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Groups > sci.electronics.design > #518379 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2018-10-05 09:29 +1000 |
| Last post | 2018-10-12 08:21 +0200 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 106 — 24 participants |
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Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-05 09:29 +1000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> - 2018-10-05 01:14 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-04 19:31 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jan Panteltje <pNaOnStPeAlMtje@yahoo.com> - 2018-10-05 07:27 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Gene Filatov <evgeny.filatov@ieee.org> - 2018-10-05 11:12 +0300
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jan Panteltje <pNaOnStPeAlMtje@yahoo.com> - 2018-10-05 08:41 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Theo Markettos <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> - 2018-10-05 16:28 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Rob Gaddi <rgaddi@highlandtechnology.invalid> - 2018-10-05 09:34 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> - 2018-10-05 20:59 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-05 14:19 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> - 2018-10-05 23:44 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-06 09:58 +1000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Steve Wilson <no@spam.com> - 2018-10-06 00:39 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-06 12:50 +1000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-06 08:42 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-06 21:41 +1000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-06 14:59 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> - 2018-10-06 09:10 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-06 16:44 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-06 16:46 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 19:34 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Rob <nomail@example.com> - 2018-10-06 13:46 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 05:12 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 04:36 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Phil Hobbs <pcdhSpamMeSenseless@electrooptical.net> - 2018-10-06 14:50 -0400
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 19:43 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Phil Hobbs <pcdhSpamMeSenseless@electrooptical.net> - 2018-10-08 13:58 -0400
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-08 20:04 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-09 07:03 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> - 2018-10-09 12:13 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-09 22:52 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-10 10:06 +1100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-10 19:06 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-10 18:43 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-11 12:16 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Gerhard Hoffmann <ghf@hoffmann-hochfrequenz.de> - 2018-10-11 14:50 +0200
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-11 13:51 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-11 08:35 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-11 15:56 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-11 13:24 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-11 21:24 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-11 20:43 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-12 07:38 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-12 08:55 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-12 16:48 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-12 10:22 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-12 16:49 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-12 16:53 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-12 10:27 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-12 23:46 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-12 17:10 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-13 02:13 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-12 22:29 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-13 09:14 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? +++ATH0 <news@ringpiece.local> - 2018-10-13 14:29 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> - 2018-10-15 16:27 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-11 08:28 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-11 08:27 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-10 10:04 +1100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? pcdhobbs@gmail.com - 2018-10-10 06:47 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-10 19:01 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> - 2018-10-06 06:03 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 05:17 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> - 2018-10-06 15:38 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 19:14 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> - 2018-10-07 07:15 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-07 08:13 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> - 2018-10-20 07:07 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> - 2018-10-05 20:12 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-06 13:42 +1000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> - 2018-10-05 21:02 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> - 2018-10-06 06:03 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-06 08:45 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> - 2018-10-06 08:51 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-06 16:42 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Dimiter_Popoff <dp@tgi-sci.com> - 2018-10-06 19:55 +0300
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> - 2018-10-06 19:29 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DLUNU <DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@DLU.org> - 2018-10-06 22:41 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Dimiter_Popoff <dp@tgi-sci.com> - 2018-10-07 02:07 +0300
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2018-10-07 11:56 +1100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 20:06 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Johnny B Good <johnny-b-good@invalid.ntlworld.com> - 2018-10-07 03:46 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 22:04 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DLUNU <DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@DLU.org> - 2018-10-06 22:40 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Dimiter_Popoff <dp@tgi-sci.com> - 2018-10-07 02:05 +0300
