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Groups > comp.sys.mac.system > #57498 > unrolled thread
| Started by | dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) |
|---|---|
| First post | 2014-03-03 08:57 +0000 |
| Last post | 2014-03-04 17:10 -0500 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 28 — 8 participants |
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File vault, firmware password, etc dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) - 2014-03-03 08:57 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> - 2014-03-03 13:20 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> - 2014-03-03 15:13 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> - 2014-03-03 16:07 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc me@home.spamsucks.ca (Király) - 2014-03-03 16:19 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) - 2014-03-03 17:57 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc me@home.spamsucks.ca (Király) - 2014-03-04 00:03 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) - 2014-03-04 12:08 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc me@home.spamsucks.ca (Király) - 2014-03-04 19:31 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) - 2014-03-04 20:46 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> - 2014-03-04 21:41 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> - 2014-03-04 17:01 -0500
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) - 2014-03-04 23:09 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> - 2014-03-04 22:06 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> - 2014-03-04 22:25 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc billy@MIX.COM - 2014-03-04 22:39 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> - 2014-03-04 23:26 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc billy@MIX.COM - 2014-03-05 00:10 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc billy@MIX.COM - 2014-03-04 21:48 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) - 2014-03-04 23:09 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> - 2014-03-03 16:25 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc billy@MIX.COM - 2014-03-03 17:05 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> - 2014-03-03 17:10 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc billy@MIX.COM - 2014-03-05 18:22 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> - 2014-03-05 18:28 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) - 2014-03-03 17:57 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> - 2014-03-03 19:11 +0000
Re: File vault, firmware password, etc Alan Browne <alan.browne@FreelunchVideotron.ca> - 2014-03-04 17:10 -0500
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| From | dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-03 08:57 +0000 |
| Subject | File vault, firmware password, etc |
| Message-ID | <1lhxa48.1f825xadchjy0N%dcohenspam@talktalk.net> |
I am thinking about additional security for my Macs, a 2007 iMac and a 2012 MacBook Pro, both running Mavericks. After reading a lot I've got very confused, possibly even more so than when I started. So some of my questions and comments may well be stupid. I don't have great secrets to protect, just normal stuff. I am mostly concerned about protecting my data if a computer was stolen. I have an admin account and also a standard account. Both have passwords, not obvious but only about a dozen characters. So far as I understand it, the situation is this. File Vault 2. This encrypts the internal drive. One logs in using the normal account password. So presumably the encryption protects against other methods of accessing the drive (removing the drive, booting from an external drive, etc) and that is its main purpose. Firmware Password. This prevents any means of accessing the drive other than a normal login. Can the drive be read if it is removed? Is that why some people use both File Vault and a firmware password? What about security on external drives? As far as I can see, it is easy enough to encrypt a Time Machine drive and also external non-boot drives. But what should be done with external boot drives? If they are given the same encryption as non-boot drives, doesn't this mean that they can be accessed from the internal drive by using a password, but can't be used for booting? And if one creates an encrypted boot drive by booting from it unecrypted and the setting up File Vault, then can it be accessed from the internal drive? And what about cloning? I have SuperDuper, but it is unclear to me whether this can clone to a drive that is both encrypted and bootable. I believe Carbon Copy Cloner can do this, but could not follow the documentation fully. -- <http://www.decohen.com> The Labyrinth of the Heart: Changed Myths for Changing Lives book and e-book <http://www.decohen.com/labyrinth> Send e-mail to the Reply-To address, not the From address.
