Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > sci.logic > #167464 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-11-25 23:58 -0800 |
| Last post | 2017-11-28 09:08 -0800 |
| Articles | 9 — 5 participants |
Back to article view | Back to sci.logic
This discussion starts older than the indexed window; earlier articles aren't shown. The article labeled Started by
below is the oldest one visible, not the original post.
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-25 23:58 -0800
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-11-27 07:54 -0800
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-11-27 12:19 -0500
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-11-27 18:14 -0800
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-28 03:24 +0000
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-11-28 11:17 -0500
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-11-27 17:24 +0000
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-27 09:25 -0800
Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-28 09:08 -0800
| From | Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-25 23:58 -0800 |
| Subject | Re: Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF |
| Message-ID | <8be2bf32-3cb7-4fb0-bed7-faa23cd7e282@googlegroups.com> |
On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 6:44:25 PM UTC+1, Pete Olcott wrote: > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom > > The > first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent > formal > system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be > carried > out, there are statements > of the language of F > which > can neither be proved nor disproved in F. > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic) > > In > mathematical logic, a > sentence of a predicate logic > is > a boolean-valued well-formed formula with no free variables. > A sentence can be viewed as expressing a proposition, something > that must > be true or false. > > > > G > @ ∃X ~Provable(X, G) > // Minimal Type Theory > > (1) > The above expression > says > that it is not provable. > > (2) > The above expression > is > indeed not provable. > > (3) > However the above expression > is not a sentence (see > graph below). It is a sentence. Read Gödel's paper. You have to understand the paper properly. He shows how to construct a sentence in the first-order language of arithmetic, with the desired property of being equivalent in the formal system F to its own F-unprovability. If you lack the ability to read and understand the paper properly, there's really no point attempting to critique it. You won't get anywhere.
[toc] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-27 07:54 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <44c7ccc1-54c1-468e-8345-9118e460a20b@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #167464 |
On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 1:58:11 AM UTC-6, Rupert wrote: > On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 6:44:25 PM UTC+1, Pete Olcott wrote: > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom > > > > The > > first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent > > formal > > system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be > > carried > > out, there are statements > > of the language of F > > which > > can neither be proved nor disproved in F. > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic) > > > > In > > mathematical logic, a > > sentence of a predicate logic > > is > > a boolean-valued well-formed formula with no free variables. > > A sentence can be viewed as expressing a proposition, something > > that must > > be true or false. > > > > > > > > G > > @ ∃X ~Provable(X, G) > > // Minimal Type Theory > > > > (1) > > The above expression > > says > > that it is not provable. > > > > (2) > > The above expression > > is > > indeed not provable. > > > > (3) > > However the above expression > > is not a sentence (see > > graph below). > > It is a sentence. Read Gödel's paper. You have to understand the paper properly. He shows how to construct a sentence in the first-order language of arithmetic, with the desired property of being equivalent in the formal system F to its own F-unprovability. > > If you lack the ability to read and understand the paper properly, there's really no point attempting to critique it. You won't get anywhere. If you want to actually respond to my work and avoid being disingenuous you must actually read it first. It sounds like you are responding to the title of this thread without bothering to look at any of the words after the title. As I have quoted and you apparently ignored a sentence of FOL must be true or false. I have shown that the Stanford University simplification of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is neither true nor false because it is erroneous. I have also shown this with my own Minimal Type Theory simplification. All in the words after the title to this thread.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-27 12:19 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <c943f0db-11a0-0692-b5db-b267c7de262f@att.net> |
| In reply to | #167534 |
On 11/27/2017 10:54 AM, peteolcott wrote:
> If you want to actually respond to my work and avoid being
> disingenuous
That is a completely unwarranted accusation of dishonesty.
And you are an asshole. QED
> you must actually read it first.
In this case, it is only necessary to read your title for
this thread in order to know that your title for this thread
is incorrect.
> It sounds like you are responding to the title of this
> thread without bothering to look at any of the words
> after the title.
With that
(what do we call it? a mistake? a lie? an error, at least)
title, there is no point to reading any further. Goedel's G
is a closed WFF. Anything you have to say about Goedel's G
that does not get that right pertains to some alternate
universe, where some guy named Irving Goedel wrote something
completely different. Maybe a movie script.
> As I have quoted and you apparently ignored a sentence of FOL
> must be true or false.
A sentence of FOL is a closed well-formed formula.