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> - 2018-10-07 01:36 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> - 2018-10-06 20:14 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Tom Gardner <spamjunk@blueyonder.co.uk> - 2018-10-07 08:07 +0100
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DLUNU <DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@DLU.org> - 2018-10-07 14:09 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> - 2018-10-07 08:55 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-08 00:50 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-08 00:51 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-06 19:23 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DLUNU <DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@DLU.org> - 2018-10-07 13:52 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-07 08:18 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-08 00:52 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-08 00:54 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-07 22:20 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-08 08:20 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Cows are Nice <nice@cows.moo> - 2018-10-08 08:19 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> - 2018-10-08 10:30 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com - 2018-10-08 19:57 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-09 06:51 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org - 2018-10-06 08:50 +0000
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? jurb6006@gmail.com - 2018-10-11 07:14 -0700
Re: Supermicro server motherboards with hardware backdoor? Philipp Klaus Krause <pkk@spth.de> - 2018-10-12 08:21 +0200
Page 4 of 6 — ← Prev page 1 2 3 [4] 5 6 Next page →
| From | gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-10 19:01 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <4666c9b9-8ceb-4c02-8128-ad615491208e@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #518872 |
On Wednesday, October 10, 2018 at 9:47:18 AM UTC-4, pcdh...@gmail.com wrote: > >>Embedded passives have been around for ages, so that's probably quite > >> feasible. > > >I learned something! I have a few questions about that. > > >Is this capability common in PCB production equipment? > >Is it likely to be available in mass-production for > >server motherboards? When is it necessary anyhow? > >What PCB design software supports it? > > Unknown. Embedded passives (mostly de-caps) were being explored by about 2000 for improving signal integrity by reducing supply inductance. That sounds a bit specious. I took a course in high speed design with Lee Ritchey where he showed the extreme effort that many use to shorten decoupling capacitor trace and thereby minimize inductance is overkill when embedded power planes are used. After showing the theory and running a simulation he built a board to measure the effect and found there was very little difference between having a decoupling cap right next to the power pins, an inch away and even near the other side of the board some six inches away. The power planes provide the needed current to the chip while the wave front propagates to the capacitor and even beyond as the wave front continues to propagate across the board. So the "slow" rise time of the capacitor current due to parasitic inductance is almost completely masked resulting in a very small dip in voltage at the power pin increasing only slightly at longer distances. In reality the power plane completely decouples the power pins and the capacitors serve to replenish the power planes. So clearly there would be very little advantage to using intra-layer decoupling caps vs using power planes. I suppose if you wanted to save the cost of the added layers in a high volume run then it might be worth while. But the cost of the additional routing on some layers may well mitigate the savings. Rick C.
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| From | <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 06:03 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <pp9j7h$pb2$1@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518466 |
gnuarm wrote: >BTW, if the chip has sufficient internal capacitance, it is possible to have >five I/Os by scavenging power from the I/Os. > >Rick C. Yes, why do they not show a circuit diagram? Board layout? Power is indeed an issue, pulldown could be done that way, but force a SPI line up?
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| From | gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 05:17 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <e69083cc-7e60-4662-80c9-5f10c9efeb3a@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #518509 |
On Saturday, October 6, 2018 at 2:03:33 AM UTC-4, 69883925...@nospam.org wrote: > gnuarm wrote: > >BTW, if the chip has sufficient internal capacitance, it is possible to have > >five I/Os by scavenging power from the I/Os. > > > >Rick C. > > Yes, why do they not show a circuit diagram? Board layout? > Power is indeed an issue, pulldown could be done that way, > but force a SPI line up? Yeah. At one time all in circuit test was done by overdriving outputs. Add a series resistor to the other source and it's a slam dunk. Rick C.
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| From | <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 15:38 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <ppaktg$g5m$1@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518526 |
gnuarm wrote >On Saturday, October 6, 2018 at 2:03:33 AM UTC-4, 69883925...@nospam.org wrote: >> gnuarm wrote: >> >BTW, if the chip has sufficient internal capacitance, it is possible to have >> >five I/Os by scavenging power from the I/Os. >> > >> >Rick C. >> >> Yes, why do they not show a circuit diagram? Board layout? >> Power is indeed an issue, pulldown could be done that way, >> but force a SPI line up? > >Yeah. At one time all in circuit test was done by overdriving outputs. Add a series resistor to the other source and it's a >slam dunk. > >Rick C. Adding an extra resistor would need one more board modification no? I drive SPI clock directly from for example a PIC output, the point being that to have that pullup power as you state, taken from the other SPI lines and !CE would be low, seems not possible to me, looking at that chip I see no big caps either. It is different if they have power on that thing.
