Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1608707 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100 |
| Last post | 2017-03-28 02:50 +0200 |
| Articles | 8 on this page of 28 — 4 participants |
Back to article view | Back to linux.kernel
[PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
[PATCH v2 4/7] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 4/7] efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-24 19:50 +0100
[PATCH v2 6/7] efi/capsule: Factor out overloadable efi_capsule_identify_image Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
[PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> - 2017-03-24 21:30 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-28 16:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-28 17:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-28 17:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-28 18:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-28 18:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-28 19:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-28 19:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-30 11:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 5/7] efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-04-04 19:50 +0200
[PATCH v2 3/7] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-24 19:20 +0100
[PATCH v2 2/7] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 2/7] efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-24 19:20 +0100
[PATCH v2 1/7] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2017-03-24 19:20 +0100
[PATCH v2 7/7] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> - 2017-03-24 21:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> - 2017-03-24 21:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-27 13:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> - 2017-03-27 12:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> - 2017-03-27 13:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> - 2017-03-28 02:50 +0200
Page 2 of 2 — ← Prev page 1 [2]
| From | Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-24 19:20 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 1/7] efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap |
| Message-ID | <toBYF-5oX-77@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1608714 |
On 24 March 2017 at 17:34, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> wrote:
> If kmap or vmap fail, it means we ran out of memory. There are no
> user-provided addressed involved that would justify EFAULT.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
> index 9ae6c11..91e91f7 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c
> @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static ssize_t efi_capsule_submit_update(struct capsule_info *cap_info)
> VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
> if (!cap_hdr_temp) {
> pr_debug("%s: vmap() failed\n", __func__);
> - return -EFAULT;
> + return -ENOMEM;
> }
>
> ret = efi_capsule_update(cap_hdr_temp, cap_info->pages);
> @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static ssize_t efi_capsule_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buff,
> kbuff = kmap(page);
> if (!kbuff) {
> pr_debug("%s: kmap() failed\n", __func__);
> - ret = -EFAULT;
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto failed;
> }
> kbuff += PAGE_SIZE - cap_info->page_bytes_remain;
> --
> 2.10.2
>
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-24 18:40 +0100 |
| Subject | [PATCH v2 7/7] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header |
| Message-ID | <toBlU-4TS-19@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1608707 |
The firmware for Quark X102x prepends a security header to the capsule
which is needed to support the mandatory secure boot on this processor.
The header can be detected by checking for the "_CSH" signature and -
to avoid any GUID conflict - validating its size field to contain the
expected value. Then we need to look for the EFI header right after the
security header and pass the image displacement in cap_info.
To be minimal invasive and maximal safe, the quirk version of
efi_capsule_identify_image is only effective on Quark processors.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 95 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
index 30031d5..7f16295 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
@@ -13,12 +13,66 @@
#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <asm/efi.h>
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
#define EFI_MIN_RESERVE 5120
#define EFI_DUMMY_GUID \
EFI_GUID(0x4424ac57, 0xbe4b, 0x47dd, 0x9e, 0x97, 0xed, 0x50, 0xf0, 0x9f, 0x92, 0xa9)
+#define QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE 0x5f435348 /* _CSH */
+#define QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE 0x400
+
+/*
+ * Header prepended to the standard EFI capsule on Quark systems the are based
+ * on Intel firmware BSP.
+ * @csh_signature: Unique identifier to sanity check signed module
+ * presence ("_CSH").
+ * @version: Current version of CSH used. Should be one for Quark A0.
+ * @modulesize: Size of the entire module including the module header
+ * and payload.
+ * @security_version_number_index: Index of SVN to use for validation of signed
+ * module.
+ * @security_version_number: Used to prevent against roll back of modules.
+ * @rsvd_module_id: Currently unused for Clanton (Quark).
+ * @rsvd_module_vendor: Vendor Identifier. For Intel products value is
+ * 0x00008086.
+ * @rsvd_date: BCD representation of build date as yyyymmdd, where
+ * yyyy=4 digit year, mm=1-12, dd=1-31.
+ * @headersize: Total length of the header including including any
+ * padding optionally added by the signing tool.
