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Groups > sci.logic > #164770 > unrolled thread
| Started by | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-10-11 05:37 -0700 |
| Last post | 2017-10-21 00:04 -0700 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 265 — 16 participants |
Back to article view | Back to sci.logic
Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 05:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 10:49 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 09:49 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 14:08 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 12:23 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 15:50 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 18:01 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 21:46 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 20:03 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 22:48 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 21:06 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-12 04:33 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-10-12 06:58 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-13 05:34 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-12 11:36 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-14 18:48 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-14 19:13 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 11:35 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-20 11:53 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:33 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 08:57 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 08:59 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 09:07 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:36 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 09:08 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 09:13 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 23:28 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-12 05:08 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-12 04:36 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-13 19:29 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-14 01:27 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 03:14 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 08:48 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 10:32 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 14:04 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:25 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:43 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 20:17 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 18:59 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 20:14 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 18:58 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 21:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-25 20:47 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-01 19:36 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:35 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 21:00 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:39 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 21:22 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:27 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 22:33 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:28 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 22:39 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 14:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2017-10-16 14:42 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-02 22:11 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-03 20:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-04 10:24 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-05 18:19 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-06 04:03 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-07 22:12 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-11-13 19:51 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-15 20:37 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-03 20:49 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-04 06:48 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-04 08:45 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 12:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 13:01 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-11 09:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 09:31 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-11 10:00 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 23:15 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 11:24 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-12 04:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 20:08 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 02:33 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-13 21:41 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-14 00:32 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-14 21:27 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-16 00:35 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-16 16:53 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-17 02:01 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 03:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-18 01:30 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:35 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-18 16:04 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-19 18:10 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 03:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-21 00:01 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 23:12 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-21 15:31 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-22 04:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-22 21:41 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-23 02:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-23 16:43 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-26 00:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-26 23:32 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-27 02:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-27 03:07 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-27 08:45 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-27 14:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-28 05:00 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-27 22:11 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-28 04:59 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-28 18:24 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-29 07:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-29 15:10 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-30 04:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-30 08:18 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-01 17:43 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-02 18:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-03 03:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-03 11:41 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-17 12:31 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-17 23:29 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-17 17:04 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-17 19:19 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2017-11-18 01:56 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-19 15:04 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2017-11-19 22:56 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-18 02:04 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 08:42 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:30 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 02:08 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-19 09:41 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 13:38 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-20 09:28 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-20 09:33 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Alan Smaill <smaill@SPAMinf.ed.ac.uk> - 2017-11-20 19:47 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-21 05:56 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-21 06:03 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-21 06:18 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-21 07:34 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-21 07:53 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-27 21:10 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:04 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 02:11 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-19 09:43 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 13:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-19 15:14 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 08:36 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-18 08:38 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-18 08:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 08:51 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-18 09:30 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:31 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:19 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-17 21:05 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-19 07:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 04:37 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-19 02:14 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 02:03 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-20 01:18 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-19 01:22 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 04:38 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:09 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-19 01:24 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 01:56 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-19 03:18 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 13:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-19 15:16 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-19 16:24 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-07 16:57 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-07 16:57 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-24 16:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 22:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-26 23:40 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-27 01:07 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-27 11:15 -0400
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-27 16:48 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-22 12:23 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 13:11 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-25 20:38 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-26 00:22 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-13 02:08 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 02:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-13 02:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 03:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-13 03:50 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 13:20 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-14 08:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-14 11:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 11:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-14 12:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 12:50 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-10-14 21:29 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 13:06 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-10-16 20:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 02:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-17 07:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 12:56 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-17 13:20 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-17 20:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-17 21:06 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-17 22:14 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-18 02:53 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-17 22:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-18 02:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:19 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-19 04:43 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-19 05:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-24 22:40 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 22:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-25 10:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 03:14 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 12:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-15 15:19 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-16 16:50 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 02:45 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 13:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:52 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 13:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:53 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-18 21:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:15 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 12:59 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-15 15:23 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-15 15:25 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-17 22:05 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:40 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-18 19:59 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:25 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-19 20:10 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-19 20:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-19 20:36 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-22 13:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 13:27 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 15:09 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 10:58 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:12 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 14:59 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Alan Smaill <smaill@SPAMinf.ed.ac.uk> - 2017-10-23 17:32 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:47 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 16:10 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 15:39 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 10:27 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 15:17 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 15:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 05:23 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 08:33 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 14:43 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 22:40 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 14:58 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-25 13:33 -0400
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-25 20:11 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-02 22:40 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-25 20:31 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-26 05:35 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 15:05 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-20 17:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 23:16 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-20 23:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-21 15:14 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-22 04:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-22 21:42 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 13:48 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-20 23:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-21 00:04 -0700
Page 4 of 14 — ← Prev page 1 2 3 [4] 5 6 … 14 Next page →
| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-13 19:51 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <e7c9d329-81e7-6712-1ff5-11f9d60195d2@att.net> |
| In reply to | #166244 |
On 11/3/2017 9:32 PM, mitch wrote:
> On 11/03/2017 12:11 AM, Rupert wrote:
>> Well, I must say this paragraph caught my eye. Can you
>> tell me a bit more about why you think the
>> arithmetization of the continuum is nonsensical?