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| From | Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-03 13:20 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <bnjdsqFii1pU1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #57498 |
On 2014-03-03, Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: > I am thinking about additional security for my Macs, a 2007 iMac and a > 2012 MacBook Pro, both running Mavericks. After reading a lot I've got > very confused, possibly even more so than when I started. So some of my > questions and comments may well be stupid. > > I don't have great secrets to protect, just normal stuff. I am mostly > concerned about protecting my data if a computer was stolen. > > I have an admin account and also a standard account. Both have > passwords, not obvious but only about a dozen characters. > > So far as I understand it, the situation is this. > > File Vault 2. This encrypts the internal drive. One logs in using the > normal account password. So presumably the encryption protects against > other methods of accessing the drive (removing the drive, booting from > an external drive, etc) and that is its main purpose. That's the way I see it too. > Firmware Password. This prevents any means of accessing the drive other > than a normal login. Can the drive be read if it is removed? Is that why > some people use both File Vault and a firmware password? Prevents acces to the machine itself. one cannot boot into single-user mode or boot fram an external disk, CD, DVD or USB stick. > What about security on external drives? As far as I can see, it is easy > enough to encrypt a Time Machine drive and also external non-boot > drives. > > But what should be done with external boot drives? Boot from the cloned drive, enable FV and allow it to complete the encryption process. Thereafter, you will have to supply the FV password to mount the drive. Once mounted, you can clone to it with the utility of choice. > > And what about cloning? I have SuperDuper, No problem; I do it regularly. One caution though -- if you change the FV password, do not clone until you have started from the clone copy and change its FV password. Failure to do so will disable the drive in the following manner. You supply the old FV password to unlock the drive but that is the wrong password for the associated account so the startup process fails causing a reboot which...
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| From | Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-03 15:13 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <bnjkg2Fk228U2@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #57506 |
On 2014-03-03, Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> wrote: > On 2014-03-03, Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: >> Firmware Password. This prevents any means of accessing the drive other >> than a normal login. Can the drive be read if it is removed? Is that why >> some people use both File Vault and a firmware password? > > Prevents acces to the machine itself. one cannot boot into single-user > mode or boot fram an external disk, CD, DVD or USB stick. It can, however be bypassed by changing the hardware configuration (for instance removing / adding RAM). Someone with physical access to the machine can overcome it. Also, someone with root access to the machine can read the firmware password easily with the nvram command-line utility. -- E-mail sent to this address may be devoured by my ravenous SPAM filter. I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead. JR
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| From | Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-03 16:07 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <slrnlh9a6u.8tb.g.kreme@oswin.local> |
| In reply to | #57511 |
In message <bnjkg2Fk228U2@mid.individual.net> Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> wrote: > On 2014-03-03, Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> wrote: >> On 2014-03-03, Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: >>> Firmware Password. This prevents any means of accessing the drive other >>> than a normal login. Can the drive be read if it is removed? Is that why >>> some people use both File Vault and a firmware password? >> >> Prevents acces to the machine itself. one cannot boot into single-user >> mode or boot fram an external disk, CD, DVD or USB stick. > It can, however be bypassed by changing the hardware configuration (for > instance removing / adding RAM). Someone with physical access to the > machine can overcome it. Yep. > Also, someone with root access to the machine can read the firmware > password easily with the nvram command-line utility. Is that still true? I thought that was no longer the case. However, Filevault 2 completely protects the data on the disk. There is no way to get to it without the password or the recovery key. -- Thanks to great leaders such as Ghengis Khan, Joan of Arc, and Socratic Method, the world is full of history.
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| From | me@home.spamsucks.ca (Király) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-03 16:19 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <lf2a1p$ctt$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #57514 |
Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> wrote: > > Also, someone with root access to the machine can read the firmware > > password easily with the nvram command-line utility. > > Is that still true? I thought that was no longer the case. Whether true or not, the firmware password is not useful for data security. People who enable it for that reason are misunderstanding its purpose. -- K. Lang may your lum reek.
