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Groups > sci.logic > #164791 > unrolled thread
| Started by | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-10-11 10:01 -0700 |
| Last post | 2017-10-24 10:34 -0700 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 59 — 8 participants |
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The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-11 10:01 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-11 10:36 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-11 21:59 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2017-10-11 18:29 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 00:52 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2017-10-11 19:15 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 02:02 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-11 18:50 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 11:28 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-12 06:37 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-12 11:52 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-12 12:44 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-12 18:08 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-12 15:25 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-12 19:18 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-12 17:12 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-12 21:24 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-13 08:31 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-13 17:07 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2017-10-17 08:38 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-17 14:51 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-17 07:08 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-17 20:49 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-18 08:54 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-18 17:28 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-18 18:41 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-18 18:49 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-20 11:51 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-20 07:17 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-20 15:45 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-20 13:09 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-18 12:56 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-18 20:11 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-18 19:52 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-18 21:41 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-18 21:44 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-19 18:26 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-19 17:39 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-20 11:38 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-20 07:18 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-20 16:10 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-18 19:12 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-18 22:32 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-18 18:54 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-18 18:47 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-18 19:31 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 19:59 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-12 17:40 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-13 01:46 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-12 17:55 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-12 21:40 -0400
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-13 12:26 +0100
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2017-10-23 15:10 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Charlie-Boo <shymathguy@gmail.com> - 2017-10-24 10:36 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 15:02 -0500
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: William Elliot <marsh@panix.com> - 2017-10-11 21:16 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2017-10-11 21:59 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: William Elliot <marsh@panix.com> - 2017-10-12 19:44 -0700
Re: The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: Charlie-Boo <shymathguy@gmail.com> - 2017-10-24 10:34 -0700
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 10:01 -0700 |
| Subject | The simplest possible form of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem: |
| Message-ID | <c0276784-2196-4375-a610-1b4df01b1a8a@googlegroups.com> |
"This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" copyright 2017 Pete Olcott
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 10:36 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <8f15f33e-17e9-45a9-99ee-96757c30772f@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164791 |
On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 12:01:36 PM UTC-5, peteolcott wrote: > "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." > > Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: > "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" > > copyright 2017 Pete Olcott Why can't this sentence be proven true?
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 21:59 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87lgkhmmdo.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164791 |
peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> writes: > "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." > > Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: > "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. > copyright 2017 Pete Olcott !! -- Ben.
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 18:29 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <0bWdna9M9OjoNEPEnZ2dnUU7-c2dnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #164812 |
On 10/11/2017 3:59 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > peteolcott writes: > >> "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." >> >> Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: >> "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" > > Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why > neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. > >> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott > > !! > Can I prove that this sentence is not a declarative sentence: This sentence is not a declarative sentence. or can I prove that this sentence sums up the essence of the 1931 GIT: This sentence cannot be proven true. -- *(Γ ⊨ _FS A) ≡ (Γ ⊢ _FS A)*
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 00:52 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <874lr5medh.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164818 |
Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> writes: > On 10/11/2017 3:59 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >> peteolcott writes: >> >>> "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." >>> >>> Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: >>> "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" >> >> Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why >> neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. >> >>> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott >> >> !! >> > > Can I prove that this sentence is not a declarative sentence: > This sentence is not a declarative sentence. > > or can I prove that this sentence sums up the essence of the 1931 GIT: > This sentence cannot be proven true. Neither. You claimed to have simple form of a theorem. I asked if you can prove it. If not, you are merely stating a conjecture, and a vague one at that. The suggestion that you try was not a pointless one. You would immediately find out why GIT is written the way it is -- Godel wanted to prove it rather than waffle on about it on Usenet and that required the degree of precision that so baffled you when you tried to follow the proof. -- Ben.
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 19:15 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <A66dnQkzYq6NKUPEnZ2dnUU7-fvNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #164820 |
On 10/11/2017 6:52 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > Pete Olcott writes: > >> On 10/11/2017 3:59 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >>> peteolcott writes: >>> >>>> "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." >>>> >>>> Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: >>>> "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" >>> >>> Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why >>> neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. >>> >>>> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott >>> >>> !! >>> >> >> Can I prove that this sentence is not a declarative sentence: >> This sentence is not a declarative sentence. >> >> or can I prove that this sentence sums up the essence of the 1931 GIT: >> This sentence cannot be proven true. > > Neither. You claimed to have simple form of a theorem. I asked if you > can prove it. And you again provide a sentence that has exactly two entirely different meanings: (1) Can I prove the simplified form of the theorem? (2) Can I prove that the sentence that I provided is an accurate simplification of the theorem? -- *(Γ ⊨ _FS A) ≡ (Γ ⊢ _FS A)*
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 02:02 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87r2u9kwk3.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164822 |
Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> writes: > On 10/11/2017 6:52 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >> Pete Olcott writes: >> >>> On 10/11/2017 3:59 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >>>> peteolcott writes: >>>> >>>>> "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." >>>>> >>>>> Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: >>>>> "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" >>>> >>>> Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why >>>> neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. >>>> >>>>> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott >>>> >>>> !! >>>> >>> >>> Can I prove that this sentence is not a declarative sentence: >>> This sentence is not a declarative sentence. >>> >>> or can I prove that this sentence sums up the essence of the 1931 GIT: >>> This sentence cannot be proven true. >> >> Neither. You claimed to have simple form of a theorem. I asked if you >> can prove it. > > And you again provide a sentence that has exactly two entirely different meanings: > (1) Can I prove the simplified form of the theorem? > (2) Can I prove that the sentence that I provided is an accurate > simplification of the theorem? No, neither. It is incorrect to refer to statements as theorems unless you know of a proof. You don't. -- Ben.
