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| Started by | Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-05-17 06:10 +0200 |
| Last post | 2017-05-23 07:10 +0200 |
| Articles | 6 — 3 participants |
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[PATCH] crypto: x86/aes - Don't use %rbp as temporary register Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> - 2017-05-17 06:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] crypto: x86/aes - Don't use %rbp as temporary register Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> - 2017-05-17 22:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] crypto: x86/aes - Don't use %rbp as temporary register Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> - 2017-05-18 00:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] crypto: x86/aes - Don't use %rbp as temporary register Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> - 2017-05-19 04:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] crypto: x86/aes - Don't use %rbp as temporary register Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> - 2017-05-19 05:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] crypto: x86/aes - Don't use %rbp as temporary register Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2017-05-23 07:10 +0200
| From | Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-17 06:10 +0200 |
| Subject | [PATCH] crypto: x86/aes - Don't use %rbp as temporary register |
| Message-ID | <tHYrE-6Bi-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> When using the "aes-asm" implementation of AES (*not* the AES-NI implementation) on an x86_64, v4.12-rc1 kernel with lockdep enabled, the following warning was reported, along with a long unwinder dump: WARNING: kernel stack regs at ffffc90000643558 in kworker/u4:2:155 has bad 'bp' value 000000000000001c The problem is that aes_enc_block() and aes_dec_block() use %rbp as a temporary register, which breaks stack traces if an interrupt occurs. Fix this by replacing %rbp with %r9, which was being used to hold the saved value of %rbp. This required rearranging the AES round macro slightly since %r9d cannot be used as the target of a move from %ah-%dh. Performance is essentially unchanged --- actually about 0.2% faster than before. Interestingly, I also measured aes-generic as being nearly 7% faster than aes-asm, so perhaps aes-asm has outlived its usefulness... Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> --- arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S | 47 +++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S index 910565547163..8739cf7795de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aes-x86_64-asm_64.S @@ -42,17 +42,15 @@ #define R5E %esi #define R6 %rdi #define R6E %edi -#define R7 %rbp -#define R7E %ebp +#define R7 %r9 /* don't use %rbp; it breaks stack traces */ +#define R7E %r9d #define R8 %r8 -#define R9 %r9 #define R10 %r10 #define R11 %r11 -#define prologue(FUNC,KEY,B128,B192,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11) \ +#define prologue(FUNC,KEY,B128,B192,r1,r2,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,r10,r11) \ ENTRY(FUNC); \ movq r1,r2; \ - movq r3,r4; \ leaq KEY+48(r8),r9; \ movq r10,r11; \ movl (r7),r5 ## E; \ @@ -70,9 +68,8 @@ je B192; \ leaq 32(r9),r9; -#define epilogue(FUNC,r1,r2,r3,r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9) \ +#define epilogue(FUNC,r1,r2,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9) \ movq r1,r2; \ - movq r3,r4; \ movl r5 ## E,(r9); \ movl r6 ## E,4(r9); \ movl r7 ## E,8(r9); \ @@ -88,12 +85,12 @@ movl TAB(,r6,4),r6 ## E; \ roll $16,r2 ## E; \ shrl $16,r4 ## E; \ - movzbl r4 ## H,r7 ## E; \ - movzbl r4 ## L,r4 ## E; \ + movzbl r4 ## L,r7 ## E; \ + movzbl r4 ## H,r4 ## E; \ xorl OFFSET(r8),ra ## E; \ xorl OFFSET+4(r8),rb ## E; \ - xorl TAB+3072(,r7,4),r5 ## E;\ - xorl TAB+2048(,r4,4),r6 ## E;\ + xorl TAB+3072(,r4,4),r5 ## E;\ + xorl TAB+2048(,r7,4),r6 ## E;\ movzbl r1 ## L,r7 ## E; \ movzbl r1 ## H,r4 ## E; \ movl TAB+1024(,r4,4),r4 ## E;\ @@ -101,19 +98,19 @@ roll $16,r1 ## E; \ shrl $16,r3 ## E; \ xorl TAB(,r7,4),r5 ## E; \ - movzbl r3 ## H,r7 ## E; \ - movzbl r3 ## L,r3 ## E; \ - xorl TAB+3072(,r7,4),r4 ## E;\ - xorl TAB+2048(,r3,4),r5 ## E;\ - movzbl r1 ## H,r7 ## E; \ - movzbl r1 ## L,r3 ## E; \ + movzbl r3 ## L,r7 ## E; \ + movzbl r3 ## H,r3 ## E; \ + xorl