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| From | dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-03 17:57 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1lhy0z9.14ckl23s2zi6eN%dcohenspam@talktalk.net> |
| In reply to | #57516 |
Király <me@home.spamsucks.ca> wrote: > Whether true or not, the firmware password is not useful for data > security. People who enable it for that reason are misunderstanding its > purpose. I realise that I am still not understanding things properly. But why is the firmware password not useful for data security? Of course, anyone who can log into an account can read the data. But the same applies to File Vault doesn't it. And what other insecurity is there? -- <http://www.decohen.com> The Labyrinth of the Heart: Changed Myths for Changing Lives book and e-book <http://www.decohen.com/labyrinth> Send e-mail to the Reply-To address, not the From address.
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| From | me@home.spamsucks.ca (Király) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 00:03 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <lf357m$f0j$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #57524 |
Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: > But why is the firmware password not useful for data security? Of > course, anyone who can log into an account can read the data. But the > same applies to File Vault doesn't it. And what other insecurity is > there? Because the firmware password can be easily defeated, buy changing the RAM configuration, or taking the drive out and putting it in a different computer. The firmware password offers zero data security protection. So if that's your goal, forget the firmware password. You need encryption. -- K. Lang may your lum reek.
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| From | dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 12:08 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1lhz47z.6egrs36m8eomN%dcohenspam@talktalk.net> |
| In reply to | #57535 |
Király <me@home.spamsucks.ca> wrote: > Because the firmware password can be easily defeated, buy changing the > RAM configuration That's out of date, only applies to older machines. > or taking the drive out and putting it in a different > computer. I thought this did not work either, but I could easily be wrong on this issue. >The firmware password offers zero data security protection. So > if that's your goal, forget the firmware password. You need encryption. I had not realised until recently that, though File Vault encryption protects against removal of the drive, it is only as secure as one's account password. Which raises the question of how complicated account passwords should be, given that they need entering fairly often. For me, I am not worried about someone trying to get into my machine because they are actively seeking my data, but would like to protect my data if my machine is casually stolen. -- <http://www.decohen.com> The Labyrinth of the Heart: Changed Myths for Changing Lives book and e-book <http://www.decohen.com/labyrinth> Send e-mail to the Reply-To address, not the From address.
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| From | me@home.spamsucks.ca (Király) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 19:31 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <lf59na$lrb$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #57549 |
Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: > > or taking the drive out and putting it in a different > > computer. > > I thought this did not work either, but I could easily be wrong on > this issue. Encryption (i.e. FileVault) protects against that, but the firmware password doesn't. > For me, I am not worried about someone trying to get into my machine > because they are actively seeking my data, but would like to protect > my data if my machine is casually stolen. It sounds like those things are one and the same. Forget the firmware password; like I said, its purpose is not data security and it will not help you if that's what you want. Go with FileVault and a strong password. -- K. Lang may your lum reek.
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| From | dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 20:46 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1li03ur.1x7dzq8typoudN%dcohenspam@talktalk.net> |
| In reply to | #57558 |
Király <me@home.spamsucks.ca> wrote: > Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: > > > or taking the drive out and putting it in a different > > > computer. > > > > I thought this did not work either, but I could easily be wrong on > > this issue. > > Encryption (i.e. FileVault) protects against that, but the firmware > password doesn't. OK, I was unsure and I will accept your statement. > > > For me, I am not worried about someone trying to get into my machine > > because they are actively seeking my data, but would like to protect > > my data if my machine is casually stolen. > > It sounds like those things are one and the same. Not really, in my opinion. Someone seeking my data might well have a fair bit of information about me (birthday, name of pets, etc), while a casual thief would have to find some way of getting my password (apart from removing the hard drive if it is unencrypted). >Forget the firmware > password; like I said, its purpose is not data security and it will not > help you if that's what you want. Go with FileVault and a strong > password. The trouble with FileVault is that, as far as I can see, it prevents Undercover (and similar computer recovery programs), and I think (not sure) that it may also prevent Find My Mac. How many characters do you reckon a strong password should have? The longer the better for strength, but the shorter the better for the occasions (and there are quite a few of them) when one has to enter an admin user's password. I don't have a feel for the balance between these and would welcome opinions. -- <http://www.decohen.com> The Labyrinth of the Heart: Changed Myths for Changing Lives book and e-book <http://www.decohen.com/labyrinth> Send e-mail to the Reply-To address, not the From address.
