> - 2025-11-29 20:08 -0500
                        Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box Richard Damon <Richard@Damon-Family.org> - 2025-11-29 20:07 -0500

#641377 — Re: Done with Olcott. --- Kaz cannot think outside the box

On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> In Message ID <I8ednT5676UOvjT9nZ2dnUU7-SPNnZ2d@giganews.com>, Peter
> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
> analysis.
> 
> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere else.
> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
> PO: am saying is incorrect.
> 
> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
> 

*Kaz cannot think outside the box*

Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, named after mathematicians Ernst Zermelo 
and Abraham Fraenkel
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory

Could think outside the box, otherwise Russell's Paradox
would still prove undecidability.

> In a pointless followup, ID <Ar-dnTUoNf4VOTf9nZ2dnUU7-T_NnZ2d@giganews.com>
> adds:
> 
> PO: The whole diagonalization thing is gibberish to me unless it only shows
> PO: that incorrect questions do not have correct answers.
> 
> There is no point in discussing halting (or anything else) with someone
> who thinks diagonalization is gibberish, and acknowledges that he's
> being incorrect according to "conventional analysis".
> 
> Even if it made sense to follow "unconventional analysis" it would have
> to be rigorously pinned down and subsequently adhered to. (I suspect,
> that very change would render it conventional, and therefore
> unpalatable).  As it stands, the "uncoventional analysis" consists of
> religious-like faith to some consistency doctrine, combined with the
> rhetorical strategy of insisting "I am right" using whatever bit of
> made-up nonsense that vaguely connects the intuition to the current
> conversation thread.
> 

Welcome to SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4)
SWI-Prolog comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. This is free software.
Please run ?- license. for legal details.

% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

% This sentence cannot be proven in F
?- G = not(provable(F, G)).
G = not(provable(F, G)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.

BEGIN:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)
Finally, a note about how Prolog matching sometimes differs from the
unification used in Resolution. Most Prolog systems will allow you to
satisfy goals like:

equal(X, X).
?- equal(foo(Y), Y).

that is, they will allow you to match a term against an uninstantiated
subterm of itself. In this example, foo(Y) is matched against Y,
which appears within it. As a result, Y will stand for foo(Y), which is
foo(foo(Y)) (because of what Y stands for), which is foo(foo(foo(Y))),
and so on. So Y ends up standing for some kind of infinite structure.
END:(Clocksin & Mellish 2003:254)


-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

[toc] | [next] | [standalone]

#641378

On 2025-11-29, olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> wrote:
> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> In Message ID <I8ednT5676UOvjT9nZ2dnUU7-SPNnZ2d@giganews.com>, Peter
>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>> analysis.
>> 
>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere else.
>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>> 
>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>
> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*

Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
if I can help it. Only by accident.

The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
I avoid magical/wishful thinking.

> Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, named after mathematicians Ernst Zermelo 
> and Abraham Fraenkel
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory
>
> Could think outside the box, otherwise Russell's Paradox
> would still prove undecidability.

1. Meaningless appeal to authority.

2. While we are appealing to authorities, you are not worth a pimple
on the ass of these gentlemen. What it means for you to think outside
the box is qualitatively different from how they thought outside of
the box.

>> PO: The whole diagonalization thing is gibberish to me unless it only shows

Great, quote yourself being an idiot some years ago! Yay!

> Welcome to SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4)
> SWI-Prolog comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. This is free software.
> Please run ?- license. for legal details.
>
> % This sentence is not true.
> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).

Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
a diagonal argument.

Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.

So, indeed, yes, the "whole diagonalization thing is gibberish" to you.

Or should we say, it is outside of your tiny box.

-- 
TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#641379

On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> wrote:
>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> In Message ID <I8ednT5676UOvjT9nZ2dnUU7-SPNnZ2d@giganews.com>, Peter
>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>> analysis.
>>>
>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere else.
>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>
>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>
>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
> 
> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
> if I can help it. Only by accident.
> 

Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
the preconceived notions of others.

> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
> 

Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
as inherently erroneous.

If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.

>> Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, named after mathematicians Ernst Zermelo
>> and Abraham Fraenkel
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo%E2%80%93Fraenkel_set_theory
>>
>> Could think outside the box, otherwise Russell's Paradox
>> would still prove undecidability.
> 
> 1. Meaningless appeal to authority.
> 

No it is an isomorphism. Russell's Paradox specified
the same incoherence of self-reference.

Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell%27s_paradox

I figured out the best isomorphism for that years ago.
A can of soup that so totally contains itself such that
it has no outside surface.

Let LP be the set of all sentences that are true
when they are false and false when they are true.

> 2. While we are appealing to authorities, you are not worth a pimple
> on the ass of these gentlemen. What it means for you to think outside
> the box is qualitatively different from how they thought outside of
> the box.
> 
>>> PO: The whole diagonalization thing is gibberish to me unless it only shows
> 
> Great, quote yourself being an idiot some years ago! Yay!
> 
>> Welcome to SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4)
>> SWI-Prolog comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. This is free software.
>> Please run ?- license. for legal details.
>>
>> % This sentence is not true.
>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
> 
> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
> a diagonal argument.
> 

It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
is not a proposition. This has never been done before.

> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
> 

The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent

> So, indeed, yes, the "whole diagonalization thing is gibberish" to you.
> 
> Or should we say, it is outside of your tiny box.
> 

By gibberish I mean provably semantically unsound, not
that I don't understand it more deeply than most everyone.

-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#641381

On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> wrote:
>>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>> In Message ID <I8ednT5676UOvjT9nZ2dnUU7-SPNnZ2d@giganews.com>, Peter
>>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
>>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>>> analysis.
>>>>
>>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere else.
>>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
>>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>>
>>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>>
>>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
>> 
>> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
>> if I can help it. Only by accident.
>> 
>
> Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
> the preconceived notions of others.

You're one of the others from where I'm standing.

You're one of those others who just say, "don't critically
examine what I say, just accept it".

So, no, I don't take preconceived notions from /such/ others, sorry;
I'm picky about my others.

Sometimes others put together a coherent set of assumptions.
Then within those assumptions they work out a result.

No, I can't refute their /reasoning/ by choosing other assumptions.

Your modus operandi is to reject (or, more usually, fundamentally
misunderstand) the assumptions and then call the reasoning wrong since
it doesn't follow from your distorted or replaced version of the
assumptions.

>> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
>> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
>> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
>> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
>> 
>
> Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
> viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
> as inherently erroneous.

Using the same same name for two different entities, in the same
argument, while pretending they are one entity, is not a "usefully
unconventional" mode of operating. So no, I cannot adopt that from you.

> If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
> I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
> of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
> incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.

Even if that somehow were achieved, you would only be choosing
different assumptions from which to work, and not challenging
any results based on their respective assumptions.

(And at that leve, you would /know/ this and refrain from
insisting that results in a framework of different assumptions
were wrongly reasoned because you like some other assumptions.)


>> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
>> a diagonal argument.
>> 
>
> It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
> is not a proposition. This has never been done before.
>
>> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
>> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
>> 
>
> The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent

Category inversion problem. Diagonalization may construct a Liar
paradox, but that doesn't mean everything made with diagonalization
is a Liar Paradox.

The ordinary Liar Paradox sentence is not constructed of
two parts; it deosn't use quoting where it turns out that
the quoted part it is talking about is identical to itself.

The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
ingredient.  You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.

...

Oops, there I go, doing all the work again, while you can't fire
two brain cells together beyond formulating something casually
dismissive.

-- 
TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#641382

On 11/28/2025 10:17 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> wrote:
>>>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>> In Message ID <I8ednT5676UOvjT9nZ2dnUU7-SPNnZ2d@giganews.com>, Peter
>>>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
>>>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>
>>>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere else.
>>>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
>>>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>>>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>>>
>>>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
>>>
>>> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
>>> if I can help it. Only by accident.
>>>
>>
>> Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
>> the preconceived notions of others.
> 
> You're one of the others from where I'm standing.
> 
> You're one of those others who just say, "don't critically
> examine what I say, just accept it".
> 
> So, no, I don't take preconceived notions from /such/ others, sorry;
> I'm picky about my others.
> 
> Sometimes others put together a coherent set of assumptions.
> Then within those assumptions they work out a result.
> 
> No, I can't refute their /reasoning/ by choosing other assumptions.
> 
> Your modus operandi is to reject (or, more usually, fundamentally
> misunderstand) the assumptions and then call the reasoning wrong since
> it doesn't follow from your distorted or replaced version of the
> assumptions.
> 
>>> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
>>> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
>>> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
>>> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
>>>
>>
>> Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
>> viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
>> as inherently erroneous.
> 
> Using the same same name for two different entities, in the same
> argument, while pretending they are one entity, is not a "usefully
> unconventional" mode of operating. So no, I cannot adopt that from you.
> 
>> If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
>> I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
>> of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
>> incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.
> 
> Even if that somehow were achieved, you would only be choosing
> different assumptions from which to work, and not challenging
> any results based on their respective assumptions.
> 

I have shown that the original assumptions are
incoherent just like
the set of all sets that are not members of themselves
is isomorphic to a can of soup that contains itself
so completely that it has no outside surface.

> (And at that leve, you would /know/ this and refrain from
> insisting that results in a framework of different assumptions
> were wrongly reasoned because you like some other assumptions.)
> 
> 
>>> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
>>> a diagonal argument.
>>>
>>
>> It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
>> is not a proposition. This has never been done before.
>>
>>> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
>>> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
>>>
>>
>> The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
> 
> Category inversion problem. Diagonalization may construct a Liar
> paradox, but that doesn't mean everything made with diagonalization
> is a Liar Paradox.
> 

No it can make all kinds a semantically unsound expressions
that no one can understand are semantically unsound because
thy refuse to pay attention to key details.

> The ordinary Liar Paradox sentence is not constructed of
> two parts; it deosn't use quoting where it turns out that
> the quoted part it is talking about is identical to itself.
> 

% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.

My Prolog version is the best it resolves to
not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))))))))

Just like the Clocksin & Mellish says.

> The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
> ingredient.  You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
> self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.
> 

Whut ???