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-11 18:50 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <70a34a4e-40e9-436a-abe5-5b7819eda41a@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164824 |
On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 8:02:38 PM UTC-5, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > Pete Olcott writes: > > > On 10/11/2017 6:52 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > >> Pete Olcott writes: > >> > >>> On 10/11/2017 3:59 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > >>>> peteolcott writes: > >>>> > >>>>> "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." > >>>>> > >>>>> Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: > >>>>> "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" > >>>> > >>>> Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why > >>>> neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. > >>>> > >>>>> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott > >>>> > >>>> !! > >>>> > >>> > >>> Can I prove that this sentence is not a declarative sentence: > >>> This sentence is not a declarative sentence. > >>> > >>> or can I prove that this sentence sums up the essence of the 1931 GIT: > >>> This sentence cannot be proven true. > >> > >> Neither. You claimed to have simple form of a theorem. I asked if you > >> can prove it. > > > > And you again provide a sentence that has exactly two entirely different meanings: > > (1) Can I prove the simplified form of the theorem? > > (2) Can I prove that the sentence that I provided is an accurate > > simplification of the theorem? > > No, neither. It is incorrect to refer to statements as theorems unless > you know of a proof. You don't. > > -- > Ben. So as usual you want to go around and around focusing on relative trivialities to make sure that the actual point is always dodged. No one will be able to begin understand the essence of what I am saying until they first totally understand (the necessary prerequisite of) exactly why the following sentence is not declarative: This is not a declarative sentence.
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 11:28 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <8760bklkxk.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #164831 |
peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> writes: > On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 8:02:38 PM UTC-5, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >> Pete Olcott writes: >> >> > On 10/11/2017 6:52 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >> >> Pete Olcott writes: >> >> >> >>> On 10/11/2017 3:59 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >> >>>> peteolcott writes: >> >>>> >> >>>>> "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." >> >>>>> >> >>>>> Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: >> >>>>> "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" >> >>>> >> >>>> Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why >> >>>> neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. >> >>>> >> >>>>> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott >> >>>> >> >>>> !! >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> Can I prove that this sentence is not a declarative sentence: >> >>> This sentence is not a declarative sentence. >> >>> >> >>> or can I prove that this sentence sums up the essence of the 1931 GIT: >> >>> This sentence cannot be proven true. >> >> >> >> Neither. You claimed to have simple form of a theorem. I asked if you >> >> can prove it. >> > >> > And you again provide a sentence that has exactly two entirely different meanings: >> > (1) Can I prove the simplified form of the theorem? >> > (2) Can I prove that the sentence that I provided is an accurate >> > simplification of the theorem? >> >> No, neither. It is incorrect to refer to statements as theorems unless >> you know of a proof. You don't. > > So as usual you want to go around and around focusing on relative > trivialities to make sure that the actual point is always dodged. I don't think the correctness of your claim is a triviality. And the point you are dodging is a very important one -- that you write English in order to avoid doing mathematics. <snip> -- Ben.