TAB+3072(,r3,4),r4 ## E;\ + xorl TAB+2048(,r7,4),r5 ## E;\ + movzbl r1 ## L,r7 ## E; \ + movzbl r1 ## H,r3 ## E; \ shrl $16,r1 ## E; \ - xorl TAB+3072(,r7,4),r6 ## E;\ - movl TAB+2048(,r3,4),r3 ## E;\ - movzbl r1 ## H,r7 ## E; \ - movzbl r1 ## L,r1 ## E; \ - xorl TAB+1024(,r7,4),r6 ## E;\ - xorl TAB(,r1,4),r3 ## E; \ + xorl TAB+3072(,r3,4),r6 ## E;\ + movl TAB+2048(,r7,4),r3 ## E;\ + movzbl r1 ## L,r7 ## E; \ + movzbl r1 ## H,r1 ## E; \ + xorl TAB+1024(,r1,4),r6 ## E;\ + xorl TAB(,r7,4),r3 ## E; \ movzbl r2 ## H,r1 ## E; \ movzbl r2 ## L,r7 ## E; \ shrl $16,r2 ## E; \ @@ -131,9 +128,9 @@ movl r4 ## E,r2 ## E; #define entry(FUNC,KEY,B128,B192) \ - prologue(FUNC,KEY,B128,B192,R2,R8,R7,R9,R1,R3,R4,R6,R10,R5,R11) + prologue(FUNC,KEY,B128,B192,R2,R8,R1,R3,R4,R6,R10,R5,R11) -#define return(FUNC) epilogue(FUNC,R8,R2,R9,R7,R5,R6,R3,R4,R11) +#define return(FUNC) epilogue(FUNC,R8,R2,R5,R6,R3,R4,R11) #define encrypt_round(TAB,OFFSET) \ round(TAB,OFFSET,R1,R2,R3,R4,R5,R6,R7,R10,R5,R6,R3,R4) \ -- 2.13.0
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| From | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-17 22:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tIe3n-7Ub-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1642943 |
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:03:08PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > When using the "aes-asm" implementation of AES (*not* the AES-NI > implementation) on an x86_64, v4.12-rc1 kernel with lockdep enabled, the > following warning was reported, along with a long unwinder dump: > > WARNING: kernel stack regs at ffffc90000643558 in kworker/u4:2:155 has bad 'bp' value 000000000000001c > > The problem is that aes_enc_block() and aes_dec_block() use %rbp as a > temporary register, which breaks stack traces if an interrupt occurs. > > Fix this by replacing %rbp with %r9, which was being used to hold the > saved value of %rbp. This required rearranging the AES round macro > slightly since %r9d cannot be used as the target of a move from %ah-%dh. > > Performance is essentially unchanged --- actually about 0.2% faster than > before. Interestingly, I also measured aes-generic as being nearly 7% > faster than aes-asm, so perhaps aes-asm has outlived its usefulness... > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> -- Josh
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| From | Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-18 00:30 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tIfCa-E3-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1643626 |
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 03:44:27PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: > On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:03:08PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > When using the "aes-asm" implementation of AES (*not* the AES-NI > > implementation) on an x86_64, v4.12-rc1 kernel with lockdep enabled, the > > following warning was reported, along with a long unwinder dump: > > > > WARNING: kernel stack regs at ffffc90000643558 in kworker/u4:2:155 has bad 'bp' value 000000000000001c > > > > The problem is that aes_enc_block() and aes_dec_block() use %rbp as a > > temporary register, which breaks stack traces if an interrupt occurs. > > > > Fix this by replacing %rbp with %r9, which was being used to hold the > > saved value of %rbp. This required rearranging the AES round macro > > slightly since %r9d cannot be used as the target of a move from %ah-%dh. > > > > Performance is essentially unchanged --- actually about 0.2% faster than > > before. Interestingly, I also measured aes-generic as being nearly 7% > > faster than aes-asm, so perhaps aes-asm has outlived its usefulness... > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> > Hmm, it looks like a number of other algorithms in arch/x86/crypto/ use %rbp (or %ebp), e.g. blowfish, camellia, cast5, and aes-i586. Presumably they have the same problem. I'm a little confused: do these all need to be fixed, and when/why did this start being considered broken? Eric
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| From | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-19 04:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tIFmW-3k7-13@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1643676 |