    In formal languages, self-reference is also very
    easy to come by. Any language capable of expressing
    some basic syntax can generate self-referential
    sentences via so-called diagonalization
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent

> ...
> 
> Oops, there I go, doing all the work again, while you can't fire
> two brain cells together beyond formulating something casually
> dismissive.
> 


-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#641383

On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 11/28/2025 10:17 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>> In Message ID <I8ednT5676UOvjT9nZ2dnUU7-SPNnZ2d@giganews.com>, Peter
>>>>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
>>>>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere else.
>>>>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
>>>>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>>>>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>>>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>>>>
>>>>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
>>>>
>>>> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
>>>> if I can help it. Only by accident.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
>>> the preconceived notions of others.
>> 
>> You're one of the others from where I'm standing.
>> 
>> You're one of those others who just say, "don't critically
>> examine what I say, just accept it".
>> 
>> So, no, I don't take preconceived notions from /such/ others, sorry;
>> I'm picky about my others.
>> 
>> Sometimes others put together a coherent set of assumptions.
>> Then within those assumptions they work out a result.
>> 
>> No, I can't refute their /reasoning/ by choosing other assumptions.
>> 
>> Your modus operandi is to reject (or, more usually, fundamentally
>> misunderstand) the assumptions and then call the reasoning wrong since
>> it doesn't follow from your distorted or replaced version of the
>> assumptions.
>> 
>>>> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
>>>> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
>>>> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
>>>> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
>>> viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
>>> as inherently erroneous.
>> 
>> Using the same same name for two different entities, in the same
>> argument, while pretending they are one entity, is not a "usefully
>> unconventional" mode of operating. So no, I cannot adopt that from you.
>> 
>>> If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
>>> I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
>>> of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
>>> incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.
>> 
>> Even if that somehow were achieved, you would only be choosing
>> different assumptions from which to work, and not challenging
>> any results based on their respective assumptions.
>> 
>
> I have shown that the original assumptions are
> incoherent just like

You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.

> the set of all sets that are not members of themselves
> is isomorphic to a can of soup that contains itself
> so completely that it has no outside surface.

Unrelated to halting.

>> (And at that leve, you would /know/ this and refrain from
>> insisting that results in a framework of different assumptions
>> were wrongly reasoned because you like some other assumptions.)
>> 
>> 
>>>> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
>>>> a diagonal argument.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
>>> is not a proposition. This has never been done before.
>>>
>>>> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
>>>> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
>> 
>> Category inversion problem. Diagonalization may construct a Liar
>> paradox, but that doesn't mean everything made with diagonalization
>> is a Liar Paradox.
>> 
>
> No it can make all kinds a semantically unsound expressions
> that no one can understand are semantically unsound because
> thy refuse to pay attention to key details.

Nonsense. It's just a general technique involving a two-dimensional
table in which something interesting develops involving the
diagonal trace.

>> The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
>> ingredient.  You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
>> self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.
>> 
>
> Whut ???
>
>     In formal languages, self-reference is also very
>     easy to come by. Any language capable of expressing
>     some basic syntax can generate self-referential
>     sentences via so-called diagonalization
>     https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent

For all the accusations that others are not "paying attention",
apparently you do not see the tiny superscripts that indicate
foonotes:

  "The situation with formal languages is actually somewhat subtler than
  our brief discussion indicates. In most cases, corner quotes really
  indicate formal terms for Gödel numbers of sentences, and are not
  genuine quotation marks in the usual sense (e.g., denoting the
  expression ‘inside’ them). Hence, the sense in which such languages
  have reference to sentences is delicate. Yet with very minimal
  resources, syntax can be represented and diagonal sentences
  constructed. Hence, there is a sense, albeit subtle, in which such
  languages can express self-reference. See the entries on provability
  logic and Gödel (the section on the incompleteness theorems), as well
  as Heck (2007)."

Nowhere does your paper say that "This sentence is false" is
diagonal by use of the pronoun.  You need quoting!

Diagonalization presupposes that there is a table. The table
combines somethng from the rows and columns and only certain
combinations are diagonal. 

"This sentence is false" just doesn't have the moving parts
and pieces in it.

You simply don't know how to read papers or think.

-- 
TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca

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#641397

On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 11/28/2025 10:17 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On 11/28/2025 8:58 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 5/25/2021 11:56 AM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>>> In Message ID <I8ednT5676UOvjT9nZ2dnUU7-SPNnZ2d@giganews.com>, Peter
>>>>>>> Olcott admits that he's wrong according to "conventional analysis" and that
>>>>>>> discussing with him requires following some "unconventional"
>>>>>>> analysis.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> PO: I understand where you are coming from. I am coming from somewhere else.
>>>>>>> PO: If you analyze what I am saying using conventional analysis then what I
>>>>>>> PO: am saying is incorrect.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Conventional analysis" is the only vessel which lets us sail into every
>>>>>>> imaginable universe such that we can be sure of anything. Those
>>>>>>> universes are the only "somewhere elses" we need.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Kaz cannot think outside the box*
>>>>>
>>>>> Nope; I don't want to think outside of the correctness box,
>>>>> if I can help it. Only by accident.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yet you define the correctness box by conformity to
>>>> the preconceived notions of others.
>>>
>>> You're one of the others from where I'm standing.
>>>
>>> You're one of those others who just say, "don't critically
>>> examine what I say, just accept it".
>>>
>>> So, no, I don't take preconceived notions from /such/ others, sorry;
>>> I'm picky about my others.
>>>
>>> Sometimes others put together a coherent set of assumptions.
>>> Then within those assumptions they work out a result.
>>>
>>> No, I can't refute their /reasoning/ by choosing other assumptions.
>>>
>>> Your modus operandi is to reject (or, more usually, fundamentally
>>> misunderstand) the assumptions and then call the reasoning wrong since
>>> it doesn't follow from your distorted or replaced version of the
>>> assumptions.
>>>
>>>>> The box where I exactly understand the definition of the problem
>>>>> and all of its constraints, so that I'm addressing myself to the
>>>>> problem and not something sort of resembling it, and the box in which
>>>>> I avoid magical/wishful thinking.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yet only within the conventional analytical framework,
>>>> viewing alternative ways of looking at the same things
>>>> as inherently erroneous.
>>>
>>> Using the same same name for two different entities, in the same
>>> argument, while pretending they are one entity, is not a "usefully
>>> unconventional" mode of operating. So no, I cannot adopt that from you.
>>>
>>>> If there was such a thing as philosophy of computation
>>>> I would be welcomed there for reframing the foundations
>>>> of the theory of computation to get rid of the inherent
>>>> incoherence that no one else bothers to notice.
>>>
>>> Even if that somehow were achieved, you would only be choosing
>>> different assumptions from which to work, and not challenging
>>> any results based on their respective assumptions.
>>>
>>
>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>> incoherent just like
> 
> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
> 