Goedel's G is a closed well-formed formula.
All of these phrases are understood syntactically. This is not
up for debate. It's like debating whether ~P(x) is P(x)
preceded by ~.
> I have shown that the Stanford University simplification of
> the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is neither true nor false
> because it is erroneous.
You changed the meaning of "sentence" and "true" and "false"
from what Goedel used in the 1931 paper. It was disingenuous
of you to do that. It is not disingenuous to point out that
this is wrong.
> I have also shown this with my own Minimal Type Theory
> simplification. All in the words after the title to this
> thread.
I can show that your Minimal Type Theory is actually
a recipe for pumpkin pie. I would do this by changing the
interpretation of pretty much every word that you have
written, but there's nothing wrong with that, is there?
(Admittedly, it would not be my favorite recipe. I don't
see why you would want to add plaster of paris, but
de gustibus non est disputandum, eh?)
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-27 18:14 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <5ef17268-1b4b-4005-b55a-b8fc82e55775@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #167538 |
On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 11:19:54 AM UTC-6, Jim Burns wrote: > On 11/27/2017 10:54 AM, peteolcott wrote: > > > If you want to actually respond to my work and avoid being > > disingenuous > > That is a completely unwarranted accusation of dishonesty. > And you are an asshole. QED > > > you must actually read it first. > > In this case, it is only necessary to read your title for > this thread in order to know that your title for this thread > is incorrect. > > > It sounds like you are responding to the title of this > > thread without bothering to look at any of the words > > after the title. > > With that > (what do we call it? a mistake? a lie? an error, at least) > title, there is no point to reading any further. Goedel's G > is a closed WFF. Anything you have to say about Goedel's G > that does not get that right pertains to some alternate > universe, where some guy named Irving Goedel wrote something > completely different. Maybe a movie script. > > > As I have quoted and you apparently ignored a sentence of FOL > > must be true or false. > > A sentence of FOL is a closed well-formed formula. > Goedel's G is a closed well-formed formula. > > All of these phrases are understood syntactically. This is not > up for debate. It's like debating whether ~P(x) is P(x) > preceded by ~. > > > I have shown that the Stanford University simplification of > > the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is neither true nor false > > because it is erroneous. > > You changed the meaning of "sentence" and "true" and "false" > from what Goedel used in the 1931 paper. It was disingenuous > of you to do that. It is not disingenuous to point out that > this is wrong. > > > I have also shown this with my own Minimal Type Theory > > simplification. All in the words after the title to this > > thread. > > I can show that your Minimal Type Theory is actually > a recipe for pumpkin pie. I would do this by changing the > interpretation of pretty much every word that you have > written, but there's nothing wrong with that, is there? > > (Admittedly, it would not be my favorite recipe. I don't > see why you would want to add plaster of paris, but > de gustibus non est disputandum, eh?) It seems like Lambda Calculus may be the ideal lingua franca for you and I to achieve mutual understanding. Lambda Calculus seems evaluate its expressions entirely in terms of the substitution you have been trying to explain to me. Although fully understanding its syntax and semantics may take a little time it is such a tiny little language that it should not take that long for either one of us to learn it completely. The simplicity of lambda calculus syntax is apparent from a BNF specification of its concrete syntax: <expression> ::= <variable> ; lowercase identifiers | <constant> ; predefined objects | ( <expression> <expression> ) ; combinations | ( λ <variable> . <expression> ) ; abstractions.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-28 03:24 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <87tvxfm6ft.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #167557 |
peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> writes: <snip> > The simplicity of lambda calculus syntax is apparent from a BNF > specification of its concrete syntax: > <expression> ::= <variable> ; lowercase identifiers > | <constant> ; predefined objects > | ( <expression> <expression> ) ; combinations > | ( λ <variable> . <expression> ) ; abstractions. The problem with the simplest syntax is that you drown in parentheses. Two useful conventions are that <exp1> <exp2> <exp3> ... <expn> means (...((<exp1> <exp2>) <exp3>) ... <expn>) and that λa . λb . λc . exp means (λa . (λb . (λc . exp))) (Obviously generalised to deeper nesting but that's hard to write with . being the separator and ... indicating "and so on".) When the two conventions meet, you resolve it by having application bind more tightly than abstraction so λa . λb . + b a means (λa . (λb . ((+ b) a))) and not ((λa . (λb . +) b) a) In short: application binds more tightly than abstraction with application associating to the left and abstraction to the right. -- Ben.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-28 11:17 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <6b7c29da-5eb1-2ad0-ec5e-d7c97a0ab2c0@att.net> |
| In reply to | #167557 |
On 11/27/2017 9:14 PM, peteolcott wrote: > On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 11:19:54 AM UTC-6, > Jim Burns wrote: >> On 11/27/2017 10:54 AM, peteolcott wrote: >>> I have shown that the Stanford University simplification of >>> the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is neither true nor false >>> because it is erroneous. >> >> You changed the meaning of "sentence" and "true" and "false" >> from what Goedel used in the 1931 paper. It was disingenuous >> of you to do that. It is not disingenuous to point out that >> this is wrong. >> >>> I have also shown this with my own Minimal Type Theory >>> simplification. All in the words after the title to this >>> thread. >> >> I can show that your Minimal Type Theory is actually >> a recipe for pumpkin pie. I would do this by changing the >> interpretation of pretty much every word that you have >> written, but there's nothing wrong with that, is there? >> >> (Admittedly, it would not be my favorite recipe. I don't >> see why you would want to add plaster of paris, but >> de gustibus non est disputandum, eh?) > > It seems like Lambda Calculus may be the ideal lingua franca > for you and I to achieve mutual understanding. Lambda > Calculus seems evaluate its expressions entirely in terms > of the substitution you have been trying to explain to me. Let's not permit the perfect to become the enemy of the good. It seems to me that we might achieve some mutual understanding with a language we already share, English. People have been reaching mutual understanding by using natural language for as long as there have been people. Perhaps we too can do that here. For example, your title for this thread makes an incorrect claim about Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem. It seems entirely feasible to me for you to recognize that the well-formed formula in question is closed. That formula has no free variables. A free variable is a variable _not_ bound by a quantifier. What we have been referring to as a Goedel number is a number. In the formal language we're using, a number is expressed as some string of 'S's followed by a '0'. We might refer to 'SSS...SSS0' as [G], because of the inconvenience of writing down more 'S's than there are particles in the universe, but, in the true-iff-not-provable closed formula of concern, it is not [G] that appears, but 'SSS...SSS0' -- not a variable. A formula with no free variables is a closed formula. That's what being a closed formula means. If you do come to recognize that it's closed, we will have reached mutual understanding on this one point. > Although fully understanding its syntax and semantics may > take a little time it is such a tiny little language that > it should not take that long for either one of us to learn > it completely. An earlier reason you gave for _not_ learning first-order predicate logic was that you simply didn't have the _time_ -- that after thirty (IIRC) years, you had to prove-or-disprove your conjecture _immediately_ One reason you gave for the sudden urgency was that you were going to lose your house otherwise. I don't remember your exact words, but I think that the loss, if it happened, was supposed to be our fault somehow. Now you have found time enough to learn lambda calculus. Good for you. I hope you haven't lost your house. Do you have time enough _now_ to learn first order predicate logic? ---- You (PO) have complained in the past about others ignoring your Minimal Type Theory to talk about your errors (as hard as it is to imagine that you could be wrong -- bear with me). In my most recent post, I pointed out that you changed the meaning of important phrases, such as "closed WFF", in order to come to your conclusion that the true-iff-not-provable expression in Goedel's paper is not a closed WFF. You completely ignored this point in your response. Is this in a category of "It's Okay If Peter Olcott Does It" (IOKIPODI)? If it is, if there is such a category, please be so kind as to give some indication what else is in there. It would bea shame to waste everyone else's time, wouldn't it? (Assuming, of course, that wouldn't be IOKIPODI.)