>
> Can you tell me where I can go to see 137?
>
> I can witness spatial relations. I cannot witness
> numbers.
>
> And, with respect to spatial relations, I can
> understand numerical difference.
I think that, using your sense of "witness", that there are
a plethora of perfectly uncontroversial theoretical objects
which we cannot witness. Quarks, electrons, the center of the
earth, distant galaxies, our own internal organs (unwitnessed
to a large though not quite total degree).
So, I don't find that a very useful sense of "witness".
It would leave my world very much under-populated by the
theoretical objects that I think we have good reason to
include in our world.
My own sense of "witness" would include whatever we need
to make sense of our world.
(The devil is very much in the details here, but I
think I don't need to say more about that for my
point here.)
In my sense, 137 is an abstract object which is part
of a theory describing countable objects: natural numbers.
It's possible that you could say that I don't understand
137. I'm not quite sure what understanding it would entail.
But I'm kind of used to not understanding things.[1]
Can I use 137 effectively? Yes, I can.
[1]
Two quotes from Richard Feynman. I bumped into the second
while looking for the first. I think the lucky find speaks
to what I mean better than what I went looking for.
I think I can safely say that nobody understands
quantum mechanics.
-- Feynman, chapter 6, "Probability and Uncertainty --
the Quantum Mechanical View of Nature," p. 129
It requires a much higher degree of imagination to
understand the electromagnetic field than to understand
invisible angels. ... I speak of the E and B fields and
wave my arms and you may imagine that I can see them ...
[but] I cannot really make a picture that is even nearly
like the true waves.
-- Feynman, volume II; lecture 20, "Solution of
Maxwell's Equations in Free Space"; section 20-3,
"Scientific imagination"; p. 20-9 to 20-10
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-15 20:37 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <C46dnWyk9YllZJHHnZ2dnUU7-KHNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #166819 |
On 11/13/2017 06:51 PM, Jim Burns wrote: > On 11/3/2017 9:32 PM, mitch wrote: >> On 11/03/2017 12:11 AM, Rupert wrote: > >>> Well, I must say this paragraph caught my eye. Can you >>> tell me a bit more about why you think the >>> arithmetization of the continuum is nonsensical? >> >> Can you tell me where I can go to see 137? >> >> I can witness spatial relations. I cannot witness >> numbers. >> >> And, with respect to spatial relations, I can >> understand numerical difference. > > I think that, using your sense of "witness", that there are > a plethora of perfectly uncontroversial theoretical objects > which we cannot witness. Quarks, electrons, the center of the > earth, distant galaxies, our own internal organs (unwitnessed > to a large though not quite total degree). Yes. I still think that my notion of "witness" and my criticism of "abstract objects" is appropriate. The reason I maintain that is because I have no objections against our best science. But, our best science says that we are evolved biological organisms. The question for me is how to get something for nothing -- or as little as possible. When I began studying implicit definitions as the "immediate principles" of a proof in which other *formalized* stipulations would follow, I sought sentence forms that yielded useful relational properties. I did not begin saying "I am talking about sets" or "I am talking about numbers". I applied what I had been taught about formal axiomatics -- the symbols had no interpretation. So, a sentence like AxAy( x =/= y <-> ( ~( x =/= x ) /\ ( ( ~( x =/= x ) -> y =/= x ) /\ ( y =/= x -> x =/= y ) ) ) ) is of interest to me because it describes a "relation" having properties following from logical structure alone. Of course, I began with intent to describe relations corresponding to those of set theory because I had been taught that set theory was the foundational theory of mathematics. And, I had been surprised to find them so easily (less than a year). When I sought some help with my axiomatizations, Mr. Greene began flaming me immediately. That is when I discovered that one could not approach formal axiomatics as I had done. People had already placed a great deal of "extra-mathematical" import on symbols I had taken to be meaningless. Mr. Greene's flame is what convinced me that I had to read the original sources for the "historical" background Mr. di Egidio complains about. In my own work, I almost found Tarski's axiom AxAy( x = y <-> Ez( x = z /\ z = y ) ) I had already found the set-theoretic relations and had been surveying connectives which might provide similar notions of relations. The only other one that seemed to work had been conjunction. However, I had been thinking of individuation in terms of topological inseparability. So, a definition for identity never even occurred to me. But, I had looked at AxAy( x R y <-> Az( x R z /\ z R y ) ) It would be a mistake to think that I actually deny the usefulness and importance of "abstract objects". I have no particular concern for the ones that are not mathematical. And, I think that the ones which are mathematical ought to be understood as constructively as possible. However, I do not think that obliges me to follow a notion of "constructive" which assumes as many "abstract objects" as "non-constructive" mathematics. Cantor's notions had been constructive and classical. Russell's notions had been constructive and classical. And, I am finding little need or use for Goedel and his platonism. You should not interpret that as degrading the significance of his contributions. It had been the incompleteness theorem that sparked my interest in mathematics. mitch
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-03 20:49 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <DNCdne-YZNUigWDEnZ2dnUU7-WXNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #166195 |