+ * @hash_algo: What Hash is used in the module signing.
+ * @cryp_algo: What Crypto is used in the module signing.
+ * @keysize: Total length of the key data including including any
+ * padding optionally added by the signing tool.
+ * @signaturesize: Total length of the signature including including any
+ * padding optionally added by the signing tool.
+ * @rsvd_next_header: 32-bit pointer to the next Secure Boot Module in the
+ * chain, if there is a next header.
+ * @rsvd: Reserved, padding structure to required size.
+ *
+ * See also QuartSecurityHeader_t in
+ * Quark_EDKII_v1.2.1.1/QuarkPlatformPkg/Include/QuarkBootRom.h
+ * from https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/23197/Intel-Quark-SoC-X1000-Board-Support-Package-BSP
+ */
+struct quark_security_header {
+ u32 csh_signature;
+ u32 version;
+ u32 modulesize;
+ u32 security_version_number_index;
+ u32 security_version_number;
+ u32 rsvd_module_id;
+ u32 rsvd_module_vendor;
+ u32 rsvd_date;
+ u32 headersize;
+ u32 hash_algo;
+ u32 cryp_algo;
+ u32 keysize;
+ u32 signaturesize;
+ u32 rsvd_next_header;
+ u32 rsvd[2];
+};
+
static efi_char16_t efi_dummy_name[6] = { 'D', 'U', 'M', 'M', 'Y', 0 };
static bool efi_no_storage_paranoia;
@@ -495,3 +549,44 @@ bool efi_poweroff_required(void)
{
return acpi_gbl_reduced_hardware || acpi_no_s5;
}
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id quark_ids[] = {
+ { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5, 9 }, /* Intel Quark X1000 */
+ { }
+};
+
+int efi_capsule_identify_image(struct efi_capsule_info *cap_info, void *header,
+ size_t hdr_bytes)
+{
+ struct quark_security_header *csh = header;
+
+ if (!x86_match_cpu(quark_ids))
+ return __efi_capsule_identify_image(cap_info, header,
+ hdr_bytes);
+
+ /* Only process data block that is larger than the security header */
+ if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(struct quark_security_header))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (csh->csh_signature != QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE ||
+ csh->headersize != QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE)
+ return __efi_capsule_identify_image(cap_info, header,
+ hdr_bytes);
+
+ /* Only process data block if EFI header is included */
+ if (hdr_bytes < QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE +
+ sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t))
+ return 0;
+
+ pr_debug("Quark security header detected\n");
+
+ if (csh->rsvd_next_header != 0) {
+ pr_err("multiple Quark security headers not supported\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ cap_info->total_size = csh->modulesize;
+ cap_info->efi_hdr_displacement = csh->headersize;
+
+ return 1;
+}
--
2.10.2
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-24 21:40 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 7/7] efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header |
| Message-ID | <toEa5-6Td-17@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1608715 |
On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 7:34 PM, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> wrote:
> The firmware for Quark X102x prepends a security header to the capsule
> which is needed to support the mandatory secure boot on this processor.
> The header can be detected by checking for the "_CSH" signature and -
> to avoid any GUID conflict - validating its size field to contain the
> expected value. Then we need to look for the EFI header right after the
> security header and pass the image displacement in cap_info.
>
> To be minimal invasive and maximal safe, the quirk version of
> efi_capsule_identify_image is only effective on Quark processors.
> +static const struct x86_cpu_id quark_ids[] = {
> + { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5, 9 }, /* Intel Quark X1000 */
> + { }
> +};
> +
> +int efi_capsule_identify_image(struct efi_capsule_info *cap_info, void *header,
> + size_t hdr_bytes)
> +{
> + struct quark_security_header *csh = header;
> +
> + if (!x86_match_cpu(quark_ids))
> + return __efi_capsule_identify_image(cap_info, header,
> + hdr_bytes);
I would slightly differently, i.e. introduce a helper
capsule_identify_image_qrk() and do here something like
#define ICPU(family, model, data) ...
