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Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones (Re: T-theory A-theory theatheory)

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  Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones (Re: T-theory A-theory theatheory) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2025-11-09 21:20 +0100
    Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones (Re: T-theory A-theory theatheory) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-09 16:11 -0800
      Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones (Re: T-theory A-theory theatheory) olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2025-11-09 22:04 -0600
      Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2025-11-10 15:49 +0100
        Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-10 09:01 -0800
          Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Maciej Woźniak <mlwozniak@wp.pl> - 2025-11-10 18:22 +0100
            Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-10 09:35 -0800
              Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Maciej Woźniak <mlwozniak@wp.pl> - 2025-11-10 20:33 +0100
          Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-10 09:41 -0800
          Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Thomas Heger <ttt_heg@web.de> - 2025-11-11 08:29 +0100
            Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-11 09:33 -0800
              Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Thomas Heger <ttt_heg@web.de> - 2025-11-12 09:04 +0100
                Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones) Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2025-11-12 18:23 -0800

#640632 — Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones (Re: T-theory A-theory theatheory)

Hi,

Since LiquidHaskell, VerseCalculus, etc.. have
the tasted of reinventing the wheel, and still
gloriously failing, I will start a series of

Pioneers of Program Formalization, and begin
with Cliff B. Jones (born 1 June 1944) is a British
computer scientist. This piece looks a little

archaic, but is full of funny examples:

4.1.2 Examples
Basic statements:
a := p+q
goto Naples
START:CONTINUE:W := 7.993

A formal Definition of Algol 60
August 1972 - Cliff B. Jones et al.
http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/cliff.jones/publications/Other-TRs/TR12.105.pdf

This post is especially a donation to Ross Finlayson,
who still is seeking consistent foundationalism,
as if Russell had written the Letter to Frege,

just yesterday, while a computer program might
simply goto Naples.

Bye

Ross Finlayson schrieb:
> On 11/04/2025 08:12 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> Farewell, RF. I look forward to observing the intellectual impact of
> your work on the T-theory, A-theory, theatheory thread.

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#640634

On 11/09/2025 12:20 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Since LiquidHaskell, VerseCalculus, etc.. have
> the tasted of reinventing the wheel, and still
> gloriously failing, I will start a series of
>
> Pioneers of Program Formalization, and begin
> with Cliff B. Jones (born 1 June 1944) is a British
> computer scientist. This piece looks a little
>
> archaic, but is full of funny examples:
>
> 4.1.2 Examples
> Basic statements:
> a := p+q
> goto Naples
> START:CONTINUE:W := 7.993
>
> A formal Definition of Algol 60
> August 1972 - Cliff B. Jones et al.
> http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/cliff.jones/publications/Other-TRs/TR12.105.pdf
>
>
> This post is especially a donation to Ross Finlayson,
> who still is seeking consistent foundationalism,
> as if Russell had written the Letter to Frege,
>
> just yesterday, while a computer program might
> simply goto Naples.
>
> Bye
>
> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>> On 11/04/2025 08:12 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> Farewell, RF. I look forward to observing the intellectual impact of
>> your work on the T-theory, A-theory, theatheory thread.

He's a real nowhere man /
Sitting in his nowhere land /
Making all his nowhere plans /
for nobody


I don't go looking for paradoxes,
since there aren't any in a real theory,
contradictions though automatically
make for counterexamples, then about
the "analytical bridges",
or ponts is what I call them,
not the "invincible ignorance".


The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.

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#640636

On 11/9/2025 6:11 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 11/09/2025 12:20 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Since LiquidHaskell, VerseCalculus, etc.. have
>> the tasted of reinventing the wheel, and still
>> gloriously failing, I will start a series of
>>
>> Pioneers of Program Formalization, and begin
>> with Cliff B. Jones (born 1 June 1944) is a British
>> computer scientist. This piece looks a little
>>
>> archaic, but is full of funny examples:
>>
>> 4.1.2 Examples
>> Basic statements:
>> a := p+q
>> goto Naples
>> START:CONTINUE:W := 7.993
>>
>> A formal Definition of Algol 60
>> August 1972 - Cliff B. Jones et al.
>> http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/cliff.jones/publications/Other-TRs/ 
>> TR12.105.pdf
>>
>>
>> This post is especially a donation to Ross Finlayson,
>> who still is seeking consistent foundationalism,
>> as if Russell had written the Letter to Frege,
>>
>> just yesterday, while a computer program might
>> simply goto Naples.
>>
>> Bye
>>
>> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>>> On 11/04/2025 08:12 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> Farewell, RF. I look forward to observing the intellectual impact of
>>> your work on the T-theory, A-theory, theatheory thread.
> 
> He's a real nowhere man /
> Sitting in his nowhere land /
> Making all his nowhere plans /
> for nobody
> 
> 
> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
> since there aren't any in a real theory,
> contradictions though automatically
> make for counterexamples, then about
> the "analytical bridges",
> or ponts is what I call them,
> not the "invincible ignorance".
> 
> 
> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
> 
> 