On 11/03/2017 12:11 AM, Rupert wrote: > On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:08:31 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: >> On 10/11/2017 11:49 AM, WM wrote: >>> Am Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2017 17:49:52 UTC+2 schrieb mitch: >>> >>> >>>> Since you like to be such a critic, why not spend a few >>>> paragraphs giving your affirmative views on the nature >>>> of mathematics, the nature of logic, and what relation >>>> might exist between them? >>>> >>> Logic rules mathematics. >> >> I see this differently. Either the two are >> on equal footing, or, mathematics rules logic. >> >> In the latter case, my view is based on concluding >> that the arithmetization of mathematics arising from >> the "crisis in geometry" is nonsensical. So the >> statement could be restated as geometry rules logic. > > Well, I must say this paragraph caught my eye. Can you tell me a bit more about why you think the arithmetization of the continuum is nonsensical? > >>> Here is an important statement: >>> For every n in |N: Every n belongs to a finite initial segment and does neither require nor allow to consider the set |N as actually closed. >> >> I agree to the import of this. >> >> You are generally dismissive of the standard literature >> and formalisms. But, there is a source in which you will >> find what you are criticizing made explicit. >> >> In Chapter 2, Section 3 of "Set Theory" by Drake, there >> is a definition for well-founded relation in which a >> second subformula explicitly assuming the existence of >> the closure is included. >> >> If one demands a witness for this existential statement, >> as does first-order logic, then one is committed to >> a completed infinity. But, there are other interpretations >> for quantifiers. It is easy enough to think of an >> epsilon-delta proof in terms of a game-theoretic >> interpretation, although making this precise might not >> be easy. > > See "Principles of Mathematics Revisited" by Hintikka for game-theoretic semantics for first-order logic and how to generalize this to independence-friendly first-order logic. > I am aware of Hintikka's work. I always have a single motivation, however. So, alternatives like this only become of interest to me in passing. If they seem to have relevance to the continuum hypothesis, I become extremely interested. For example, I have recently learned that inductive definitions and definability are intimately related to admissible set theory. Early in its development, V = L had been significant. But, once it had been rewritten from "first principles", the early motivations are no longer central to the subject. I will eventually sort through the material. But, it will take time. This winter, though, I would like to spend more time with Drake's book. It is very well written. I just have a problem during my work season because I am often too tired to concentrate or cannot dedicate sufficient time for study. mitch
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-04 06:48 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <f8adnfB99fuXNGDEnZ2dnUU7-U3NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #166195 |
On 11/03/2017 12:11 AM, Rupert wrote: > On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:08:31 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: >> On 10/11/2017 11:49 AM, WM wrote: >>> Am Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2017 17:49:52 UTC+2 schrieb mitch: >>> >>> >>>> Since you like to be such a critic, why not spend a few >>>> paragraphs giving your affirmative views on the nature >>>> of mathematics, the nature of logic, and what relation >>>> might exist between them? >>>> >>> Logic rules mathematics. >> >> I see this differently. Either the two are >> on equal footing, or, mathematics rules logic. >> >> In the latter case, my view is based on concluding >> that the arithmetization of mathematics arising from >> the "crisis in geometry" is nonsensical. So the >> statement could be restated as geometry rules logic. > > Well, I must say this paragraph caught my eye. Can you tell me a bit more about why you think the arithmetization of the continuum is nonsensical? > >>> Here is an important statement: >>> For every n in |N: Every n belongs to a finite initial segment and does neither require nor allow to consider the set |N as actually closed. >> >> I agree to the import of this. >> >> You are generally dismissive of the standard literature >> and formalisms. But, there is a source in which you will >> find what you are criticizing made explicit. >> >> In Chapter 2, Section 3 of "Set Theory" by Drake, there >> is a definition for well-founded relation in which a >> second subformula explicitly assuming the existence of >> the closure is included. >> >> If one demands a witness for this existential statement, >> as does first-order logic, then one is committed to >> a completed infinity. But, there are other interpretations >> for quantifiers. It is easy enough to think of an >> epsilon-delta proof in terms of a game-theoretic >> interpretation, although making this precise might not >> be easy. > > See "Principles of Mathematics Revisited" by Hintikka for game-theoretic semantics for first-order logic and how to generalize this to independence-friendly first-order logic. > >> This will never suffice for notions of truth >> that resolve to the Aristotelian concept of individuals >> as primary substance. >> >> Aristotle, himself, held that truth ultimately resides >> with perceptions. By characterizing mathematical logic >> solely in terms of a syntax/semantics distinction, >> philosophers and their logicians have made it difficult >> for many mathematicians to accept their analyses. > > Well, I find this very intriguing, but let's think about what corresponds to a "perception" in the case of mathematical reality (as in the case of physical reality). In "The Provenance of Pure Reason" Tait tries to do an argument along these lines that any argument for skepticism about mathematical objects works just as well for skepticism about physical objects. > I could see that argument working. Kant portrayed mathematics as a basis for objective truth. Basically, mathematics is associated with cognitive abilities. As