static const struct x86_cpu_id efi_capsule_quirk_ids[] = {
ICPU(5, 9, qrk_capsule_identify_image),
{}
};
...
id = x86_match_cpu(efi_capsule_quirk_ids);
if (id)
return ((...)id->data)(...);
return __efi_capsule_identify_image(cap_info, header, hdr_bytes);
> +
> + /* Only process data block that is larger than the security header */
> + if (hdr_bytes < sizeof(struct quark_security_header))
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (csh->csh_signature != QUARK_CSH_SIGNATURE ||
> + csh->headersize != QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE)
> + return __efi_capsule_identify_image(cap_info, header,
> + hdr_bytes);
> +
> + /* Only process data block if EFI header is included */
> + if (hdr_bytes < QUARK_SECURITY_HEADER_SIZE +
> + sizeof(efi_capsule_header_t))
> + return 0;
> +
> + pr_debug("Quark security header detected\n");
> +
> + if (csh->rsvd_next_header != 0) {
> + pr_err("multiple Quark security headers not supported\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + cap_info->total_size = csh->modulesize;
> + cap_info->efi_hdr_displacement = csh->headersize;
> +
> + return 1;
> +}
--
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-24 21:50 +0100 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images |
| Message-ID | <toEjL-6Xy-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1608707 |
On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 7:34 PM, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> wrote: > This addresses the review feedback provided on round 1, specifically > - refactored queue to keep the Quark mess in > - only check for CSH on Quark CPUs > - added some smaller cleanups of the capsule loader > - documented capsule header / linked to original code > > See last patch for the background of the series. > > The series has been tested on the Galileo Gen2, to exclude regressions, > with a firmware.cap with AND without security header and the SIMATIC > IOT2040 which requires the header because of its mandatory secure boot. The series looks good to me from code prospective. It's clean and understandable, though I have couple of comments (see related patches). Please, address them. I wasn't able to test it, thus FWIW: Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> > > Jan > > Jan Kiszka (7): > efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap > efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT > efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages > efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info > efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header > efi/capsule: Factor out overloadable efi_capsule_identify_image > efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header > > arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- > drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c | 21 +++++- > include/linux/efi.h | 19 +++++ > 4 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) > > -- > 2.10.2 > -- With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-27 13:30 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images |
| Message-ID | <tpB0u-7gY-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1608963 |
On 2017-03-24 21:39, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > On Fri, Mar 24, 2017 at 7:34 PM, Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> wrote: >> This addresses the review feedback provided on round 1, specifically >> - refactored queue to keep the Quark mess in >> - only check for CSH on Quark CPUs >> - added some smaller cleanups of the capsule loader >> - documented capsule header / linked to original code >> >> See last patch for the background of the series. >> >> The series has been tested on the Galileo Gen2, to exclude regressions, >> with a firmware.cap with AND without security header and the SIMATIC >> IOT2040 which requires the header because of its mandatory secure boot. > > The series looks good to me from code prospective. It's clean and > understandable, though I have couple of comments (see related > patches). > Please, address them. Done, also the kbuild reboot finding and another build issue along that. Will send v3 after testing again (unfortunately not on the Galileo - my board died). > > I wasn't able to test it, thus FWIW: > Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Thanks, Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RDA ITP SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-27 12:50 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images |
| Message-ID | <tpAnM-6J9-33@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1608707 |