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| From | gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 19:14 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <f09c086c-2acd-4670-9879-352509784207@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #518533 |
On Saturday, October 6, 2018 at 11:38:32 AM UTC-4, 69883925...@nospam.org wrote: > gnuarm wrote > >On Saturday, October 6, 2018 at 2:03:33 AM UTC-4, 69883925...@nospam.org wrote: > >> gnuarm wrote: > >> >BTW, if the chip has sufficient internal capacitance, it is possible to have > >> >five I/Os by scavenging power from the I/Os. > >> > > >> >Rick C. > >> > >> Yes, why do they not show a circuit diagram? Board layout? > >> Power is indeed an issue, pulldown could be done that way, > >> but force a SPI line up? > > > >Yeah. At one time all in circuit test was done by overdriving outputs. Add a series resistor to the other source and it's a > >slam dunk. > > > >Rick C. > > Adding an extra resistor would need one more board modification no? > I drive SPI clock directly from for example a PIC output, > the point being that to have that pullup power as you state, > taken from the other SPI lines and !CE would be low, > seems not possible to me, looking at that chip I see no big caps either. > > It is different if they have power on that thing. Big caps??? The clock line is high for half a bit time on every bit. Why do you need "big" caps? I expect the small capacitance needed could have been included in the one device. They may not use a resistor, they may not vampire power from the data lines. We don't know much about how the device worked. I was suggesting what could be possible. I don't see the resistor being a problem really. If you modify the layout and the automated optical inspection configuration, it is very unlikely anyone would spot your changes unless they compare the design to the original design files which is, I believe, how the hack was discovered. Had the mod been between the board layers and top/bottom layer Gerbers where not changed, this likely would not have been discovered - at least not at Elemental. I think they said Apple discovered the hack by detecting aberrant network traffic which is what some here have suggested should have been noticed. Rick C.
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| From | <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-07 07:15 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <ppcbra$vom$1@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518604 |
gnuarm wrote >> >On Saturday, October 6, 2018 at 2:03:33 AM UTC-4, 69883925...@nospam.org >wrote: >> Adding an extra resistor would need one more board modification no? >> I drive SPI clock directly from for example a PIC output, >> the point being that to have that pullup power as you state, >> taken from the other SPI lines and !CE would be low, >> seems not possible to me, looking at that chip I see no big caps either. >> >> It is different if they have power on that thing. > >Big caps??? The clock line is high for half a bit time on every bit. Why do >you need "big" caps? I expect the small capacitance needed could have been >included in the one device. So you are suggesting they are using the existing clock? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial_Peripheral_Interface For that 'thing' to actually send data it must set clock high and then low again, you cannot pull yourself up by the hairs. You cannot have a circuit powered from a positive supply generated by its own output FYI. Something to do with conserva/// or perpet... >They may not use a resistor, they may not vampire power from the data lines. > We don't know much about how the device worked. I was suggesting what could >be possible. > >I don't see the resistor being a problem really. If you modify the layout and >the automated optical inspection configuration, it is very unlikely anyone OK, if you can modify the board (= circuit) the all bets are off. I would think, as a spy-master why not just monitor the databits and send on some Gigle-Hertz to a nearby listening device (car, whatever) has been done to tap consulates with transmitters powered from microwave beams.. However on a board like this plenty of power available if you can route it. When sci.crypt was more fun there were references to listening systems that used the RFI from computers to decode decrypted stuff, to view what was on the screen (passwords) etc etc, just recently I did read an other paper on that. Of course it is fun to be able to just query the data via some IP address, or have it send to the mother-land at given times on some IP address, but then you do not wan the SPI bus, but more likely have modified firmware in one of the processor interface chips, east-brdge . west bridge what was it, processor updates ;-). I think that is also what US is doing. I see my top secret invasion plans with 'snort' leaving the system all the time... Many many years ago somebody got really pissed in sci.crypt when I pointed that out... stepped on some tones I suppose. Anyways there a zillion ways to get at the data, and every big country is having a go at it (maybe small ones too). It is a fun hobby, if war arrives I'd be glad to play. >would spot your changes unless they compare the design to the original design >files which is, I believe, how the hack was discovered. Had the mod >been between the board layers and top/bottom layer Gerbers where not changed, >this likely would not have been discovered - at least not at Elemental. > I think they said Apple discovered the hack by detecting aberrant network >traffic which is what some here have suggested should have been noticed. mm Apple, Steve Jobs tried selling his old stuff by saying the Macs were as powerful as what was used by the new-nuke-testing facilities in the US. People buy that crap. I seriously wonder if the story was true Apple's competence (was it an Apple board?) in controlling its own manufacturing. it is more in the spirit of "let's move it all to the US and charge even more for the crap". I have clicked my fingers to de-hypnotize those Apple buyers, but I need help, it is stuck so deep in their brain, lemme put it this way: DON'T YOU SEE APPLE IS DANGEROUS (click). . hehe >Rick >C. >