such, it provides a common ground for communication about shared experience. Thus, physics reflects what is invariant with respect to phenomena as understood through mathematical relations and not what is true about the universe. The problem with being skeptical about physical objects is that gamma rays will still cause radiation sickness. So, one ought to respect the described phenomena even if gamma rays are a fiction. > I was at a panel discussion for a symposium in Boston and Hugh Woodin said "Maybe the anti-infinitarians are right that the concept of an infinite set will prove to be inconsistent, or maybe the single-universe view will prove to be unsustainable. Is there an argument that that won't happen?" > > So I said "I see the universe of sets before my eyes". And he said "Good". > > But I must be joking, mustn't I? Do I really see the universe of sets before my eyes? > > Comparing the phenomenology of mathematical "perception" with the phenomenology of physical perception could be an interesting project. > I would find it terrifying. To the extent that I see any mathematics before my eyes, I am compelled to try and understand it. This has not always been in my best interests. Anyone familiar with my posts will know that I have identified the free Boolean lattice on two generators with the cell topology of the tetrahedron on the basis of its order-theoretic presentation. There is an equivalent of the continuum hypothesis governing a partition of the plane into classes of points between which distances are unique. It is theorem 1 in the survey paper, https://www.math.wisc.edu/~miller/old/m873-05/setplane.pdf by Miller. The result, itself, had been obtained by Davies. If you read the abstract of Davies paper, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/mathematical-proceedings-of-the-cambridge-philosophical-society/article/partitioning-the-plane-into-denumerably-many-sets-without-repeated-distances/E75C1675C975ECCA2FCD764B353A3FF7 you will see that the result is actually presented in terms of planar tetrahedra. The first time I recognized that tetrahedral symmetries might be related to logical forms had been in 2003. I had actually posted about the symmetries of a cube for which a response by Mr. Greene still has a link, http://mathforum.org/kb/message.jspa?messageID=531455 The two are related because a cube can circumscribe two tetrahedra. The more important posting had been the day before. It had been an observation about the incidence matrix of a trivial affine plane, http://mathforum.org/kb/servlet/JiveServlet/download/13-104007-531277-12010/att1.dat The incidence matrix for a tetrahedron is the same. This work has led to a more general investigation of relations on a 16-set derived from 6-sets labeled by a seventh element. So, a pair of tetrahedra circumscribed by a cube has been replaced by a pair of (16,6,2) designs related to each other by using a third (16,6,2) design corresponding with the Galois field. I would later learn that there are only three such block designs, https://www.emis.de/journals/HOA/IJMMS/Volume2_2/281.pdf https://ac.els-cdn.com/0012365X84900694/1-s2.0-0012365X84900694-main.pdf?_tid=8aedb14a-c14f-11e7-b687-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1509793483_00bf654adfaed1863662e9509dbe5cf6 I do not know why I see the mathematical relations that I do. I accept a statement like yours precisely because of my own experience. But, I cannot view my experience as anything comparable to physical perception. mitch
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-04 08:45 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <XqCdnccsUYP2WWDEnZ2dnUU7-IHNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #166195 |
On 11/03/2017 12:11 AM, Rupert wrote: > On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 9:08:31 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: >> Because I have no problem "trusting" topology, I am >> more inclined to view natural numbers with Gauss as >> a system of aliquot and aliquant parts. I can write >> a theory on that basis. > > Can you? Have you showed me? Maybe email it to me at rupertmccallum@yahoo.com? Although I deeply regret that I am looking for a job at the moment and so will struggle to find the time to do other stuff. > I will send it to you. Do not spend much time on it. At the moment it is just a TeX listing of formal sentences, and, there is nothing simple about them. I have not worked on it for several years. The implicit/inductive definitions need to have companions written that support substitutivity as I have done with my set-theoretic sentences. And, I had only just begun to use Tarski's axiom for a non-eliminable identity. So, it is far from meeting the aesthetic which I would eventually hope to achieve. The system is based on a toy model I used to verify that my set-theoretic sentences had a model. The sentence, AxAy( x < y <-> ( Az( y < z -> x < z ) /\ Ez( x < z /\ ~( y < z ) ) ) ) is interpreted as describing "proper divisor" instead of "proper subset" or "proper part". So, let it be rewritten as AxAy( x |_p y <-> ( Az( y |_p z -> x |_p z ) /\ Ez( x |_p z /\ ~( y |_p z ) ) ) ) The sentence that had been used for "membership" is altered and interpreted as describing an "atomic divisor" which corresponds to the unit element or a prime. AxAy( x |_a y <-> ( Az( y |_p z -> x |_a z ) /\ Az( z |_p x -> Aw( z |_a w ) ) ) ) The second subformula says that any proper divisor of an atomic divisor is universally an atomic divisor. After that it gets quite complicated. Successor relations for each atomic divisor are stipulated. Addition relations for each atomic divisor are stipulated. And difference relations for each atomic divisor are stipulated. Proper division and differences are used to ground identity criteria. Then axioms are introduced aligning the relations so that every element falls within unit succession. It still needs a great deal of work and I am certain there are errors. >> By contrast, both Skolem and >> Brouwer would have me "believe" in natural numbers >> outside of a theory and counted one at a time. > > I always thought Brouwer conceived of