Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init

From	Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Newsgroups	linux.kernel
Subject	Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init
Date	2016-09-21 11:50 +0200
Message-ID	<sjMk9-7il-9@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References	<sfg9b-3i8-13@gated-at.bofh.it> <shdgT-6sF-61@gated-at.bofh.it> <shj2W-1R7-29@gated-at.bofh.it> <shl4J-36P-13@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization	linux.* mail to news gateway

Show all headers | View raw

On 09/14/2016, 06:17 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> Correct, this is a continuing effort to reduce the internal attack
> surface of the kernel, where one of the most common exploitation
> methods is overwriting function pointers.
> 
> Some examples of attacks and mitigations are here:
> http://kernsec.org/wiki/index.php/Exploit_Methods/Function_pointer_overwrite
> 
> While this patch isn't a huge change, it's still a viable candidate. I
> send these as I notice them, and hope that other folks will start to
> see these opportunities and send more patches too. :)

I didn't object to the patch. I could imagine the use case. But putting
the idea to the commit message would have made it clear.

thanks,
-- 
js
suse labs

Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread

Thread

Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> - 2016-09-14 10:00 +0200
  Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> - 2016-09-14 16:10 +0200
    Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-09-14 18:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> - 2016-09-21 11:50 +0200

csiph-web