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[PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self

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  [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> - 2016-08-10 02:00 +0200
    Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-08-10 20:40 +0200
      Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> - 2016-08-10 21:10 +0200
        Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> - 2016-08-10 21:20 +0200
        Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting  self Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> - 2016-08-10 22:10 +0200
          Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> - 2016-08-10 22:50 +0200
      Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-08-10 23:10 +0200
        Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> - 2016-08-10 23:20 +0200
          Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-08-10 23:30 +0200

#1459205 — [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self

In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.

Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
(which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).

This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
the CAP_SYS_NICE value.

This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm

Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
---
 fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (!p)
 		return -ESRCH;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
-		count = -EPERM;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (p != current) {
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+			count = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
 
-	err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
-	if (err) {
-		count = err;
-		goto out;
+		err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
+		if (err) {
+			count = err;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 
 	task_lock(p);
@@ -2315,14 +2317,16 @@ static int timerslack_ns_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 	if (!p)
 		return -ESRCH;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
-		err = -EPERM;
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (p != current) {
 
-	err = security_task_getscheduler(p);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
+			err = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		err = security_task_getscheduler(p);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	task_lock(p);
 	seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", p->timer_slack_ns);
-- 
1.9.1

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#1459446

On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 4:54 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
> In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
> to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
> when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.
>
> Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
> privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
> a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
> (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).
>
> This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
> the CAP_SYS_NICE value.
>
> This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm
>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>         if (!p)
>                 return -ESRCH;
>
> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> -               count = -EPERM;
> -               goto out;
> -       }
> +       if (p != current) {
> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> +                       count = -EPERM;
> +                       goto out;
> +               }
>
> -       err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
> -       if (err) {
> -               count = err;
> -               goto out;
> +               err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
> +               if (err) {
> +                       count = err;
> +                       goto out;
> +               }
>         }

This entirely bypasses LSM when p == current. Is that intended?

-Kees

>
>         task_lock(p);
> @@ -2315,14 +2317,16 @@ static int timerslack_ns_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>         if (!p)
>                 return -ESRCH;
>
> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> -               err = -EPERM;
> -               goto out;
> -       }
> +       if (p != current) {
>
> -       err = security_task_getscheduler(p);
> -       if (err)
> -               goto out;
> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
> +                       err = -EPERM;
> +                       goto out;
> +               }
> +               err = security_task_getscheduler(p);
> +               if (err)
> +                       goto out;
> +       }
>
>         task_lock(p);
>         seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", p->timer_slack_ns);
> --
> 1.9.1
>



-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security

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#1459592

On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 11:36 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 4:54 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
>> In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
>> to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
>> when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.
>>
>> Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
>> privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
>> a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
>> (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).
>>
>> This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
>> the CAP_SYS_NICE value.
>>
>> This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm
>>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
>> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
>> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
>> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
>> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
>> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
>> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
>> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
>> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
>> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
>> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
>> ---
>>  fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>> index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>> @@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>>         if (!p)
>>                 return -ESRCH;
>>
>> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> -               count = -EPERM;
>> -               goto out;
>> -       }
>> +       if (p != current) {
>> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> +                       count = -EPERM;
>> +                       goto out;
>> +               }
>>
>> -       err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>> -       if (err) {
>> -               count = err;
>> -               goto out;
>> +               err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>> +               if (err) {
>> +                       count = err;
>> +                       goto out;
>> +               }
>>         }
>
> This entirely bypasses LSM when p == current. Is that intended?

I wasn't entierly sure. I didn't think PR_SET_TIMERSLACK has a
security hook, but looking again I now see the top-level
security_task_prctl() check, so maybe not skipping it in this case
would be good?

thanks
-john

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#1459644

On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 12:03 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 11:36 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 4:54 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
>>> In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
>>> to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
>>> when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.
>>>
>>> Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
>>> privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
>>> a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
>>> (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).
>>>
>>> This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
>>> the CAP_SYS_NICE value.
>>>
>>> This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm
>>>
>>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
>>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>>> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
>>> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
>>> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
>>> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
>>> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
>>> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
>>> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
>>> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
>>> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
>>> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
>>> ---
>>>  fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>>> index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
>>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>>> @@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>>>         if (!p)
>>>                 return -ESRCH;
>>>
>>> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>> -               count = -EPERM;
>>> -               goto out;
>>> -       }
>>> +       if (p != current) {
>>> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>> +                       count = -EPERM;
>>> +                       goto out;
>>> +               }
>>>
>>> -       err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>> -       if (err) {
>>> -               count = err;
>>> -               goto out;
>>> +               err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>> +               if (err) {
>>> +                       count = err;
>>> +                       goto out;
>>> +               }
>>>         }
>>
>> This entirely bypasses LSM when p == current. Is that intended?
>
> I wasn't entierly sure. I didn't think PR_SET_TIMERSLACK has a
> security hook, but looking again I now see the top-level
> security_task_prctl() check, so maybe not skipping it in this case
> would be good?