On 24/03/17 17:34, Jan Kiszka wrote: > This addresses the review feedback provided on round 1, specifically > - refactored queue to keep the Quark mess in > - only check for CSH on Quark CPUs > - added some smaller cleanups of the capsule loader > - documented capsule header / linked to original code > > See last patch for the background of the series. > > The series has been tested on the Galileo Gen2, to exclude regressions, > with a firmware.cap with AND without security header and the SIMATIC > IOT2040 which requires the header because of its mandatory secure boot. > > Jan > > Jan Kiszka (7): > efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap > efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT > efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages > efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info > efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header > efi/capsule: Factor out overloadable efi_capsule_identify_image > efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header > > arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- > drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c | 21 +++++- > include/linux/efi.h | 19 +++++ > 4 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) > BTW, Thanks for taking the time to remove the __func__ stuff all over the place. I'll try to test this out for you. I found that the current BSP Intel is releasing has some sort of GUI that downloads an image to a board (which completely fails for me on the Galileo I have)... not sure if you have different results with the stuff from the Intel website but it's non-functional for me :( I'd like to suggest to you adding something to Documentation describing how to load and trigger a capsule update. For example on Quark you need to use the EFI reset method to cause capsule update to work. Could you add a patch to your series for Documentation detailing: 1. Entry criteria (needing to boot in EFI reset mode) 1. Description of loading a capsule 3. Description of triggering the update (reboot) 4. Verifying the update succeeded (actually is this possible right now?) --- bod
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-27 13:10 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images |
| Message-ID | <tpAH8-75T-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1609733 |
On 2017-03-27 12:29, Bryan O'Donoghue wrote: > > > On 24/03/17 17:34, Jan Kiszka wrote: >> This addresses the review feedback provided on round 1, specifically >> - refactored queue to keep the Quark mess in >> - only check for CSH on Quark CPUs >> - added some smaller cleanups of the capsule loader >> - documented capsule header / linked to original code >> >> See last patch for the background of the series. >> >> The series has been tested on the Galileo Gen2, to exclude regressions, >> with a firmware.cap with AND without security header and the SIMATIC >> IOT2040 which requires the header because of its mandatory secure boot. >> >> Jan >> >> Jan Kiszka (7): >> efi/capsule: Fix return code on failing kmap/vmap >> efi/capsule: Remove pr_debug on ENOMEM or EFAULT >> efi/capsule: Clean up pr_err/info messages >> efi/capsule: Adjust return type of efi_capsule_setup_info >> efi/capsule: Prepare for loading images with security header >> efi/capsule: Factor out overloadable efi_capsule_identify_image >> efi/capsule: Add support for Quark security header >> >> arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> drivers/firmware/efi/capsule-loader.c | 136 >> +++++++++++++++++++--------------- >> drivers/firmware/efi/capsule.c | 21 +++++- >> include/linux/efi.h | 19 +++++ >> 4 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) >> > > BTW, > > Thanks for taking the time to remove the __func__ stuff all over the place. > > I'll try to test this out for you. I found that the current BSP Intel is > releasing has some sort of GUI that downloads an image to a board (which > completely fails for me on the Galileo I have)... not sure if you have > different results with the stuff from the Intel website but it's > non-functional for me :( I found the Galileo capsules *.cap in the jar archives of the Galileo firmware update packages, and they work. > > I'd like to suggest to you adding something to Documentation describing > how to load and trigger a capsule update. For example on Quark you need > to use the EFI reset method to cause capsule update to work. cat /path/to/capsule.cap > /dev/efi_capsule_loader The reset method is auto-adjusted by the kernel when an update is pending. So firmware update is now seriously simple. But I can write a 2 or 3-lines readme if it's preferred. > > Could you add a patch to your series for Documentation detailing: > > 1. Entry criteria (needing to boot in EFI reset mode) > 1. Description of loading a capsule > 3. Description of triggering the update (reboot) > 4. Verifying the update succeeded (actually is this possible right now?) dmidecode -> check BIOS version information (vendor-specific) Jan
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Bryan O'Donoghue <pure.logic@nexus-software.ie> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-03-28 02:50 +0200 |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 0/7] efi: Enhance capsule loader to support signed Quark images |
| Message-ID | <tpNuH-7Yq-59@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1609740 |
On 27/03/17 12:01, Jan Kiszka wrote: > The reset method is auto-adjusted by the kernel when an update is > pending. So firmware update is now seriously simple. But I can write a 2 > or 3-lines readme if it's preferred. Using myself as a benchmark I'd say, never assume anything is idiot proof to a sufficiently talented idiot, better to document it to be sure and give you're spinning a new patch for some comments from Andy I'd say it's a worthwhile addition to the set. --- bod
[toc] | [prev] | [standalone]
Page 2 of 2 — ← Prev page 1 [2]
Back to top | Article view | linux.kernel
csiph-web