them as human mental constructions. Although I'm interested in your analogy with physical perception I'm a bit puzzled about what the ontology is meant to be for you. > You are probably correct here. But Brouwer did have to change his original ideas to get free choice sequences. Perhaps my statement should have made reference to Heyting instead. My actual point goes back to the characterization of mathematics as being within formal axiomatics. If you want to talk to me about mathematical objects beyond the scope of those theories I see little difference between that and religion. Skolem's introduction of primitive recursive arithmetic is available in van Heijenoort. He is clear about taking natural numbers and succession as given. He is also clear about rejecting quantificational logic except where it can be eliminated with respect to taking natural numbers and succession as given. So, where does Skolem send anyone to see a natural number? I recently purchased Heyting's book on intuitionism because I had been trying to trace the introduction of a formula for apartness through bibliographic references. Well, intuitionism takes natural numbers for granted. Even more, spreads are based upon the Baire space. So, where does Heyting send anyone to see a natural number? In Tyler Burge's "Truth and singular terms" you have the following discussion of Pegasus, < begin quote > When native speakers are asked whether 'Pegasus is winged' is true, they rely upon common knowledge and contextual clues to determine what the questioner intends. It is now common knowledge among people who use 'Pegasus' in the relevant contexts that the name is part of, and is meant to be related to, a mythical story. The prefix to the sentence that we provided above will generally be accepted as providing a paraphrase. But if asked whether the myth is true -- whether it is a matter of fact (rather than a matter of fiction) that Pegasus is winged -- native speakers will reply that the sentence is not literally or 'factually' true. I take this behavior as evidence for embedding the sentence in an intensional context when it is regarded as true. Nondenoting singular terms simply do not have anything as their "ordinary" (nonoblique) denotation. < end quote > I probably would never have been led to question mathematical practice along these lines had it not been for the continuum hypothesis and how it is understood to be independent. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory has no proper classes. They are non-existent with respect to the mathematics. I do not see a compelling reason to accept the result, although I have no compelling justification to think otherwise. mitch
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| From | George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-14 12:51 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <f650c004-b615-42e7-9730-f3d9bad46ba4@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164789 |
On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 12:49:10 PM UTC-4, WM wrote: > Logic rules mathematics. Not in YOUR opinion. Otherwise, you would be willing TO USE it when talking about mathematics. > Here is an important statement: > For every n in |N: Every n belongs to a finite initial segment Of course > and does neither require nor allow to consider the set |N as actually closed. That statement is NOT important. It is also not coherent. It is also not mathematically. YOU CANNOT DEFINED whether any purported "set" is or is not "actually closed". You are NOT SAYING ANYthing.
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-15 13:01 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <996c7caa-e2d5-412d-b6ff-3c741f09b85a@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165022 |
Am Samstag, 14. Oktober 2017 21:51:45 UTC+2 schrieb George Greene: > On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 12:49:10 PM UTC-4, WM wrote: > > Here is an important statement: > > For every n in |N: Every n belongs to a finite initial segment > > Of course > > > and does neither require nor allow to consider the set |N as actually closed. > > That statement is NOT important. It is also not coherent. It is also not mathematically. It is all of that. > YOU CANNOT DEFINED whether any purported "set" is or is not "actually closed". I do not define it. I prove that for every natural number the set is not actually infinite. More is neither required nor possible. Regards, WM
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| From | shionoro@googlemail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 09:04 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <771bb306-95ba-457d-8e32-a028aed8d07c@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164770 |
On Wednesday, 11 October 2017 14:37:32 UTC+2, WM wrote: > - Axiom of well-ordering: Every set can be well-ordered. (This axiom is not constructive. In most cases provably no set theoretic definition of a well-order can be found.) > > - Axiom of three points on a line: Every triple of points belongs to a straight line. (But in most cases provably no geometrical construction can be given.) > > - Axiom of ten even primes: There are 10 even prime numbers. (But provably no arithmetical method to find them is available.) > > - Axiom of prime number triples: There is a second triple of prime numbers besides (3, 5, 7). (But provably this second triple is not arithmetically definable.) > > - Axiom of meagre sum (AMS): There is a set of n different positive natural numbers with sum n*n/2. (This axiom is not constructive. Provably no such set can be found.) > > - Axiom of ultimate mathematics simplification: All mathematical problems are solved by whatever I declare as the solution. (This axiom is guaranteed not less useful than the axiom of choice.) > > Regards, WM You didn't understand what an axiom is. The point about choice is that choice cannot be disproven, thus we can assume it as true without coming to a contradiction. However it is proveable that there are no even prime numbers except 2, so having this as an axiom would lead to a contradictory axiom system, which choice does NOT.