So thinking about this some more. I'm really not sure what the right
thing is. Since the LSM check for security_task_setscheduler(), is
different from the security_task_prctl() check, it seems odd to have
different checks for different interfaces which in the p==current case
are really are the same.

Suggestions?

thanks
-john

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#1459787 — Re: [PATCH] proc: Fix timerslack_ns CAP_SYS_NICE check when adjusting self

On 8/10/2016 12:03 PM, John Stultz wrote:

> I wasn't entierly sure. I didn't think PR_SET_TIMERSLACK has a
> security hook, but looking again I now see the top-level
> security_task_prctl() check, so maybe not skipping it in this case
> would be good?

the easy fix would be to add back the ptrace check.. just either ptrace-able OR CAP_SYS_NICE ;)
then you can prove you only added new stuff as well, and have all the LSM from before

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#1459890

On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 1:01 PM, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> On 8/10/2016 12:03 PM, John Stultz wrote:
>
>> I wasn't entierly sure. I didn't think PR_SET_TIMERSLACK has a
>> security hook, but looking again I now see the top-level
>> security_task_prctl() check, so maybe not skipping it in this case
>> would be good?
>
>
> the easy fix would be to add back the ptrace check.. just either ptrace-able
> OR CAP_SYS_NICE ;)

Well, I worry that just adds more complexity to trying to understand it.
p==current OR CAP_SYS_NICE makes the most sense to me.

> then you can prove you only added new stuff as well, and have all the LSM
> from before

The LSM bits (and how consistent or inconsistent they can be) is
really the part that I have the most concern about, and I'm not sure
what the best approach would be.

thanks
-john

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#1459941

On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 11:36 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 4:54 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
>> In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
>> to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
>> when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.
>>
>> Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
>> privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
>> a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
>> (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).
>>
>> This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
>> the CAP_SYS_NICE value.
>>
>> This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm
>>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
>> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
>> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
>> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
>> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
>> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
>> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
>> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
>> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
>> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
>> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
>> ---
>>  fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>> index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>> @@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>>         if (!p)
>>                 return -ESRCH;
>>
>> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> -               count = -EPERM;
>> -               goto out;
>> -       }
>> +       if (p != current) {
>> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> +                       count = -EPERM;
>> +                       goto out;
>> +               }
>>
>> -       err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>> -       if (err) {
>> -               count = err;
>> -               goto out;
>> +               err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>> +               if (err) {
>> +                       count = err;
>> +                       goto out;
>> +               }
>>         }
>
> This entirely bypasses LSM when p == current. Is that intended?

I take back my concern. :) I think this is correct (as you mention in
the thread: the prctl LSM hook already fired), so until there is a
specific use-case that wants to block current from these actions, we
can adjust the logic then.

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

-Kees

>
> -Kees
>
>>
>>         task_lock(p);
>> @@ -2315,14 +2317,16 @@ static int timerslack_ns_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>>         if (!p)
>>                 return -ESRCH;
>>
>> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> -               err = -EPERM;
>> -               goto out;
>> -       }
>> +       if (p != current) {
>>
>> -       err = security_task_getscheduler(p);
>> -       if (err)
>> -               goto out;
>> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>> +                       err = -EPERM;
>> +                       goto out;
>> +               }
>> +               err = security_task_getscheduler(p);
>> +               if (err)
>> +                       goto out;
>> +       }
>>
>>         task_lock(p);
>>         seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", p->timer_slack_ns);
>> --
>> 1.9.1
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Kees Cook
> Nexus Security



