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Groups > comp.arch.embedded > #21449
| From | Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | comp.arch.embedded |
| Subject | Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway |
| Date | 2015-07-22 19:49 -0700 |
| Organization | Aioe.org NNTP Server |
| Message-ID | <mopkn7$jik$1@speranza.aioe.org> (permalink) |
| References | <mom6g4$i05$1@dont-email.me> <c94af3b6-01e5-4bbd-bf2c-f2f4b1e50e03@googlegroups.com> <momgml$1hi$1@speranza.aioe.org> <2b477b24-3685-41cb-977f-9832e6803b98@googlegroups.com> |
On 7/22/2015 3:30 PM, lasselangwadtchristensen@gmail.com wrote: > Den onsdag den 22. juli 2015 kl. 00.22.18 UTC+2 skrev Don Y: >> On 7/21/2015 2:35 PM, Ian Yellowley wrote: >> >>> I wonder why there should be any connection between these networks, I >>> can see consolidation of steering, suspension and braking info for >>> stability but the rest??? There would seem to be huge differences in >>> required bandwidth, latency and reliability so is there a cost saving? I >>> was involved in the design of steer by wire systems many years ago and >>> the extent to which we went to provide reliability, multiple layers of >>> redundancy and isolation from other systems were fairly extreme. This >>> was in a University lab...I would expect at least that from a commercial >>> product. >> >> From the (limited) exposure I've had to automotive control systems, there >> doesn't seem to be a cohesive, integrated "system design" at work. >> Instead, there are all these little islands of control that are hacked >> together and "integrated" after-the-fact. >> >> [Often, individual subsystems are farmed out to third parties. E.g., you >> can bet that the auto manufacturer doesn't design the navigation system, >> entertainment system, security system -- perhaps not even the engine >> control system itself!] >> >> E.g., why would the ECU need to talk to anything other than the *engine*? >> "Ah, but we can tell the air conditioning compressor to disengage when we >> are calling for extra demand from the engine! So, let the *engine* tell >> the air conditioner to 'pause' -- instead of having some higher level of >> integration impose those rules. Likewise, let the tranny controller tell >> the door locks to engage when the vehicle is put in gear (or, when the >> wheels attain a certain speed). > > afaiu from a guy I know that works a lot with car electronics as in building > ECUs, gearbox controllers and integrating them with the different system in > a number of different cars, most of the systems are stand alone and mostly > listen to each other, i.e. the ECU does nothing but run the engine and > broadcast what it is doing, ditto for all the other systems > > so if the doorlocks see the tranny broadcasting a speed over x it can > decide to lock the doors, if the AC see the engine broadcast a load over x > it can decide to pause, if the ECU see the ABS module broadcast wheelspeeds > that indicate wheelspin it can turn down the power > > I guess it is similar to the unix philosophy, do one thing and do it well Modern cars are more highly (functionally) integrated. There is little inherent in the protocols that directly supports authentication. E.g., a node has no *proof* that a message/datum actually originated from a node that is *intended* to source messages of that type. So, the "radio link" -- once hacked -- can *forge* a message indicating the engine speed is X or the shift lever has been placed in 'R' or... You have to consider any node in the system (modern vehicles have *many* nodes!) as potentially being compromised. Once compromised, how reliable are your protocol-based security measures? Can I hack the door locks (body controller) and get a beachhead there? Or, the entertainment system? Or... The security model seems to be one of "don't expect anything *foreign* or adversarial *inside* the vehicle". Sort of like most businesses try to keep adversaries *out* of their "intranets" but, do little to protect against an adversary that's already *inside* the firewall (e.g., a PC that becomes infected from a virus transported across the protection domain on a thumb drive!) If, instead, you treat each interaction as a secure communication, then you don't care where (physical node or bus) the communication originated -- it self-authenticates. Imagine lots of VPN's inside the box -- even a VPN *mesh*! An adversary can break physical security but still be locked out because it doesn't have the credentials for the VPN's of interest. Finally, if you encode rules in the fabric itself (not really possible with the distributed nature of CAN), then you can ensure any infiltration is limited to mimicking the functionality that it has supplanted. E.g., your door lock system can send and receive only messages associated with door locks -- not braking functions, entertainment system functions, environmental controls, etc. So, you limit the "damage" to the subsystem that has been compromised and nothing more -- you can masquerade ONLY as the subsystem that you've hacked and can't do anything more than that subsystem could do, [This is where the lack of authentication leaves most systems vulnerable in unnecessarily cascaded "faults"]
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Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Rob Gaddi <rgaddi@technologyhighland.invalid> - 2015-07-21 19:28 +0000
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-21 13:00 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Clifford Heath <no.spam@please.net> - 2015-07-21 21:49 +1000
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-21 18:55 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway DJ Delorie <dj@delorie.com> - 2015-07-21 20:37 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-21 18:47 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Ian Yellowley <iany99@gmail.com> - 2015-07-21 14:35 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-21 15:22 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Ian Yellowley <iany99@gmail.com> - 2015-07-22 13:42 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-22 18:48 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway lasselangwadtchristensen@gmail.com - 2015-07-22 17:33 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Rob Gaddi <rgaddi@technologyhighland.invalid> - 2015-07-24 16:51 +0000
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Paul Rubin <no.email@nospam.invalid> - 2015-07-24 10:23 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-24 11:22 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Hans-Bernhard Bröker <HBBroeker@t-online.de> - 2015-07-24 21:49 +0200
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway hamilton <hamilton@nothere.com> - 2015-07-24 12:45 -0600
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-22 16:59 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-22 21:30 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway lasselangwadtchristensen@gmail.com - 2015-07-22 15:30 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-22 18:53 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-22 19:49 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-22 23:20 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Robert Wessel <robertwessel2@yahoo.com> - 2015-07-23 03:49 -0500
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Don Y <this@is.not.me.com> - 2015-07-23 03:26 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-23 12:09 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Hans-Bernhard Bröker <HBBroeker@t-online.de> - 2015-07-23 21:38 +0200
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-23 16:36 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Hans-Bernhard Bröker <HBBroeker@t-online.de> - 2015-07-23 23:56 +0200
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-24 13:25 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-23 11:32 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Ed Prochak <edprochak@gmail.com> - 2015-07-21 20:00 -0700
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway rickman <gnuarm@gmail.com> - 2015-07-22 00:57 -0400
Re: Semi-OT: Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway Mel Wilson <mwilson@the-wire.com> - 2015-07-26 15:06 +0000
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