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Groups > linux.kernel > #1567053
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() |
| Date | 2017-01-26 01:20 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <t3FXb-mn-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <t3CZk-6Zx-21@gated-at.bofh.it> <t3CZk-6Zx-31@gated-at.bofh.it> <t3DC1-7dw-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Wed, Jan 25, 2017 at 1:43 PM, Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> wrote: > On Wed, 2017-01-25 at 13:06 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> If an unprivileged program opens a setgid file for write and passes >> the fd to a privileged program and the privileged program writes to >> it, we currently fail to clear the setgid bit. Fix it by checking >> f_cred instead of current's creds whenever a struct file is >> involved. > [...] > > What if, instead, a privileged program passes the fd to an un > unprivileged program? It sounds like a bad idea to start with, but at > least currently the unprivileged program is going to clear the setgid > bit when it writes. This change would make that behaviour more > dangerous. > > Perhaps there should be a capability check on both the current > credentials and file credentials? (I realise that we've considered > file credential checks to be sufficient elsewhere, but those cases > involved virtual files with special semantics, where it's clearer that > a privileged process should not pass them to an unprivileged process.) We need a set of self-tests for this whole area. :( There are so many corner cases. We still have an unfixed corner case with mmap writes not clearing set*id bits that I tried to solve last year... -Kees -- Kees Cook Nexus Security
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[PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2017-01-25 22:10 +0100
Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2017-01-25 22:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2017-01-25 22:50 +0100
RE: [PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() "Frank Filz" <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com> - 2017-01-26 00:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: Check f_cred instead of current's creds in should_remove_suid() Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-01-26 01:20 +0100
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