-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security

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#1459963

On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 11:36 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 4:54 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
>>> In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
>>> to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
>>> when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.
>>>
>>> Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
>>> privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
>>> a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
>>> (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).
>>>
>>> This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
>>> the CAP_SYS_NICE value.
>>>
>>> This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm
>>>
>>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
>>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>>> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
>>> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
>>> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
>>> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
>>> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
>>> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
>>> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
>>> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
>>> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
>>> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
>>> ---
>>>  fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>>> index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
>>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>>> @@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>>>         if (!p)
>>>                 return -ESRCH;
>>>
>>> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>> -               count = -EPERM;
>>> -               goto out;
>>> -       }
>>> +       if (p != current) {
>>> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>> +                       count = -EPERM;
>>> +                       goto out;
>>> +               }
>>>
>>> -       err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>> -       if (err) {
>>> -               count = err;
>>> -               goto out;
>>> +               err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>> +               if (err) {
>>> +                       count = err;
>>> +                       goto out;
>>> +               }
>>>         }
>>
>> This entirely bypasses LSM when p == current. Is that intended?
>
> I take back my concern. :) I think this is correct (as you mention in
> the thread: the prctl LSM hook already fired), so until there is a

But did it? The prctrl hook is just for the prctrl interface. The
proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns is separate.

This is part of my confusion here, mostly in that I'm not really sure
I have a good sense of philosophy for LSM hooks.
Are these just interface guards/hooks, or are we trying to map the
hook to the underlying action being taken?

As with the prctrl interface, it seems like its just an interface
guard, but the /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns interface checking
security_task_setscheduler() seems to be more connected to the
underlying action being done by changing the timerslack value.

thanks
-john

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#1459982

On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 2:12 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, Aug 10, 2016 at 11:36 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 4:54 PM, John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> wrote:
>>>> In changing from checking ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS)
>>>> to capable(CAP_SYS_NICE), I missed that ptrace_my_access succeeds
>>>> when p == current, but the CAP_SYS_NICE doesn't.
>>>>
>>>> Thus while the previous commit was intended to loosen the needed
>>>> privledges to modify a processes timerslack, it needlessly restricted
>>>> a task modifying its own timerslack via the proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns
>>>> (which is permitted also via the PR_SET_TIMERSLACK method).
>>>>
>>>> This patch corrects this by checking if p == current before checking
>>>> the CAP_SYS_NICE value.
>>>>
>>>> This patch applies on top of my two previous patches currently in -mm
>>>>
>>>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>>> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
>>>> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
>>>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>>>> CC: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
>>>> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com>
>>>> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com>
>>>> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com>
>>>> Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
>>>> Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
>>>> Cc: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
>>>> Cc: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
>>>> Cc: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
>>>> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
>>>> ---
>>>>  fs/proc/base.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
>>>>  1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
>>>> index 02f8389..01c3c2d 100644
>>>> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
>>>> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
>>>> @@ -2281,15 +2281,17 @@ static ssize_t timerslack_ns_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>>>>         if (!p)
>>>>                 return -ESRCH;
>>>>
>>>> -       if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>>> -               count = -EPERM;
>>>> -               goto out;
>>>> -       }
>>>> +       if (p != current) {
>>>> +               if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) {
>>>> +                       count = -EPERM;
>>>> +                       goto out;
>>>> +               }
>>>>
>>>> -       err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>>> -       if (err) {
>>>> -               count = err;
>>>> -               goto out;
>>>> +               err = security_task_setscheduler(p);
>>>> +               if (err) {
>>>> +                       count = err;
>>>> +                       goto out;
>>>> +               }
>>>>         }
>>>
>>> This entirely bypasses LSM when p == current. Is that intended?
>>
>> I take back my concern. :) I think this is correct (as you mention in
>> the thread: the prctl LSM hook already fired), so until there is a
>
> But did it? The prctrl hook is just for the prctrl interface. The
> proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns is separate.

Oh, hrm, well, I think I'm still fine with it as-is: if we end up
needing to tighten this to block current, we can change it. Nick,
would this be something you'd want to be able to do with the hook?

-Kees

> This is part of my confusion here, mostly in that I'm not really sure
> I have a good sense of philosophy for LSM hooks.
> Are these just interface guards/hooks, or are we trying to map the
> hook to the underlying action being taken?
>
> As with the prctrl interface, it seems like its just an interface
> guard, but the /proc/<tid>/timerslack_ns interface checking
> security_task_setscheduler() seems to be more connected to the
> underlying action being done by changing the timerslack value.



-- 
Kees Cook
Nexus Security

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