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Groups > linux.kernel > #1483346
| From | One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init |
| Date | 2016-09-14 16:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <shj2W-1R7-29@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <sfg9b-3i8-13@gated-at.bofh.it> <shdgT-6sF-61@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | Intel Corporation |
On Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:59:42 +0200 Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> wrote: > On 09/09/2016, 12:35 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > > The ptmx_fops structure is only changed during init, so mark it as such. > > Right, but I am missing what is the benefit? You would have to elaborate > here... The pages end up marked read only even to the kernel (and in future could even be marked read only forever when in kvm if we get suitable virtual machine extensions). That makes it much harder to patch those vectors when making security attacks.
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Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> - 2016-09-14 10:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> - 2016-09-14 16:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-09-14 18:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] pty: make ptmx file ops read-only after init Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> - 2016-09-21 11:50 +0200
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