The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
"This sentence is not true."
If its true that makes it untrue and if its untrue that makes it true.

% This sentence is not true.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Prolog detects an infinite cycle.
not(true(not(true(not(true(not(true(...))))

The halting problem instance is even screwier.
I won't get into that until after you prove
that you understand the Liar Paradox

>> the set of all sets that are not members of themselves
>> is isomorphic to a can of soup that contains itself
>> so completely that it has no outside surface.
> 
> Unrelated to halting.
> 

It it is all incoherence of self-reference.

I won't get into that until after you prove
that you understand how the Liar Paradox is
incorrect. I have no patience for people
playing perpetual head games.

>>> (And at that leve, you would /know/ this and refrain from
>>> insisting that results in a framework of different assumptions
>>> were wrongly reasoned because you like some other assumptions.)
>>>
>>>
>>>>> Not an example of diagonalization; the Liar Paradox is not
>>>>> a diagonal argument.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It does one and for all prove that the Liar Paradox
>>>> is not a proposition. This has never been done before.
>>>>
>>>>> Diagonal arguemnts patterned after Cantor do not exhibit
>>>>> a problem that is analogous to the Liar Paradox.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Liar Paradox constructed with diagonalization L ⊣⊢ ¬Tr(┌L┐)
>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
>>>
>>> Category inversion problem. Diagonalization may construct a Liar
>>> paradox, but that doesn't mean everything made with diagonalization
>>> is a Liar Paradox.
>>>
>>
>> No it can make all kinds a semantically unsound expressions
>> that no one can understand are semantically unsound because
>> thy refuse to pay attention to key details.
> 
> Nonsense. It's just a general technique involving a two-dimensional
> table in which something interesting develops involving the
> diagonal trace.
> 

The diagonal trace cheats because it hides the incoherence
of the underlying semantic inference steps. If you leap to
a conclusion without showing your work people might guess
that you are correct never seeing the mistake.

>>> The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
>>> ingredient.  You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
>>> self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.
>>>
>>
>> Whut ???
>>
>>      In formal languages, self-reference is also very
>>      easy to come by. Any language capable of expressing
>>      some basic syntax can generate self-referential
>>      sentences via so-called diagonalization
>>      https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
> 
> For all the accusations that others are not "paying attention",
> apparently you do not see the tiny superscripts that indicate
> foonotes:
> 
>    "The situation with formal languages is actually somewhat subtler than
>    our brief discussion indicates. In most cases, corner quotes really
>    indicate formal terms for Gödel numbers of sentences, and are not
>    genuine quotation marks in the usual sense (e.g., denoting the
>    expression ‘inside’ them). Hence, the sense in which such languages
>    have reference to sentences is delicate. Yet with very minimal
>    resources, syntax can be represented and diagonal sentences
>    constructed. Hence, there is a sense, albeit subtle, in which such
>    languages can express self-reference. See the entries on provability
>    logic and Gödel (the section on the incompleteness theorems), as well
>    as Heck (2007)."
> 

I created Olcott's Minimal Type Theory to get around
all that screwy nonsense. LP := ~True(LP) specifies
~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))
https://philarchive.org/archive/PETMTT-4v2

> Nowhere does your paper say that "This sentence is false" is
> diagonal by use of the pronoun.  You need quoting!
> 

You must pay attention to the MTT language specification.
provided above. Especially the "defined as" operator: :=

> Diagonalization presupposes that there is a table. The table
> combines somethng from the rows and columns and only certain
> combinations are diagonal.
> 

It hides all the of underlying semantic details and
leaps to a conclusion.

> "This sentence is false" just doesn't have the moving parts
> and pieces in it.
> 

Google [Olcott's Minimal Type Theory]
LP := ~True(LP) // LP says of itself that it is not true
It expands to: ~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(~True(...))))))

> You simply don't know how to read papers or think.
> 

You don't even glance at what I say before you judge it.

-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

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#641428

On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>> incoherent just like
>> 
>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>> 
>
> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.