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 09:31 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <04cbb6ba-b108-4929-a9b7-fada5768ed52@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164786 |
Am Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2017 18:04:43 UTC+2 schrieb shio...@googlemail.com: > The point about choice is that choice cannot be disproven, In fact it cannot be disproven since there is nothing uncountable. But if there was an uncountable set, then its elements could not be counted. Is that clear so far? > thus we can assume it as true without coming to a contradiction. A contradiction would exist for uncopuntable sets because to one cannot choose what cannot be counted. > > However it is proveable that there are no even prime numbers except 2, so having this as an axiom would lead to a contradictory axiom system, which choice does NOT. It is provable that objects that have no material existence cannot be dealt with other than by labelling them. Alas there are only countably many labels. Of course that is a contradiction as already Cantor recognized: "Infinite definitions" (that do not happen in finite time) are non-things (Undinge). If König's theorem was true, according to which all "finitely definable" real numbers form a set of cardinality 0, this would imply that the whole continuum was countable [G. Cantor, letter to D. Hilbert (8 Aug 1906)] But set theory has blocked set theorists, even intelligent one, so strongly that they cannot dare to think of a contradiction and remain blind in this respect. Reggards, WM
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| From | shionoro@googlemail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 10:00 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <3206aeb5-4d43-4c22-90fe-e9c0dcef809a@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164787 |
> > The point about choice is that choice cannot be disproven, > > In fact it cannot be disproven since there is nothing uncountable. But if there was an uncountable set, then its elements could not be counted. Is that clear so far? There are uncountable sets, we have been over that. i doN#t think you will accept that, but it is not important for this matter. What is proven is that choice does not contradict the other axioms. > > > thus we can assume it as true without coming to a contradiction. > > A contradiction would exist for uncopuntable sets because to one cannot choose what cannot be counted. No. Simply no. There are uncountable sets and they do not contradict with choice in any way. > > However it is proveable that there are no even prime numbers except 2, so having this as an axiom would lead to a contradictory axiom system, which choice does NOT. > > It is provable that objects that have no material existence cannot be dealt with other than by labelling them. Alas there are only countably many labels. Your statement is not a mathematical one, so you miss the point. Fact is: Your other 'axioms' contradict the axiom system ZF, while choice does not. > Of course that is a contradiction as already Cantor recognized: "Infinite definitions" (that do not happen in finite time) are non-things (Undinge). If König's theorem was true, according to which all "finitely definable" real numbers form a set of cardinality 0, this would imply that the whole continuum was countable [G. Cantor, letter to D. Hilbert (8 Aug 1906)] > Once again, quoting old works of mathematicians who usually use other definitions entirely is a moot point and does not get you anywhere. Cantor does not agree with what you are saying. > But set theory has blocked set theorists, even intelligent one, so strongly that they cannot dare to think of a contradiction and remain blind in this respect. > > Reggards, WM
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 23:15 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <e612b5f5-409b-40b4-8104-4e17cdd8c640@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164790 |
Am Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2017 19:00:33 UTC+2 schrieb shio...@googlemail.com: > > > The point about choice is that choice cannot be disproven, > > > > In fact it cannot be disproven since there is nothing uncountable. But if there was an uncountable set, then its elements could not be counted. Is that clear so far? > > There are uncountable sets, we have been over that. There are not uncountably many paths in the Binary Tree that can be constructed by nodes: "If all nodes of a path have been deleted, that does not mean you ever deleted the path!!! You could delete all and only the finite paths from the tree, and that would delete all the nodes, yet you would never have deleted any infinite path, and they would all still exist in any case, regardless of what had been deleted! [George Greene, sci logic (22 Jul 2016)] "You seem to be ignoring the fact that, after you have colored a countable family of pathes, say P0, P1, …, Pn,…, there may be other paths Q that are not on this countable list but have, nevertheless, had all their nodes and edges colored. Perhaps the first node and edge of Q were also in P1, the second node and edge of Q were in P2, etc. [...] by choosing the sequence of Pn's intelligently, you can, in fact, ensure that this sort of thing happens for every path Q." [Andreas Blass, MathOverflow (3 Jul 2013)] It simply is impossible to give all sets in a constructive way ... and any theory, founded on this assumption, would by no means be a theory of sets. [E. Zermelo, letter to E. Artin (?) (25 May 1930)] > i doN#t think you will accept that, Nobody who can think should accept that. > but it is not important for this matter. Therefore this matter rapes, besnirches and finally tries to kill mathematics, > > A contradiction would exist for uncountable sets because to one cannot choose what cannot be counted. > > No. Simply no. Yes, simply yes, because all your possible choices belong to a countable set. > There are uncountable sets and they do not contradict with choice in any way. That's the claim of some matheologians, but no sober mind will accept this. I explain it to my students in this simple way: You choose a thought object by thinking of a name, picture, whatever. But