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-27 17:24 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <ovhhp8$vct$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #167534 |
peteolcott wrote: > As I have quoted and you apparently ignored a sentence of FOL must be > true or false. I have shown that the Stanford University > simplification of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is neither true nor > false because it is erroneous. So should your Subject header be not "Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF", but rather "The Stanford University simplification of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is neither true nor false because it is erroneous"? It may be that you *also* believe that Kurt Gödel’s 1931 Incompleteness Theorem is only undecidable because it is not a closed WFF, but your reading of a SEP article is irrelevant to that. What would be relevant is reading Kurt Gödel’s paper. (On a minor point, it is not the incompleteness theorem that is (or is claimed to be, if you wish) undecidable but rather a sentence "17 Gen r" of a theory called P. Two further points might be made - i) Though "17 Gen r" is a sentence of P, it is clear from Gödel’s paper that the same idea is applicable to many theories other than P. On this point see the /Note added 28 August 1963/ at the end of the paper in van Heijenoort. ii) Strictly speaking, "17 Gen r" isn't a sentence of P, rather it is what results when all the definitions are expanded away that is a sentence of P. But the last I heard you did not even know where "x Gen y" was defined in Gödel’s paper, despite being told at least eighty four million times.) -- Do, as a concession to my poor wits, Lord Darlington, just explain to me what you really mean. I think I had better not, Duchess. Nowadays to be intelligible is to be found out. -- Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere's Fan
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-27 09:25 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <5bdfb741-dc25-4661-b324-36ce43c5458a@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #167534 |
On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:54:39 PM UTC+1, peteolcott wrote: > On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 1:58:11 AM UTC-6, Rupert wrote: > > On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 6:44:25 PM UTC+1, Pete Olcott wrote: > > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom > > > > > > The > > > first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent > > > formal > > > system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be > > > carried > > > out, there are statements > > > of the language of F > > > which > > > can neither be proved nor disproved in F. > > > > > > > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic) > > > > > > In > > > mathematical logic, a > > > sentence of a predicate logic > > > is > > > a boolean-valued well-formed formula with no free variables. > > > A sentence can be viewed as expressing a proposition, something > > > that must > > > be true or false. > > > > > > > > > > > > G > > > @ ∃X ~Provable(X, G) > > > // Minimal Type Theory > > > > > > (1) > > > The above expression > > > says > > > that it is not provable. > > > > > > (2) > > > The above expression > > > is > > > indeed not provable. > > > > > > (3) > > > However the above expression > > > is not a sentence (see > > > graph below). > > > > It is a sentence. Read Gödel's paper. You have to understand the paper properly. He shows how to construct a sentence in the first-order language of arithmetic, with the desired property of being equivalent in the formal system F to its own F-unprovability. > > > > If you lack the ability to read and understand the paper properly, there's really no point attempting to critique it. You won't get anywhere. > > If you want to actually respond to my work and avoid being disingenuous you must actually read it first. It sounds like you are responding to the title of this thread without bothering to look at any of the words after the title. No. That is not the case.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-28 09:08 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <2ca44652-1552-4ac3-a360-ba8c13ec1348@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #167540 |
On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:49:41 PM UTC+1, Pete Olcott wrote: > On 11/27/2017 11:25 AM, Rupert wrote: > > > > On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:54:39 PM UTC+1, peteolcott wrote: > > > On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 1:58:11 AM UTC-6, Rupert wrote: > > > On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 6:44:25 PM UTC+1, Pete Olcott wrote: > > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/#FirIncTheCom > > The > first incompleteness theorem states that in any consistent > formal > system F within which a certain amount of arithmetic can be > carried > out, there are statements > of the language of F > which > can neither be proved nor disproved in F. > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentence_(mathematical_logic) > > In > mathematical logic, a > sentence of a predicate logic > is > a boolean-valued well-formed formula with no free variables. > A sentence can be viewed as expressing a proposition, something > that must > be true or false. > > > > G > @ ∃X ~Provable(X, G) > // Minimal Type Theory > > (1) > The above expression > says > that it is not provable. > > (2) > The above expression > is > indeed not provable. > > (3) > However the above expression > is not a sentence (see > graph below). > > > It is a sentence. Read Gödel's paper. You have to understand the paper properly. He shows how to construct a sentence in the first-order language of arithmetic, with the desired property of being equivalent in the formal system F to its own F-unprovability. > > If you lack the ability to read and understand the paper properly, there's really no point attempting to critique it. You won't get anywhere. > > > If you want to actually respond to my work and avoid being disingenuous you must actually read it first. It sounds like you are responding to the title of this thread without bothering to look at any of the words after the title. > > > No. That is not the case. > > > > Yes that is the case. I have proven > that it is the case in my reply to Percival. > > > > My > MTT simplification does correctly sum up the essence of the > 1931 GIT > in that it provides an expression of a formal language that > can be > neither proven nor refuted within that language. By writing this, you are claiming to have proved your previous statement "you are responding to the title of this thread without bothering to look at any of the words after the title"?
[toc] | [prev] | [standalone]
Back to top | Article view | sci.logic
csiph-web