No, it isn't.

You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
of investigating the problem.

The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".

It's a valid, and very good question. The subject, the Turing Machine,
has a rigid definition.

The self-referential instance arises when we explore the /answer/ to the
question. We realize that such a deciding program could be given a
Turing Machine input which contains an embedding of that program itself,
and this leads us to discover certain situations that force us to
conclude that a TM cannot calculate the halting of all TM.

That's not the Halting Problem; all of that is /findings/ from
the investigation of the Halting Problem: that simple question.

The findings are air-tight.

The test cases involving self-reference cases can actually be built; a
criticism from a constructivist angle is hardly possible.

If you don't like self-referental programs, you need to propose
a model of computation in which they are /provably/ impossible to
write, and convince the world that thekkkkkk

> The halting problem instance is even screwier.

The self-referential instance used in halting problem proofs
contains no self-contradiction. No part of it is a logical
proposition which claims that something is false that is
elsewhere in that that instance claimed to be true.

H(D) may be regarded as a proposition, whch claims something to be
false. But nowhere in the D case or in the H program is it claimed to be
true.

Philosophically, the case has an /observer/: an agent not part of
the case who is evaluating what is going on inside it.

The observer sees that H(D) returns zero and interprets that
as an assertion "D does not halt".

The observer sees that D is reacting to the value and halting.

The observer puts these two together and concludes that H(D)
is incorrect.

The observer is not in the loop; it is not part of H or D.

> I won't get into that until after you prove
> that you understand the Liar Paradox
>
>>> the set of all sets that are not members of themselves
>>> is isomorphic to a can of soup that contains itself
>>> so completely that it has no outside surface.
>> 
>> Unrelated to halting.
>
> It it is all incoherence of self-reference.

Not all self-reference is incoherent. "I'm hungry" or "I'm hurt
and I need help" are beneficial, useful self-references.

"This sentence has five words" is self-reference and truth-bearing.
(You have agreed with this.)

Self-reference is real and cannot be removed from the world.

Long after you are removed from the world, self-reference will
live on.

> I won't get into that until after you prove
> that you understand how the Liar Paradox is
> incorrect. I have no patience for people
> playing perpetual head games.

No, you have no patience for people who can use their heads.

(Or so you say, but you constantly reply to them.)

>> Nonsense. It's just a general technique involving a two-dimensional
>> table in which something interesting develops involving the
>> diagonal trace.
>
> The diagonal trace cheats because it hides the incoherence
> of the underlying semantic inference steps. If you leap to
> a conclusion without showing your work people might guess
> that you are correct never seeing the mistake.

No; HHH cheats by receiving different values of Root from Init_Halts_HHH,
and behaving like two different deciders.

All the cheats are yours; Turing never cheated whatsoever.

Disagreeing with the diagonalization technique is like ranting
against the chain rule or integration by parts in calculus.

It's just a tool; a useful one for the right job.

>>>> The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
>>>> ingredient.  You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
>>>> self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Whut ???
>>>
>>>      In formal languages, self-reference is also very
>>>      easy to come by. Any language capable of expressing
>>>      some basic syntax can generate self-referential
>>>      sentences via so-called diagonalization
>>>      https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
>> 
>> For all the accusations that others are not "paying attention",
>> apparently you do not see the tiny superscripts that indicate
>> foonotes:
>> 
>>    "The situation with formal languages is actually somewhat subtler than
>>    our brief discussion indicates. In most cases, corner quotes really
>>    indicate formal terms for Gödel numbers of sentences, and are not
>>    genuine quotation marks in the usual sense (e.g., denoting the
>>    expression ‘inside’ them). Hence, the sense in which such languages
>>    have reference to sentences is delicate. Yet with very minimal
>>    resources, syntax can be represented and diagonal sentences
>>    constructed. Hence, there is a sense, albeit subtle, in which such
>>    languages can express self-reference. See the entries on provability
>>    logic and Gödel (the section on the incompleteness theorems), as well
>>    as Heck (2007)."
>> 
>
> I created Olcott's Minimal Type Theory to get around

It is three pages of pure rubbish, not suitable to be handed in
as PHIL 100 homeowrk.

>> Nowhere does your paper say that "This sentence is false" is
>> diagonal by use of the pronoun.  You need quoting!
>
> You must pay attention to the MTT language specification.
> provided above. Especially the "defined as" operator: :=

This is not referenced in the stanford.edu paper you cited,
(nor would such garbage ever be).

>> Diagonalization presupposes that there is a table. The table
>> combines somethng from the rows and columns and only certain
>> combinations are diagonal.
>
> It hides all the of underlying semantic details and
> leaps to a conclusion.

The diagonal method and its table shows what you choose to put in it;
it's a tool.

What you are saying is tripe, like that a hammer and nail hide the
underlying semantic details of how a 2x4 ends up holding up drywall.

>> "This sentence is false" just doesn't have the moving parts
>> and pieces in it.
>> 
>
> Google [Olcott's Minimal Type Theory]
> LP := ~True(LP) // LP says of itself that it is not true

This is equivalent to the Liar Paradox, but it not expressed
in the same way using a pronoun.

Neither are using diagonalization. You need to identfy separate
abstractions that combine together in various kinds of pairs, only a
subset of which are along the diagonal trace, where the paradox happens.

