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Groups > linux.kernel > #1381867
| From | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization |
| Date | 2016-04-18 18:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rpjUn-8sp-47@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <rofJ8-6Cp-15@gated-at.bofh.it> <rok67-1C3-27@gated-at.bofh.it> <rokpt-1JE-27@gated-at.bofh.it> <rokIO-1T9-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
I will send the next version today. Note that I get_random_bytes_arch
is used because at that stage we have 0 bits of entropy. It seemed
like a better idea to use the arch version that will fallback on
get_random_bytes sub API in the worse case.
On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:47 PM, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
> Thanks for the comments. I will address them in a v2 early next week.
>
> If anyone has other comments, please let me know.
>
> Thomas
>
> On Fri, Apr 15, 2016 at 3:26 PM, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> wrote:
>> On Fri, 2016-04-15 at 15:00 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
>>> On Fri, 15 Apr 2016 10:25:59 -0700 Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> wrote:
>>> > Provide an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the
>>> > SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set
>>> > of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot
>>> > for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of the
>>> > kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much less
>>> > stable.
>>
>> trivia:
>>
>>> > @@ -1229,6 +1229,61 @@ static void __init set_up_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, int index)
>> []
>>> > + */
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_2[2];
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_4[4];
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_8[8];
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_16[16];
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_32[32];
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_64[64];
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_128[128];
>>> > +static freelist_idx_t master_list_256[256];
>>> > +static struct m_list {
>>> > + size_t count;
>>> > + freelist_idx_t *list;
>>> > +} master_lists[] = {
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_2), master_list_2 },
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_4), master_list_4 },
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_8), master_list_8 },
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_16), master_list_16 },
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_32), master_list_32 },
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_64), master_list_64 },
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_128), master_list_128 },
>>> > + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_256), master_list_256 },
>>> > +};
>>
>> static const struct m_list?
>>
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[PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-15 19:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> - 2016-04-16 00:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> - 2016-04-16 00:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-16 00:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-18 18:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> - 2016-04-18 21:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-18 22:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> - 2016-04-25 23:10 +0200
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