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 06:37 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <59730dc6-53f9-4325-bce7-9c901e96dabe@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164853 |
On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > peteolcott writes: > > > On Wednesday, October 11, 2017 at 8:02:38 PM UTC-5, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > >> Pete Olcott writes: > >> > >> > On 10/11/2017 6:52 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > >> >> Pete Olcott writes: > >> >> > >> >>> On 10/11/2017 3:59 PM, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > >> >>>> peteolcott writes: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> "This (quoted) sentence cannot be proven true." > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> Transformed so it is much easier to see what is going on: > >> >>>>> "Why can't this (quoted) sentence be proven true?" > >> >>>> > >> >>>> Can you prove your theorem? I doubt it, but trying to will reveal why > >> >>>> neither of these are the simplest possible form of any theorem. > >> >>>> > >> >>>>> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott > >> >>>> > >> >>>> !! > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> Can I prove that this sentence is not a declarative sentence: > >> >>> This sentence is not a declarative sentence. > >> >>> > >> >>> or can I prove that this sentence sums up the essence of the 1931 GIT: > >> >>> This sentence cannot be proven true. > >> >> > >> >> Neither. You claimed to have simple form of a theorem. I asked if you > >> >> can prove it. > >> > > >> > And you again provide a sentence that has exactly two entirely different meanings: > >> > (1) Can I prove the simplified form of the theorem? > >> > (2) Can I prove that the sentence that I provided is an accurate > >> > simplification of the theorem? > >> > >> No, neither. It is incorrect to refer to statements as theorems unless > >> you know of a proof. You don't. > > > > So as usual you want to go around and around focusing on relative > > trivialities to make sure that the actual point is always dodged. > > I don't think the correctness of your claim is a triviality. And the > point you are dodging is a very important one -- that you write English > in order to avoid doing mathematics. > > <snip> > -- > Ben. No, as I told you many years ago all of the currently existing branches of mathematics are insufficiently expressive to detect the error. Because of this I invented Minimal Type Theory. MTT has now been transformed into a computer language that translates its expressions into Directed Graphs. Also as I told you many years ago any cycles in this Directed Graph indicate error. https://philpapers.org/archive/PETMTT-4.pdf http://LiarParadox.org/Provability_with_Minimal_Type_Theory.pdf The first "paradox" that I showed to be simply erroneous (and thus not paradoxical) was the Liar Paradox: http://LiarParadox.org
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 11:52 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <779cf9e8-3b8a-07b2-c484-e07a5b404021@att.net> |
| In reply to | #164861 |
On 10/12/2017 9:37 AM, peteolcott wrote:
> No, as I told you many years ago all of the currently existing
> branches of mathematics are insufficiently expressive to
> detect the error. Because of this I invented Minimal
> Type Theory.
>
> MTT has now been transformed into a computer language that
> translates its expressions into Directed Graphs.
I'm pretty sure I mentioned to you that the definitions in
the 1931 paper do not have cycles. You "simplify" it to
something or other that you say has cycles. That simplification
is all yours, not Godel's nor anyone else's.
I looked at the two links below. They're not intended to be
finished work, are they? You give some examples but mostly
I don't see any rules.
Your BNF definitions of 'sentence' etc can use some work.
Your all-caps words 'IMPLIES', 'IFF', etc seem to be
literals -- except for 'IDENTIFIER'. I suspect you intend
otherwise. Also, it looks like you either need order of
precedence for your sentence builder operations or parentheses
around (P OR Q) etc.
I don't see a big problem with 'PROVES', although I think
you'd be better off adding a 'sentence_list' type. And you're
not done, you know. Defining what a sentence is is only one
step.
----
I recall that about six months ago, you wanted us to say we
agreed with you, so that you would not lose your house. It
seemed pretty clear that you considered it our responsibility,
our karma, to agree with you in order for you to keep your
house.
<Olcott>
I really will lose my house unless and until I am
unequivocally proven to be correct or incorrect. I say
this so that you fully realize that your head games will
have real life consequences.
</Olcott>
<https://groups.google.com/d/msg/sci.logic/cwhGpabMFnk/QUPRMPe2AQAJ>
I just noticed the irony of you accusing others of playing
"head games". Good one.
Anyway, how's that working out for you? Have you lost
your house yet?
I vaguely remember you telling us that you were going to
charge to let people see what you have accomplished. Have
you set a price for that yet?
I also vaguely recall that you were intentionally avoiding
educating yourself about first order predicate logic as part
of your strategy for resolving the Liar Paradox. Do you feel
that you have resolved the Liar Paradox now? If you have,
will you be educating yourself about first order logic now?
> Also as I told you many years ago any cycles in this
> Directed Graph indicate error.
You don't seem to be taking any notice of Yablo's Paradox.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yablo%27s_paradox>
I'm not suggesting that you should take notice, if you
don't want to. But why can't you just disregard the Liar
Paradox the same way you disregard Yablo's Paradox?
It seems like a lot less work -- and that seems to be
very important to you.