test

-- 
Copyright 2025 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer

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#640638 — Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

Hi,

Nice blooper Rossy Boy:

 > I don't go looking for paradoxes,
 > since there aren't any in a real theory,
 > contradictions though automatically
 > make for counterexamples, then about
 > the "analytical bridges",
 > or ponts is what I call them,
 > not the "invincible ignorance".

If a theory is consistent, then it has a
model. If it has a counter model, then
it it is inconsisent.

But if it is inconsistent, we don't
know whether it has a counter model,
because we don't know whether the

foundation is consistent, i.e. ZFC etc..

Did you even attend a single logic class?

Bye

P.S.: Under the assumption that the foundation
is consistent, it indeed follows that inconsistency
must have a model. But this model might be

infinite. Not "computable". Otherwise the
Halting Problem could be solved. In the arithmetic
hierarchy counter models are a level higher,

than provability.

Ross Finlayson schrieb:
> On 11/09/2025 12:20 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Since LiquidHaskell, VerseCalculus, etc.. have
>> the tasted of reinventing the wheel, and still
>> gloriously failing, I will start a series of
>>
>> Pioneers of Program Formalization, and begin
>> with Cliff B. Jones (born 1 June 1944) is a British
>> computer scientist. This piece looks a little
>>
>> archaic, but is full of funny examples:
>>
>> 4.1.2 Examples
>> Basic statements:
>> a := p+q
>> goto Naples
>> START:CONTINUE:W := 7.993
>>
>> A formal Definition of Algol 60
>> August 1972 - Cliff B. Jones et al.
>> http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/cliff.jones/publications/Other-TRs/TR12.105.pdf 
>>
>>
>>
>> This post is especially a donation to Ross Finlayson,
>> who still is seeking consistent foundationalism,
>> as if Russell had written the Letter to Frege,
>>
>> just yesterday, while a computer program might
>> simply goto Naples.
>>
>> Bye
>>
>> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>>> On 11/04/2025 08:12 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> Farewell, RF. I look forward to observing the intellectual impact of
>>> your work on the T-theory, A-theory, theatheory thread.
> 
> He's a real nowhere man /
> Sitting in his nowhere land /
> Making all his nowhere plans /
> for nobody
> 
> 
> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
> since there aren't any in a real theory,
> contradictions though automatically
> make for counterexamples, then about
> the "analytical bridges",
> or ponts is what I call them,
> not the "invincible ignorance".
> 
> 
> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
> 
> 

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#640640 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

