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Re: [PATCH v5 0/4] x86, boot: KASLR memory randomization

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I'm travelling this week, but I'll try to spend some time on it.

-Kees

On Mon, May 16, 2016 at 11:25 AM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> Any feedback on the patch? Ingo? Kees?
>
> Kees mentioned he will take care of the build warning on the KASLR
> refactor (the function is not used right now).
>
> Thanks,
> Thomas
>
> On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 12:28 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
>> This is PATCH v5 for KASLR memory implementation for x86_64.
>>
>> Recent changes:
>>     Add performance information on commit.
>>     Add details on PUD alignment.
>>     Add information on testing against the KASLR bypass exploit.
>>     Rebase on next-20160511 and merge recent KASLR changes.
>>     Integrate feedback from Kees.
>>
>> ***Background:
>> The current implementation of KASLR randomizes only the base address of
>> the kernel and its modules. Research was published showing that static
>> memory can be overwitten to elevate privileges bypassing KASLR.
>>
>> In more details:
>>
>>    The physical memory mapping holds most allocations from boot and heap
>>    allocators. Knowning the base address and physical memory size, an
>>    attacker can deduce the PDE virtual address for the vDSO memory page.
>>    This attack was demonstrated at CanSecWest 2016, in the "Getting
>>    Physical Extreme Abuse of Intel Based Paged Systems"
>>    https://goo.gl/ANpWdV (see second part of the presentation). The
>>    exploits used against Linux worked successfuly against 4.6+ but fail
>>    with KASLR memory enabled (https://goo.gl/iTtXMJ). Similar research
>>    was done at Google leading to this patch proposal. Variants exists to
>>    overwrite /proc or /sys objects ACLs leading to elevation of privileges.
>>    These variants were tested against 4.6+.
>>
>> This set of patches randomizes base address and padding of three
>> major memory sections (physical memory mapping, vmalloc & vmemmap).
>> It mitigates exploits relying on predictable kernel addresses. This
>> feature can be enabled with the CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY option.
>>
>> Padding for the memory hotplug support is managed by
>> CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING. The default value is 10
>> terabytes.
>>
>> The patches were tested on qemu & physical machines. Xen compatibility was
>> also verified. Multiple reboots were used to verify entropy for each
>> memory section.
>>
>> ***Problems that needed solving:
>>  - The three target memory sections are never at the same place between
>>    boots.
>>  - The physical memory mapping can use a virtual address not aligned on
>>    the PGD page table.
>>  - Have good entropy early at boot before get_random_bytes is available.
>>  - Add optional padding for memory hotplug compatibility.
>>
>> ***Parts:
>>  - The first part prepares for the KASLR memory randomization by
>>    refactoring entropy functions used by the current implementation and
>>    support PUD level virtual addresses for physical mapping.
>>    (Patches 01-02)
>>  - The second part implements the KASLR memory randomization for all
>>    sections mentioned.
>>    (Patch 03)
>>  - The third part adds support for memory hotplug by adding an option to
>>    define the padding used between the physical memory mapping section
>>    and the others.
>>    (Patch 04)
>>
>> Performance data:
>>
>> Kernbench shows almost no difference (-+ less than 1%):
>>
>> Before:
>>
>> Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation):
>> Elapsed Time 102.63 (1.2695)
>> User Time 1034.89 (1.18115)
>> System Time 87.056 (0.456416)
>> Percent CPU 1092.9 (13.892)
>> Context Switches 199805 (3455.33)
>> Sleeps 97907.8 (900.636)
>>
>> After:
>>
>> Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation):
>> Elapsed Time 102.489 (1.10636)
>> User Time 1034.86 (1.36053)
>> System Time 87.764 (0.49345)
>> Percent CPU 1095 (12.7715)
>> Context Switches 199036 (4298.1)
>> Sleeps 97681.6 (1031.11)
>>
>> Hackbench shows 0% difference on average (hackbench 90
>> repeated 10 times):
>>
>> attemp,before,after
>> 1,0.076,0.069
>> 2,0.072,0.069
>> 3,0.066,0.066
>> 4,0.066,0.068
>> 5,0.066,0.067
>> 6,0.066,0.069
>> 7,0.067,0.066
>> 8,0.063,0.067
>> 9,0.067,0.065
>> 10,0.068,0.071
>> average,0.0677,0.0677
>>
>> Thanks!
>>



-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security

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Thread

[PATCH v5 0/4] x86, boot: KASLR memory randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-05-12 21:30 +0200
  [PATCH v5 2/4] x86, boot: PUD VA support for physical mapping (x86_64) Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-05-12 21:30 +0200
  [PATCH v5 1/4] x86, boot: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-05-12 21:30 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] x86, boot: Refactor KASLR entropy functions kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> - 2016-05-12 22:30 +0200
  [PATCH v5 4/4] x86, boot: Memory hotplug support for KASLR memory randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-05-12 21:30 +0200
  [PATCH v5 3/4] x86, boot: Implement ASLR for kernel memory sections (x86_64) Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-05-12 21:30 +0200
  Re: [PATCH v5 0/4] x86, boot: KASLR memory randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-05-16 20:30 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v5 0/4] x86, boot: KASLR memory randomization Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-05-17 10:20 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v5 0/4] x86, boot: KASLR memory randomization Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-05-17 21:40 +0200
  Re: [PATCH v5 0/4] x86, boot: KASLR memory randomization Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-05-17 21:40 +0200

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