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| From | gnuarm.deletethisbit@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-07 08:13 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <4d1d8e9e-be81-4522-a03f-caf4368645d9@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #518619 |
On Sunday, October 7, 2018 at 3:15:59 AM UTC-4, 69883925...@nospam.org wrote: > gnuarm wrote > >> >On Saturday, October 6, 2018 at 2:03:33 AM UTC-4, 69883925...@nospam.org > >wrote: > >> Adding an extra resistor would need one more board modification no? > >> I drive SPI clock directly from for example a PIC output, > >> the point being that to have that pullup power as you state, > >> taken from the other SPI lines and !CE would be low, > >> seems not possible to me, looking at that chip I see no big caps either. > >> > >> It is different if they have power on that thing. > > > >Big caps??? The clock line is high for half a bit time on every bit. Why do > >you need "big" caps? I expect the small capacitance needed could have been > >included in the one device. > > So you are suggesting they are using the existing clock? > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serial_Peripheral_Interface > > For that 'thing' to actually send data it must set clock high and then low again, > you cannot pull yourself up by the hairs. > You cannot have a circuit powered from a positive supply generated by its own output FYI. > Something to do with conserva/// or perpet... Not sure what you are talking about. This circuit doesn't need to drive the clock line does it? Regardless, there are multiple signal lines. They don't need to be high all the time, just enough to power the circuit. > >They may not use a resistor, they may not vampire power from the data lines. > > We don't know much about how the device worked. I was suggesting what could > >be possible. > > > >I don't see the resistor being a problem really. If you modify the layout and > >the automated optical inspection configuration, it is very unlikely anyone > > > OK, if you can modify the board (= circuit) the all bets are off. How else could the chip have been inserted into the design??? > I would think, as a spy-master why not just monitor the databits and send on some Gigle-Hertz to a nearby listening device (car, whatever) > has been done to tap consulates with transmitters powered from microwave beams.. How would they know where the board ended up? Even if you sit and wait for a board to show up where you want to spy, anything that emanates RF is subject to two problems, 1) being detected in a sweep and B) being shielded since most installations try to prevent RFI. > However on a board like this plenty of power available if you can route it. > When sci.crypt was more fun there were references to listening systems that used the RFI from computers > to decode decrypted stuff, to view what was on the screen (passwords) etc etc, just recently I did read an other paper on that. When I was still getting my ears wet in electronics the US Government had adopted TEMPEST requirements to prevent emanation of RF that could be used to snoop computers. They were big, heavy, metal encased and had screened CRTs as well as keyboards. Expensive, yes, but subject to snooping, no. > Of course it is fun to be able to just query the data via some IP address, or have it send to the mother-land at given times > on some IP address, but then you do not wan the SPI bus, but more likely > have modified firmware in one of the processor interface chips, east-brdge . west bridge what was it, processor updates ;-). > I think that is also what US is doing. I don't think you really read the article. > I see my top secret invasion plans with 'snort' leaving the system all the time... > Many many years ago somebody got really pissed in sci.crypt when I pointed that out... stepped on some tones I suppose. Your code is too cryptic for me to understand what you are saying. > Anyways there a zillion ways to get at the data, and every big country is having a go at it (maybe small ones too). > It is a fun hobby, if war arrives I'd be glad to play. > > > > >would spot your changes unless they compare the design to the original design > >files which is, I believe, how the hack was discovered. Had the mod > >been between the board layers and top/bottom layer Gerbers where not changed, > >this likely would not have been discovered - at least not at Elemental. > > I think they said Apple discovered the hack by detecting aberrant network > >traffic which is what some here have suggested should have been noticed. > > mm Apple, Steve Jobs tried selling his old stuff by saying the Macs were as powerful as what was used by the new-nuke-testing facilities in the US. > People buy that crap. > > I seriously wonder if the story was true Apple's competence (was it an Apple board?) in controlling its own manufacturing. > it is more in the spirit of "let's move it all to the US and charge even more for the crap". > I have clicked my fingers to de-hypnotize those Apple buyers, but I need help, > it is stuck so deep in their brain, > lemme put it this way: DON'T YOU SEE APPLE IS DANGEROUS (click). I didn't see that manufacturing was all moved to the US. I think they just moved it out of China. Interesting that they started that way, in countries other than China and gradually moved into China. Taiwan was one of the earlier countries and likely to end up as one of the new ones. Rick C.