On 11/10/2025 06:49 AM, Mild Shock wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Nice blooper Rossy Boy:
>
>  > I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>  > since there aren't any in a real theory,
>  > contradictions though automatically
>  > make for counterexamples, then about
>  > the "analytical bridges",
>  > or ponts is what I call them,
>  > not the "invincible ignorance".
>
> If a theory is consistent, then it has a
> model. If it has a counter model, then
> it it is inconsisent.
>
> But if it is inconsistent, we don't
> know whether it has a counter model,
> because we don't know whether the
>
> foundation is consistent, i.e. ZFC etc..
>
> Did you even attend a single logic class?
>
> Bye
>
> P.S.: Under the assumption that the foundation
> is consistent, it indeed follows that inconsistency
> must have a model. But this model might be
>
> infinite. Not "computable". Otherwise the
> Halting Problem could be solved. In the arithmetic
> hierarchy counter models are a level higher,
>
> than provability.
>
> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>> On 11/09/2025 12:20 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> Since LiquidHaskell, VerseCalculus, etc.. have
>>> the tasted of reinventing the wheel, and still
>>> gloriously failing, I will start a series of
>>>
>>> Pioneers of Program Formalization, and begin
>>> with Cliff B. Jones (born 1 June 1944) is a British
>>> computer scientist. This piece looks a little
>>>
>>> archaic, but is full of funny examples:
>>>
>>> 4.1.2 Examples
>>> Basic statements:
>>> a := p+q
>>> goto Naples
>>> START:CONTINUE:W := 7.993
>>>
>>> A formal Definition of Algol 60
>>> August 1972 - Cliff B. Jones et al.
>>> http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/cliff.jones/publications/Other-TRs/TR12.105.pdf
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This post is especially a donation to Ross Finlayson,
>>> who still is seeking consistent foundationalism,
>>> as if Russell had written the Letter to Frege,
>>>
>>> just yesterday, while a computer program might
>>> simply goto Naples.
>>>
>>> Bye
>>>
>>> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>>>> On 11/04/2025 08:12 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> Farewell, RF. I look forward to observing the intellectual impact of
>>>> your work on the T-theory, A-theory, theatheory thread.
>>
>> He's a real nowhere man /
>> Sitting in his nowhere land /
>> Making all his nowhere plans /
>> for nobody
>>
>>
>> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>> since there aren't any in a real theory,
>> contradictions though automatically
>> make for counterexamples, then about
>> the "analytical bridges",
>> or ponts is what I call them,
>> not the "invincible ignorance".
>>
>>
>> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
>> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
>>
>>
>

I never even heard of "set theory" until my mid-20's,
of course though "sets" were introduced in 7'th grade
geometry, which was mostly 8'th graders.

Churchill was the text in the college logic course,
about the same time I started reading Hegel. I found
the de Morgan's rules of direct implication most useful.
I have a copy of it around here. The contrapositive
is considered the only needful rule.


So, model theory is defined as there existing a model
meaning there exists a structure, embodying all matters
of relation as they may be, of a theory its objects.

So, Goedel helps show that _ordinary_ theories like
as after Russell's retro-thesis, can't be consistent
and complete.

Now, Goedelian incompleteness applies to theories
with finite axiomatizations. It doesn't say that
it applies to theories with either _no_ axioms,
stipulations, wishes, or _universal_ axioms, i.e.
something like the "constant-free" or "term-free"
sometimes it's called, that Tarski, who was an addict
and self-aggrandizing flake, used to say he was on
about, at his Montague parties, that later people
like Scott and Feferman had to walk back about
circle and box notation or quantifier disambiguation,
while though already Zermelo and Fraenkel have
Mirimanoff and Skolem to wonder about, and Russell
flaked on about Chwistek and Sheffer, in a nice world
where Herbrand gives this is all quite formal.

Then, for mathematics, there's Erdos, about the
Giant Monster of Independence. Goedel, about CH,
and von Neumann, about Not CH, the "consistency"
both ways that contradict each other, led to Cohen
axiomatizing forcing for basically the statement
that "ZF(C) is inconsistent without another axiom
making ordering theory separate from set theory,
which thusly also is inconsistent".

Then, that's just called "independent", ordinary
set theory, that CH is independent, yet it can
be shewn much earlier that Russell's retro-thesis
for something like the ordinals those containing
themselves, that a smaller theory a sub-theory
what would be a sub-model or ZF, has Russell's
paradox the inconsistencies either way.

So, all that broken is fixed with something like
"axiomless natural deduction" then to arrive at
a heno-theory with an aspect that ordinary and
extra-ordinary set-theory.



I _did_ go looking for the paradoxes, and after
something like my slates on uncountability and
paradox, they're gone now.

What you got are contradictions.

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#640641 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

On 11/10/2025 6:01 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:

> Now, Goedelian incompleteness applies to theories
> with finite axiomatizations.

Unless they're inconsistent. And since
every theory Godel talked about is
including liar-like paradox - they're
all inconsistent.

