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Groups > linux.kernel > #1426805
| From | Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG |
| Date | 2016-06-20 18:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rMayC-2eu-29@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <rJChH-8go-15@gated-at.bofh.it> <rM0zf-4zu-7@gated-at.bofh.it> <rM8ZQ-1ph-31@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
Am Montag, 20. Juni 2016, 11:01:47 schrieb Theodore Ts'o: Hi Theodore, > > So simply doing chacha20 encryption in a tight loop in the kernel > might not be a good proxy for what would actually happen in real life > when someone calls getrandom(2). (Another good question to ask is > when someone might be needing to generate millions of 256-bit session > keys per second, when the D-H setup, even if you were using ECCDH, > would be largely dominating the time for the connection setup anyway.) Is speed everything we should care about? What about: - offloading of crypto operation from the CPU - potentially additional security features a hardware cipher may provide like cache coloring attack resistance? Ciao Stephan
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[PATCH-v4 0/7] random: replace urandom pool with a CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 17:50 +0200
[PATCH 7/7] random: add backtracking protection to the CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 17:50 +0200
[PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 18:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-13 20:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 21:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2016-06-15 17:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-20 01:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2016-06-20 03:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-20 07:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2016-06-20 08:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-20 17:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-20 18:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> - 2016-06-20 22:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 5/7] random: replace non-blocking pool with a Chacha20-based CRNG Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-21 01:50 +0200
[PATCH 1/7] random: initialize the non-blocking pool via add_hwgenerator_randomness() Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 18:00 +0200
[PATCH 2/7] random: print a warning for the first ten uninitialized random users Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 18:00 +0200
[PATCH 6/7] random: make /dev/urandom scalable for silly userspace programs Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 18:00 +0200
[PATCH 3/7] random: add interrupt callback to VMBus IRQ handler Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 18:00 +0200
[PATCH 4/7] random: properly align get_random_int_hash Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-13 18:00 +0200
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