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| From | VanguardLH <V@nguard.LH> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | comp.misc, alt.privacy |
| Subject | Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected |
| Date | 2014-06-18 01:25 -0500 |
| Organization | Usenet denizen |
| Message-ID | <lnrbcs$srq$1@news.albasani.net> (permalink) |
| References | <lnp7sd$k1u$1@solani.org> <c0asvjFaidbU1@mid.individual.net> <lnq85a$97n$1@news.albasani.net> <c0cibdFl83fU1@mid.individual.net> |
Cross-posted to 2 groups.
Sylvia Else wrote: > But it's a subpoena, not a court order. It can only seek information, > and indeed, there's a significant limit on the information that can be > sought. The gag order relates to subpoena, and prevents the recipient > from disclosing its existence, or content, but it does not, and cannot, > impose a wider restriction the recipient. It's the Justice Department issuing the secret subpoena. They don't need a court. They are a court. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/09/AR2010080906252.html The government has long argued, as it did in this case, that "secrecy is often essential to the successful conduct of counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations" and that public disclosure of the receipt of a letter "may pose serious risks to the investigation itself and to other national security interests." FBI spokesman Mike Kortan said, "The FBI needs the ability to protect investigations, sources and methods." The recent request by the Obama administration to amend the law governing the letters has prompted debate in Congress over which types of electronic records should require a judge's permission before the FBI can seek them, and which types should not, as is the case with national security letters. A letter may be issued by a FBI field office supervisor if they think the data will be relevant to a terrorism probe. The US gov't is split into 3 branches: legislative, judicial, and executive. Where do you think the DOJ resides? Look at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Justice#mediaviewer/File:US_Department_of_Justice_Organizational_Chart.png See the FBI down the chart under the DOJ? Although we've been bandying "NSA" around as the "wicked one", they're under the Dept. of Defense (DOD) which is under the executive branch. I'm sure they appreciate our disinformation. The FBI is administered by the DOJ. How hard do you think it is for the DOJ to write their own judicial writs while also requiring them to be kept secret? Recipients are usually not allowed to disclose receipt of the national security letter (NSL), its demands or scope or its effects. The National Security Letter provision of the Patriot Act allows the FBI forbid or gag anyone who receives an NSL. "NSLs may contain a nondisclosure provision—preventing the recipient of an NSL from disclosing that the FBI had requested the information — only if the Director of the FBI (or his designee) authorizes the nondisclosure requirement." Aren't the Patriot and Victory Acts (2 versions of each) just wonderful? The recipient can challenge the non-disclosure requirement in federal count; however, all the proceedings remain secret until a decision is made. So how many years might that be? We can't know how many challenges there are because, well, they recipients have to remain mum until the case is decided. So far, there are only 3 known challenges where the DOJ/FBI rescinded: Kahle (Internet Archive aka WayBackMachine; Nicholas Merrill, of Calyx Internet Access; and the Connecticut librarians George Christian, Barbara Bailey, Peter Chase, and Janet Nocek. The challenges are per NSL, not umbrella exclusion from further NSLs. Looks like Kahle (or someone else responsible at the Internet Archive) got hit with another NSL this time regarding TrueCrypt: all the archive pages at the WayBackMachine for the TrueCrypt site suddenly disappeared. Does that look like just data collection to you? Google received 0 to 999 NSLs each year between 2009 and 2012 (http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/US/). They probably aren't allow to provide an exact count because the scope of each subpoena required non-disclosure on each. If you can't disclose any, any count would imply disclosure. Since the national security letter is secret and the defendents must remain silent, we don't know what they say or demand. It's a secret. "Badges? We ain't got no badges. We don't need no badges. I don't have to show you no stinkin' badges" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsdZKCh6RsU, 0:09 timemark) > In particular, it could not require someone to refrain from revealing > that some party, government, or otherwise, had compromised Truecrypt. > >> You might want to see what happened to Lavabit after getting served a >> secret subpoena (e.g., en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lavabit). Read >> http://threatpost.com/of-truecrypt-and-warrant-canaries/106355 on how >> Apple applied a warrant canary. > > Yes, but that was a different situation entirely. How? Lavabit got a subpoena (national security letter) and decided to close shop rather than comply (for a writ declaring surrending data records on ALL their customers' communications). Looks like the TrueCrypt authors got a NSL, too, so they also closed shop. Rather than fight with the advantage so heavily weighted to the DOJ, both chose to leave. If they chose the challenge to rescind non-disclosure, that's all secret, too, so we'll only know if they win in federal count. The Vogons showed up so the dolphins left saying, "So long, and thanks for all the fish". (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Invb2vHPLLc, timemark 1:34:10)
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Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected RS Wood <rsw@therandymon.com> - 2014-06-17 11:13 +0000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Sylvia Else <sylvia@not.at.this.address> - 2014-06-17 23:09 +1000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Shadow <Sh@dow.br> - 2014-06-17 11:13 -0300
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Sylvia Else <sylvia@not.at.this.address> - 2014-06-18 11:07 +1000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected VanguardLH <V@nguard.LH> - 2014-06-17 15:24 -0500
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Sylvia Else <sylvia@not.at.this.address> - 2014-06-18 14:19 +1000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected VanguardLH <V@nguard.LH> - 2014-06-18 01:25 -0500
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Sylvia Else <sylvia@not.at.this.address> - 2014-06-18 16:40 +1000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Oregonian Haruspex <bob_davis_retired@yahoo.com> - 2014-06-17 13:59 -0700
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Mark Harvard <mark.harvard.909we3@gmail-.com> - 2014-06-17 14:03 -0700
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Sylvia Else <sylvia@not.at.this.address> - 2014-06-18 14:28 +1000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> - 2014-06-17 13:15 -0400
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected VanguardLH <V@nguard.LH> - 2014-06-17 15:50 -0500
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Marko Rauhamaa <marko@pacujo.net> - 2014-06-18 00:22 +0300
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected Oregonian Haruspex <bob_davis_retired@yahoo.com> - 2014-06-17 14:01 -0700
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected scott@alfter.diespammersdie.us (Scott Alfter) - 2014-06-17 21:38 +0000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected RS Wood <rsw@therandymon.com> - 2014-06-17 21:50 +0000
Re: Truecrypt infiltrated by NSA, as suspected "tdk" <forum.tdk@squte.com> - 2014-06-18 10:52 -0500
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