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#640642 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

On 11/10/2025 09:22 AM, Maciej Woźniak wrote:
> On 11/10/2025 6:01 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>
>> Now, Goedelian incompleteness applies to theories
>> with finite axiomatizations.
>
> Unless they're inconsistent. And since
> every theory Godel talked about is
> including liar-like paradox - they're
> all inconsistent.
>

Well, one needs exclude "ex falso quodlibet" since
that's the Liar for you, then to make "ex falso nihilum"
that it involves starting with a language that's all
true except the one Liar that _only speaks of itself_,
i.e., _it's not relevant to anything else_, so that then
a modal, temporal, relevance logic needn't allow EFQ,
that pollutes and perverts via "material implication"
today's "classical logic" which is better called
"quasi-modal logic", since "classical logic" already
may include Chrysippus and Aristotle while excluding
Philo and Plotinus and be "classical modal relevance logic"
as a more true / less Liar "classical logic".

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#640646 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

On 11/10/2025 6:35 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 11/10/2025 09:22 AM, Maciej Woźniak wrote:
>> On 11/10/2025 6:01 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>
>>> Now, Goedelian incompleteness applies to theories
>>> with finite axiomatizations.
>>
>> Unless they're inconsistent. And since
>> every theory Godel talked about is
>> including liar-like paradox - they're
>> all inconsistent.
>>
> 
> Well, one needs exclude "ex falso quodlibet" since
> that's the Liar for you, then to make "ex falso nihilum"
> that it involves starting with a language that's all
> true except the one Liar that _only speaks of itself_,
> i.e., _it's not relevant to anything else_, so that then
> a modal, temporal, relevance logic needn't allow EFQ,
> that pollutes and perverts via "material implication"
> today's "classical logic" which is better called
> "quasi-modal logic", since "classical logic" already
> may include Chrysippus and Aristotle while excluding
> Philo and Plotinus and be "classical modal relevance logic"
> as a more true / less Liar "classical logic".
> 
> 

Paradoxes like liar paradox can be avoided many ways,
Or at least pretended to be non-existing.
Godel didn't avoid it at all. He thought playing
with it was smart.

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#640644 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