> https://philpapers.org/archive/PETMTT-4.pdf
>
> http://LiarParadox.org/Provability_with_Minimal_Type_Theory.pdf
>
> The first "paradox" that I showed to be simply erroneous
> (and thus not paradoxical) was the Liar Paradox:
> http://LiarParadox.org
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 12:44 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <63c4ccef-222a-4d9e-a43a-8bf74666a257@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164863 |
On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 10:52:16 AM UTC-5, Jim Burns wrote: > On 10/12/2017 9:37 AM, peteolcott wrote: > > > No, as I told you many years ago all of the currently existing > > branches of mathematics are insufficiently expressive to > > detect the error. Because of this I invented Minimal > > Type Theory. > > > > MTT has now been transformed into a computer language that > > translates its expressions into Directed Graphs. > > I'm pretty sure I mentioned to you that the definitions in > the 1931 paper do not have cycles. You "simplify" it to > something or other that you say has cycles. That simplification > is all yours, not Godel's nor anyone else's. > No not that. two things: (1) The 1931 GIT has all kinds of extraneous complexity that is mostly eliminated by this: http://liarparadox.org/NNH_Pages_96_98.pdf (G) ~(∃x) Dem (x, Sub(n, 17, n) ) // page 96 Two more steps reduce this extraneous complexity further. Completing the substitution (G) ~(∃x) Dem (x, G) Converting to common notation (G) ~(∃x)(x ⊢ G) > I looked at the two links below. They're not intended to be > finished work, are they? You give some examples but mostly > I don't see any rules. > It is not polished, but, it is otherwise suffcifiently complete. > Your BNF definitions of 'sentence' etc can use some work. > Your all-caps words 'IMPLIES', 'IFF', etc seem to be > literals -- except for 'IDENTIFIER'. I suspect you intend > otherwise. Also, it looks like you either need order of > precedence for your sentence builder operations or parentheses > around (P OR Q) etc. > The listing is YACC, the fully elaborated listing adds precedence and MTT specific syntax. > I don't see a big problem with 'PROVES', although I think > you'd be better off adding a 'sentence_list' type. And you're > not done, you know. Defining what a sentence is is only one > step. > The fully elaborated YACC and LEX of which the above is a precise subset is a fully operational computer language compiler. My postings for the last several months have included direct output from this compiler. > Anyway, how's that working out for you? Have you lost > your house yet? My finances have vastly improved. I have SS, a pension and paid off all my credit cards by refinancing my house. > > I also vaguely recall that you were intentionally avoiding > educating yourself about first order predicate logic as part > of your strategy for resolving the Liar Paradox. Do you feel > that you have resolved the Liar Paradox now? If you have, > will you be educating yourself about first order logic now? It turns out that the Prolog programming language is a much better model than FOPL. I have started carefully studying this language because it is the closest thing in the world to MTT. If nothing else I can teach people MTT in terms of Prolog. > > > Also as I told you many years ago any cycles in this > > Directed Graph indicate error. > > You don't seem to be taking any notice of Yablo's Paradox. > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yablo%27s_paradox> Since it never evaluates to either true or false because the evaluation is infinitely long it makes the same sort of mistake as the LP and the GIT. I have already proved the error of the LP to all that can totally understand what I am saying. To the exact same extent that my simplification of NNH accurately represents the 1931 GIT, I have also showed the error of the 1931 GIT, because the analysis is identical to the analysis of the LP.
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 18:08 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <1afcb5c2-ec36-15af-368c-00be093ba3b4@att.net> |
| In reply to | #164868 |
On 10/12/2017 3:44 PM, peteolcott wrote: > On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 10:52:16 AM UTC-5, > Jim Burns wrote: >> On 10/12/2017 9:37 AM, peteolcott wrote: >>> No, as I told you many years ago all of the currently existing >>> branches of mathematics are insufficiently expressive to >>> detect the error. Because of this I invented Minimal >>> Type Theory. >>> >>> MTT has now been transformed into a computer language that >>> translates its expressions into Directed Graphs. >> >> I'm pretty sure I mentioned to you that the definitions in >> the 1931 paper do not have cycles. You "simplify" it to >> something or other that you say has cycles. That simplification >> is all yours, not Godel's nor anyone else's. > > No not that. "No not" _what_ ? > two things: > (1) The 1931 GIT has all kinds of extraneous complexity > that is mostly eliminated by this: > http://liarparadox.org/NNH_Pages_96_98.pdf > (G) ~(∃x) Dem (x, Sub(n, 17, n) ) // page 96 The complexity you are calling extraneous is necessary in order to describe the formal system. A formal system can be complex. ---- I recall that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy had an entry on provability logic which pointed to a proof of what essentially was Godel's first incompleteness theorem -- as a fixed point theorem. That eliminated even more complexity, but it did not refute Goedel. It did the opposite. Have you looked at that, now that you have more time to do so?
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 15:25 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <10935fc8-c5a1-4f61-8b76-77c3a15a06ca@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164871 |
On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 5:08:58 PM UTC-5, Jim Burns wrote: > On 10/12/2017 3:44 PM, peteolcott wrote: > > On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 10:52:16 AM UTC-5, > > Jim Burns wrote: > >> On 10/12/2017 9:37 AM, peteolcott wrote: > > >>> No, as I told you many years ago all of the currently existing > >>> branches of mathematics are insufficiently expressive to > >>> detect the error. Because of this I invented Minimal > >>> Type Theory. > >>> > >>> MTT has now been transformed into a computer language that > >>> translates its expressions into Directed Graphs. > >> > >> I'm pretty sure I mentioned to you that the definitions in > >> the 1931 paper do not have cycles. You "simplify" it to > >> something or other that you say has cycles. That simplification > >> is all yours, not Godel's nor anyone else's. > > > > No not that. > > "No not" _what_ ? > > > two things: > > (1) The 1931 GIT has all kinds of extraneous complexity > > that is mostly eliminated by this: > > http://liarparadox.org/NNH_Pages_96_98.pdf > > (G) ~(∃x) Dem (x, Sub(n, 17, n) ) // page 96 > > The complexity you are calling extraneous is necessary > in order to describe the formal system. A formal system > can be complex. > > ---- > I recall that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy had > an entry on provability logic which pointed to a proof of > what essentially was Godel's first incompleteness theorem > -- as a fixed point theorem. That eliminated even more complexity, > but it did not refute Goedel. It did the opposite. > > Have you looked at that, now that you have more time to do so? We have to go through every single step of reasoning, you keep skipping steps with vague generalities. What essential details does NNH leave out and exactly how does leaving out these details change the evaluation making its conclusion not analogous to the original GIT? People that understand what they are talking about could answer these questions. People that learn these things by rote and do not really understand the underlying reasoning, could either admit this, or find one doge or another to avoid the question.
