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Groups > linux.kernel > #1666586
| From | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 |
| Date | 2017-06-15 11:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tSyWR-yc-13@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (2 earlier) <sYpJo-6v8-17@gated-at.bofh.it> <thcBY-5Kp-23@gated-at.bofh.it> <tK8ZA-68C-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <tQ1Vo-2mY-19@gated-at.bofh.it> <tSriG-3Uo-7@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Thu, Jun 15, 2017 at 9:54 AM, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
>
> This push fixes a bug on sparc where we may dereference freed stack
> memory.
Ugh, that's a particularly ugly fix for a random gcc bug on a random
architecture that almost nobody tests.
In other words, it's nasty. It's nasty because nobody sane will ever
realize this pattern, and the code will either bit-rot or just happen
again somewhere else.
I'd have been *much* happier if this had been some nicer abstraction
that is built up around the use of SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(), and just
have some rule that "SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK()" needs to be paired with
retrieving the final value and then a SHASH_DESC_DEALLOC() or
whatever.
Then you *could* implement SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK() as a kmalloc, and
SHASH_DESC_DEALLOC() would be a kfree - but with an alloca()-like
allocation the SHASH_DESC_DEALLOC() would be that "barrier_data()".
At that point the interface would make _sense_ at some conceptual
level, rather than being a random hack for a small collection of
random users of this thing.
There's a fair number of SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK users, are all the others
safe for some random reason that just happens to be about code
generation? Did people actually verify that?
Linus
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Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2017-06-08 11:30 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> - 2017-06-08 16:10 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2017-06-09 05:00 +0200
Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2017-06-15 03:00 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> - 2017-06-15 11:10 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> - 2017-06-15 11:10 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> - 2017-06-15 11:50 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> - 2017-06-15 17:10 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> - 2017-06-15 17:10 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2017-06-16 15:00 +0200
Re: Crypto Fixes for 4.12 David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> - 2017-06-16 19:00 +0200
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