On 11/10/2025 09:01 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 11/10/2025 06:49 AM, Mild Shock wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Nice blooper Rossy Boy:
>>
>>  > I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>>  > since there aren't any in a real theory,
>>  > contradictions though automatically
>>  > make for counterexamples, then about
>>  > the "analytical bridges",
>>  > or ponts is what I call them,
>>  > not the "invincible ignorance".
>>
>> If a theory is consistent, then it has a
>> model. If it has a counter model, then
>> it it is inconsisent.
>>
>> But if it is inconsistent, we don't
>> know whether it has a counter model,
>> because we don't know whether the
>>
>> foundation is consistent, i.e. ZFC etc..
>>
>> Did you even attend a single logic class?
>>
>> Bye
>>
>> P.S.: Under the assumption that the foundation
>> is consistent, it indeed follows that inconsistency
>> must have a model. But this model might be
>>
>> infinite. Not "computable". Otherwise the
>> Halting Problem could be solved. In the arithmetic
>> hierarchy counter models are a level higher,
>>
>> than provability.
>>
>> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>>> On 11/09/2025 12:20 PM, Mild Shock wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> Since LiquidHaskell, VerseCalculus, etc.. have
>>>> the tasted of reinventing the wheel, and still
>>>> gloriously failing, I will start a series of
>>>>
>>>> Pioneers of Program Formalization, and begin
>>>> with Cliff B. Jones (born 1 June 1944) is a British
>>>> computer scientist. This piece looks a little
>>>>
>>>> archaic, but is full of funny examples:
>>>>
>>>> 4.1.2 Examples
>>>> Basic statements:
>>>> a := p+q
>>>> goto Naples
>>>> START:CONTINUE:W := 7.993
>>>>
>>>> A formal Definition of Algol 60
>>>> August 1972 - Cliff B. Jones et al.
>>>> http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/cliff.jones/publications/Other-TRs/TR12.105.pdf
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This post is especially a donation to Ross Finlayson,
>>>> who still is seeking consistent foundationalism,
>>>> as if Russell had written the Letter to Frege,
>>>>
>>>> just yesterday, while a computer program might
>>>> simply goto Naples.
>>>>
>>>> Bye
>>>>
>>>> Ross Finlayson schrieb:
>>>>> On 11/04/2025 08:12 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> Farewell, RF. I look forward to observing the intellectual impact of
>>>>> your work on the T-theory, A-theory, theatheory thread.
>>>
>>> He's a real nowhere man /
>>> Sitting in his nowhere land /
>>> Making all his nowhere plans /
>>> for nobody
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>>> since there aren't any in a real theory,
>>> contradictions though automatically
>>> make for counterexamples, then about
>>> the "analytical bridges",
>>> or ponts is what I call them,
>>> not the "invincible ignorance".
>>>
>>>
>>> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
>>> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> I never even heard of "set theory" until my mid-20's,
> of course though "sets" were introduced in 7'th grade
> geometry, which was mostly 8'th graders.
>
> Churchill was the text in the college logic course,
> about the same time I started reading Hegel. I found
> the de Morgan's rules of direct implication most useful.
> I have a copy of it around here. The contrapositive
> is considered the only needful rule.
>
>
> So, model theory is defined as there existing a model
> meaning there exists a structure, embodying all matters
> of relation as they may be, of a theory its objects.
>
> So, Goedel helps show that _ordinary_ theories like
> as after Russell's retro-thesis, can't be consistent
> and complete.
>
> Now, Goedelian incompleteness applies to theories
> with finite axiomatizations. It doesn't say that
> it applies to theories with either _no_ axioms,
> stipulations, wishes, or _universal_ axioms, i.e.
> something like the "constant-free" or "term-free"
> sometimes it's called, that Tarski, who was an addict
> and self-aggrandizing flake, used to say he was on
> about, at his Montague parties, that later people
> like Scott and Feferman had to walk back about
> circle and box notation or quantifier disambiguation,
> while though already Zermelo and Fraenkel have
> Mirimanoff and Skolem to wonder about, and Russell
> flaked on about Chwistek and Sheffer, in a nice world
> where Herbrand gives this is all quite formal.
>
> Then, for mathematics, there's Erdos, about the
> Giant Monster of Independence. Goedel, about CH,
> and von Neumann, about Not CH, the "consistency"
> both ways that contradict each other, led to Cohen
> axiomatizing forcing for basically the statement
> that "ZF(C) is inconsistent without another axiom
> making ordering theory separate from set theory,
> which thusly also is inconsistent".
>
> Then, that's just called "independent", ordinary
> set theory, that CH is independent, yet it can
> be shewn much earlier that Russell's retro-thesis
> for something like the ordinals those containing
> themselves, that a smaller theory a sub-theory
> what would be a sub-model or ZF, has Russell's
> paradox the inconsistencies either way.
>
> So, all that broken is fixed with something like
> "axiomless natural deduction" then to arrive at
> a heno-theory with an aspect that ordinary and
> extra-ordinary set-theory.
>
>
>
> I _did_ go looking for the paradoxes, and after
> something like my slates on uncountability and
> paradox, they're gone now.
>
> What you got are contradictions.
>
>
>

It's like "Bayesians versus frequentists",
that's a false dichotomy since that's basically
"probabilists versus chance-ers", when really
the true dichotomy is Bayes vis-a-vis Jeffreys
vis-a-vis Knight about about likelihood, uncertainty,
and chance, that when I see people weighing Bayes
and frequentism I think they don't know the same
problems affect both of those.


This is since the _extra-ordinary_ that the
_non-standard_ has that Robinson's "non-standard"
has _nothing_ to say and says _nothing_ while
there's a _non-standard_ that starts with the integers
then results _super-standard_ the _extra-ordinary_,
then to make laws, plural, of large numbers, for
continuous domains, plural, about why that again
the finitary reasoning about the "ordinary inductive"
is vanity and merely a law of small numbers.

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#640652 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

Am Montag000010, 10.11.2025 um 18:01 schrieb Ross Finlayson:
...
>>> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>>> since there aren't any in a real theory,
>>> contradictions though automatically
>>> make for counterexamples, then about
>>> the "analytical bridges",
>>> or ponts is what I call them,
>>> not the "invincible ignorance".
>>>
>>>
>>> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
>>> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
>>>
>>>
>>
> 
> I never even heard of "set theory" until my mid-20's,
> of course though "sets" were introduced in 7'th grade
> geometry, which was mostly 8'th graders.
> 
> Churchill was the text in the college logic course,
> about the same time I started reading Hegel. I found
> the de Morgan's rules of direct implication most useful.
> I have a copy of it around here. The contrapositive
> is considered the only needful rule.

