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Groups > linux.kernel > #1622226
| From | Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function |
| Date | 2017-04-12 17:20 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tvsdP-64C-13@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tvmrM-2Do-29@gated-at.bofh.it> <tvp6h-3Zp-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <tvqF4-51n-31@gated-at.bofh.it> <tvrB9-5Bn-33@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
2017-04-12 16:35 GMT+02:00 Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>: > How are you using this SELinux information in the kernel and/or in > userspace? What's the purpose of it? What are you comparing it > against? Why do you care if it changes? Enforcement status and policy version are compared to their previously stored value. If they differ, then it means we need to call a userland helper from Lustre client kernelspace to read the currently loaded policy (reading it will let us know if the Lustre client node is conforming to the Lustre-wide security policy). As calling the userland helper is costly, we do it only when it is necessary by retrieving some SELinux key information directly from kernelspace. > Note btw that the notion of a policy name/type and the policy file path > is purely a userspace construct and shouldn't be embedded in your > kernel code. Android for example doesn't follow that convention at > all; their SELinux policy file is simply /sepolicy. On modern kernels, > you can always read the currently loaded policy from the kernel itself > via /sys/fs/selinux/policy (formerly just /selinux/policy). As I understand it, a userspace program can directly read the policy info exposed by the kernel by reading this file. But how about reading it from kernelspace?
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[PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> - 2017-04-12 11:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> - 2017-04-12 14:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> - 2017-04-12 15:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2017-04-12 16:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> - 2017-04-12 17:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2017-04-12 18:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> - 2017-04-12 19:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2017-04-12 19:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> - 2017-04-12 15:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2017-04-12 16:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Sebastien Buisson <sbuisson.ddn@gmail.com> - 2017-04-12 17:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2017-04-12 18:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> - 2017-04-13 02:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] selinux: add selinux_is_enforced() function Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2017-04-12 14:10 +0200
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