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Groups > sci.logic > #170812 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2018-01-23 15:17 +0000 |
| Last post | 2018-01-24 17:31 +0000 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 254 — 10 participants |
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Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-23 15:17 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 08:54 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) j4n bur53 <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2018-01-23 18:47 +0100
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) j4n bur53 <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2018-01-23 18:52 +0100
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-23 18:27 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-23 14:30 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-23 23:03 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-23 16:28 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-23 16:31 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-23 17:53 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-23 15:04 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-23 18:13 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 14:20 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-23 22:56 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 18:01 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 16:52 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-23 20:03 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 18:45 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-23 21:53 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-23 21:00 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 18:26 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 19:16 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 19:12 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-24 12:46 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 21:15 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-24 18:44 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-25 08:27 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-25 17:44 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-26 15:22 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 13:25 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:24 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-25 07:48 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-25 17:32 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-26 09:53 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 13:13 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:09 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 16:18 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-24 19:11 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-25 08:37 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 18:17 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-24 12:42 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 21:04 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-25 07:37 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-25 16:53 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-26 09:45 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 09:58 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 18:01 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-29 20:07 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 14:11 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 11:32 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 13:08 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:01 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-24 21:19 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-25 09:42 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-25 18:25 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-26 15:46 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 13:49 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:31 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 16:42 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 12:26 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-30 17:46 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 01:50 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 23:15 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 13:08 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 14:48 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 21:35 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 15:29 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-01 21:38 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-31 18:51 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 16:53 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-02 13:42 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 21:59 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 21:22 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 22:47 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 00:52 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 14:00 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2018-01-31 19:16 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 19:38 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 18:44 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-23 18:46 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 14:35 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-23 23:08 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 18:14 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-23 21:44 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-23 19:01 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 19:07 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-24 08:48 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 19:15 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-24 12:52 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 21:24 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-25 07:58 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-25 17:37 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-26 15:12 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 14:00 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 14:05 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 14:13 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) j4n bur53 <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2018-01-26 23:15 +0100
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 14:28 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 22:28 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 22:18 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 14:17 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-29 20:11 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 17:53 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 22:39 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 13:20 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:21 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 16:25 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-25 09:30 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-25 10:31 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-25 14:08 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-25 14:15 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-01-25 20:28 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-01-25 16:56 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-26 15:49 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 13:50 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:33 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 16:49 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-25 22:20 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-25 22:41 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-26 00:45 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-26 16:28 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 14:30 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 14:34 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 22:31 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 15:43 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-30 17:30 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 20:54 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-30 18:55 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 03:04 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 23:25 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 13:26 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 15:25 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 21:44 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 15:36 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-01 21:41 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2018-01-31 19:23 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 22:29 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 00:45 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 01:19 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 14:14 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 16:09 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 22:25 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 16:27 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-02 13:31 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-31 12:43 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 22:15 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 22:36 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-01 09:13 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 13:50 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-01 19:49 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 17:06 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-01 20:37 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 18:22 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-01 21:56 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 19:21 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 00:35 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-02 11:25 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Alan Smaill <smaill@SPAMinf.ed.ac.uk> - 2018-02-02 16:55 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-02 18:52 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 11:03 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 11:38 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-02 19:41 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 11:48 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 12:18 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 16:24 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 16:31 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 22:57 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-02 01:19 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 22:39 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-02 13:16 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-01-31 00:03 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 10:56 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 15:15 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 16:11 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 22:29 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 16:42 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-02 13:28 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-27 13:08 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 22:57 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 12:03 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-30 17:50 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 01:53 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-30 18:41 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 02:56 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 21:04 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 03:30 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 00:48 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 13:52 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 15:44 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 21:59 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2018-01-31 19:34 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 19:00 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2018-02-02 22:05 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-02 21:57 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2018-02-03 14:43 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 23:16 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 12:12 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 14:43 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 21:14 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 15:30 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 15:35 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 15:41 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 16:01 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 16:06 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 16:24 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 15:51 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 15:44 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-31 19:03 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 16:54 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-02 13:18 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 13:20 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 15:17 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 21:11 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 21:00 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 03:08 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 23:33 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 13:33 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 15:33 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 21:53 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 15:50 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-01 21:54 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 00:41 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) j4n bur53 <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2018-01-26 09:44 +0100
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-01-26 00:47 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-01-26 13:57 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-27 00:22 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-01-27 20:31 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 22:42 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 21:55 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-01-30 17:42 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 01:47 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-30 23:10 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 12:01 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-31 14:40 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-31 21:08 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 09:48 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 08:01 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-01 14:57 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-01 21:08 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-01 17:04 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-01 15:13 -0800
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 14:04 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:43 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 16:50 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 14:10 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 23:45 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-30 10:12 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 16:51 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-01-26 00:06 -0500
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-26 16:12 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-27 12:54 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-01-29 22:59 -0600
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-30 16:06 +0000
Re: Adding a FOPL Provable() Predicate to Propositional Logic (for review) Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-01-24 17:31 +0000
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-01-31 16:09 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <PsOdnRJZQYgRo-_HnZ2dnUU7-WednZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #171494 |
On 1/31/2018 8:14 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 1/30/2018 9:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote: >>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>> On Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 7:54:09 PM UTC-6, >>>> Jim Burns wrote: >>>>> On 1/30/2018 8:30 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>> >>>>>> I can't understand why FOPL was ever created when it is so >>>>>> easy to totally eliminate the restriction to FO. MY HOL is >>>>>> the tiniest little change from FOL and it can express any >>>>>> order of logic from 0 to N. >>>>> >>>>> What you did, expressing the logic, writing things down, is >>>>> the easy part. You haven't gotten started on the harder parts >>>>> yet, it would seem. >>>>> <wiki> >>>>> It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that >>>>> there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of >>>>> provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously >>>>> satisfies these three desired attributes:[4] >>>>> -- (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is >>>>> universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under >>>>> standard semantics. >>>>> -- (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order >>>>> formula, under standard semantics, is provable. >> >>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>> is a proof or not. >>>> >>>> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head of >>>> every pin. >>> >>> You said you didn't understand. I tried to explain. >>> If you don't _want_ to understand, that's different. >>> Go ahead and wallow in your ignorance as long as you like. >>> >>> >>>> I know that the above is necessarily false because I have >>>> analyzed it at a much high level of abstraction that anyone >>>> here is currently capable of. >>> >>> You talk like you think you're an Ascended Master. >>> Will you be founding your own church soon? >>> By "your own" I hope you didn't think I meant >>> "found a church in which you are a _worshipper_ " >>> You would be there to be _worshipped_ of course. >>> >>>> I would redefine the effectiveness differently. >>> >>> <snip> tl;dr >>> >>> If you're not addressing the question of an effective >>> _as we mean it_ proof-checking algorithm, then it really >>> doesn't matter what you end up doing with that letter- >>> sequence e-f-f-e-c-t-i-v-e-n-e-s-s. >>> >>> Do you think "effectiveness" is part of some magic spell, >>> and if you take it away from us, we no longer can perform our >>> secret rituals? If you "redefine effectiveness", then >>> _you're talking about the wrong thing_ >>> >> >>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>> is a proof or not. >> >> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#MakiInfoConcPrec >> >> By the Entscheidungsproblem of a system of symbolic logic is here understood the problem to find an effective method by which, given any expression Q in the notation of the system, it can be determined whether or not Q is provable in the system. (Church 1936b: 41) >> >> So it looks like the way that I was saying it is closer than the way that you were saying it. > > You are confusing two different things. (They are easily confused, so I forgive you.) There is a difference between these problems - > > Is a finite sequence of formulae a proof? This one is asinine because as I already said a proof could contain a centillion extraneous steps. Whether or not a proof exists is the whole point.
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-01-31 22:25 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p4tfou$pb9$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #171534 |
Pete Olcott wrote: > On 1/31/2018 8:14 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >> Pete Olcott wrote: >>> On 1/30/2018 9:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote: >>>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>>> On Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 7:54:09 PM UTC-6, >>>>> Jim Burns wrote: >>>>>> On 1/30/2018 8:30 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> I can't understand why FOPL was ever created when it is so >>>>>>> easy to totally eliminate the restriction to FO. MY HOL is >>>>>>> the tiniest little change from FOL and it can express any >>>>>>> order of logic from 0 to N. >>>>>> >>>>>> What you did, expressing the logic, writing things down, is >>>>>> the easy part. You haven't gotten started on the harder parts >>>>>> yet, it would seem. >>>>>> <wiki> >>>>>> It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that >>>>>> there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of >>>>>> provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously >>>>>> satisfies these three desired attributes:[4] >>>>>> -- (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is >>>>>> universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under >>>>>> standard semantics. >>>>>> -- (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order >>>>>> formula, under standard semantics, is provable. >>> >>>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>>> is a proof or not. >>>>> >>>>> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head of >>>>> every pin. >>>> >>>> You said you didn't understand. I tried to explain. >>>> If you don't _want_ to understand, that's different. >>>> Go ahead and wallow in your ignorance as long as you like. >>>> >>>> >>>>> I know that the above is necessarily false because I have >>>>> analyzed it at a much high level of abstraction that anyone >>>>> here is currently capable of. >>>> >>>> You talk like you think you're an Ascended Master. >>>> Will you be founding your own church soon? >>>> By "your own" I hope you didn't think I meant >>>> "found a church in which you are a _worshipper_ " >>>> You would be there to be _worshipped_ of course. >>>> >>>>> I would redefine the effectiveness differently. >>>> >>>> <snip> tl;dr >>>> >>>> If you're not addressing the question of an effective >>>> _as we mean it_ proof-checking algorithm, then it really >>>> doesn't matter what you end up doing with that letter- >>>> sequence e-f-f-e-c-t-i-v-e-n-e-s-s. >>>> >>>> Do you think "effectiveness" is part of some magic spell, >>>> and if you take it away from us, we no longer can perform our >>>> secret rituals? If you "redefine effectiveness", then >>>> _you're talking about the wrong thing_ >>>> >>> >>>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>>> is a proof or not. >>> >>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#MakiInfoConcPrec >>> >>> By the Entscheidungsproblem of a system of symbolic logic is here >>> understood the problem to find an effective method by which, given >>> any expression Q in the notation of the system, it can be determined >>> whether or not Q is provable in the system. (Church 1936b: 41) >>> >>> So it looks like the way that I was saying it is closer than the way >>> that you were saying it. >> >> You are confusing two different things. (They are easily confused, so >> I forgive you.) There is a difference between these problems - >> >> Is a finite sequence of formulae a proof? > > This one is asinine because as I already said a proof could contain a > centillion extraneous steps. > > Whether or not a proof exists is the whole point. Clearly you didn't read what I wrote. Nor are you obliged to. But what puzzles me is why you respond to posts that you don't read. The not reading I understand: you think you're a genius and can't learn from us dullards. But why respond?