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| From | <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-20 07:07 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <pqek9h$avu$1@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518466 |
gnuarm wrote: >BTW, if the chip has sufficient internal capacitance, it is possible to have >five I/Os by scavenging power from the I/Os. > >Rick C. Apple and others are denying anything was on the boards... http://chinaplus.cri.cn/news/china/9/20181020/198303.html
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| From | Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-05 20:12 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <n07grdlc3jdr2ssnej54fakvilrdka07u1@4ax.com> |
| In reply to | #518424 |
On 05 Oct 2018 16:28:21 +0100 (BST), Theo Markettos <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote: >In comp.arch.embedded Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> wrote: >> Whether it turns out to be true or not, this will be the biggest >> security blockbuster of the decade. >> >> <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies> >This is my analysis: >https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2018/10/05/making-sense-of-the-supermicro-motherboard-attack/ >Theo Thanks. Nicely thought out blog article. I agree that putting the chip on the SPI bus would be the ideal location. I might add that is would be possible to add microcode instructions to the CPU via the SPI bus (depending on how the added chip is wired into the system). Some deficiencies and unanswered questions in the original Bloomberg article: 1. Since Bloomberg apparently has possession of several of these mystery chips, why haven't anyone done an autopsy or xray analysis on what's inside? From the few photos, it looks like a resistor network. <https://www.siricomindia.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Chip-Resistor-array-300x300.jpg> 2. If I wanted to compromise a server, it would much easier to add a few more undocumented instructions to an existing chip, such as a bus controller (which sees the entire data bus), than to add a new device that might be detected by the production equipment that uses optical comparators to detect missing, backwards, and misaligned components. A white alumina or porcelain chip, among the usual brown ceramic chips, would be easily visible. 3. The photos of the mystery chip seems a little odd: <https://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/i9VdsjZLS_Pk/v1/-1x-1.jpg> The solder pads on the sides of the chip look slightly oxidized and do not look like anything that has been unsoldered by a hot air SMT desoldering station, where the solder would be shiny and tends to collect near the PCB side of the chip. 4. What is a "signal conditioning coupler"? <http://www.samsungsem.com/global/product/passive-component/chip-resistor/array/index.jsp> <https://hexus.net/media/uploaded/2018/10/eb42add4-0827-4831-b6c7-8409fb539eb1.jpg> 5. With a PCB and chip in Bloomberg's possession, it would be fairly easy to determine how it was connected into the server. This should have been done before announcing to the world that they had discovered a spy chip, rather than discovering a capacitor or termination resistor. 6. There seems to be nearly zero demonstratable information on how the chip could actually do something useful. Plenty of theoretical possibilities, but nothing that an SPI or serial bus analyzer couldn't handle. etc... Not currently having the answers to these questions doesn't bother me. The lack of anyone close to the source actually bothering to answer them does bother me. Sorry to be so vague but I've had a rotten day dealing with Microsoft's October 2018 Windoze 10 update destroying customer data. This has not been a good day. <https://www.google.com/search?q=windows+10+update+erase+user+files&tbs=qdr:w> -- Jeff Liebermann jeffl@cruzio.com 150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558
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| From | Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 13:42 +1000 |
| Message-ID | <9bWtD.148454$LK2.27093@fx36.iad> |
| In reply to | #518505 |
On 06/10/18 13:12, Jeff Liebermann wrote: > On 05 Oct 2018 16:28:21 +0100 (BST), Theo Markettos > <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote: >> In comp.arch.embedded Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> wrote: >>> Whether it turns out to be true or not, this will be the biggest >>> security blockbuster of the decade. >>> >>> <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies> > >> This is my analysis: >> https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2018/10/05/making-sense-of-the-supermicro-motherboard-attack/ >> Theo > > Thanks. Nicely thought out blog article. I agree that putting the > chip on the SPI bus would be the ideal location. I might add that is > would be possible to add microcode instructions to the CPU via the SPI > bus (depending on how the added chip is wired into the system). > > Some deficiencies and unanswered questions in the original Bloomberg > article: > > 1. Since Bloomberg apparently has possession of several of these > mystery chips They don't claim that, and we don't know it. The motherboard photos could have been sent by their inside source. It would have been much more risky to provide a whole MB to Bloomberg. The chip photos are probably something off Digikey. If they don't have the board or chips, the rest of your questions don't matter. Clifford Heath.