A hammer may drive a nail, but it's not a nail gun.

Just because you have defined a Liar sentence somehow doesn't
mean diagonalization was used.

-- 
TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca

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#641431

On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>> incoherent just like
>>>
>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>
>>
>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
> 
> No, it isn't.
> 
> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
> of investigating the problem.
> 
> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
> 

When the halting problem instance defines and input
that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
that are true only when they are false and false only
when they are true.

ChatGPT didn't initially think that I properly understood
isomorphism until I gave it that example.

> It's a valid, and very good question. The subject, the Turing Machine,
> has a rigid definition.
> 
> The self-referential instance arises when we explore the /answer/ to the
> question. We realize that such a deciding program could be given a
> Turing Machine input which contains an embedding of that program itself,
> and this leads us to discover certain situations that force us to
> conclude that a TM cannot calculate the halting of all TM.
> 
> That's not the Halting Problem; all of that is /findings/ from
> the investigation of the Halting Problem: that simple question.
> 
> The findings are air-tight.
> 
> The test cases involving self-reference cases can actually be built; a
> criticism from a constructivist angle is hardly possible.
> 
> If you don't like self-referental programs, you need to propose
> a model of computation in which they are /provably/ impossible to
> write, and convince the world that thekkkkkk
> 
>> The halting problem instance is even screwier.
> 
> The self-referential instance used in halting problem proofs
> contains no self-contradiction. No part of it is a logical
> proposition which claims that something is false that is
> elsewhere in that that instance claimed to be true.
> 
> H(D) may be regarded as a proposition, whch claims something to be
> false. But nowhere in the D case or in the H program is it claimed to be
> true.
> 
> Philosophically, the case has an /observer/: an agent not part of
> the case who is evaluating what is going on inside it.
> 
> The observer sees that H(D) returns zero and interprets that
> as an assertion "D does not halt".
> 
> The observer sees that D is reacting to the value and halting.
> 
> The observer puts these two together and concludes that H(D)
> is incorrect.
> 
> The observer is not in the loop; it is not part of H or D.
> 
>> I won't get into that until after you prove
>> that you understand the Liar Paradox
>>
>>>> the set of all sets that are not members of themselves
>>>> is isomorphic to a can of soup that contains itself
>>>> so completely that it has no outside surface.
>>>
>>> Unrelated to halting.
>>
>> It it is all incoherence of self-reference.
> 
> Not all self-reference is incoherent. "I'm hungry" or "I'm hurt
> and I need help" are beneficial, useful self-references.
> 
> "This sentence has five words" is self-reference and truth-bearing.
> (You have agreed with this.)
> 
> Self-reference is real and cannot be removed from the world.
> 
> Long after you are removed from the world, self-reference will
> live on.
> 
>> I won't get into that until after you prove
>> that you understand how the Liar Paradox is
>> incorrect. I have no patience for people
>> playing perpetual head games.
> 
> No, you have no patience for people who can use their heads.
> 
> (Or so you say, but you constantly reply to them.)
> 
>>> Nonsense. It's just a general technique involving a two-dimensional
>>> table in which something interesting develops involving the
>>> diagonal trace.
>>
>> The diagonal trace cheats because it hides the incoherence
>> of the underlying semantic inference steps. If you leap to
>> a conclusion without showing your work people might guess
>> that you are correct never seeing the mistake.
> 
> No; HHH cheats by receiving different values of Root from Init_Halts_HHH,
> and behaving like two different deciders.
> 
> All the cheats are yours; Turing never cheated whatsoever.
> 
> Disagreeing with the diagonalization technique is like ranting
> against the chain rule or integration by parts in calculus.
> 
> It's just a tool; a useful one for the right job.
> 
>>>>> The paper you reference makes it clear that this is a required
>>>>> ingredient.  You can't just use the pronoun "this sentence"; that's a
>>>>> self-reference, but not acheived via diagonalization.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Whut ???
>>>>
>>>>       In formal languages, self-reference is also very
>>>>       easy to come by. Any language capable of expressing
>>>>       some basic syntax can generate self-referential
>>>>       sentences via so-called diagonalization
>>>>       https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liar-paradox/#ExisLiarLikeSent
>>>
>>> For all the accusations that others are not "paying attention",
>>> apparently you do not see the tiny superscripts that indicate
>>> foonotes:
>>>
>>>     "The situation with formal languages is actually somewhat subtler than
>>>     our brief discussion indicates. In most cases, corner quotes really
>>>     indicate formal terms for Gödel numbers of sentences, and are not
>>>     genuine quotation marks in the usual sense (e.g., denoting the
>>>     expression ‘inside’ them). Hence, the sense in which such languages
>>>     have reference to sentences is delicate. Yet with very minimal
>>>     resources, syntax can be represented and diagonal sentences
>>>     constructed. Hence, there is a sense, albeit subtle, in which such
>>>     languages can express self-reference. See the entries on provability
>>>     logic and Gödel (the section on the incompleteness theorems), as well
>>>     as Heck (2007)."
>>>
>>
>> I created Olcott's Minimal Type Theory to get around
> 
> It is three pages of pure rubbish, not suitable to be handed in
> as PHIL 100 homeowrk.
> 
>>> Nowhere does your paper say that "This sentence is false" is
>>> diagonal by use of the pronoun.  You need quoting!
>>
>> You must pay attention to the MTT language specification.
>> provided above. Especially the "defined as" operator: :=
> 
> This is not referenced in the stanford.edu paper you cited,
> (nor would such garbage ever be).
> 
>>> Diagonalization presupposes that there is a table. The table
>>> combines somethng from the rows and columns and only certain
>>> combinations are diagonal.
>>
>> It hides all the of underlying semantic details and
>> leaps to a conclusion.
> 
> The diagonal method and its table shows what you choose to put in it;
> it's a tool.
> 
> What you are saying is tripe, like that a hammer and nail hide the
> underlying semantic details of how a 2x4 ends up holding up drywall.
> 
>>> "This sentence is false" just doesn't have the moving parts
>>> and pieces in it.
>>>
>>
>> Google [Olcott's Minimal Type Theory]
>> LP := ~True(LP) // LP says of itself that it is not true
> 
> This is equivalent to the Liar Paradox, but it not expressed
> in the same way using a pronoun.
> 
> Neither are using diagonalization. You need to identfy separate
> abstractions that combine together in various kinds of pairs, only a
> subset of which are along the diagonal trace, where the paradox happens.
> 
> A hammer may drive a nail, but it's not a nail gun.
> 
> Just because you have defined a Liar sentence somehow doesn't
> mean diagonalization was used.
> 