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| From | Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 21:41 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <bnmvjkFbrt0U1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #57560 |
On 2014-03-04, Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: > Kir?ly <me@home.spamsucks.ca> wrote: > [snip] > > The trouble with FileVault is that, as far as I can see, it prevents > Undercover (and similar computer recovery programs), and I think (not > sure) that it may also prevent Find My Mac. Why do you say that? As long as the utility operates on a mounted volume or goes through the proper API for mounting a volume, it will perform its function. I've had no problem cloning with SuperDuper! or rebuilding with DiskWarrior. > How many characters do you reckon a strong password should have? The > longer the better for strength, but the shorter the better for the > occasions (and there are quite a few of them) when one has to enter an > admin user's password. I don't have a feel for the balance between these > and would welcome opinions. It's not the length so much as it is the difficulity a thief would have finding a starting place for his cracking program. Obvious and word play should be avoided but strings made from the first (or second) letters of a phrase that you are familiar with, with some scattered capitalization work pretty well.
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| From | nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 17:01 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <040320141701348276%nospam@nospam.invalid> |
| In reply to | #57564 |
In article <bnmvjkFbrt0U1@mid.individual.net>, Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> wrote: > > The trouble with FileVault is that, as far as I can see, it prevents > > Undercover (and similar computer recovery programs), and I think (not > > sure) that it may also prevent Find My Mac. > > Why do you say that? As long as the utility operates on a mounted volume or > goes through the proper API for mounting a volume, it will perform its function. without the proper password, it won't mount the drive. > I've had no problem cloning with SuperDuper! or rebuilding with DiskWarrior. undercover is a recovery tool, not a cloning tool. if the mac is stolen, it reports its location so it can be tracked. if the thug can't use the computer at all, it will never run and never report itself and the thug gets to keep the computer and probably steal a bunch more.
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| From | dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 23:09 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1li08kn.3342ny1ubw3hcN%dcohenspam@talktalk.net> |
| In reply to | #57570 |
nospam <nospam@nospam.invalid> wrote: > In article <bnmvjkFbrt0U1@mid.individual.net>, Tom Stiller > <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > The trouble with FileVault is that, as far as I can see, it prevents > > > Undercover (and similar computer recovery programs), and I think (not > > > sure) that it may also prevent Find My Mac. > > > > Why do you say that? As long as the utility operates on a mounted volume > > or goes through the proper API for mounting a volume, it will perform > > its function. > > without the proper password, it won't mount the drive. > > > I've had no problem cloning with SuperDuper! or rebuilding with > >DiskWarrior. > > undercover is a recovery tool, not a cloning tool. > > if the mac is stolen, it reports its location so it can be tracked. Quite. Tom is right about cloning programs, but UC is not a cloner, it is a recovery program. When a user is logged in, it will report the location of the Mac, so one can hope to trace it. But if the drive is still locked, UC can't work. > > if the thug can't use the computer at all, it will never run and never > report itself and the thug gets to keep the computer and probably steal > a bunch more. Of course, in latest versions, anyone can use Safari (maybe ONLY Safari) as a guest user even with an encrypted disk. -- <http://www.decohen.com> The Labyrinth of the Heart: Changed Myths for Changing Lives book and e-book <http://www.decohen.com/labyrinth> Send e-mail to the Reply-To address, not the From address.