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| From | Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-05 21:02 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <j6cgrdpklrosgg5h210f4heg8anbaq84vt@4ax.com> |
| In reply to | #518506 |
On Sat, 6 Oct 2018 13:42:59 +1000, Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> wrote: >On 06/10/18 13:12, Jeff Liebermann wrote: >> On 05 Oct 2018 16:28:21 +0100 (BST), Theo Markettos >> <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote: >>> In comp.arch.embedded Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> wrote: >>>> Whether it turns out to be true or not, this will be the biggest >>>> security blockbuster of the decade. >>>> >>>> <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies> >> >>> This is my analysis: >>> https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2018/10/05/making-sense-of-the-supermicro-motherboard-attack/ >>> Theo >> >> Thanks. Nicely thought out blog article. I agree that putting the >> chip on the SPI bus would be the ideal location. I might add that is >> would be possible to add microcode instructions to the CPU via the SPI >> bus (depending on how the added chip is wired into the system). >> >> Some deficiencies and unanswered questions in the original Bloomberg >> article: >> >> 1. Since Bloomberg apparently has possession of several of these >> mystery chips >They don't claim that, and we don't know it. The motherboard >photos could have been sent by their inside source. It would >have been much more risky to provide a whole MB to Bloomberg. >The chip photos are probably something off Digikey. > >If they don't have the board or chips, the rest of your questions >don't matter. > >Clifford Heath. Good point. If they don't have physical possession of a working chip and/or motherboard, then that's the end of the physical evidence making literally everything written so far no better than speculation. Incidentally, the photo of the chip and the finger look edited: <https://assets.bwbx.io/images/users/iqjWHBFdfxIU/i9VdsjZLS_Pk/v1/600x-1.jpg> At that level of magnifications, the ridges of the finger and the nail show substantial levels of dirt, cuts, and irregularities. Most peoples palm and back of the hand are different colors. To produce a perfectly rounded edge view, clean nails, clean ridges, an uniform color requires considerable photo editing. Since the chip seems to be back lighted, while the finger is lighted most from the right side, I would guess that the chip was added to the finger photo. Looking again at the solder plate on the chip, I'm sure it's never been attached to a PCB. Fake news? I think so. -- Jeff Liebermann jeffl@cruzio.com 150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558
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| From | <698839253X6D445TD@nospam.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 06:03 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <pp9j7c$pat$1@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518506 |
Clifford Heath wrote: >On 06/10/18 13:12, Jeff Liebermann wrote: >> On 05 Oct 2018 16:28:21 +0100 (BST), Theo Markettos >> <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote: >>> In comp.arch.embedded Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> wrote: >>>> Whether it turns out to be true or not, this will be the biggest >>>> security blockbuster of the decade. >>>> >>>> >>>> <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate-america-s-top-companies> >> >>> This is my analysis: >>> https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2018/10/05/making-sense-of-the-supermicro-motherboard-attack/ >>> Theo >> >> Thanks. Nicely thought out blog article. I agree that putting the >> chip on the SPI bus would be the ideal location. I might add that is >> would be possible to add microcode instructions to the CPU via the SPI >> bus (depending on how the added chip is wired into the system). >> >> Some deficiencies and unanswered questions in the original Bloomberg >> article: >> >> 1. Since Bloomberg apparently has possession of several of these >> mystery chips > >They don't claim that, and we don't know it. The motherboard >photos could have been sent by their inside source. It would >have been much more risky to provide a whole MB to Bloomberg. >The chip photos are probably something off Digikey. > >If they don't have the board or chips, the rest of your questions >don't matter. He has a good analysis IMNSHO. Sure hand anything to the press, especially the biased press, and it will publish that. The whole issue here is to get the reality show manager re-elected, mid-terms are knocking on the door, keep republicans in power, create a common enemy, standard stuff. Truth and 'tronics has little to do with it. Any kid can make up this story. Maybe that 'chip dot' is just flee poop, like the rest of what the reality lost show manager does. And as significant as that. At the same time companies like Apple may hand all user data to China, they only have to ask for it.. Money, sales, profit is the law. Snake oil is the trade. :-) Oh well... remember in the last cold war how Russia was accused of spying on every one... Now US does it as one bigger number. And there is nothing to know really, of value, that China does not already have, or can do better. That includes running a country.
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| From | DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 08:45 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <pp9sn7$16t6$2@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518505 |
Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> wrote in news:n07grdlc3jdr2ssnej54fakvilrdka07u1@4ax.com: > 1. Since Bloomberg apparently has possession of several of these > mystery chips, why haven't anyone done an autopsy or xray analysis on > what's inside? Did you even read the article? Did you not see the picture of what the chip contained? And I am quite sure that the DoD's investigation into it was much more comprehensive than a news agency's most elite hardware nerd.