All pathological self-reference is inherently
semantically unsound.

-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

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#641434

On 11/29/25 3:56 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>
>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>
>> No, it isn't.
>>
>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>> of investigating the problem.
>>
>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>
> 
> When the halting problem instance defines and input
> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
> that are true only when they are false and false only
> when they are true.

nope.

The Liar's paradox depend on an explict use of self-reference.

The Halting Problem's proof is built on the fact that the system is 
powerful enough to describe the effect of such a reference without 
actually needing to use a reference.

In essence, this sort of comes from the ability to use a finite 
description to create infinite/unbounded behavior.

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#641441

On 11/29/25 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 11/29/25 3:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>>
>>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>>
>>> No, it isn't.
>>>
>>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>>> of investigating the problem.
>>>
>>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>>
>>
>> When the halting problem instance defines and input
>> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
>> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
>> that are true only when they are false and false only
>> when they are true.
> 
> nope.
> 
> The Liar's paradox depend on an explict use of self-reference.
> 
> The Halting Problem's proof is built on the fact that the system is 
> powerful enough to describe the effect of such a reference without 
> actually needing to use a reference.

bruh making the self-reference one step more indirect does make the 
self-reference go away, i don't know why people keep repeating that, but 
it's not true

you form the self-reference directly, or u search the whole space of 
machines for a self-reference (which is inherently possible with how TMs 
are defined) ... either way is forming a self-reference that results in 
an inability to classify the machine into some set defined by a 
particular semantic property.

> 
> In essence, this sort of comes from the ability to use a finite 
> description to create infinite/unbounded behavior.


-- 
a burnt out swe investigating into why our tooling doesn't involve
basic semantic proofs like halting analysis

please excuse my pseudo-pyscript,

~ nick

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#641454

On 11/29/25 5:16 PM, dart200 wrote:
> On 11/29/25 1:34 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 11/29/25 3:56 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>>>
>>>> No, it isn't.
>>>>
>>>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>>>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>>>> of investigating the problem.
>>>>
>>>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>>>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>>>
>>>
>>> When the halting problem instance defines and input
>>> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
>>> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
>>> that are true only when they are false and false only
>>> when they are true.
>>
>> nope.
>>
>> The Liar's paradox depend on an explict use of self-reference.
>>
>> The Halting Problem's proof is built on the fact that the system is 
>> powerful enough to describe the effect of such a reference without 
>> actually needing to use a reference.
> 
> bruh making the self-reference one step more indirect does make the 
> self-reference go away, i don't know why people keep repeating that, but 
> it's not true

It isn't "indirect", it is out of the system. The "meaning" that forms 
the "reference" is based on thing not in the system.

Its sort of like getting an encrypted message (that you don't have the 
key too) that is a random number, and being asked about a property of 
that number. That is what you need to do to find the reference. That 
isn't an exact equivalent, but gives the idea.

> 
> you form the self-reference directly, or u search the whole space of 
> machines for a self-reference (which is inherently possible with how TMs 
> are defined) ... either way is forming a self-reference that results in 
> an inability to classify the machine into some set defined by a 
> particular semantic property.

The problem is the space where the reference was formed isn't the same 
space the program is searching.

> 
>>
>> In essence, this sort of comes from the ability to use a finite 
>> description to create infinite/unbounded behavior.
> 
> 

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#641437

On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>
>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>> 
>> No, it isn't.
>> 
>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>> of investigating the problem.
>> 
>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>> 
>
> When the halting problem instance defines and input
> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
> that are true only when they are false and false only
> when they are true.

Only in the mind of an imbecile who can't think outside of the box.

Specifically, the [75, 95] box on the IQ scale.

The instance does not refer to any part of itself and assert
its negation. An external observer is required in order to
recognize a contradiction. There is a self-reference, but not
one that causes an infinite evaluation issue.

It is simulatenously true in that case that a certain decision
is being made, and that the program is behasving opposite to that.

