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Re: [RFC PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values

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On Wed, Jun 07, 2017 at 03:59:25PM +0100, Edward Cree wrote:
> Allows us to, sometimes, combine information from a signed check of one
>  bound and an unsigned check of the other.
> We now track the full range of possible values, rather than restricting
>  ourselves to [0, 1<<30) and considering anything beyond that as
>  unknown.  While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more
>  straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  22 +-
>  kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 661 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
>  2 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 288 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> index e341469..10a5944 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> @@ -11,11 +11,15 @@
>  #include <linux/filter.h> /* for MAX_BPF_STACK */
>  #include <linux/tnum.h>
>  
> - /* Just some arbitrary values so we can safely do math without overflowing and
> -  * are obviously wrong for any sort of memory access.
> -  */
> -#define BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE (1024 * 1024 * 1024)
> -#define BPF_REGISTER_MIN_RANGE -1
> +/* Maximum variable offset umax_value permitted when resolving memory accesses.
> + * In practice this is far bigger than any realistic pointer offset; this limit
> + * ensures that umax_value + (int)off + (int)size cannot overflow a u64.
> + */
> +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF	(1ULL << 31)
> +/* Maximum variable size permitted for ARG_CONST_SIZE[_OR_ZERO].  This ensures
> + * that converting umax_value to int cannot overflow.
> + */
> +#define BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ	INT_MAX
>  
>  struct bpf_reg_state {
>  	enum bpf_reg_type type;
> @@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
>  	 * PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL, we have to NULL-check it _first_.
>  	 */
>  	u32 id;
> -	/* These three fields must be last.  See states_equal() */
> +	/* These five fields must be last.  See states_equal() */
>  	/* For scalar types (SCALAR_VALUE), this represents our knowledge of
>  	 * the actual value.
>  	 * For pointer types, this represents the variable part of the offset
> @@ -51,8 +55,10 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
>  	 * These refer to the same value as align, not necessarily the actual
>  	 * contents of the register.
>  	 */
> -	s64 min_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
> -	u64 max_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */
> +	s64 smin_value; /* minimum possible (s64)value */
> +	s64 smax_value; /* maximum possible (s64)value */
> +	u64 umin_value; /* minimum possible (u64)value */
> +	u64 umax_value; /* maximum possible (u64)value */

have uneasy feeling about this one.
It's 16 extra bytes to be stored in every reg_state and memcmp later
while we didn't have cases where people wanted negative values
in ptr+var cases. Why bother than?

>  unknown.  While this is probably not necessary, it makes the code more
>  straightforward and symmetrical between signed and unsigned bounds.

it's hard for me to see the 'straightforward' part yet.

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Re: [RFC PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned  min/max values Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> - 2017-06-08 04:50 +0200
  Re: [RFC PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned  min/max values Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> - 2017-06-08 17:30 +0200
    Re: [RFC PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned  min/max values Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> - 2017-06-08 18:50 +0200

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