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 16:27 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <OOydndCuZPepCe7HnZ2dnUU7-RfNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #171538 |
On 1/31/2018 4:25 PM, Peter Percival wrote: > Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 1/31/2018 8:14 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>> On 1/30/2018 9:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote: >>>>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>>>> On Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 7:54:09 PM UTC-6, >>>>>> Jim Burns wrote: >>>>>>> On 1/30/2018 8:30 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>>> I can't understand why FOPL was ever created when it is so >>>>>>>> easy to totally eliminate the restriction to FO. MY HOL is >>>>>>>> the tiniest little change from FOL and it can express any >>>>>>>> order of logic from 0 to N. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What you did, expressing the logic, writing things down, is >>>>>>> the easy part. You haven't gotten started on the harder parts >>>>>>> yet, it would seem. >>>>>>> <wiki> >>>>>>> It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that >>>>>>> there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of >>>>>>> provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously >>>>>>> satisfies these three desired attributes:[4] >>>>>>> -- (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is >>>>>>> universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under >>>>>>> standard semantics. >>>>>>> -- (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order >>>>>>> formula, under standard semantics, is provable. >>>> >>>>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>>>> is a proof or not. >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head of >>>>>> every pin. >>>>> >>>>> You said you didn't understand. I tried to explain. >>>>> If you don't _want_ to understand, that's different. >>>>> Go ahead and wallow in your ignorance as long as you like. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I know that the above is necessarily false because I have >>>>>> analyzed it at a much high level of abstraction that anyone >>>>>> here is currently capable of. >>>>> >>>>> You talk like you think you're an Ascended Master. >>>>> Will you be founding your own church soon? >>>>> By "your own" I hope you didn't think I meant >>>>> "found a church in which you are a _worshipper_ " >>>>> You would be there to be _worshipped_ of course. >>>>> >>>>>> I would redefine the effectiveness differently. >>>>> >>>>> <snip> tl;dr >>>>> >>>>> If you're not addressing the question of an effective >>>>> _as we mean it_ proof-checking algorithm, then it really >>>>> doesn't matter what you end up doing with that letter- >>>>> sequence e-f-f-e-c-t-i-v-e-n-e-s-s. >>>>> >>>>> Do you think "effectiveness" is part of some magic spell, >>>>> and if you take it away from us, we no longer can perform our >>>>> secret rituals? If you "redefine effectiveness", then >>>>> _you're talking about the wrong thing_ >>>>> >>>> >>>>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>>>> is a proof or not. >>>> >>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#MakiInfoConcPrec >>>> >>>> By the Entscheidungsproblem of a system of symbolic logic is here understood the problem to find an effective method by which, given any expression Q in the notation of the system, it can be determined whether or not Q is provable in the system. (Church 1936b: 41) >>>> >>>> So it looks like the way that I was saying it is closer than the way that you were saying it. >>> >>> You are confusing two different things. (They are easily confused, so I forgive you.) There is a difference between these problems - >>> >>> Is a finite sequence of formulae a proof? >> >> This one is asinine because as I already said a proof could contain a centillion extraneous steps. >> >> Whether or not a proof exists is the whole point. > > Clearly you didn't read what I wrote. Nor are you obliged to. But what puzzles me is why you respond to posts that you don't read. The not reading I understand: you think you're a genius and can't learn from us dullards. But why respond? > I did read your Wiki quote. You made a pretty good point. My counter was there is no practical benefit to validating any arbitrary proof as long as a proof can be either generated or proven to be impossible. -- *∀X True(X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms Provable(Γ, X) *
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-02 13:31 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p51p87$mss$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #171640 |
Pete Olcott wrote: > On 1/31/2018 4:25 PM, Peter Percival wrote: >> Pete Olcott wrote: >>> On 1/31/2018 8:14 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>>> On 1/30/2018 9:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote: >>>>>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>>>>> On Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 7:54:09 PM UTC-6, >>>>>>> Jim Burns wrote: >>>>>>>> On 1/30/2018 8:30 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I can't understand why FOPL was ever created when it is so >>>>>>>>> easy to totally eliminate the restriction to FO. MY HOL is >>>>>>>>> the tiniest little change from FOL and it can express any >>>>>>>>> order of logic from 0 to N. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What you did, expressing the logic, writing things down, is >>>>>>>> the easy part. You haven't gotten started on the harder parts >>>>>>>> yet, it would seem. >>>>>>>> <wiki> >>>>>>>> It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that >>>>>>>> there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of >>>>>>>> provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously >>>>>>>> satisfies these three desired attributes:[4] >>>>>>>> -- (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is >>>>>>>> universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under >>>>>>>> standard semantics. >>>>>>>> -- (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order >>>>>>>> formula, under standard semantics, is provable. >>>>> >>>>>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>>>>> is a proof or not. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head of >>>>>>> every pin. >>>>>> >>>>>> You said you didn't understand. I tried to explain. >>>>>> If you don't _want_ to understand, that's different. >>>>>> Go ahead and wallow in your ignorance as long as you like. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I know that the above is necessarily false because I have >>>>>>> analyzed it at a much high level of abstraction that anyone >>>>>>> here is currently capable of. >>>>>> >>>>>> You talk like you think you're an Ascended Master. >>>>>> Will you be founding your own church soon? >>>>>> By "your own" I hope you didn't think I meant >>>>>> "found a church in which you are a _worshipper_ " >>>>>> You would be there to be _worshipped_ of course. >>>>>> >>>>>>> I would redefine the effectiveness differently. >>>>>> >>>>>> <snip> tl;dr >>>>>> >>>>>> If you're not addressing the question of an effective >>>>>> _as we mean it_ proof-checking algorithm, then it really >>>>>> doesn't matter what you end up doing with that letter- >>>>>> sequence e-f-f-e-c-t-i-v-e-n-e-s-s. >>>>>> >>>>>> Do you think "effectiveness" is part of some magic spell, >>>>>> and if you take it away from us, we no longer can perform our >>>>>> secret rituals? If you "redefine effectiveness", then >>>>>> _you're talking about the wrong thing_ >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>>>>> is a proof or not. >>>>> >>>>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#MakiInfoConcPrec >>>>> >>>>> By the Entscheidungsproblem of a system of symbolic logic is here >>>>> understood the problem to find an effective method by which, given >>>>> any expression Q in the notation of the system, it can be >>>>> determined whether or not Q is provable in the system. (Church >>>>> 1936b: 41) >>>>> >>>>> So it looks like the way that I was saying it is closer than the >>>>> way that you were saying it. >>>> >>>> You are confusing two different things. (They are easily confused, >>>> so I forgive you.) There is a difference between these problems - >>>> >>>> Is a finite sequence of formulae a proof? >>> >>> This one is asinine because as I already said a proof could contain a >>> centillion extraneous steps. >>> >>> Whether or not a proof exists is the whole point. >> >> Clearly you didn't read what I wrote. Nor are you obliged to. But >> what puzzles me is why you respond to posts that you don't read. The >> not reading I understand: you think you're a genius and can't learn >> from us dullards. But why respond? >> > > I did read your Wiki quote. You made a pretty good point. > My counter was there is no practical benefit to validating > any arbitrary proof as long as a proof can be either generated > or proven to be impossible. There is no algorithm for determining, for each formula, what its proof is if it has one, or that it has none.
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-01-31 12:43 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <a999d697-578c-f48e-fcc0-6a9801bc51b2@att.net> |
| In reply to | #171477 |
On 1/31/2018 2:19 AM, Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 1/30/2018 9:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote:
>>> On Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 7:54:09 PM UTC-6,
>>> Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> On 1/30/2018 8:30 PM, peteolcott wrote:
>>>>> *I can't understand* why FOPL was ever created when it is
>>>>> so easy to totally eliminate the restriction to FO.
>>>>> MY HOL is the tiniest little change from FOL and it can
>>>>> express any order of logic from 0 to N.
>>>>
>>>> *What you did* expressing the logic, writing things down,
>>>> *is the easy part* You haven't gotten started on the harder
>>>> parts yet, it would seem.
*emphasis added*
>>>> <wiki>
>>>> It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that
>>>> there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of
>>>> provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously
>>>> satisfies these three desired attributes:[4]
>>>> -- (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is
>>>> universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under
>>>> standard semantics.