Churchill had written about logic?>
> So, model theory is defined as there existing a model
> meaning there exists a structure, embodying all matters
> of relation as they may be, of a theory its objects.
> 
> So, Goedel helps show that _ordinary_ theories like
> as after Russell's retro-thesis, can't be consistent
> and complete.

A model and reality are two distinct entities.

Therefore, a model cannot describe reality as reality is, because a 
model is usually way simpler then even the smallest parts of nature are.

So we cannot have both: 'sharpness' of a model and its usability.

If the description is quite good, the model will become practically 
impossible to use. If it should be usable, the model needs to simplify.

Also Goedelian 'completeness' is nonsense, because models of any kind 
can only address some subset of what we could eventually model.

TH

...

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#640657 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

On 11/10/2025 11:29 PM, Thomas Heger wrote:
> Am Montag000010, 10.11.2025 um 18:01 schrieb Ross Finlayson:
> ...
>>>> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>>>> since there aren't any in a real theory,
>>>> contradictions though automatically
>>>> make for counterexamples, then about
>>>> the "analytical bridges",
>>>> or ponts is what I call them,
>>>> not the "invincible ignorance".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
>>>> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> I never even heard of "set theory" until my mid-20's,
>> of course though "sets" were introduced in 7'th grade
>> geometry, which was mostly 8'th graders.
>>
>> Churchill was the text in the college logic course,
>> about the same time I started reading Hegel. I found
>> the de Morgan's rules of direct implication most useful.
>> I have a copy of it around here. The contrapositive
>> is considered the only needful rule.
>
> Churchill had written about logic?>
>> So, model theory is defined as there existing a model
>> meaning there exists a structure, embodying all matters
>> of relation as they may be, of a theory its objects.
>>
>> So, Goedel helps show that _ordinary_ theories like
>> as after Russell's retro-thesis, can't be consistent
>> and complete.
>
> A model and reality are two distinct entities.
>
> Therefore, a model cannot describe reality as reality is, because a
> model is usually way simpler then even the smallest parts of nature are.
>
> So we cannot have both: 'sharpness' of a model and its usability.
>
> If the description is quite good, the model will become practically
> impossible to use. If it should be usable, the model needs to simplify.
>
> Also Goedelian 'completeness' is nonsense, because models of any kind
> can only address some subset of what we could eventually model.
>
> TH
>
> ...

How about infinity?

It's simple enough to have infinity be unbounded, endless,
yet, deductively it's arrived at the thought experiments
of Zeno, and it can only be that it's complete infinity,
to be actual, the motion, continuity.

It's a very usual idea that the great ontology of our
natural language, a "Coleridge" language, say, never
quite reaches a great teleology of a "super-" natural
language, a "Comenius" language say, like Quine's or
Nietzsche's "eternal basic text" somehow way above
Liebnitz' "universal grammar". That's the usual idea
of logicist positivism and nominalist fictionalism
the nominalism since Occam.

Yet, it's also very usual that nature somehow _is_
complete, that there's a universe at all, about
the "univocity" of Duns Scotus, about the haeccity
and quiddity, the reasonable and rational about
the natural and real (de res de racio de natura de re).

The set theory or Mengenlehre is very well explored,
the idea that there's "a foundations" at all for
"a universe" at all, then gets into Skolem and Mirimanoff
as what it must be "extra-ordinary", the domain or realm
the universe of those objects, even about things like
the numbers or names of things in reality, their "true"
names and numbers, which would be infinite/transcendental,
otherwise as you noted the "completeness" would be
merely a partial account, and incomplete.


Physics already knows by now that it can't be
merely a particle theory, or merely discrete.

And, the infinitary introduces itself with
any change at all and all the infinitely-many
higher orders of acceleration, with regards to
any observable, mostly infinitesimal, yet
resulting "real analytical character", the
real analysis the measurable magnitudes.

So, the classical as real is only after
all the potentialistic as really real
and it's a continuum mechanics, with
for example a one-world hypothesis and
a clock hypothesis, of a modal model at all.


Or, one may readily find contradictions of
any otherwise merely partial half-account
talking about the world.