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| From | Jolly Roger <jollyroger@pobox.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 22:06 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <bnn12oF9cdjU2@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #57564 |
On 2014-03-04, Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> wrote: > On 2014-03-04, Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: >> Kir?ly <me@home.spamsucks.ca> wrote: >> > > [snip] > >> >> The trouble with FileVault is that, as far as I can see, it prevents >> Undercover (and similar computer recovery programs), and I think (not >> sure) that it may also prevent Find My Mac. > > Why do you say that? As long as the utility operates on a mounted > volume or goes through the proper API for mounting a volume, it will > perform its function. I was going to ask the same question. > I've had no problem cloning with SuperDuper! or rebuilding with > DiskWarrior. > >> How many characters do you reckon a strong password should have? The >> longer the better for strength, but the shorter the better for the >> occasions (and there are quite a few of them) when one has to enter >> an admin user's password. I don't have a feel for the balance between >> these and would welcome opinions. > > It's not the length so much as it is the difficulity a thief would > have finding a starting place for his cracking program. Obvious and > word play should be avoided but strings made from the first (or > second) letters of a phrase that you are familiar with, with some > scattered capitalization work pretty well. Indeed. I tend to use complete sentences with normal capitalization and punctuation, sometimes with proper nouns included. That makes them very easy to remember for me. -- E-mail sent to this address may be devoured by my ravenous SPAM filter. I often ignore posts from Google. Use a real news client instead. JR
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| From | Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 22:25 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <slrnlhckmq.29qh.g.kreme@amelia.local> |
| In reply to | #57564 |
In message <bnmvjkFbrt0U1@mid.individual.net> Tom Stiller <clusterfux.upmon@gmail.com> wrote: > On 2014-03-04, Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> wrote: >> Kir?ly <me@home.spamsucks.ca> wrote: >> > [snip] >> >> The trouble with FileVault is that, as far as I can see, it prevents >> Undercover (and similar computer recovery programs), and I think (not >> sure) that it may also prevent Find My Mac. > Why do you say that? As long as the utility operates on a mounted volume or goes > through the proper API for mounting a volume, it will perform its function. > I've had no problem cloning with SuperDuper! or rebuilding with DiskWarrior. >> How many characters do you reckon a strong password should have? The >> longer the better for strength, but the shorter the better for the >> occasions (and there are quite a few of them) when one has to enter an >> admin user's password. I don't have a feel for the balance between these >> and would welcome opinions. > It's not the length so much as it is the difficulity a thief would have finding > a starting place for his cracking program. Obvious and word play should be > avoided but strings made from the first (or second) letters of a phrase that you > are familiar with, with some scattered capitalization work pretty well. I'm not sure how often you can try a password against a FileVault 2 Volume. If there is any wait period than any password not listed int eh 1000 most common may be enough. However, in general, anything under 12 characters is unacceptable. -- Thanks to the human heart by which we live, Thanks to its tenderness, its joys, and fears, To me the meanest flower that blows can give Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears
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| From | billy@MIX.COM |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 22:39 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <lf5knj$d8b$1@reader2.panix.com> |
| In reply to | #57579 |
Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> writes:
> I'm not sure how often you can try a password against a FileVault 2 Volume. If
> there is any wait period than any password not listed int eh 1000 most common
> may be enough.
As far as I know, Apple is not doing (as we call it in the VMS world)
break-in evasion. I think it'd be good if they did, even though there
is some risk of it being used in a denial of service attack. The VMS
default is after three failed login attempts, you're locked out (even
with the real password) for 15 minutes.
Billy Y..
--
sub #'9+1 ,r0 ; convert ascii byte
add #9.+1 ,r0 ; to an integer
bcc 20$ ; not a number
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| From | Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 23:26 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <slrnlhco9h.2b8q.g.kreme@amelia.local> |
| In reply to | #57582 |
In message <lf5knj$d8b$1@reader2.panix.com> billy@MIX.COM <billy@MIX.COM> wrote: > Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> writes: >> I'm not sure how often you can try a password against a FileVault 2 Volume. If >> there is any wait period than any password not listed int eh 1000 most common >> may be enough. > As far as I know, Apple is not doing (as we call it in the VMS world) > break-in evasion. I think it'd be good if they did, even though there > is some risk of it being used in a denial of service attack. The VMS > default is after three failed login attempts, you're locked out (even > with the real password) for 15 minutes. that's not exactly what I meant. For example, you may be able to try 1,000,000 passwords a second against a filevault volume, or because of the way the password is queried, you may be able to only try 1,000 a second. If you are 'rate-limited' to 1,000 a second, then a 'weak' password is now much much stronger than it was. Locking users out of accounts after too many failed attempts doesn't really work in the real world. "I'm sorry Dave, i can't allow you to try to use your own computer you purchased with your own hardware for the next 15 minuts because the cat walked on the keyboard. Oh, the cat walked on the keyboard again, you're now locked out for 24 hours." -- Didn't pay my exorcism bill, got repossessed.