>>>> -- (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order
>>>> formula, under standard semantics, is provable.
>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that
>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols
>>>> is a proof or not.
>>>
>>> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head of
>>> every pin.
<PO>
> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head
> of every pin.
>
> I know that the above is necessarily false because I have
> analyzed it at a much high level of abstraction that
> anyone here is currently capable of.
>
> *I would redefine the effectiveness differently*
> Instead I would say that everything True in L is always
> provable in L, and everything False in L is always
> refutable in L.
>
> Instead of requiring any proof (no matter how convoluted)
> to be confirmed we only require that any True conclusion
> can be proven.
>
> I can make it such that no human or machine on Earth can
> possibly add two integers together by simply requiring a
> centillion extraneous steps. It is on this basis that I
> reject the definition of effectiveness.
</PO>
*emphasis added*
>>> I would redefine the effectiveness differently.
>>
>> <snip> tl;dr
<unsnipped above>
>>
>> If you're not addressing the question of an effective
>> _as we mean it_ proof-checking algorithm, then it really
>> doesn't matter what you end up doing with that letter-
>> sequence e-f-f-e-c-t-i-v-e-n-e-s-s.
>>
>> Do you think "effectiveness" is part of some magic spell,
>> and if you take it away from us, we no longer can perform
>> our secret rituals? If you "redefine effectiveness", then
>> _you're talking about the wrong thing_
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#MakiInfoConcPrec
>
> By the Entscheidungsproblem of a system of symbolic logic
> is here understood the problem to find an effective method
> by which, given any expression Q in the notation of the
> system, it can be determined whether or not Q is provable
> in the system. (Church 1936b: 41)
>
> So it looks like the way that I was saying it is closer
> than the way that you were saying it.
So it looks -- again -- like you haven't bothered to read
either the post you're responding to or to read the reference
that you would like to show that you are -- somehow, without
having read -- more right than others.
----
If you want to know why something as easy as defining a
higher-order logic hasn't been leapt upon before you arrived
at the scene, the answer (from Wikipedia) is that such logics
don't have all of the useful properties that have been proven
for first-order logic: soundness, completeness, effectiveness.
Changing the labels for those properties from "soundness",
"completeness", and "effectiveness" does not grant whatever
higher-order logic you are imagining the properties that
previously had those labels.
----
This has _nothing to do_ with what we mean by "effectiveness",
but suppose that everything True in L is always provable in L,
and everything False in L is always refutable in L. Call this
axiom PO.
Also, suppose that there is a provable-in-L predicate
LprovL() in the language of L and a substituted-in-L
function LsubL(,) in the language of L.
*Then, from axiom PO, it follows that L is inconsistent*
We will define Q(x) as the abbreviation of the following
formula with one free (un-quantified) variable x
Q(x) :<-> Ey:( ~LprovL(y) & LsubL(x,x) = y )
Q(x) can be reduced to the language of L.
We will name qx the element in L that would represent Q(x)
for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,)
qx := [Q(x)]
We will name qqx the element in L that would represent Q(qx)
for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,)
qqx := [Q(qx)]
This is a theorem of L:
Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)]
Call it theorem G.
By hypothesis, everything True in L is always provable in L,
and everything False in L is always refutable in L, axiom PO.
(i) Let Q(qx) be True.
By axiom PO, Q(qx) -> LprovL([Q(qx])
By theorem G, Q(qx) -> ~LprovL([Q(qx)])
LprovL([Q(qx)]) & ~LprovL([Q(qx)])
L is inconsistent.
(ii) Let Q(qx) be False, ~Q(qx) be True.
By axiom PO, ~Q(qx) -> LprovL([~Q(qx)])
By theorem G, ~Q(qx) -> Lprovl([Q[qx)])
LprovL[ ~Q(qx) & Q(qx) ]
L is inconsistent.
Therefore, L is inconsistent.
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-01-31 22:15 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <Rd-dnRRH1t3qCe_HnZ2dnUU7-QHNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #171510 |
On 1/31/2018 11:43 AM, Jim Burns wrote: > On 1/31/2018 2:19 AM, Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 1/30/2018 9:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote: >>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>> On Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 7:54:09 PM UTC-6, >>>> Jim Burns wrote: >>>>> On 1/30/2018 8:30 PM, peteolcott wrote: > >>>>>> *I can't understand* why FOPL was ever created when it is >>>>>> so easy to totally eliminate the restriction to FO. >>>>>> MY HOL is the tiniest little change from FOL and it can >>>>>> express any order of logic from 0 to N. >>>>> >>>>> *What you did* expressing the logic, writing things down, >>>>> *is the easy part* You haven't gotten started on the harder >>>>> parts yet, it would seem. > *emphasis added* >>>>> <wiki> >>>>> It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that >>>>> there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of >>>>> provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously >>>>> satisfies these three desired attributes:[4] >>>>> -- (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is >>>>> universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under >>>>> standard semantics. >>>>> -- (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order >>>>> formula, under standard semantics, is provable. >>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>> is a proof or not. >>>> >>>> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head of >>>> every pin. > > <PO> > > Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head > > of every pin. > > > > I know that the above is necessarily false because I have > > analyzed it at a much high level of abstraction that > > anyone here is currently capable of. > > > > *I would redefine the effectiveness differently* > > Instead I would say that everything True in L is always > > provable in L, and everything False in L is always > > refutable in L. > > > > Instead of requiring any proof (no matter how convoluted) > > to be confirmed we only require that any True conclusion > > can be proven. > > > > I can make it such that no human or machine on Earth can > > possibly add two integers together by simply requiring a > > centillion extraneous steps. It is on this basis that I > > reject the definition of effectiveness. > </PO> > *emphasis added* > >>>> I would redefine the effectiveness differently. >>> >>> <snip> tl;dr > <unsnipped above> >>> >>> If you're not addressing the question of an effective >>> _as we mean it_ proof-checking algorithm, then it really >>> doesn't matter what you end up doing with that letter- >>> sequence e-f-f-e-c-t-i-v-e-n-e-s-s. >>> >>> Do you think "effectiveness" is part of some magic spell, >>> and if you take it away from us, we no longer can perform >>> our secret rituals? If you "redefine effectiveness", then >>> _you're talking about the wrong thing_ > >> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#MakiInfoConcPrec >> >> By the Entscheidungsproblem of a system of symbolic logic >> is here understood the problem to find an effective method >> by which, given any expression Q in the notation of the >> system, it can be determined whether or not Q is provable >> in the system. (Church 1936b: 41) >> >> So it looks like the way that I was saying it is closer >> than the way that you were saying it. > > So it looks -- again -- like you haven't bothered to read > either the post you're responding to or to read the reference > that you would like to show that you are -- somehow, without > having read -- more right than others. > Church-Turing is what is meant by effective computation.
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-01-31 22:36 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <b5SdnVKwIYmgBO_HnZ2dnUU7-QfNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #171510 |
On 1/31/2018 11:43 AM, Jim Burns wrote: > On 1/31/2018 2:19 AM, Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 1/30/2018 9:29 PM, Jim Burns wrote: >>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>> On Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 7:54:09 PM UTC-6, >>>> Jim Burns wrote: >>>>> On 1/30/2018 8:30 PM, peteolcott wrote: > >>>>>> *I can't understand* why FOPL was ever created when it is >>>>>> so easy to totally eliminate the restriction to FO. >>>>>> MY HOL is the tiniest little change from FOL and it can >>>>>> express any order of logic from 0 to N. >>>>> >>>>> *What you did* expressing the logic, writing things down, >>>>> *is the easy part* You haven't gotten started on the harder >>>>> parts yet, it would seem. > *emphasis added* >>>>> <wiki> >>>>> It is a corollary of Gödel's incompleteness theorem that >>>>> there is no deductive system (that is, no notion of >>>>> provability) for second-order formulas that simultaneously >>>>> satisfies these three desired attributes:[4] >>>>> -- (Soundness) Every provable second-order sentence is >>>>> universally valid, i.e., true in all domains under >>>>> standard semantics. >>>>> -- (Completeness) Every universally valid second-order >>>>> formula, under standard semantics, is provable. >>>>> -- (Effectiveness) There is a proof-checking algorithm that >>>>> can correctly decide whether a given sequence of symbols >>>>> is a proof or not. >>>> >>>> Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head of >>>> every pin. > > <PO> > > Yes and a thousand invisible fairies dance on the head > > of every pin. > > > > I know that the above is necessarily false because I have > > analyzed it at a much high level of abstraction that > > anyone here is currently capable of. > > > > *I would redefine the effectiveness differently* > > Instead I would say that everything True in L is always > > provable in L, and everything False in L is always > > refutable in L. > > > > Instead of requiring any proof (no matter how convoluted) > > to be confirmed we only require that any True conclusion > > can be proven. > > > > I can make it such that no human or machine on Earth can > > possibly add two integers together by simply requiring a > > centillion extraneous steps. It is on this basis that I > > reject the definition of effectiveness. > </PO> > *emphasis added* > >>>> I would redefine the effectiveness differently. >>> >>> <snip> tl;dr > <unsnipped above> >>> >>> If you're not addressing the question of an effective >>> _as we mean it_ proof-checking algorithm, then it really >>> doesn't matter what you end up doing with that letter- >>> sequence e-f-f-e-c-t-i-v-e-n-e-s-s. >>> >>> Do you think "effectiveness" is part of some magic spell, >>> and if you take it away from us, we no longer can perform >>> our secret rituals? If you "redefine effectiveness", then >>> _you're talking about the wrong thing_ > >> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#MakiInfoConcPrec >> >> By the Entscheidungsproblem of a system of symbolic logic >> is here understood the problem to find an effective method >> by which, given any expression Q in the notation of the >> system, it can be determined whether or not Q is provable >> in the system. (Church 1936b: 41) >> >> So it looks like the way that I was saying it is closer >> than the way that you were saying it. > > So it looks -- again -- like you haven't bothered to read > either the post you're responding to or to read the reference > that you would like to show that you are -- somehow, without > having read -- more right than others. > > ---- > If you want to know why something as easy as defining a > higher-order logic hasn't been leapt upon before you arrived > at the scene, the answer (from Wikipedia) is that such logics > don't have all of the useful properties that have been proven > for first-order logic: soundness, completeness, effectiveness. > > Changing the labels for those properties from "soundness", > "completeness", and "effectiveness" does not grant whatever > higher-order logic you are imagining the properties that > previously had those labels. > > ---- > This has _nothing to do_ with what we mean by "effectiveness", > but suppose that everything True in L is always provable in L, > and everything False in L is always refutable in L. Call this > axiom PO. > > Also, suppose that there is a provable-in-L predicate > LprovL() in the language of L and a substituted-in-L > function LsubL(,) in the language of L. > *Then, from axiom PO, it follows that L is inconsistent* > > We will define Q(x) as the abbreviation of the following > formula with one free (un-quantified) variable x > Q(x) :<-> Ey:( ~LprovL(y) & LsubL(x,x) = y ) > Q(x) can be reduced to the language of L. > > We will name qx the element in L that would represent Q(x) > for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,) > qx := [Q(x)] > > We will name qqx the element in L that would represent Q(qx) > for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,) > qqx := [Q(qx)] > > This is a theorem of L: > Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)] > Call it theorem G. > > By hypothesis, everything True in L is always provable in L, > and everything False in L is always refutable in L, axiom PO. > > (i) Let Q(qx) be True. > By axiom PO, Q(qx) -> LprovL([Q(qx]) > By theorem G, Q(qx) -> ~LprovL([Q(qx)]) G is logically incoherent, not merely inconsistent.