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 19:18 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <444d0064-1f0d-5f43-7588-a6d50d660b92@att.net> |
| In reply to | #164872 |
On 10/12/2017 6:25 PM, peteolcott wrote:
> On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 5:08:58 PM UTC-5,
> Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 10/12/2017 3:44 PM, peteolcott wrote:
>>> On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 10:52:16 AM UTC-5,
>>> Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> On 10/12/2017 9:37 AM, peteolcott wrote:
>>>>> No, as I told you many years ago all of the currently existing
>>>>> branches of mathematics are insufficiently expressive to
>>>>> detect the error. Because of this I invented Minimal
>>>>> Type Theory.
>>>>>
>>>>> MTT has now been transformed into a computer language that
>>>>> translates its expressions into Directed Graphs.
>>>>
>>>> I'm pretty sure I mentioned to you that the definitions in
>>>> the 1931 paper do not have cycles. You "simplify" it to
>>>> something or other that you say has cycles. That simplification
>>>> is all yours, not Godel's nor anyone else's.
>>>
>>> No not that.
>>
>> "No not" _what_ ?
"No not" _what_ ?
>>> two things:
>>> (1) The 1931 GIT has all kinds of extraneous complexity
>>> that is mostly eliminated by this:
>>> http://liarparadox.org/NNH_Pages_96_98.pdf
>>> (G) ~(∃x) Dem (x, Sub(n, 17, n) ) // page 96
>>
>> The complexity you are calling extraneous is necessary
>> in order to describe the formal system. A formal system
>> can be complex.
>>
>> ----
>> I recall that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy had
>> an entry on provability logic which pointed to a proof of
>> what essentially was Godel's first incompleteness theorem
>> -- as a fixed point theorem. That eliminated even more complexity,
>> but it did not refute Goedel. It did the opposite.
>>
>> Have you looked at that, now that you have more time to do so?
>
> We have to go through every single step of reasoning,
> you keep skipping steps with vague generalities.
>
> What essential details does NNH leave out and exactly how
> does leaving out these details change the evaluation making
> its conclusion not analogous to the original GIT?
The original GIT does not have cycles in its definitions.
Go look at the paper. It's not hard to see, it doesn't even
take any real understanding of the argument. Each definition
of 46, listed over several pages, only refers to _earlier_
defined terms.
> People that understand what they are talking about
> could answer these questions. People that learn these things
> by rote and do not really understand the underlying reasoning,
> could either admit this, or find one doge or another to
> avoid the question.
Until you begin to show some sign that you know something of
what you are talking about, your opinions on what others
understand or don't understand aren't worth much.
There's a roadmap below that we could follow _in principle_ .
I could _in principle_ explain it in more detail, if you
thought that would help you. But I am skeptical of the usefulness
of trying to explain anything to you, Peter Olcott, beyond
a high level view.
You haven't said you understand first order predicate logic now,
so I think it's safe to assume that you still don't. And, even
if you said you did understand, I remember when you claimed you
understood the argument for the diagonal lemma. You didn't.
----
If a formal system is able to formally describe _that system_
(for example, able to state that, if 'P' and 'Q' are formulas,
then 'P & Q' is a formula: that is to say, _specific rules_ )
then it is able to formally state that there exists some proof
in that formal system of a given formula S. Saying there's a
proof is just a statement about _that system_ , after all, and
we can describe that system in the language of that system.
(Remember, "able to be stated" is not the same as "true".)
For any formal system able (for example) to describe _that_
_system_ , for _any_ property Prop() which we can express,
there is a formula D which we can express such that only
these options are possible:
(i) D is true and Prop(D) is false
(ii) D is false and Prop(D) is true
Suppose that a formal system is able to express "there is
a proof of the given formula D" as some formula Prov(D).
Then it can express a sentence G such that only these
options are possible:
(i) G is true and G is not provable.
(ii) G is false and G is provable (provable true).
In case (i), the formal system is incomplete.
In case (ii), the formal system is inconsistent.