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| From | Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 08:51 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <gskhrdtud3u1jf0fi8un1si04cja0t9382@4ax.com> |
| In reply to | #518520 |
On Sat, 6 Oct 2018 08:45:28 +0000 (UTC), DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org wrote: >Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> wrote in >news:n07grdlc3jdr2ssnej54fakvilrdka07u1@4ax.com: > >> 1. Since Bloomberg apparently has possession of several of these >> mystery chips, why haven't anyone done an autopsy or xray analysis on >> what's inside? > Did you even read the article? Yes. >Did you not see the picture of what the >chip contained? Do you mean this rubbish? <https://www.bloomberg.com/toaster/v2/charts/85c4e100b7ab4a8bbffe7ce2a3e137c1.html> You have a good imagination. Perhaps you might know what a "signal conditioner coupler" mentioned in the first paragraph might be? While you're working on that, perhaps you can also explain what an operating system core might be as in "...the microchip altered the operating system’s core so it could accept modifications". Duz Supermicro use core memory? > And I am quite sure that the DoD's investigation into it was much more >comprehensive than a news agency's most elite hardware nerd. Certainly they'll investigate. So will every other government agency and publicity hungry entity will conduct their own independent investigation. This was discovered by Amazon's outside security contractor something like 2 years ago. One might suspect that there are now a fair number of these chips floating around and that they have been rather thoroughly analyzed over the last 2 years. Oddly, I don't see any reports, photos, or info leaks. However, I'm sure they'll take their time releasing any real results, when they discover it's an SMD resistor network. On Sat, 6 Oct 2018 08:50:02 +0000 (UTC), DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org wrote: >Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> wrote in >news:n07grdlc3jdr2ssnej54fakvilrdka07u1@4ax.com: > >> Microsoft's October 2018 Windoze 10 update destroying customer data. > >Bullshit. Operator error. Is that like blame the victim? I would think that the average user might assume that an operating system update wouldn't erase all their data. Actually, that begs the question of what was Microsoft doing digging around in the users files anyway? Were they building a catalog of "interesting" files for the NSA? Why was this update so big when it only added a few new features: <https://www.cnet.com/how-to/windows-10-october-2018-update-the-7-best-new-features/> New spyware, err... telemetry perhaps? Incidentally, MS has suspended the update and is investigating the problem. <https://www.cnet.com/how-to/windows-10-october-2018-update-the-7-best-new-features/> Pulling the plug 5 days after a huge number of rather serious complaints is what is now called "decisive action". >Always backup first for one thing, and I still >think you did something to cause the loss. The first step to solving a problem really is to blame someone, but never blame the person in charge of fixing the problem. They might get angry and do nothing. I have a simple method of dealing with such complainers. I construct a clone of their computer. I then push pins and needles into the motherboard until it exhibits erratic behavior. By sympathetic voodoo and quantum entanglement, your identical PC will exhibit identical problems. >And you do not have an >instantaneous mirror on another machine for their data? For my former medical office customers, that was standard procedure. I also didn't install updates of any kind until after a suitable waiting period. However, for the typical small business and home user, I prefer image backups, which allows me to quickly restore literally everything. For backups between image backups, I just copy or rsync a few directories that I consider important to a local NAS (network attached storage) drive. > Sounds like something Trump would say. Trump doesn't say anything. He tweets. -- Jeff Liebermann jeffl@cruzio.com 150 Felker St #D http://www.LearnByDestroying.com Santa Cruz CA 95060 http://802.11junk.com Skype: JeffLiebermann AE6KS 831-336-2558
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| From | DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 16:42 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <ppaoko$mgp$1@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518534 |
Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> wrote in news:gskhrdtud3u1jf0fi8un1si04cja0t9382@4ax.com: >>Always backup first for one thing, and I still >>think you did something to cause the loss. > > The first step to solving a problem really is to blame someone, but > never blame the person in charge of fixing the problem. They might > get angry and do nothing. > Especially when the FIRST thing they are ALWAYS supposed to do is perform a backup. Yeah... you might get angry and... start blaming Microsoft for your missteps.