On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 03:21:41PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 03:44:27PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: > > On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:03:08PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > > > When using the "aes-asm" implementation of AES (*not* the AES-NI > > > implementation) on an x86_64, v4.12-rc1 kernel with lockdep enabled, the > > > following warning was reported, along with a long unwinder dump: > > > > > > WARNING: kernel stack regs at ffffc90000643558 in kworker/u4:2:155 has bad 'bp' value 000000000000001c > > > > > > The problem is that aes_enc_block() and aes_dec_block() use %rbp as a > > > temporary register, which breaks stack traces if an interrupt occurs. > > > > > > Fix this by replacing %rbp with %r9, which was being used to hold the > > > saved value of %rbp. This required rearranging the AES round macro > > > slightly since %r9d cannot be used as the target of a move from %ah-%dh. > > > > > > Performance is essentially unchanged --- actually about 0.2% faster than > > > before. Interestingly, I also measured aes-generic as being nearly 7% > > > faster than aes-asm, so perhaps aes-asm has outlived its usefulness... > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > > > Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> > > > > Hmm, it looks like a number of other algorithms in arch/x86/crypto/ use %rbp (or > %ebp), e.g. blowfish, camellia, cast5, and aes-i586. Presumably they have the > same problem. I'm a little confused: do these all need to be fixed, and > when/why did this start being considered broken? This warning was only recently added, with the goal of flushing out these types of issues with hand-coded asm to make frame pointer based stack traces more reliable. I can take a look at fixing the rest of them if you want. -- Josh
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| From | Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-19 05:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tIGj0-43X-13@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1645115 |
On Thu, May 18, 2017 at 08:56:32PM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote: > > > > Hmm, it looks like a number of other algorithms in arch/x86/crypto/ use %rbp (or > > %ebp), e.g. blowfish, camellia, cast5, and aes-i586. Presumably they have the > > same problem. I'm a little confused: do these all need to be fixed, and > > when/why did this start being considered broken? > > This warning was only recently added, with the goal of flushing out > these types of issues with hand-coded asm to make frame pointer based > stack traces more reliable. I can take a look at fixing the rest of > them if you want. > Okay. I'm worried you might run into one that is difficult to fix due to lack of spare registers. But if you're interested in looking into it, please go ahead. Thanks! Eric
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| From | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-05-23 07:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tKaeZ-77l-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| In reply to | #1642943 |
On Tue, May 16, 2017 at 09:03:08PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > When using the "aes-asm" implementation of AES (*not* the AES-NI > implementation) on an x86_64, v4.12-rc1 kernel with lockdep enabled, the > following warning was reported, along with a long unwinder dump: > > WARNING: kernel stack regs at ffffc90000643558 in kworker/u4:2:155 has bad 'bp' value 000000000000001c > > The problem is that aes_enc_block() and aes_dec_block() use %rbp as a > temporary register, which breaks stack traces if an interrupt occurs. > > Fix this by replacing %rbp with %r9, which was being used to hold the > saved value of %rbp. This required rearranging the AES round macro > slightly since %r9d cannot be used as the target of a move from %ah-%dh. > > Performance is essentially unchanged --- actually about 0.2% faster than > before. Interestingly, I also measured aes-generic as being nearly 7% > faster than aes-asm, so perhaps aes-asm has outlived its usefulness... > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Patch applied. Thanks. -- Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
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