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 17:12 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <9826ee00-6f84-4136-92a1-1cdc87d6e30d@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164873 |
On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 6:18:41 PM UTC-5, Jim Burns wrote: > ---- > If a formal system is able to formally describe _that system_ > (for example, able to state that, if 'P' and 'Q' are formulas, > then 'P & Q' is a formula: that is to say, _specific rules_ ) > then it is able to formally state that there exists some proof > in that formal system of a given formula S. Saying there's a > proof is just a statement about _that system_ , after all, and > we can describe that system in the language of that system. > (Remember, "able to be stated" is not the same as "true".) > > For any formal system able (for example) to describe _that_ > _system_ , for _any_ property Prop() which we can express, > there is a formula D which we can express such that only > these options are possible: > (i) D is true and Prop(D) is false > (ii) D is false and Prop(D) is true > > Suppose that a formal system is able to express "there is > a proof of the given formula D" as some formula Prov(D). > Then it can express a sentence G such that only these > options are possible: > (i) G is true and G is not provable. > (ii) G is false and G is provable (provable true). > In case (i), the formal system is incomplete. > In case (ii), the formal system is inconsistent. Lets try to formalize that. I am not sure that you ever understood this: The Alias_Operator @ provides the means for an expression to refer directly to itself and thus not indirectly to its name. (i) G @ True(G) & Provable(G) (ii) G @ False(G) & ~Provable(G) Is this what you mean ?
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-12 21:24 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <7972a1a1-bf76-c729-da02-1692f632e180@att.net> |
| In reply to | #164874 |
On 10/12/2017 8:12 PM, peteolcott wrote:
> On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 6:18:41 PM UTC-5,
> Jim Burns wrote:
>> Suppose that a formal system is able to express "there is
>> a proof of the given formula D" as some formula Prov(D).
>> Then it can express a sentence G such that only these
>> options are possible:
>> (i) G is true and G is not provable.
>> (ii) G is false and G is provable (provable true).
>> In case (i), the formal system is incomplete.
>> In case (ii), the formal system is inconsistent.
>
> Lets try to formalize that.
>
> I am not sure that you ever understood this:
> The Alias_Operator @ provides the means for an expression
> to refer directly to itself and thus not indirectly
> to its name.
>
> (i) G @ True(G) & Provable(G)
> (ii) G @ False(G) & ~Provable(G)
>
> Is this what you mean ?
No, G does not refer to either of those.
And, before we lose the context, the proof is that
(i) OR (ii) is true.
Also, the way we say some sentence G is true in FPOL is:
G
and the way we say G is false is
~G
Using True(G) and False(G) instead suggests to me that
True(X) is to stand for some formula in the formal language
we are using which evaluates X, and for which True(X) has
the same truth value as X, for all X.
(Tarski proved that, for a wide range of formal systems,
there wasn't such a formula.)
And similarly for False(X).
That's not what I mean. Not 'True(G)', just 'G'. Could we write
G and ~G when we mean true and false for G? I think I would
find it distracting-to-confusing to introduce this notation.
The thing that is proved is that, for some sentence G,
( G & ~Prov(G) ) OR ( ~G & Prov(G) )
We prove that, pretty much completely, with the diagonal
lemma.
----
The interesting part of the proof is the actual statement of
that sentence, in the original un-extended language. What we
see is an abbreviation of that very long, very complex sentence
-- which is basically unreadable by humans, but which is what
actually gets proved.
We get the actual statement by backing down that list of
46 definitions, replacing
Provable(y) "y is provable'
with
Ex: IsProofOf(x,y) "There is a proof x of y"
and then IsProofOf() with the definition of IsProofOf,
followed by the defined terms in that definition, dot-dot-dot.
Eventually, all the defined terms are gone.
----
The point of the First Incompletness Theorem is that we prove
that there is some statement _in the original unextended language_
of our formal system which is true if and only if it is
not provable in that formal system. We _abbreviate_ that
unwieldy sentence as G, but we are talking about the
unabbreviated sentence.