These two situations easily coexist.

The contradiction between them is something that is externally
recognized; it doesn't threaten the well-formedness of the
case.

> All pathological self-reference is inherently
> semantically unsound.

Not all self-reference is "pathological". Liar Paradox? I would
say so. It has an obvious problem of not being evaluable, and so
if we adopt the word "pathological" for any such a problem,
it is pathological.


-- 
TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca

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#641439

On 11/29/2025 3:53 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>>
>>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>>
>>> No, it isn't.
>>>
>>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>>> of investigating the problem.
>>>
>>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>>
>>
>> When the halting problem instance defines and input
>> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
>> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
>> that are true only when they are false and false only
>> when they are true.
> 
> Only in the mind of an imbecile who can't think outside of the box.
> 

Fuckheads that don't have reasoning prove
that they are mere fuckheads by using insults
instead.

-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

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#641445

On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 11/29/2025 3:53 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>>>
>>>> No, it isn't.
>>>>
>>>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>>>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>>>> of investigating the problem.
>>>>
>>>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>>>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>>>
>>>
>>> When the halting problem instance defines and input
>>> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
>>> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
>>> that are true only when they are false and false only
>>> when they are true.
>> 
>> Only in the mind of an imbecile who can't think outside of the box.
>
> Fuckheads that don't have reasoning prove
> that they are mere fuckheads by using insults
> instead.

The above is a thoroughly evidence-based observation.

I also have solid aguments why self-reference in halting proofs is
different from Liar Paradox sentences.

Though I'm confident I could teach them to sixth graders, evidently they
are over your head.

-- 
TXR Programming Language: http://nongnu.org/txr
Cygnal: Cygwin Native Application Library: http://kylheku.com/cygnal
Mastodon: @Kazinator@mstdn.ca

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#641448

On 11/29/2025 4:57 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 11/29/2025 3:53 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>>>>
>>>>> No, it isn't.
>>>>>
>>>>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>>>>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>>>>> of investigating the problem.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>>>>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When the halting problem instance defines and input
>>>> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
>>>> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
>>>> that are true only when they are false and false only
>>>> when they are true.
>>>
>>> Only in the mind of an imbecile who can't think outside of the box.
>>
>> Fuckheads that don't have reasoning prove
>> that they are mere fuckheads by using insults
>> instead.
> 
> The above is a thoroughly evidence-based observation.
> 
> I also have solid aguments why self-reference in halting proofs is
> different from Liar Paradox sentences.
> 

No you fucking don't or you would have provided
it years ago. I you or anyone else here has on
Gödel is bluster and presumption.

I spent years creating Olcott's Minimal
Type Theory to say this: G := (F ⊬ G)
G says of itself that it is unprovable in F.


-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott

My 28 year goal has been to make
"true on the basis of meaning" computable.

This required establishing a new foundation
for correct reasoning.

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#641456

On 11/29/25 6:24 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/29/2025 4:57 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/29/2025 3:53 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No, it isn't.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>>>>>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>>>>>> of investigating the problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>>>>>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When the halting problem instance defines and input
>>>>> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
>>>>> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
>>>>> that are true only when they are false and false only
>>>>> when they are true.
>>>>
>>>> Only in the mind of an imbecile who can't think outside of the box.
>>>
>>> Fuckheads that don't have reasoning prove
>>> that they are mere fuckheads by using insults
>>> instead.
>>
>> The above is a thoroughly evidence-based observation.
>>
>> I also have solid aguments why self-reference in halting proofs is
>> different from Liar Paradox sentences.
>>
> 
> No you fucking don't or you would have provided
> it years ago. I you or anyone else here has on
> Gödel is bluster and presumption.
> 
> I spent years creating Olcott's Minimal
> Type Theory to say this: G := (F ⊬ G)
> G says of itself that it is unprovable in F.
> 
> 

It *HAS* been, it just is over your head because you refuse to let the 
words mean what they actually mean, because you are to stuburn to admit 
you are ignorant.

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#641455

On 11/29/25 5:01 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 11/29/2025 3:53 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> On 11/29/2025 2:39 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>> On 2025-11-29, olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 11/28/2025 11:52 PM, Kaz Kylheku wrote:
>>>>>>> I have shown that the original assumptions are
>>>>>>> incoherent just like
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You have not. Only that your understanding is incoherent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The halting problem instance is merely the Liar Paradox in disguise.
>>>>
>>>> No, it isn't.
>>>>
>>>> You're not even smart enough to keep straight in your head
>>>> what is part of the /problem/ and what is a /result/
>>>> of investigating the problem.
>>>>
>>>> The Halting Problem is literally a sentence of the form: "can
>>>> a Turing machine calculate whether any Turing Machine halts".
>>>>
>>>
>>> When the halting problem instance defines and input
>>> that does the opposite of whatever its decider reports
>>> this is structurally the same as the set of sentences
>>> that are true only when they are false and false only
>>> when they are true.
>>
>> Only in the mind of an imbecile who can't think outside of the box.
>>
> 
> Fuckheads that don't have reasoning prove
> that they are mere fuckheads by using insults
> instead.
> 

Isn't that just what you did?

The fact that you don't understand what people are talking about because 
you CHOSE to be ignotant, doesn't make them wrong, it makes you stupid 
and wrong.

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