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| From | billy@MIX.COM |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-05 00:10 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <lf5q1r$sgg$1@reader2.panix.com> |
| In reply to | #57592 |
Lewis <g.kreme@gmail.com.dontsendmecopies> writes:
> For example, you may be able to try 1,000,000 passwords a second against a
> filevault volume, or because of the way the password is queried, you may be
> able to only try 1,000 a second. If you are 'rate-limited' to 1,000 a second,
> then a 'weak' password is now much much stronger than it was.
Well, it's somewhat rate-limited due to the 1000s of trips through hashing.
But, probably not so much with today's hardware.
> Locking users out of accounts after too many failed attempts doesn't really
> work in the real world.
>
> "I'm sorry Dave, i can't allow you to try to use your own computer you
> purchased with your own hardware for the next 15 minuts because the cat walked
> on the keyboard. Oh, the cat walked on the keyboard again, you're now locked
> out for 24 hours."
There are those who agree with you, but I'm not one of them. Seeing
something like this doesn't bother me at all...
Last interactive login on Wednesday, 2-JUN-2010 11:06:17.08
Last non-interactive login on Wednesday, 2-JUN-2010 15:24:30.13
771 login failures since last successful login
Billy Y..
--
sub #'9+1 ,r0 ; convert ascii byte
add #9.+1 ,r0 ; to an integer
bcc 20$ ; not a number
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| From | billy@MIX.COM |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 21:48 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <lf5ho8$jsl$1@reader2.panix.com> |
| In reply to | #57560 |
Daniel Cohen <dcohenspam@talktalk.net> writes:
> How many characters do you reckon a strong password should have? The
> longer the better for strength, but the shorter the better for the
> occasions (and there are quite a few of them) when one has to enter an
> admin user's password. I don't have a feel for the balance between these
> and would welcome opinions.
I'm reasonably sure recent OS X versions (from 10.8 or maybe 10.7)
allow up to 32 byte passwords. Previous versions stopped at 8, even
though you could type more chars in.
http://support.apple.com/kb/TA20725
http://diceware.com has lots of useful password info, mostly here -
http://world.std.com/%7Ereinhold/dicewarefaq.html#login
Somewhere on this site is info about the above move to longer strings,
but if you're curious about that, you'll have to find it yourself.
Billy Y..
--
sub #'9+1 ,r0 ; convert ascii byte
add #9.+1 ,r0 ; to an integer
bcc 20$ ; not a number
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| From | dcohenspam@talktalk.net (Daniel Cohen) |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014-03-04 23:09 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1li0ax8.1u7yx1217hb3rkN%dcohenspam@talktalk.net> |
| In reply to | #57565 |
<billy@MIX.COM> wrote: > I'm reasonably sure recent OS X versions (from 10.8 or maybe 10.7) > allow up to 32 byte passwords. Previous versions stopped at 8, even > though you could type more chars in. I've just checked that Apple's Password Assistant in Mavericks goes up to 31 characters. I guess I should cjange my eleven character password by lengthening it. -- <http://www.decohen.com> The Labyrinth of the Heart: Changed Myths for Changing Lives book and e-book <http://www.decohen.com/labyrinth> Send e-mail to the Reply-To address, not the From address.
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