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-13 08:31 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <64350daa-5b6a-471b-bf7d-f06fd08e0d59@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #164882 |
On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 8:24:42 PM UTC-5, Jim Burns wrote: > On 10/12/2017 8:12 PM, peteolcott wrote: > > On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 6:18:41 PM UTC-5, > > Jim Burns wrote: > > >> Suppose that a formal system is able to express "there is > >> a proof of the given formula D" as some formula Prov(D). > >> Then it can express a sentence G such that only these > >> options are possible: > >> (i) G is true and G is not provable. > >> (ii) G is false and G is provable (provable true). > >> In case (i), the formal system is incomplete. > >> In case (ii), the formal system is inconsistent. > > > > Lets try to formalize that. > > > > I am not sure that you ever understood this: > > The Alias_Operator @ provides the means for an expression > > to refer directly to itself and thus not indirectly > > to its name. > > > > (i) G @ True(G) & Provable(G) > > (ii) G @ False(G) & ~Provable(G) > > > > Is this what you mean ? > > No, G does not refer to either of those. > > And, before we lose the context, the proof is that > (i) OR (ii) is true. > > Also, the way we say some sentence G is true in FPOL is: > G > and the way we say G is false is > ~G > > Using True(G) and False(G) instead suggests to me that > True(X) is to stand for some formula in the formal language > we are using which evaluates X, and for which True(X) has > the same truth value as X, for all X. > (Tarski proved that, for a wide range of formal systems, > there wasn't such a formula.) > And similarly for False(X). > > That's not what I mean. Not 'True(G)', just 'G'. Could we write > G and ~G when we mean true and false for G? I think I would > find it distracting-to-confusing to introduce this notation. > > The thing that is proved is that, for some sentence G, > > ( G & ~Prov(G) ) OR ( ~G & Prov(G) ) > http://liarparadox.org/index.php/2017/06/10/602/ ∃X (X ⊢ Y) asserts that there is a set of connected WFF from X to Y. If G is an alias (sentential variable) for ∃X (X ⊢ Y), then G is either True or False, even if both X and Y are gibberish. If G is an alias (sentential variable) for ~∃X (X ⊢ G) we have pathological self-reference creating infinite recursion. copyright 2017 Pete Olcott
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-13 17:07 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <22af3d64-d635-27cd-c3aa-a07ef9e6be8b@att.net> |
| In reply to | #164918 |
On 10/13/2017 11:31 AM, peteolcott wrote:
> On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 8:24:42 PM UTC-5,
> Jim Burns wrote:
>> On 10/12/2017 8:12 PM, peteolcott wrote:
>>> On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 6:18:41 PM UTC-5,
>>> Jim Burns wrote:
>>>> Suppose that a formal system is able to express "there is
>>>> a proof of the given formula D" as some formula Prov(D).
>>>> Then it can express a sentence G such that only these
>>>> options are possible:
>>>> (i) G is true and G is not provable.
>>>> (ii) G is false and G is provable (provable true).
>>>> In case (i), the formal system is incomplete.
>>>> In case (ii), the formal system is inconsistent.
>>>
>>> Lets try to formalize that.
>>>
>>> I am not sure that you ever understood this:
>>> The Alias_Operator @ provides the means for an expression
>>> to refer directly to itself and thus not indirectly
>>> to its name.
>>>
>>> (i) G @ True(G) & Provable(G)
>>> (ii) G @ False(G) & ~Provable(G)
>>>
>>> Is this what you mean ?
>>
>> No, G does not refer to either of those.
>>
>> And, before we lose the context, the proof is that
>> (i) OR (ii) is true.
>>
>> Also, the way we say some sentence G is true in FPOL is:
>> G
>> and the way we say G is false is
>> ~G
>>
>> Using True(G) and False(G) instead suggests to me that
>> True(X) is to stand for some formula in the formal language
>> we are using which evaluates X, and for which True(X) has
>> the same truth value as X, for all X.
>> (Tarski proved that, for a wide range of formal systems,
>> there wasn't such a formula.)
>> And similarly for False(X).
>>
>> That's not what I mean. Not 'True(G)', just 'G'. Could we write
>> G and ~G when we mean true and false for G? I think I would
>> find it distracting-to-confusing to introduce this notation.
>>
>> The thing that is proved is that, for some sentence G,
>>
>> ( G & ~Prov(G) ) OR ( ~G & Prov(G) )
>
> http://liarparadox.org/index.php/2017/06/10/602/
> ∃X (X ⊢ Y) asserts that there is a set of connected WFF
> from X to Y.
Provable(y) @ Ex: IsProofOf(x,y)
IsProofOf(x,y) @ ProofSeq(x) & IsLastOf(y,x)
IsLastOf(y,x) @ y = peek(len(x),x)
ProofSeq(x) @
En > 1: n = len(x) &
Ak: 1 =< k =< n ->
Axiom( peek(k,x) ) \/
Ei:Ej: 1=< i < k & 1 =< j < k &
Rule( peek(i,x), peek(j,x), peek(k,x) )
-- len(x) returns the number of items in the finite sequence x
of items
-- peek(k,x) returns the k_th item of the finite sequence x
of items
-- Axiom(x) is true if x is an axiom of the formal system
-- Rule(x,y,z) is true if z follows from x and y by one of
the rules of inference of the formal system
Since the formal language will get specified in order to define
Axiom() and Rule(), we have language, axioms and rules specified,
which describes the formal system for which Provable() is
correct.
This is how I would say formally that
"Provable(y) asserts that y is provable"
-- with more detail.
> If G is an alias (sentential variable) for ∃X (X ⊢ Y),
> then G is either True or False, even if both X and Y are
> gibberish.
>
> If G is an alias (sentential variable) for ~∃X (X ⊢ G)
> we have pathological self-reference creating infinite
> recursion.
In the 1931 paper, G is not an alias for anything.
Any cycles you introduce are your own problem, and not
Goedel's.
People occasionally work out the precise sentence of arithmetic
that is proven to be true if and only if it is provable and
the precise natural number that represents that statement.
