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Groups > linux.kernel > #1661251
| From | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 07/23] KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffers |
| Date | 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tQ68F-50i-1@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tQ5Z0-4WL-11@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 |
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped. Fix this for the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the decryption padding. Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y: keyctl new_session keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s) datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" keyctl unlink $keyid keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s) datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)" [ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!" Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> --- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 2ab48eab29a1..d14f1a47a130 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -479,12 +479,9 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, struct skcipher_request *req; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; - unsigned int padlen; - char pad[16]; int ret; encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize); - padlen = encrypted_datalen - epayload->decrypted_datalen; req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen); ret = PTR_ERR(req); @@ -492,11 +489,10 @@ static int derived_key_encrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, goto out; dump_decrypted_data(epayload); - memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad); sg_init_table(sg_in, 2); sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen); - sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], pad, padlen); + sg_set_page(&sg_in[1], ZERO_PAGE(0), AES_BLOCK_SIZE, 0); sg_init_table(sg_out, 1); sg_set_buf(sg_out, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen); @@ -583,9 +579,14 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, struct skcipher_request *req; unsigned int encrypted_datalen; u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; - char pad[16]; + u8 *pad; int ret; + /* Throwaway buffer to hold the unused zero padding at the end */ + pad = kmalloc(AES_BLOCK_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pad) + return -ENOMEM; + encrypted_datalen = roundup(epayload->decrypted_datalen, blksize); req = init_skcipher_req(derived_key, derived_keylen); ret = PTR_ERR(req); @@ -593,13 +594,12 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, goto out; dump_encrypted_data(epayload, encrypted_datalen); - memset(pad, 0, sizeof pad); sg_init_table(sg_in, 1); sg_init_table(sg_out, 2); sg_set_buf(sg_in, epayload->encrypted_data, encrypted_datalen); sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen); - sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof pad); + sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); memcpy(iv, epayload->iv, sizeof(iv)); skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out, encrypted_datalen, iv); @@ -611,6 +611,7 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, goto out; dump_decrypted_data(epayload); out: + kfree(pad); return ret; }
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[PATCH 00/23] KEYS: Fixes David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 15:50 +0200
[PATCH 05/23] KEYS: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in get_derived_key() David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 15:50 +0200
[PATCH 18/23] KEYS: DH: forbid using digest_null as the KDF hash David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 15:50 +0200
[PATCH 10/23] KEYS: encrypted: use constant-time HMAC comparison David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 15:50 +0200
[PATCH 04/23] X.509: Fix error code in x509_cert_parse() David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 15:50 +0200
[PATCH 07/23] KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffers David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 20/23] KEYS: DH: ensure the KDF counter is properly aligned David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 19/23] KEYS: DH: don't feed uninitialized "otherinfo" into KDF David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 16/23] KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 21/23] KEYS: DH: add __user annotations to keyctl_kdf_params David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 13/23] KEYS: sanitize add_key() and keyctl() key payloads David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 14/23] KEYS: user_defined: sanitize key payloads David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 22/23] crypto : asymmetric_keys : verify_pefile:zero memory content before freeing David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 23/23] KEYS: Convert KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE to use the crypto KPP API David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 11/23] KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 09/23] KEYS: encrypted: fix race causing incorrect HMAC calculations David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:00 +0200
[PATCH 08/23] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:10 +0200
[PATCH 02/23] security: use READ_ONCE instead of deprecated ACCESS_ONCE David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH 00/23] KEYS: Fixes James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> - 2017-06-08 16:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH 00/23] KEYS: Fixes David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-06-08 16:50 +0200
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