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 09:13 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <f3119130-ccea-9d32-813b-8ed0921a6296@att.net> |
| In reply to | #171566 |
On 1/31/2018 11:36 PM, Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 1/31/2018 11:43 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> *I would redefine the effectiveness differently*
>>>>> Instead I would say that everything True in L is
>>>>> always provable in L, and everything False in L is
>>>>> always refutable in L.
>> ----
>> This has _nothing to do_ with what we mean by
>> "effectiveness", but suppose that everything True in L
>> is always provable in L, and everything False in L is
>> always refutable in L. Call this axiom PO.
>>
>> Also, suppose that there is a provable-in-L predicate
>> LprovL() in the language of L and a substituted-in-L
>> function LsubL(,) in the language of L.
>> *Then, from axiom PO, it follows that L is inconsistent*
>>
>> We will define Q(x) as the abbreviation of the following
>> formula with one free (un-quantified) variable x
>> Q(x) :<-> Ey:( ~LprovL(y) & LsubL(x,x) = y )
>> Q(x) can be reduced to the language of L.
>>
>> We will name qx the element in L that would represent Q(x)
>> for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,)
>> qx := [Q(x)]
>>
>> We will name qqx the element in L that would represent Q(qx)
>> for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,)
>> qqx := [Q(qx)]
>>
>> This is a theorem of L:
>> Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)]
>> Call it theorem G.
>>
>> By hypothesis, everything True in L is always provable in L,
>> and everything False in L is always refutable in L, axiom PO.
>>
>> (i) Let Q(qx) be True.
>> By axiom PO, Q(qx) -> LprovL([Q(qx])
>> By theorem G, Q(qx) -> ~LprovL([Q(qx)])
>
> G is logically incoherent, not merely inconsistent.
There is nothing incoherent about theorem G
Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)]
You have all its definitions available. You could verify
that it's not self-referential, if you wanted to.
Of course, you don't _want_ to verify that. Instead of doing
that, you'll replace it with something else and complain about
_your_ version.
You do this over and over.
Suppose:
-- I claim that there exists a list of all fifty capital cities
of the US states.
-- No, there isn't, you say. Where is the capital of Wyoming?
-- Down toward the bottom.
-- I deleted all that unnecessary detail, you say. I simplified
the list (brilliantly, of course) to the capitals of New York,
Texas, and Rhode Island. I have (brilliantly) made it
obvious that the capital of Wyoming is not in the list.
-- <head explodes>
----
The key insight is that a reasonably expressive language is
able to describe a reasonably expressive language -- even if
that language is itself. We have a box of crayons with which
we are able to draw a box of crayons -- even the box we are
using to draw.
The incompleteness result is just a corollary of that key
insight. Once we show that we can draw our own box of crayons
(and demonstrating the existence of Provable(x) does that)
the syntactically infallible Diagonal Lemma finishes the job.
And _it's a theorem_ . If you merely add an axiom denying a
theorem (apparently, this is your thirty-year-old Great Insight)
you don't get rid of any old theorem, you add new ones. The
result of _that_ is that you've made your theoryinconsistent.
And the result of inconsistency is _everything_ -- including
a proof that cats are goldfish.
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 13:50 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <4dKdnZ3AkPUC8u7HnZ2dnUU7-SfNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #171587 |
On 2/1/2018 8:13 AM, Jim Burns wrote: > On 1/31/2018 11:36 PM, Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 1/31/2018 11:43 AM, Jim Burns wrote: > >>>>> On 1/30/2018 9:55 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> *I would redefine the effectiveness differently* >>>>>> Instead I would say that everything True in L is >>>>>> always provable in L, and everything False in L is >>>>>> always refutable in L. > >>> ---- >>> This has _nothing to do_ with what we mean by >>> "effectiveness", but suppose that everything True in L >>> is always provable in L, and everything False in L is >>> always refutable in L. Call this axiom PO. >>> >>> Also, suppose that there is a provable-in-L predicate >>> LprovL() in the language of L and a substituted-in-L >>> function LsubL(,) in the language of L. >>> *Then, from axiom PO, it follows that L is inconsistent* >>> >>> We will define Q(x) as the abbreviation of the following >>> formula with one free (un-quantified) variable x >>> Q(x) :<-> Ey:( ~LprovL(y) & LsubL(x,x) = y ) >>> Q(x) can be reduced to the language of L. >>> >>> We will name qx the element in L that would represent Q(x) >>> for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,) >>> qx := [Q(x)] >>> >>> We will name qqx the element in L that would represent Q(qx) >>> for the purpose of defining LprovL() and LsubL(,) >>> qqx := [Q(qx)] >>> >>> This is a theorem of L: >>> Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)] >>> Call it theorem G. >>> >>> By hypothesis, everything True in L is always provable in L, >>> and everything False in L is always refutable in L, axiom PO. >>> >>> (i) Let Q(qx) be True. >>> By axiom PO, Q(qx) -> LprovL([Q(qx]) >>> By theorem G, Q(qx) -> ~LprovL([Q(qx)]) >> >> G is logically incoherent, not merely inconsistent. > > There is nothing incoherent about theorem G > Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)] > You have all its definitions available. You could verify > that it's not self-referential, if you wanted to. LP <-> ~True(LP) G <-> ~Provable(G) (Using Saul Kripke's terms) are semantically ungrounded. http://liarparadox.org/Prolog_Detects_Pathological_Self_Reference.pdf equal(X, X). ?- equal(foo(Y), Y). match a term against an uninstantiated subterm of itself LP <-> ~True(LP) G <-> ~Provable(G) Logically_Equivalent(True(LP), LP) Logically_Equivalent(Provable(G), G) http://www.swi-prolog.org/pldoc/man?predicate=acyclic_term/1 acyclic_term(@Term) True if Term does not contain cycles, i.e. can be processed recursively in finite time. See also cyclic_term/1 and section 2.17. acyclic_term(LP)--->FALSE acyclic_term(G)---->FALSE That you continue to ignore the pathological self-reference error does not make this error go away.
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 19:49 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <86a1010f-c15d-eeba-8732-0e05b3aae8ae@att.net> |
| In reply to | #171621 |
On 2/1/2018 2:50 PM, Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 2/1/2018 8:13 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 1/31/2018 11:36 PM, Pete Olcott wrote:
>>> On 1/31/2018 11:43 AM, Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> Q(x) :<-> Ey:( ~LprovL(y) & LsubL(x,x) = y )
>>>> qx := [Q(x)]
>>>> qqx := [Q(qx)]
>>>>
>>>> This is a theorem of L:
>>>> Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)]
>>>> Call it theorem G.
>>> G is logically incoherent, not merely inconsistent.
>>
>> There is nothing incoherent about theorem G
>> Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)]
>> You have all its definitions available. You could verify
>> that it's not self-referential, if you wanted to.
>
> LP <-> ~True(LP)
> G <-> ~Provable(G)
> (Using Saul Kripke's terms) are semantically ungrounded.
> http://liarparadox.org/Prolog_Detects_Pathological_Self_Reference.pdf
You did it again. You replaced what *I* am talking about
with something *you* defined poorly and then you complained
about how what *I* am talking about is poorly defined.
Don't give me any more of this bullshit about this stuff being
too hard to understand. Your complaint is about semantic loops
that _you_ put in there. "Being hard to understand" is no
excuse for you to mess up someone else's work and then
blame them for your screw-up.
Suppose:
-- I claim that there exists a list of all fifty capital cities
of the US states.
