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Groups > linux.kernel > #1385705

[PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules

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Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else.  Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
---
 kernel/module.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 66426f743c29..649b1827ed15 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2599,13 +2599,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	int err = -ENOKEY;
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
-	if (info->len > markerlen &&
+	/*
+	 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+	 * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+	 */
+	if (flags == 0 &&
+	    info->len > markerlen &&
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2624,7 +2629,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
 	return err;
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3386,7 +3391,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
 	long err;
 	char *after_dashes;
 
-	err = module_sig_check(info);
+	err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_copy;
 

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[PATCH 0/3] Module signing and version info Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2016-04-23 20:50 +0200
  [PATCH 3/3] module: Disable MODULE_FORCE_LOAD when MODULE_SIG_FORCE  is enabled Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2016-04-23 20:50 +0200
  [PATCH 2/3] Documentation/module-signing.txt: Note need for version  info if reusing a key Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2016-04-23 20:50 +0200
  [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2016-04-23 20:50 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> - 2016-04-26 22:40 +0200
      Re: [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded  modules Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> - 2016-04-26 23:10 +0200
        Re: [PATCH 1/3] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> - 2016-04-28 02:30 +0200

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