Then, "model theory" is considered by definition
that there's structure in the world at all.
Models are abstract, thusly there are models of
it, then that's equi-interpretable with proof
theory for mathematics and logic, and,
makes for mathematical models the physical models
the mathematical interpretation of the physical
interpretation, for physical theories of
real mathematical physics, of the real.

Naturally, ....

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#640673 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

Am Dienstag000011, 11.11.2025 um 18:33 schrieb Ross Finlayson:
> On 11/10/2025 11:29 PM, Thomas Heger wrote:
>> Am Montag000010, 10.11.2025 um 18:01 schrieb Ross Finlayson:
>> ...
>>>>> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>>>>> since there aren't any in a real theory,
>>>>> contradictions though automatically
>>>>> make for counterexamples, then about
>>>>> the "analytical bridges",
>>>>> or ponts is what I call them,
>>>>> not the "invincible ignorance".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
>>>>> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> I never even heard of "set theory" until my mid-20's,
>>> of course though "sets" were introduced in 7'th grade
>>> geometry, which was mostly 8'th graders.
>>>
>>> Churchill was the text in the college logic course,
>>> about the same time I started reading Hegel. I found
>>> the de Morgan's rules of direct implication most useful.
>>> I have a copy of it around here. The contrapositive
>>> is considered the only needful rule.
>>
>> Churchill had written about logic?>
>>> So, model theory is defined as there existing a model
>>> meaning there exists a structure, embodying all matters
>>> of relation as they may be, of a theory its objects.
>>>
>>> So, Goedel helps show that _ordinary_ theories like
>>> as after Russell's retro-thesis, can't be consistent
>>> and complete.
>>
>> A model and reality are two distinct entities.
>>
>> Therefore, a model cannot describe reality as reality is, because a
>> model is usually way simpler then even the smallest parts of nature are.
>>
>> So we cannot have both: 'sharpness' of a model and its usability.
>>
>> If the description is quite good, the model will become practically
>> impossible to use. If it should be usable, the model needs to simplify.
>>
>> Also Goedelian 'completeness' is nonsense, because models of any kind
>> can only address some subset of what we could eventually model.
>>
>> TH
>>
>> ...
> 
> How about infinity?
> 
> It's simple enough to have infinity be unbounded, endless,
> yet, deductively it's arrived at the thought experiments
> of Zeno, and it can only be that it's complete infinity,
> to be actual, the motion, continuity.


I have a distinct idea about infinity, which you most likely cannot 
understand.

I personally think, that the universe has more dimensions than what we 
think.

I think, that our perception of some sort of underlying reality is not 
real, but a picture, which we receive from the past.

That picuture is also called 'past light cone'.

We 'cut' the 'real universe' into some sort of observations by being 
somewhere and look at the world from there.

This creates a picture, which we can see in the nicht sky. And what we 
see there is called 'universe', even if that ain't true, because it is 
actually our own past light cone.

That 'real deal' is something that we can see, but only from our own 
perspective.

The underlying reality seems to be a field, which behaves as if it would 
be composed from complex quaternions.

That 'something' is what I call 'spacetime' (of GR).

Now I had written kind of book called 'Structured spacetime' about how I 
think, that observetions could eventually emerge, that look exactly like 
our universe:

https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Ur3_giuk2l439fxUa8QHX4wTDxBEaM6lOlgVUa0cFU4/edit?usp=sharing

Now back to infinity:

This 'real universe' has no time per se, but time is local there only.

Any spot has its own time and that time 'flows' and builds a path, which 
we could call 'worldpath' of that spot.

But we could divert from that path and create a new worldline, which 
bends away from the old one.

Such worldline can curve (a little) and could eventually curve backwards.

Than we would reach a realm, where time flows into the opposite 
direction (compared to the one we started with).

Now: from this would follow, that infinited distances could be traveled, 
even if the universe is actually finite.

...


