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Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

Started byKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
First post2016-04-04 21:40 +0200
Last post2016-04-05 01:10 +0200
Articles 2 — 2 participants

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  Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-04-04 21:40 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-04-05 01:10 +0200

#1370835 — Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

FromKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Date2016-04-04 21:40 +0200
SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 5/5] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions
Message-ID<rkivU-86a-15@gated-at.bofh.it>
On Thu, Mar 31, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 14:14 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>> +static const char *id_str[READING_MAX_ID] = {
>> +     [READING_FIRMWARE] = "firmware",
>> +     [READING_MODULE] = "kernel module",
>> +     [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = "kexec image",
>> +     [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = "kexec initramfs",
>> +     [READING_POLICY] = "security policy",
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> +{
>> +     struct super_block *load_root;
>> +     const char *origin;
>> +
>> +     if (id < 0 || id >= READING_MAX_ID)
>> +             return -EINVAL;
>> +
>
> The kernel_read_file_id enumeration starts at 1.

Yeah, I noticed that but decided that since I didn't have a named
value to mark the start, and negative value enums are extremely
unliked, I'd just check against "0" since missing id_str entries will
be correctly identified as "unknown" in the case where id_str and
READING_* enum is out of sync.

>> +     origin = id_str[id];
>> +     if (!origin) {
>> +             origin = "unknown";
>
> Right, all the entries in the kernel_read_file_id enumeration are
> currently listed in id_str.  Checking origin is needed for when id_str[]
> isn't kept in sync with the enumeration.

I wonder if there should be a function that returns a const string for
each kernel_read_file_id enum so users of the enum don't need to do
it?

> Looks good!

Thanks! I'll be sending an updated version shortly...

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

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#1370949

FromMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date2016-04-05 01:10 +0200
Message-ID<rklN8-24A-31@gated-at.bofh.it>
In reply to#1370835
On Mon, 2016-04-04 at 12:31 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 31, 2016 at 2:24 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2016-03-28 at 14:14 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >
> >> +static const char *id_str[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> >> +     [READING_FIRMWARE] = "firmware",
> >> +     [READING_MODULE] = "kernel module",
> >> +     [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = "kexec image",
> >> +     [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = "kexec initramfs",
> >> +     [READING_POLICY] = "security policy",
> >> +};
> >> +

> I wonder if there should be a function that returns a const string for
> each kernel_read_file_id enum so users of the enum don't need to do
> it?

Right, having a single, corresponding, string array would be good.  Some
of the strings in id_str[] have blanks, which might be problematic for
the audit subsystem, and would need to be replaced with a hyphen or
underscore.

Mimi

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