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| From | Dimiter_Popoff <dp@tgi-sci.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 19:55 +0300 |
| Message-ID | <ppapdd$s8$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #518540 |
On 06.10.2018 г. 19:42, DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org wrote: > Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> wrote in > news:gskhrdtud3u1jf0fi8un1si04cja0t9382@4ax.com: > >>> Always backup first for one thing, and I still >>> think you did something to cause the loss. >> >> The first step to solving a problem really is to blame someone, but >> never blame the person in charge of fixing the problem. They might >> get angry and do nothing. >> > > Especially when the FIRST thing they are ALWAYS supposed to do is perform a > backup. Yeah... you might get angry and... start blaming Microsoft for > your missteps. > At that frequency of "updates" I hear windows 10 is doing backing up a a few terabytes all the time sounds the practical thing to do, yeah. Dimiter ====================================================== Dimiter Popoff, TGI http://www.tgi-sci.com ====================================================== http://www.flickr.com/photos/didi_tgi/
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| From | Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 19:29 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <ppauu1$11ja$1@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518544 |
On 10/06/18 17:55, Dimiter_Popoff wrote: > On 06.10.2018 г. 19:42, DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@decadence.org wrote: >> Jeff Liebermann <jeffl@cruzio.com> wrote in >> news:gskhrdtud3u1jf0fi8un1si04cja0t9382@4ax.com: >> >>>> Always backup first for one thing, and I still >>>> think you did something to cause the loss. >>> >>> The first step to solving a problem really is to blame someone, but >>> never blame the person in charge of fixing the problem. They might >>> get angry and do nothing. >>> >> >> Especially when the FIRST thing they are ALWAYS supposed to do is >> perform a >> backup. Yeah... you might get angry and... start blaming Microsoft for >> your missteps. >> > > At that frequency of "updates" I hear windows 10 is doing backing up a > a few terabytes all the time sounds the practical thing to do, yeah. > > Dimiter > > ====================================================== > Dimiter Popoff, TGI http://www.tgi-sci.com > ====================================================== > http://www.flickr.com/photos/didi_tgi/ > > > > I wouldn't touch win 10 with yours, never mind my own. Completely untrustworthy if you value personal or even corporate privacy. Modern systems are getting so complex, who can verify what's been hidden in either the hardware or software ?. This report has really been a wakeup call for me, even though it doesn't impact work here at all. Never even considered that substitute or added h/w might have been fitted, but state level actors have the resources to do just that. Where are most of the management engine cpus made, for example ?... Chris
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| From | DLUNU <DecadentLinuxUserNumeroUno@DLU.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-06 22:41 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <ppbdnf$1pfv$2@gioia.aioe.org> |
| In reply to | #518554 |
Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> wrote in news:ppauu1$11ja$1 @gioia.aioe.org: > I wouldn't touch win 10 with yours, never mind my own. Completely > untrustworthy if you value personal or even corporate privacy. > Modern systems are getting so complex, who can verify what's been > hidden in either the hardware or software ?. > Ummm... the millions of folks using it. Particularly the pro installations.
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| From | Dimiter_Popoff <dp@tgi-sci.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-07 02:07 +0300 |
| Message-ID | <ppbf81$2ls$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #518590 |
On 07.10.2018 г. 01:41, DLUNU wrote: > Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> wrote in news:ppauu1$11ja$1 > @gioia.aioe.org: > >> I wouldn't touch win 10 with yours, never mind my own. Completely >> untrustworthy if you value personal or even corporate privacy. >> Modern systems are getting so complex, who can verify what's been >> hidden in either the hardware or software ?. >> > > Ummm... the millions of folks using it. Particularly the pro > installations. > Millions or billions of users do not change the facts. Yes, millions are hooked and have no reasonable escape option, which is why windows 10 still has a market share - and why nobody cares to try to make something to replace it, because the effort looks (is) doomed.
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| From | Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-10-07 11:56 +1100 |
| Message-ID | <rRcuD.98406$9O2.74456@fx03.iad> |
| In reply to | #518590 |
On 07/10/18 09:41, DLUNU wrote: > Chris <xxx.syseng.yyy@gfsys.co.uk> wrote in news:ppauu1$11ja$1 > @gioia.aioe.org: > >> I wouldn't touch win 10 with yours, never mind my own. Completely >> untrustworthy if you value personal or even corporate privacy. >> Modern systems are getting so complex, who can verify what's been >> hidden in either the hardware or software ?. >> > > Ummm... the millions of folks using it. Particularly the pro > installations. Microsoft doesn't have users. They have hostages.
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