all names, pictures, whatevers belong to a countable set. Everybody not saying so is stupid or cheating. > > Fact is: Your other 'axioms' contradict the axiom system ZF, while choice does not. Why should an unfindable even prime number be a harder contradiction than an undefinable well-order? > > > > Of course that is a contradiction as already Cantor recognized: "Infinite definitions" (that do not happen in finite time) are non-things (Undinge). If König's theorem was true, according to which all "finitely definable" real numbers form a set of cardinality 0, this would imply that the whole continuum was countable [G. Cantor, letter to D. Hilbert (8 Aug 1906)] > > > > Once again, quoting old works of mathematicians who usually use other definitions entirely is a moot point and does not get you anywhere. > Cantor does not agree with what you are saying. But we know that his disagreement is resting on a false premise. Regards, WM
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 11:24 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87a80wll3f.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164846 |
WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > Am Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2017 19:00:33 UTC+2 schrieb shio...@googlemail.com: >> > > The point about choice is that choice cannot be disproven, >> > >> > In fact it cannot be disproven since there is nothing >> > uncountable. But if there was an uncountable set, then its elements >> > could not be counted. Is that clear so far? >> >> There are uncountable sets, we have been over that. > > There are not uncountably many paths in the Binary Tree that can be > constructed by nodes: It would be a great coup for you if you could write out the bijection from N to the paths in the binary tree[1]. Since only things with finite definitions exist in WMaths it will have a finite definition. Can you write it down? [1] Obviously I mean in "your" binary tree -- the one that "can be constructed by nodes". It looks the same as everyone else's binary tree but your favourite game is to play with words rather than mathematics and I want to avoid that so I'm only asking about your binary tree. <snip> -- Ben.
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 04:44 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <829b8a83-b9df-41bb-98f3-15f9d3bc7fd5@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164852 |
Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 12:24:55 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > > > Am Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2017 19:00:33 UTC+2 schrieb shio...@googlemail.com: > >> > > The point about choice is that choice cannot be disproven, > >> > > >> > In fact it cannot be disproven since there is nothing > >> > uncountable. But if there was an uncountable set, then its elements > >> > could not be counted. Is that clear so far? > >> > >> There are uncountable sets, we have been over that. > > > > There are not uncountably many paths in the Binary Tree that can be > > constructed by nodes: > > It would be a great coup for you if you could write out the bijection > from N to the paths in the binary tree[1]. Map every finite path on its last node. Understand that real numbers are simply limits. > Since only things with > finite definitions exist in true mathematics > [1] Obviously I mean in "your" binary tree -- the one that "can be > constructed by nodes". Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. In my humble opinion the following statements "If all nodes of a path have been deleted, that does not mean you ever deleted the path!!! You could delete all and only the finite paths from the tree, and that would delete all the nodes, yet you would never have deleted any infinite path, and they would all still exist in any case, regardless of what had been deleted! [George Greene, sci logic (22 Jul 2016)] "You seem to be ignoring the fact that, after you have colored a countable family of pathes, say P0, P1, …, Pn,…, there may be other paths Q that are not on this countable list but have, nevertheless, had all their nodes and edges colored. Perhaps the first node and edge of Q were also in P1, the second node and edge of Q were in P2, etc. [...] by choosing the sequence of Pn's intelligently, you can, in fact, ensure that this sort of thing happens for every path Q." [Andreas Blass, MathOverflow (3 Jul 2013)] It simply is impossible to give all sets in a constructive way ... and any theory, founded on this assumption, would by no means be a theory of sets. [E. Zermelo, letter to E. Artin (?) (25 May 1930)] are the summit of matheology. I cannot recommend to share those opinions. They rape, besmirch and finally try to kill mathematics. Regards, WM
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 20:08 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87y3ogi3p3.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164857 |
WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 12:24:55 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: >> WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: >> >> > Am Mittwoch, 11. Oktober 2017 19:00:33 UTC+2 schrieb shio...@googlemail.com: >> >> > > The point about choice is that choice cannot be disproven, >> >> > >> >> > In fact it cannot be disproven since there is nothing >> >> > uncountable. But if there was an uncountable set, then its elements >> >> > could not be counted. Is that clear so far? >> >> >> >> There are uncountable sets, we have been over that. >> > >> > There are not uncountably many paths in the Binary Tree that can be >> > constructed by nodes: >> >> It would be a great coup for you if you could write out the bijection >> from N to the paths in the binary tree[1]. > > Map every finite path on its last node. Understand that real numbers > are simply limits. What is the last node on the left? Is the left-hand edge not a path? I have to ask because anything is possible in WMaths. <snip> > Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that > by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. The left-hand edge is constructed by nodes. It is not in the image of your bijection. <snip> -- Ben.