-- No, there isn't, you say. Where is the capital of Wyoming?
-- Down toward the bottom.
-- I deleted all that unnecessary detail, you say. I simplified
the list (brilliantly, of course) to the capitals of New York,
Texas, and Rhode Island. I have (brilliantly) made it
obvious that the capital of Wyoming is not in the list.
-- <head explodes>
You shouldn't need someone to do this for you, but I'm tired
of your whining. See below for the *ACYCLIC* graph of the
Forty-Six Definitions in Godel's 1931 paper.
<snip> tl;dr
> That you continue to ignore the pathological self-reference
> error does not make this error go away.
That you continue to lie about what I'm saying does not
make Goedel's incompleteness go away.
--------------------
The Forty-Six Definitions and Their Well-Grounded-Ness
name[2] name[1] listed # << uses #
provable Bew 46 << 45
proofFor B 45 << 44 7 6
isProofFigure Bw 44 << 43 42 7 6
immConseq Fl 43 << 32 15 12
isAxiom Ax 42 << 41 40 39 38 36 34
setAxiom M-Ax 41 << 33
reduAxiom R-Ax 40 << 32 26 23 15 11 10 9 8
quantor2Axiom L2-Ax 39 << 32 26 23 15 14 12
quantor1Axiom L1-Ax 38 << 37 32 31 23 19 15 11
quantor1AxiomCondition Q 37 << 25 24 7 6
propAxiom A-Ax 36 << 35
prop1Axiom A1-Ax 35 << 32 23 14 (see note in paper)
peanoAxiom Z-Ax 34 << (see note in paper)
typeLift Th 33 << 7 6 3
imp Imp 32 << 15 14 13
32 and Con 32 << 15 14 13
equiv Aeq 32 << 15 14 13
exists Ex 32 << 15 14 13
subst Sb 31 << 30 29
subst' Sb0 30 << 28 27
nFreePlaces A 29 << 28 7
freePlace St 28 << 25 7
insert Su 27 << 9 8 7 6 5
free(2) Fr 26 << 25 7
free(3) Fr 25 << 24 23 12 7 6
bound Geb 24 << 23 15 12 8 7
isFm Form 23 << 22 7 6 5
fmSeq FR 22 << 21 20 7 6
op Op 21 << 15 13 14 12
elFm Elf 20 << 19 10 8
stype Typ_n 19 << 18 11 9
stype1 Typ1' 18 << 16 11 9
number Z 17 << 16 9
succ_n N 16 << 9
forall Gen 15 << 10 9 8
or Dis 14 << 10 9 8
not Neg 13 << 10 9 8
isVar Var 12 << 11
vtype Var 11 << 2
paren E 10 << 9 8
seq R 9 <<
o * 8 << 7 6 5
length l 7 << 3
item Gl 6 << 3 1
nthPrime Pr 5 << 4 2
! ! 4 <<
prFactor Pr 3 << 2 1
isPrime Prim 2 << 1
| / <<
[1]
http://jacqkrol.x10.mx/assets/articles/godel-1931.pdf
[2]
https://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf
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| From | grahamcooper7@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 17:06 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <e6a7074f-b1e4-4b41-8003-3bfd8a12a651@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #171665 |
On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 10:49:21 AM UTC+10, Jim Burns wrote: > On 2/1/2018 2:50 PM, Pete Olcott wrote: > > On 2/1/2018 8:13 AM, Jim Burns wrote: > >> On 1/31/2018 11:36 PM, Pete Olcott wrote: > >>> On 1/31/2018 11:43 AM, Jim Burns wrote: > > >>>> Q(x) :<-> Ey:( ~LprovL(y) & LsubL(x,x) = y ) > > >>>> qx := [Q(x)] > > >>>> qqx := [Q(qx)] > >>>> > >>>> This is a theorem of L: > >>>> Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)] > >>>> Call it theorem G. > > >>> G is logically incoherent, not merely inconsistent. > >> > >> There is nothing incoherent about theorem G > >> Q(qx) <-> ~LprovL[Q(qx)] > >> You have all its definitions available. You could verify > >> that it's not self-referential, if you wanted to. > > > > LP <-> ~True(LP) > > G <-> ~Provable(G) > > (Using Saul Kripke's terms) are semantically ungrounded. > > http://liarparadox.org/Prolog_Detects_Pathological_Self_Reference.pdf > > You did it again. You replaced what *I* am talking about > with something *you* defined poorly and then you complained > about how what *I* am talking about is poorly defined. > > Don't give me any more of this bullshit about this stuff being > too hard to understand. Your complaint is about semantic loops > that _you_ put in there. "Being hard to understand" is no > excuse for you to mess up someone else's work and then > blame them for your screw-up. > > Suppose: > -- I claim that there exists a list of all fifty capital cities > of the US states. > -- No, there isn't, you say. Where is the capital of Wyoming? > -- Down toward the bottom. > -- I deleted all that unnecessary detail, you say. I simplified > the list (brilliantly, of course) to the capitals of New York, > Texas, and Rhode Island. I have (brilliantly) made it > obvious that the capital of Wyoming is not in the list. > -- <head explodes> > > You shouldn't need someone to do this for you, but I'm tired > of your whining. See below for the *ACYCLIC* graph of the > Forty-Six Definitions in Godel's 1931 paper. > > <snip> tl;dr > > > That you continue to ignore the pathological self-reference > > error does not make this error go away. > > That you continue to lie about what I'm saying does not > make Goedel's incompleteness go away. > > -------------------- > The Forty-Six Definitions and Their Well-Grounded-Ness > > name[2] name[1] listed # << uses # > > provable Bew 46 << 45 > proofFor B 45 << 44 7 6 > isProofFigure Bw 44 << 43 42 7 6 > immConseq Fl 43 << 32 15 12 > isAxiom Ax 42 << 41 40 39 38 36 34 > setAxiom M-Ax 41 << 33 > reduAxiom R-Ax 40 << 32 26 23 15 11 10 9 8 > quantor2Axiom L2-Ax 39 << 32 26 23 15 14 12 > quantor1Axiom L1-Ax 38 << 37 32 31 23 19 15 11 > quantor1AxiomCondition Q 37 << 25 24 7 6 > propAxiom A-Ax 36 << 35 > prop1Axiom A1-Ax 35 << 32 23 14 (see note in paper) > peanoAxiom Z-Ax 34 << (see note in paper) > typeLift Th 33 << 7 6 3 > imp Imp 32 << 15 14 13 > 32 and Con 32 << 15 14 13 > equiv Aeq 32 << 15 14 13 > exists Ex 32 << 15 14 13 > subst Sb 31 << 30 29 > subst' Sb0 30 << 28 27 > nFreePlaces A 29 << 28 7 > freePlace St 28 << 25 7 > insert Su 27 << 9 8 7 6 5 > free(2) Fr 26 << 25 7 > free(3) Fr 25 << 24 23 12 7 6 > bound Geb 24 << 23 15 12 8 7 > isFm Form 23 << 22 7 6 5 > fmSeq FR 22 << 21 20 7 6 > op Op 21 << 15 13 14 12 > elFm Elf 20 << 19 10 8 > stype Typ_n 19 << 18 11 9 > stype1 Typ1' 18 << 16 11 9 > number Z 17 << 16 9 > succ_n N 16 << 9 > forall Gen 15 << 10 9 8 > or Dis 14 << 10 9 8 > not Neg 13 << 10 9 8 > isVar Var 12 << 11 > vtype Var 11 << 2 > godel didnt write that! Are you seriously claiming there is a LOGICAL DEDUCTION from 25 << 24 23 12 7 6
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 20:37 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <c69643e2-c2b9-4029-b4c3-1f081aa5f922@att.net> |
| In reply to | #171668 |
On 2/1/2018 8:06 PM, grahamcooper7@gmail.com wrote: > On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 10:49:21 AM UTC+10 >, Jim Burns wrote: >> -------------------- >> The Forty-Six Definitions and Their Well-Grounded-Ness >> >> name[2] name[1] listed # << uses # >> >> provable Bew 46 << 45 >> proofFor B 45 << 44 7 6 >> isProofFigure Bw 44 << 43 42 7 6 >> immConseq Fl 43 << 32 15 12 >> isAxiom Ax 42 << 41 40 39 38 36 34 >> setAxiom M-Ax 41 << 33 >> reduAxiom R-Ax 40 << 32 26 23 15 11 10 9 8 >> quantor2Axiom L2-Ax 39 << 32 26 23 15 14 12 >> quantor1Axiom L1-Ax 38 << 37 32 31 23 19 15 11 >> quantor1AxiomCondition Q 37 << 25 24 7 6 >> propAxiom A-Ax 36 << 35 >> prop1Axiom A1-Ax 35 << 32 23 14 (see note in paper) >> peanoAxiom Z-Ax 34 << (see note in paper) >> typeLift Th 33 << 7 6 3 >> imp Imp 32 << 15 14 13 >> 32 and Con 32 << 15 14 13 >> equiv Aeq 32 << 15 14 13 >> exists Ex 32 << 15 14 13 >> subst Sb 31 << 30 29 >> subst' Sb0 30 << 28 27 >> nFreePlaces A 29 << 28 7 >> freePlace St 28 << 25 7 >> insert Su 27 << 9 8 7 6 5 >> free(2) Fr 26 << 25 7 >> free(3) Fr 25 << 24 23 12 7 6 >> bound Geb 24 << 23 15 12 8 7 >> isFm Form 23 << 22 7 6 5 >> fmSeq FR 22 << 21 20 7 6 >> op Op 21 << 15 13 14 12 >> elFm Elf 20 << 19 10 8 >> stype Typ_n 19 << 18 11 9 >> stype1 Typ1' 18 << 16 11 9 >> number Z 17 << 16 9 >> succ_n N 16 << 9 >> forall Gen 15 << 10 9 8 >> or Dis 14 << 10 9 8 >> not Neg 13 << 10 9 8 >> isVar Var 12 << 11 >> vtype Var 11 << 2 >> paren E 10 << 9 8 >> seq R 9 << >> o * 8 << 7 6 5 >> length l 7 << 3 >> item Gl 6 << 3 1 >> nthPrime Pr 5 << 4 2 >> ! ! 4 << >> prFactor Pr 3 << 2 1 >> isPrime Prim 2 << 1 >> | / << >> [1] >> http://jacqkrol.x10.mx/assets/articles/godel-1931.pdf >> [2] >> https://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf > > godel didnt write that! > Are you seriously claiming there is a LOGICAL DEDUCTION from > 25 << 24 23 12 7 6 This is a graph (a list of directed edges from right to left) of the 46 definitions in Godel's paper. This shows that all of the definitions are eventually semantically grounded in _arithmetic_ . For example, definition 25 uses definitions 24, 23, 12, 7, 6 all of them are earlier definitions. And the same for all the rest of them. There are no cycles. The graph of definitions is a tree rooted in arithmetic. ---- The reason that this is relevant is that Peter Olcott keeps claiming that the provably true-but-not-provable sentence G uses pathological self-reference. However, we can see here that, whatever _pathological_ self-reference might be, the definition of G uses _no self-reference_ . What Olcott has been saying is clearly wrong, and in a way that Olcott _should have_ been able to check -- a way he _would have_ checked if he cared anything about truth. Draw your own conclusions about that.
