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Groups > linux.kernel > #1629429
| From | "PaX Team" <pageexec@freemail.hu> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling |
| Date | 2017-04-24 13:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tzK2u-6io-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tzK2u-6io-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <tzHHk-4GC-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On 24 Apr 2017 at 10:32, Peter Zijlstra wrote: > On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 03:09:39PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > This patch ports the x86-specific atomic overflow handling from PaX's > > PAX_REFCOUNT to the upstream refcount_t API. This is an updated version > > from PaX that eliminates the saturation race condition by resetting the > > atomic counter back to the INT_MAX saturation value on both overflow and > > underflow. To win a race, a system would have to have INT_MAX threads > > simultaneously overflow before the saturation handler runs. note that the above is wrong (and even contradicting itself and the code). > And is this impossible? Highly unlikely I'll grant you, but absolutely > impossible? here's my analysis from a while ago: http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/01/05/19 > Also, you forgot nr_cpus in your bound. Afaict the worst case here is > O(nr_tasks + 3*nr_cpus). what does nr_cpus have to do with winning the race? > Because PaX does it, is not a correctness argument. And this really > wants one. heh, do you want to tell me about how checking for a 0 refcount prevents exploiting a bug?
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[PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-22 00:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2017-04-24 10:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> - 2017-04-24 11:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2017-04-24 11:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling "PaX Team" <pageexec@freemail.hu> - 2017-04-24 13:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2017-04-24 13:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling "PaX Team" <pageexec@freemail.hu> - 2017-04-24 15:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2017-04-24 15:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling "PaX Team" <pageexec@freemail.hu> - 2017-04-24 17:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-24 22:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-24 22:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-24 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2017-04-24 12:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-24 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2017-04-24 13:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount_t handling Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-04-24 22:30 +0200
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