They take pages to write down and do not add any clarity to
the argument, but they exist and can be written down.
> copyright 2017 Pete Olcott
Thank you for NOT copywriting my words.
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-17 08:38 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <s4mdneXXZdZamnvEnZ2dnUU7-SXNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #164949 |
On 10/13/2017 4:07 PM, Jim Burns wrote: > On 10/13/2017 11:31 AM, peteolcott wrote: >> On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 8:24:42 PM UTC-5, >> Jim Burns wrote: >>> On 10/12/2017 8:12 PM, peteolcott wrote: >>>> On Thursday, October 12, 2017 at 6:18:41 PM UTC-5, >>>> Jim Burns wrote: > >>>>> Suppose that a formal system is able to express "there is >>>>> a proof of the given formula D" as some formula Prov(D). >>>>> Then it can express a sentence G such that only these >>>>> options are possible: >>>>> (i) G is true and G is not provable. >>>>> (ii) G is false and G is provable (provable true). >>>>> In case (i), the formal system is incomplete. >>>>> In case (ii), the formal system is inconsistent. >>>> >>>> Lets try to formalize that. >>>> >>>> I am not sure that you ever understood this: >>>> The Alias_Operator @ provides the means for an expression >>>> to refer directly to itself and thus not indirectly >>>> to its name. >>>> >>>> (i) G @ True(G) & Provable(G) >>>> (ii) G @ False(G) & ~Provable(G) >>>> >>>> Is this what you mean ? >>> >>> No, G does not refer to either of those. >>> >>> And, before we lose the context, the proof is that >>> (i) OR (ii) is true. >>> >>> Also, the way we say some sentence G is true in FPOL is: >>> G >>> and the way we say G is false is >>> ~G >>> >>> Using True(G) and False(G) instead suggests to me that >>> True(X) is to stand for some formula in the formal language >>> we are using which evaluates X, and for which True(X) has >>> the same truth value as X, for all X. >>> (Tarski proved that, for a wide range of formal systems, >>> there wasn't such a formula.) >>> And similarly for False(X). >>> >>> That's not what I mean. Not 'True(G)', just 'G'. Could we write >>> G and ~G when we mean true and false for G? I think I would >>> find it distracting-to-confusing to introduce this notation. >>> >>> The thing that is proved is that, for some sentence G, >>> >>> ( G & ~Prov(G) ) OR ( ~G & Prov(G) ) >> >> http://liarparadox.org/index.php/2017/06/10/602/ >> ∃X (X ⊢ Y) asserts that there is a set of connected WFF >> from X to Y. > > Provable(y) @ Ex: IsProofOf(x,y) > > IsProofOf(x,y) @ ProofSeq(x) & IsLastOf(y,x) > > IsLastOf(y,x) @ y = peek(len(x),x) > > ProofSeq(x) @ > En > 1: n = len(x) & > Ak: 1 =< k =< n -> > Axiom( peek(k,x) ) \/ > Ei:Ej: 1=< i < k & 1 =< j < k & > Rule( peek(i,x), peek(j,x), peek(k,x) ) > > -- len(x) returns the number of items in the finite sequence x > of items > -- peek(k,x) returns the k_th item of the finite sequence x > of items > -- Axiom(x) is true if x is an axiom of the formal system > -- Rule(x,y,z) is true if z follows from x and y by one of > the rules of inference of the formal system > All of the above makes no sense to me, If you want to write the ideas in terms of computer programming Prolog is the appropriate language. Prolog is appropriate because you simply specify what must be accomplished and not how to accomplish it. This was abstracts out all of the extraneous details and retains only the essential specifications. > Since the formal language will get specified in order to define > Axiom() and Rule(), we have language, axioms and rules specified, > which describes the formal system for which Provable() is > correct. > I could not see how you did that, too meany extraneous details in what you said. > This is how I would say formally that > "Provable(y) asserts that y is provable" > -- with more detail. > This stuff is already built in to Prolog, and Prolog is very easy to learn because none of the typical programming steps are needed: iteration, selection. >> If G is an alias (sentential variable) for ∃X (X ⊢ Y), >> then G is either True or False, even if both X and Y are >> gibberish. >> >> If G is an alias (sentential variable) for ~∃X (X ⊢ G) >> we have pathological self-reference creating infinite >> recursion. > > In the 1931 paper, G is not an alias for anything. > Any cycles you introduce are your own problem, and not > Goedel's. > I can show that G is an alias for something both in the original paper and in the NNH simplification. I am not going to bother trying to explaining this until you prove that you are not simply trolling me by answering my prior response to you. > People occasionally work out the precise sentence of arithmetic > that is proven to be true if and only if it is provable and AND it is impossibly provable because it is logically incoherent: G @ ∃X Provable(X,G) - [00] ROOT (01) - [01] G (02) - [02] Provable (03)(0) // Cycle indicates evaluation infinite loop - [03] X -
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