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| From | grahamcooper7@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 18:22 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <a1a5d476-280a-4ff6-9d16-ff0a57515206@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #171677 |
On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:37:49 AM UTC+10, Jim Burns wrote: > On 2/1/2018 8:06 PM, grahamcooper7@gmail.com wrote: > > On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 10:49:21 AM UTC+10 > >, Jim Burns wrote: > > >> -------------------- > >> The Forty-Six Definitions and Their Well-Grounded-Ness > >> > >> name[2] name[1] listed # << uses # > >> > >> provable Bew 46 << 45 > >> proofFor B 45 << 44 7 6 > >> isProofFigure Bw 44 << 43 42 7 6 > >> immConseq Fl 43 << 32 15 12 > >> isAxiom Ax 42 << 41 40 39 38 36 34 > >> setAxiom M-Ax 41 << 33 > >> reduAxiom R-Ax 40 << 32 26 23 15 11 10 9 8 > >> quantor2Axiom L2-Ax 39 << 32 26 23 15 14 12 > >> quantor1Axiom L1-Ax 38 << 37 32 31 23 19 15 11 > >> quantor1AxiomCondition Q 37 << 25 24 7 6 > >> propAxiom A-Ax 36 << 35 > >> prop1Axiom A1-Ax 35 << 32 23 14 (see note in paper) > >> peanoAxiom Z-Ax 34 << (see note in paper) > >> typeLift Th 33 << 7 6 3 > >> imp Imp 32 << 15 14 13 > >> 32 and Con 32 << 15 14 13 > >> equiv Aeq 32 << 15 14 13 > >> exists Ex 32 << 15 14 13 > >> subst Sb 31 << 30 29 > >> subst' Sb0 30 << 28 27 > >> nFreePlaces A 29 << 28 7 > >> freePlace St 28 << 25 7 > >> insert Su 27 << 9 8 7 6 5 > >> free(2) Fr 26 << 25 7 > >> free(3) Fr 25 << 24 23 12 7 6 > >> bound Geb 24 << 23 15 12 8 7 > >> isFm Form 23 << 22 7 6 5 > >> fmSeq FR 22 << 21 20 7 6 > >> op Op 21 << 15 13 14 12 > >> elFm Elf 20 << 19 10 8 > >> stype Typ_n 19 << 18 11 9 > >> stype1 Typ1' 18 << 16 11 9 > >> number Z 17 << 16 9 > >> succ_n N 16 << 9 > >> forall Gen 15 << 10 9 8 > >> or Dis 14 << 10 9 8 > >> not Neg 13 << 10 9 8 > >> isVar Var 12 << 11 > >> vtype Var 11 << 2 > >> paren E 10 << 9 8 > >> seq R 9 << > >> o * 8 << 7 6 5 > >> length l 7 << 3 > >> item Gl 6 << 3 1 > >> nthPrime Pr 5 << 4 2 > >> ! ! 4 << > >> prFactor Pr 3 << 2 1 > >> isPrime Prim 2 << 1 > >> | / << > >> [1] > >> http://jacqkrol.x10.mx/assets/articles/godel-1931.pdf > >> [2] > >> https://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf > > > > godel didnt write that! > > Are you seriously claiming there is a LOGICAL DEDUCTION from > > 25 << 24 23 12 7 6 > > This is a graph (a list of directed edges from right to left) > of the 46 definitions in Godel's paper. This shows that > all of the definitions are eventually semantically grounded > in _arithmetic_ . > > For example, definition 25 uses definitions 24, 23, 12, 7, 6 > all of them are earlier definitions. And the same for all > the rest of them. There are no cycles. The graph of > definitions is a tree rooted in arithmetic. Are you saying A(i) i<=46 AXIOM(Ki) v EXIST( a,b,c...z ) a<i, b<i, ... z<i ( Ka ^ Kb ^ Kc ... Kz ) -> Ki INCLUDING K46 ? THAT WAS STEP 44 > > ---- > The reason that this is relevant is that Peter Olcott keeps > claiming... G is the BONA FIDE self referencing FORMULA in LOGIC! Every GODEL PROOF details HOW TO DO SELF REFERENCE [JIM] the definition of G uses _no self-reference_ . absurd Jim!
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 21:56 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <bb847f02-203a-cd79-27f0-cb7907ac0a11@att.net> |
| In reply to | #171682 |
On 2/1/2018 9:22 PM, grahamcooper7@gmail.com wrote:
> On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:37:49 AM UTC+10,
> Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 2/1/2018 8:06 PM, grahamcooper7@gmail.com wrote:
>>> On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 10:49:21 AM UTC+10
>>> , Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> --------------------
>>>> The Forty-Six Definitions and Their Well-Grounded-Ness
>>>>
>>>> name[2] name[1] listed # << uses #
>>>>
>>>> provable Bew 46 << 45
>>>> proofFor B 45 << 44 7 6
>>>> isProofFigure Bw 44 << 43 42 7 6
>>>> immConseq Fl 43 << 32 15 12
>>>> isAxiom Ax 42 << 41 40 39 38 36 34
>>>> setAxiom M-Ax 41 << 33
>>>> reduAxiom R-Ax 40 << 32 26 23 15 11 10 9 8
>>>> quantor2Axiom L2-Ax 39 << 32 26 23 15 14 12
>>>> quantor1Axiom L1-Ax 38 << 37 32 31 23 19 15 11
>>>> quantor1AxiomCondition Q 37 << 25 24 7 6
>>>> propAxiom A-Ax 36 << 35
>>>> prop1Axiom A1-Ax 35 << 32 23 14 (see note in paper)
>>>> peanoAxiom Z-Ax 34 << (see note in paper)
>>>> typeLift Th 33 << 7 6 3
>>>> imp Imp 32 << 15 14 13
>>>> 32 and Con 32 << 15 14 13
>>>> equiv Aeq 32 << 15 14 13
>>>> exists Ex 32 << 15 14 13
>>>> subst Sb 31 << 30 29
>>>> subst' Sb0 30 << 28 27
>>>> nFreePlaces A 29 << 28 7
>>>> freePlace St 28 << 25 7
>>>> insert Su 27 << 9 8 7 6 5
>>>> free(2) Fr 26 << 25 7
>>>> free(3) Fr 25 << 24 23 12 7 6
>>>> bound Geb 24 << 23 15 12 8 7
>>>> isFm Form 23 << 22 7 6 5
>>>> fmSeq FR 22 << 21 20 7 6
>>>> op Op 21 << 15 13 14 12
>>>> elFm Elf 20 << 19 10 8
>>>> stype Typ_n 19 << 18 11 9
>>>> stype1 Typ1' 18 << 16 11 9
>>>> number Z 17 << 16 9
>>>> succ_n N 16 << 9
>>>> forall Gen 15 << 10 9 8
>>>> or Dis 14 << 10 9 8
>>>> not Neg 13 << 10 9 8
>>>> isVar Var 12 << 11
>>>> vtype Var 11 << 2
>>>> paren E 10 << 9 8
>>>> seq R 9 <<
>>>> o * 8 << 7 6 5
>>>> length l 7 << 3
>>>> item Gl 6 << 3 1
>>>> nthPrime Pr 5 << 4 2
>>>> ! ! 4 <<
>>>> prFactor Pr 3 << 2 1
>>>> isPrime Prim 2 << 1
>>>> | / <<
>>>> [1]
>>>> http://jacqkrol.x10.mx/assets/articles/godel-1931.pdf
>>>> [2]
>>>> https://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf
>>>
>>> godel didnt write that!
>>> Are you seriously claiming there is a LOGICAL DEDUCTION from
>>> 25 << 24 23 12 7 6
>>
>> This is a graph (a list of directed edges from right to left)
>> of the 46 definitions in Godel's paper. This shows that
>> all of the definitions are eventually semantically grounded
>> in _arithmetic_ .