TH

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#640696 — Re: Halting Problem Solved: Automatic Counter Examples (Re: Not Ross Finlayson: Pioneers Cliff B. Jones)

On 11/12/2025 12:04 AM, Thomas Heger wrote:
> Am Dienstag000011, 11.11.2025 um 18:33 schrieb Ross Finlayson:
>> On 11/10/2025 11:29 PM, Thomas Heger wrote:
>>> Am Montag000010, 10.11.2025 um 18:01 schrieb Ross Finlayson:
>>> ...
>>>>>> I don't go looking for paradoxes,
>>>>>> since there aren't any in a real theory,
>>>>>> contradictions though automatically
>>>>>> make for counterexamples, then about
>>>>>> the "analytical bridges",
>>>>>> or ponts is what I call them,
>>>>>> not the "invincible ignorance".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "A-Theory" is consistent foundationalism,
>>>>>> and complete, yay, even constant and concrete.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I never even heard of "set theory" until my mid-20's,
>>>> of course though "sets" were introduced in 7'th grade
>>>> geometry, which was mostly 8'th graders.
>>>>
>>>> Churchill was the text in the college logic course,
>>>> about the same time I started reading Hegel. I found
>>>> the de Morgan's rules of direct implication most useful.
>>>> I have a copy of it around here. The contrapositive
>>>> is considered the only needful rule.
>>>
>>> Churchill had written about logic?>
>>>> So, model theory is defined as there existing a model
>>>> meaning there exists a structure, embodying all matters
>>>> of relation as they may be, of a theory its objects.
>>>>
>>>> So, Goedel helps show that _ordinary_ theories like
>>>> as after Russell's retro-thesis, can't be consistent
>>>> and complete.
>>>
>>> A model and reality are two distinct entities.
>>>
>>> Therefore, a model cannot describe reality as reality is, because a
>>> model is usually way simpler then even the smallest parts of nature are.
>>>
>>> So we cannot have both: 'sharpness' of a model and its usability.
>>>
>>> If the description is quite good, the model will become practically
>>> impossible to use. If it should be usable, the model needs to simplify.
>>>
>>> Also Goedelian 'completeness' is nonsense, because models of any kind
>>> can only address some subset of what we could eventually model.
>>>
>>> TH
>>>
>>> ...
>>
>> How about infinity?
>>
>> It's simple enough to have infinity be unbounded, endless,
>> yet, deductively it's arrived at the thought experiments
>> of Zeno, and it can only be that it's complete infinity,
>> to be actual, the motion, continuity.
>
>
> I have a distinct idea about infinity, which you most likely cannot
> understand.
>
> I personally think, that the universe has more dimensions than what we
> think.
>
> I think, that our perception of some sort of underlying reality is not
> real, but a picture, which we receive from the past.
>
> That picuture is also called 'past light cone'.
>
> We 'cut' the 'real universe' into some sort of observations by being
> somewhere and look at the world from there.
>
> This creates a picture, which we can see in the nicht sky. And what we
> see there is called 'universe', even if that ain't true, because it is
> actually our own past light cone.
>
> That 'real deal' is something that we can see, but only from our own
> perspective.
>
> The underlying reality seems to be a field, which behaves as if it would
> be composed from complex quaternions.
>
> That 'something' is what I call 'spacetime' (of GR).
>
> Now I had written kind of book called 'Structured spacetime' about how I
> think, that observetions could eventually emerge, that look exactly like
> our universe:
>
> https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1Ur3_giuk2l439fxUa8QHX4wTDxBEaM6lOlgVUa0cFU4/edit?usp=sharing
>
>
> Now back to infinity:
>
> This 'real universe' has no time per se, but time is local there only.
>
> Any spot has its own time and that time 'flows' and builds a path, which
> we could call 'worldpath' of that spot.
>
> But we could divert from that path and create a new worldline, which
> bends away from the old one.
>
> Such worldline can curve (a little) and could eventually curve backwards.
>
> Than we would reach a realm, where time flows into the opposite
> direction (compared to the one we started with).
>
> Now: from this would follow, that infinited distances could be traveled,
> even if the universe is actually finite.
>
> ...
>
>
> TH

I think that one may imagine whatever they may
and that a notion of distinct, absent perspective
is a matter of personal objectivism, then as with
regards to its reality is that that's subjective,
then that "information is free", may be so, and
that "the speed of love" or something like that
abstractly "is" infinite, and that an arbitrary
amount of detail may be suggested by image.

One of those theories has a one-world hypothesis
and a clock hypothesis in effect, to be a "reality".

There's room in it for personal objectivism, though.

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