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Groups > linux.kernel > #1297003
| From | Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization |
| Date | 2015-12-22 20:20 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <qIADv-7Ym-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (4 earlier) <qIyV4-6R0-23@gated-at.bofh.it> <qIyV4-6R0-25@gated-at.bofh.it> <qIyV4-6R0-21@gated-at.bofh.it> <qIzxM-7jr-19@gated-at.bofh.it> <qIzHs-7mN-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On 12/22/15 10:19 AM, Dave Hansen wrote: > On 12/22/2015 10:08 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote: >> On Tue, 22 Dec 2015, Dave Hansen wrote: >>>> Why would you use zeros? The point is just to clear the information right? >>>> The regular poisoning does that. >>> >>> It then allows you to avoid the zeroing at allocation time. >> >> Well much of the code is expecting a zeroed object from the allocator and >> its zeroed at that time. Zeroing makes the object cache hot which is an >> important performance aspect. > > Yes, modifying this behavior has a performance impact. It absolutely > needs to be evaluated, and I wouldn't want to speculate too much on how > good or bad any of the choices are. > > Just to reiterate, I think we have 3 real choices here: > > 1. Zero at alloc, only when __GFP_ZERO > (behavior today) > 2. Poison at free, also Zero at alloc (when __GFP_ZERO) > (this patch's proposed behavior, also what current poisoning does, > doubles writes) > 3. Zero at free, *don't* Zero at alloc (when __GFP_ZERO) > (what I'm suggesting, possibly less perf impact vs. #2) > > poisoning with non-zero memory makes it easier to determine that the error came from accessing the sanitized memory vs. some other case. I don't think the feature would be as strong if the memory was only zeroed vs. some other data value. Thanks, Laura -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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[RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
[RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> - 2015-12-22 10:40 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 19:00 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> - 2015-12-22 19:40 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 20:20 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2015-12-22 21:10 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> - 2015-12-22 21:10 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> - 2015-12-22 16:00 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2015-12-22 17:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> - 2015-12-22 18:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2015-12-22 19:10 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> - 2015-12-22 19:20 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 20:20 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> - 2015-12-22 20:40 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2015-12-22 18:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> - 2015-12-22 18:30 +0100
[RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
[RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
[RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
[RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
[RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
Re: [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> - 2015-12-22 21:50 +0100
[RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 04:50 +0100
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> - 2015-12-22 17:10 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> - 2015-12-22 17:20 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2015-12-22 17:40 +0100
Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2015-12-22 21:10 +0100
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