>>
>> For example, definition 25 uses definitions 24, 23, 12, 7, 6
>> all of them are earlier definitions. And the same for all
>> the rest of them. There are no cycles. The graph of
>> definitions is a tree rooted in arithmetic.
>
> Are you saying
No, I'm not saying that.
I'm saying Provable() is defined with arithmetic --
not defined _immediately_ with arithmetic
-- provable(46) uses proofFor(45), length(7), item(6)
-- proofFor(45) uses isProofFigure(44), length(7), item(6)
-- isProofFigure(44) uses immConseq(43), isAxiom(42),
length(7), item(6)
-- immConseq(43) uses exists(32), forall(15), isVar(12)
-- isAxiom(42) uses setAxiom(41), reduAxiom(40),
quantor2Axiom(39), quantor1Axiom(38), propAxiom(36),
peanoAxiom(34)
and so on. Not _immediately_ but _eventually_ all these
defined terms get replaced with lower down terms, and
_eventually_ all we are left with is arithmetic.
> A(i) i<=46
> AXIOM(Ki)
> v
> EXIST( a,b,c...z ) a<i, b<i, ... z<i
> ( Ka ^ Kb ^ Kc ... Kz ) -> Ki
> INCLUDING K46 ?
> THAT WAS STEP 44
>> ----
>> The reason that this is relevant is that Peter
>> Olcott keeps claiming...
>
> G is the BONA FIDE self referencing FORMULA in LOGIC!
> Every GODEL PROOF details HOW TO DO SELF REFERENCE
>
> [JIM]
> the definition of G uses _no self-reference_ .
>
> absurd Jim!
Look at the graph I wrote out. Check it against the 1931
paper, if you don't believe me. It's not like I'm claiming
secret knowledge. It's right out there in the open.
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| From | grahamcooper7@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-01 19:21 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <38af9fea-a61a-43db-8f92-13b2be774f18@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #171684 |
> > > A(i) i<=46 > > AXIOM(Ki) > > v > > EXIST( a,b,c...z ) a<i, b<i, ... z<i > > ( Ka ^ Kb ^ Kc ... Kz ) -> Ki > > INCLUDING K46 ? > > THAT WAS STEP 44 > >> ---- > >> The reason that this is relevant is that Peter > >> Olcott keeps claiming... > > > > G is the BONA FIDE self referencing FORMULA in LOGIC! > > Every GODEL PROOF details HOW TO DO SELF REFERENCE > > > > [JIM] > > the definition of G uses _no self-reference_ . > > > > absurd Jim! > > Look at the graph I wrote out. Check it against the 1931 > paper, if you don't believe me. It's not like I'm claiming > secret knowledge. It's right out there in the open. a few problems with your argument. 1 STEP 44 is provable( <K1,K2...Kn> Kn ) Your suggesting GODELS PROOF ITSELF is formal(izable) but its insufficient to show: K1^K4->K5 as you suggested, Godels steps are not IMPLIED by previous steps but "grounded" by successive pre-defined terms. Writing a DICTIONARY starting with small words first doesn't prove MacBeth actually lived. So Godels Proof remains IN-FORMAL until you provide a Finite Checking Algorithm that LOGICALLY IMPLIES each STEPn from x<n, y<n, STEPx STEPy... conjugated. It must be the 1 algorithm that verifies all successive steps. 2. The fact an INFORMAL PROOF is LINEAR is unrelated to 1 of the formulas within the proof being cyclic. 3. The fact a formula is converted to a number is not basing logic on arithmetic. Godel incorrectly used an infinite logic symbol base. All formulas are numbers when represented alphanumerically to BASE_No.Symbols. 4. Predicate Calculus (AXIOMS OF LOGIC) preceed Peano Arithmetic. Simply writing: EXIST ( 0 ) X + 0 = X .. and formulating ARITHMETIC EXPRESSIONS as a TEST LOGIC THEORY with simple properties is like building a Calculator with COGS and calling "EUREKA EURAKA NUN OF DA MATHS CONTRADICTS YO!"
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| From | bursejan@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-02 00:35 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <bc20bac5-81df-482c-8782-eaca6a2df56b@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #171684 |
Cool! How did you make the graph? You manually
sifting through the proof or from some other source?
Did you notice that Gödels proof is about HOL,
and not FOL. It uses even two higher order axioms:
Eu Av (u(v) <-> a) /* comprehension */
Az (x(z) <-> y(z)) -> x = y /* extensionality */
But then axioms for equality are missing, there
are no axioms such as:
x = x
x = y -> y = x
x = y /\ y = z -> x = z
x = y /\ z(x) -> z(y)
Can they be derived somehow? His type system includes
the following classifiers:
type 1 = i /* individuals */
type 2 = i -> o /* "classes" */
type 3 = (i -> o) -> o /* "classes" of "classes" */
Classes then appear in the definitions, and
are used in reasoning, even p(p) is claimed as
an underivable instance. But effectively he uses
much more types, here are some examples:
succ : i -> i
| : i -> i -> o
Despite all this sloppyness, I guess the proof
would still go through if we would add the
missing pieces.
Am Freitag, 2. Februar 2018 03:56:25 UTC+1 schrieb Jim Burns:
> On 2/1/2018 9:22 PM, grahamcooper7@gmail.com wrote:
> > On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 11:37:49 AM UTC+10,
> > Jim Burns wrote:
> >> On 2/1/2018 8:06 PM, grahamcooper7@gmail.com wrote:
> >>> On Friday, February 2, 2018 at 10:49:21 AM UTC+10
> >>> , Jim Burns wrote:
>
> >>>> --------------------
> >>>> The Forty-Six Definitions and Their Well-Grounded-Ness
> >>>>
> >>>> name[2] name[1] listed # << uses #
> >>>>
> >>>> provable Bew 46 << 45
> >>>> proofFor B 45 << 44 7 6
> >>>> isProofFigure Bw 44 << 43 42 7 6
> >>>> immConseq Fl 43 << 32 15 12
> >>>> isAxiom Ax 42 << 41 40 39 38 36 34
> >>>> setAxiom M-Ax 41 << 33
> >>>> reduAxiom R-Ax 40 << 32 26 23 15 11 10 9 8
> >>>> quantor2Axiom L2-Ax 39 << 32 26 23 15 14 12
> >>>> quantor1Axiom L1-Ax 38 << 37 32 31 23 19 15 11
> >>>> quantor1AxiomCondition Q 37 << 25 24 7 6
> >>>> propAxiom A-Ax 36 << 35
> >>>> prop1Axiom A1-Ax 35 << 32 23 14 (see note in paper)
> >>>> peanoAxiom Z-Ax 34 << (see note in paper)
> >>>> typeLift Th 33 << 7 6 3
> >>>> imp Imp 32 << 15 14 13
> >>>> 32 and Con 32 << 15 14 13
> >>>> equiv Aeq 32 << 15 14 13
> >>>> exists Ex 32 << 15 14 13
> >>>> subst Sb 31 << 30 29
> >>>> subst' Sb0 30 << 28 27
> >>>> nFreePlaces A 29 << 28 7
> >>>> freePlace St 28 << 25 7
> >>>> insert Su 27 << 9 8 7 6 5
> >>>> free(2) Fr 26 << 25 7
> >>>> free(3) Fr 25 << 24 23 12 7 6
> >>>> bound Geb 24 << 23 15 12 8 7
> >>>> isFm Form 23 << 22 7 6 5
> >>>> fmSeq FR 22 << 21 20 7 6
> >>>> op Op 21 << 15 13 14 12
> >>>> elFm Elf 20 << 19 10 8
> >>>> stype Typ_n 19 << 18 11 9
> >>>> stype1 Typ1' 18 << 16 11 9
> >>>> number Z 17 << 16 9
> >>>> succ_n N 16 << 9
> >>>> forall Gen 15 << 10 9 8
> >>>> or Dis 14 << 10 9 8
> >>>> not Neg 13 << 10 9 8
> >>>> isVar Var 12 << 11
> >>>> vtype Var 11 << 2
> >>>> paren E 10 << 9 8
> >>>> seq R 9 <<
> >>>> o * 8 << 7 6 5
> >>>> length l 7 << 3
> >>>> item Gl 6 << 3 1
> >>>> nthPrime Pr 5 << 4 2
> >>>> ! ! 4 <<
> >>>> prFactor Pr 3 << 2 1
> >>>> isPrime Prim 2 << 1
> >>>> | / <<
> >>>> [1]
> >>>> http://jacqkrol.x10.mx/assets/articles/godel-1931.pdf
> >>>> [2]
> >>>> https://www.research.ibm.com/people/h/hirzel/papers/canon00-goedel.pdf
> >>>
> >>> godel didnt write that!
> >>> Are you seriously claiming there is a LOGICAL DEDUCTION from
> >>> 25 << 24 23 12 7 6
> >>
> >> This is a graph (a list of directed edges from right to left)
> >> of the 46 definitions in Godel's paper. This shows that
> >> all of the definitions are eventually semantically grounded
> >> in _arithmetic_ .
> >>
> >> For example, definition 25 uses definitions 24, 23, 12, 7, 6
> >> all of them are earlier definitions. And the same for all
> >> the rest of them. There are no cycles. The graph of
> >> definitions is a tree rooted in arithmetic.
> >
> > Are you saying
>
> No, I'm not saying that.
