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Groups > linux.kernel > #1645963
| From | riel@redhat.com |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary |
| Date | 2017-05-19 23:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tIXMR-86v-3@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tIXMR-86v-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and PaX/grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index aa1076c5e4a9..b3591e9250a8 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_canary(); #endif /* -- 2.9.3
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[PATCH 2/5] fork,random: use get_random_canary to set tsk->stack_canary riel@redhat.com - 2017-05-19 23:40 +0200
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