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-13 02:33 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <17a32e69-1426-4c43-84d4-78cd24edd5f1@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164867 |
Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 21:08:59 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > > Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that > > by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. > > The left-hand edge is constructed by nodes. It is not in the image of > your bijection. Most paths are not in the bijection because they cannot be defined. In order to distinguish path A from n paths P1, P2, ..., Pn we need n nodes. It cannot be excluded, that one node a of A is sufficient, to distinguish A from all P1, P2, ..., Pn, but these are not n different paths unless there are nodes that distinguish P1 from P2 to Pn, and P2 from P3 to Pn and so on. In total n - 1 nodes are required to distinguish n paths P1, P2, ..., Pn. Regards, WM
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-13 21:41 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87vajig4q6.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164903 |
WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 21:08:59 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > >> > Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that >> > by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. >> >> The left-hand edge is constructed by nodes. It is not in the image of >> your bijection. > > Most paths are not in the bijection because they cannot be defined. I just defined a path not in your supposed bijection: the left-hand edge. It is defined by nodes -- those that are powers of 2. <snip> -- Ben.
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-14 00:32 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <1173cee3-3233-427a-89d2-7d681d39e900@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164947 |
Am Freitag, 13. Oktober 2017 22:41:55 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > > > Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 21:08:59 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > > > >> > Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that > >> > by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. > >> > >> The left-hand edge is constructed by nodes. It is not in the image of > >> your bijection. > > > > Most paths are not in the bijection because they cannot be defined. > > I just defined a path not in your supposed bijection: the left-hand > edge. It is defined by nodes -- those that are powers of 2. > In potential infinity this path is only the set of its finite initial segments. Each one has its own node. But those which can be defined can also be mapped. Map the powers of 2 on the finite paths. Map the poers of 3 on the paths defined by finite formulas like that one above. Regards, WM
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-14 21:27 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87wp3xscdy.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164971 |
WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > Am Freitag, 13. Oktober 2017 22:41:55 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: >> WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: >> >> > Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 21:08:59 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: >> > >> >> > Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that >> >> > by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. >> >> >> >> The left-hand edge is constructed by nodes. It is not in the image of >> >> your bijection. >> > >> > Most paths are not in the bijection because they cannot be defined. >> >> I just defined a path not in your supposed bijection: the left-hand >> edge. It is defined by nodes -- those that are powers of 2. >> > In potential infinity this path is only the set of its finite initial > segments. Each one has its own node. The left-hand edge is one such path. <snip> -- Ben.
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-16 00:35 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87bml856ht.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #165028 |
Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> writes: > WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > >> Am Freitag, 13. Oktober 2017 22:41:55 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: >>> WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: >>> >>> > Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 21:08:59 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: >>> > >>> >> > Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that >>> >> > by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. >>> >> >>> >> The left-hand edge is constructed by nodes. It is not in the image of >>> >> your bijection. >>> > >>> > Most paths are not in the bijection because they cannot be defined. >>> >>> I just defined a path not in your supposed bijection: the left-hand >>> edge. It is defined by nodes -- those that are powers of 2. >>> >> In potential infinity this path is only the set of its finite initial >> segments. Each one has its own node. > > The left-hand edge is one such path. Nothing about this I see, just a new thread as a distraction from your obvious error. A wise move. You'd have to either admit that the function you gave does /not/ include all paths, or you'd have to say the left-hand edge is not a path in the tree, thereby admitting that it was always about definitions (a WM-binary-tree) and not substance. -- Ben.
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-15 23:57 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <2b19a908-f2ed-4f85-8bed-52c271c446e2@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165125 |
Am Montag, 16. Oktober 2017 01:36:01 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> writes: > > > WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > > > >> Am Freitag, 13. Oktober 2017 22:41:55 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > >>> WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes: > >>> > >>> > Am Donnerstag, 12. Oktober 2017 21:08:59 UTC+2 schrieb Ben Bacarisse: > >>> > > >>> >> > Try to imagine a path that cannot be constructed by nodes. Note that > >>> >> > by definition a path is a construct by certain nodes. > >>> >> > >>> >> The left-hand edge is constructed by nodes. It is not in the image of > >>> >> your bijection. > >>> > > >>> > Most paths are not in the bijection because they cannot be defined. > >>> > >>> I just defined a path not in your supposed bijection: the left-hand > >>> edge. It is defined by nodes -- those that are powers of 2. > >>> > >> In potential infinity this path is only the set of its finite initial > >> segments. Each one has its own node. > > > > The left-hand edge is one such path. > > Nothing about this I see, just a new thread as a distraction from your > obvious error. A wise move. You'd have to either admit that the > function you gave does /not/ include all paths, or you'd have to say the > left-hand edge is not a path in the tree, It is the sequence of its finite initial segments. Concerning a simple proof of countability see A direct comparison test for the Binary Tree. Regards, WM
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