>
> I'm saying Provable() is defined with arithmetic --
> not defined _immediately_ with arithmetic
> -- provable(46) uses proofFor(45), length(7), item(6)
> -- proofFor(45) uses isProofFigure(44), length(7), item(6)
> -- isProofFigure(44) uses immConseq(43), isAxiom(42),
> length(7), item(6)
> -- immConseq(43) uses exists(32), forall(15), isVar(12)
> -- isAxiom(42) uses setAxiom(41), reduAxiom(40),
> quantor2Axiom(39), quantor1Axiom(38), propAxiom(36),
> peanoAxiom(34)
> and so on. Not _immediately_ but _eventually_ all these
> defined terms get replaced with lower down terms, and
> _eventually_ all we are left with is arithmetic.
>
> > A(i) i<=46
> > AXIOM(Ki)
> > v
> > EXIST( a,b,c...z ) a<i, b<i, ... z<i
> > ( Ka ^ Kb ^ Kc ... Kz ) -> Ki
> > INCLUDING K46 ?
> > THAT WAS STEP 44
> >> ----
> >> The reason that this is relevant is that Peter
> >> Olcott keeps claiming...
> >
> > G is the BONA FIDE self referencing FORMULA in LOGIC!
> > Every GODEL PROOF details HOW TO DO SELF REFERENCE
> >
> > [JIM]
> > the definition of G uses _no self-reference_ .
> >
> > absurd Jim!
>
> Look at the graph I wrote out. Check it against the 1931
> paper, if you don't believe me. It's not like I'm claiming
> secret knowledge. It's right out there in the open.
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-02 11:25 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <04989ce4-0f86-f7b6-f96f-23cc3461d7dc@att.net> |
| In reply to | #171700 |
On 2/2/2018 3:35 AM, bursejan@gmail.com wrote:
> Cool! How did you make the graph? You manually
> sifting through the proof or from some other source?
Thank you. I read through the Forty-Six Definitions in
the (English translation of) the 1932 paper. It's not so
difficult as it might sound. A little tedious, but I was
in no particular hurry.
I thought of doing this way back when Peter Olcott
started(?) to claim that G was self-referential. But it
seemed to me then as though there were easier ways to
make my point. I think I was wrong then on two counts.
It turns out to be easier than other things I have already
done for Peter Olcott. And showing Peter Olcott anything less
than the _full_ graph of definition dependencies is asking
him to trust me that the rest of it is acyclic as well.
I'm not willing to trust him (though I have reasons). Maybe
I shouldn't ask him to trust me.
> Did you notice that Gödels proof is about HOL,
> and not FOL. It uses even two higher order axioms:
Yes, I did notice. :) I don't remember if anyone has
mentioned this to Peter Olcott, who thinks HOL must give
him refutation of Godel.
(I doubt telling him (PO) would make a difference to him.
His reasoning that leads him to use HOL appears to be:
HOL is complicated. I (imaginary PO) will be able to
make claims and it will be too complicated to hold me
accountable for them. Therefore, HOL gives me the
"correct" answer.
He treats HOL (really, _all_ of logic) like technobabble,
like tailfins on starships, so we get to imagine his claim
going SWOOOOSH!)
I think a lovely semantic loop might be seen here. Isn't
this the paper that led us to making the first-order,
second-order, ... , higher-order distinction?
> Eu Av (u(v) <-> a) /* comprehension */
> Az (x(z) <-> y(z)) -> x = y /* extensionality */
Unrestricted comprehension... Is the theory P which Godel
used inconsistent? I know, that would be no disaster for
the result, his proof has been repeated for many other
theories. But it would be weird, and maybe a bit upsetting.
> But then axioms for equality are missing, there
> are no axioms such as:
> x = x
> x = y -> y = x
> x = y /\ y = z -> x = z
> x = y /\ z(x) -> z(y)
> Can they be derived somehow?
I suspect they can be derived.
(For _this_ paper? Of course I suspect that.)
I don't see how to do that right now.
Isn't theory P supposed to be a version of the one in
Principia Mathematics? I would look in PM for hints on
how to do that.
> His type system includes the following classifiers:
> type 1 = i /* individuals */
> type 2 = i -> o /* "classes" */
> type 3 = (i -> o) -> o /* "classes" of "classes" */
> Classes then appear in the definitions, and
> are used in reasoning, even p(p) is claimed as
> an underivable instance. But effectively he uses
> much more types, here are some examples:
> succ : i -> i
> | : i -> i -> o
> Despite all this sloppyness, I guess the proof
> would still go through if we would add the
> missing pieces.
>
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| From | Alan Smaill <smaill@SPAMinf.ed.ac.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-02 16:55 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <fwevaff8h6l.fsf@foxtrot.inf.ed.ac.uk> |
| In reply to | #171715 |
Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> writes: > On 2/2/2018 3:35 AM, bursejan@gmail.com wrote: > ... >> Did you notice that Gödels proof is about HOL, >> and not FOL. It uses even two higher order axioms: > > Yes, I did notice. :) I don't remember if anyone has > mentioned this to Peter Olcott, who thinks HOL must give > him refutation of Godel. ... > I think a lovely semantic loop might be seen here. Isn't > this the paper that led us to making the first-order, > second-order, ... , higher-order distinction? > >> Eu Av (u(v) <-> a) /* comprehension */ >> Az (x(z) <-> y(z)) -> x = y /* extensionality */ > > Unrestricted comprehension... Is the theory P which Godel > used inconsistent? I know, that would be no disaster for > the result, his proof has been repeated for many other > theories. But it would be weird, and maybe a bit upsetting. His proof is about the formal system of Principia Mathematica. These are not axioms that are used inside his proof, though -- I don't see anything higher-order going on in the proof myself. > Isn't theory P supposed to be a version of the one in > Principia Mathematics? I would look in PM for hints on > how to do that. Yes it is. But these are little tricks that make the object theory work, as we'd like, not part of Goedel's own argument, I think. -- Alan Smaill
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-02 18:52 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p52c0i$941$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #171715 |
Jim Burns wrote:
> Isn't
> this the paper that led us to making the first-order,
> second-order, ... , higher-order distinction?
There is a paper by Gregory H. Moore [1] about the emergence of
first-order logic. Do you have ready access to a university library?
Moore claims that Hilbert 1917 and Hilbert & Ackerman 1928 [Eng. trans.
3] makes the distinction between first-order and higher-order logic.
> Isn't theory P supposed to be a version of the one in
> Principia Mathematics?
Gödel writes [Eng. trans. in 4] "/P/ is essentially the system obtained
when the logic of /PM/ is superposed upon the Peano axioms^{16} (with
the numbers as individuals and the successor relation as primitive
notion)." F.n. 16 reads - "The addition of the Peano axioms as well as
all other modifications introduced in the system /PM/, merely serves to
simplify the proof and is dispensable in principle." van Heijenoort
writes "The logical axioms are equivalent to the logic of /Principia
mathematica/ without the ramified theory of types." and he points out
that individuals (= type 1 objects) are identified with natural numbers.
So "without the ramified theory of types" surely means "with the
simple theory of types"! (Wits have been known to call it the
Ramseyfied theory of types.)
[1] Gregory H. Moore, /A house divided against itself: the emergence of
first-order logic as the basis of mathematics/, in [2].
[2] Esther R. Phillips (ed.), /Studies in the history of mathematics/,
MAA, 1987.
[3] David Hilbert, Wilhelm Ackermann, /Principles of Mathematical Logic/.
[4] Jean van Heijenoort, /From Frege to Gödel: a source book.../ Harvard UP.
[5] Nils-Eric Sahlin, /The Philosophy of F. P. Ramsey/, Cambridge UP.
(The pun is not Sahlin's, and long predates his book.)
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| From | bursejan@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-02 11:03 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <62a3f392-e386-40a2-8fea-4e2421474704@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #171715 |
Am Freitag, 2. Februar 2018 17:25:53 UTC+1 schrieb Jim Burns:
> > Eu Av (u(v) <-> a) /* comprehension */
> > Az (x(z) <-> y(z)) -> x = y /* extensionality */
>
> Unrestricted comprehension... Is the theory P which Godel
> used inconsistent? I know, that would be no disaster for
> the result, his proof has been repeated for many other
> theories. But it would be weird, and maybe a bit upsetting.
Well, I guess there is no reason for an alarm.
Recall that in Gödels system all variables are
typed, so they have type 1, type 2 or etc..
So usually they are written as:
x_1, y_2, z_1, etc..
/* check reference [2] */
Where 1, 2, 1, etc.. indicate the type. So the
comprehension axiom is a schema that has its
full expression as follows with indicating
the type level:
Eu_n+1 Av_n (u_n+1(v_n) <-> a)
So the variables range over some small set. Which
exists by means of set theory and hence the comprehension
is not anymore naive, and exists as well viewed
from set theory. What are small sets? Here is my guess:
Small Sets = { P^n(N) | n in N }
Where P^n(N) denotes taking n times the power set.
So we have for example:
type 1 = i /* individuals */ = P^0(N) = N
type 2 = i -> o /* classes */ = P^1(N) = P(N)
type 3 = (i -> o) -> o /* classes of classes */
= P^2(N) = P(P(N))
> > But then axioms for equality are missing, there
> > are no axioms such as:
> > x = x
> > x = y -> y = x
> > x = y /\ y = z -> x = z
> > x = y /\ z(x) -> z(y)
> > Can they be derived somehow?
>
> I suspect they can be derived.
> (For _this_ paper? Of course I suspect that.)
> I don't see how to do that right now.
I am waiting. I am pretty courious how they would
pop up. I even don't remember whether I tried to
do it sometime or have tried to look it up somewhere.
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