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Groups > sci.logic > #172303 > unrolled thread
| Started by | Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2018-02-09 16:19 -0800 |
| Last post | 2018-02-10 16:32 +0000 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 99 — 9 participants |
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What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-09 16:19 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 02:05 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-10 00:31 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 12:19 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-10 18:26 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-12 09:19 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-10 00:15 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-10 06:49 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 18:23 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-10 15:37 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-12 09:16 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-12 17:40 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-12 20:48 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-13 04:46 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 14:16 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-13 20:46 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 19:26 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 13:54 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 15:24 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 00:21 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 19:36 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 18:05 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 22:12 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 21:10 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 21:35 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 23:36 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 14:54 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 09:00 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-14 08:29 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 10:46 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-14 21:37 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-14 21:49 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-16 11:52 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-16 11:54 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 12:52 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 14:05 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-15 07:02 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-15 07:09 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 10:41 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 15:20 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 10:56 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:05 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 11:29 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:35 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 11:55 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 13:44 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 07:21 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-16 15:39 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 09:08 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 17:25 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-16 11:38 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 17:49 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-16 12:03 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 18:23 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 10:33 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-16 16:49 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-16 18:20 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 10:28 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 18:55 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 12:46 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 20:53 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 13:36 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-28 13:22 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-28 15:46 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-16 20:44 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-16 15:53 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:29 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-14 08:42 -0500
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 09:35 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 20:14 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 17:10 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 13:39 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-15 06:47 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-14 20:55 -0500
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-14 08:27 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 14:52 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 09:47 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 20:12 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 17:05 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 13:53 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-15 06:51 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 15:16 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-15 08:36 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 11:14 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:19 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 10:43 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 16:57 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-15 09:24 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-16 11:58 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-14 21:33 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 14:45 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 02:24 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 22:18 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 05:32 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 00:30 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 14:07 +0000
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-13 18:04 -0800
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-10 09:06 -0600
Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 16:32 +0000
Page 3 of 5 — ← Prev page 1 2 [3] 4 5 Next page →
| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-15 10:56 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <A7adnb821ccxJhjHnZ2dnUU7-U_NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #172788 |
On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > peteolcott wrote: >> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: >>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever >>>> did that before that I am aware of. >>> >>> You're not aware of much. >> >> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of? > > Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever calculus is presented. What could be clearer than that? So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)? An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018). A BasicFact can express how the rule-of-inference works: In this case: A A -> B ------ B Has free variables yet still expresses the BasicFact of how A -> B works. So a BasicFact would seem to be analogous to a Prolog fact and a Prolog Rule. Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott > >> It seems that Mendelson gets confused and conflates the term Theorem >> with the term Axiom. > > Mendelson does what I say in my first paragraph a number of times (because he discusses a number of calculi). > > >> In section 1.4 he specifies that a Theorem has >> the empty set as its formal proof. >> >> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html >> A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments. In general, a theorem is an embodiment of some general principle that makes it part of a larger theory. The process of showing a theorem to be correct is called a proof. >> >> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Axiom.html >> An axiom is a proposition regarded as self-evidently true without proof. The word "axiom" is a slightly archaic synonym for postulate. Compare conjecture or hypothesis, both of which connote apparently true but not self-evident statements. >> >> Across different authors an Axiom is anything from an assumption to >> a self-evident truth. I ended this nonsense and simply define BaseFact >> as an expression X of language L that has been defined to have the >> semantic property of True. >> > -- *∀X True(X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms Provable(Γ, X) *
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-15 17:05 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p64ekq$a8j$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #172801 |
Pete Olcott wrote: > On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >> peteolcott wrote: >>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival >>> wrote: >>>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever >>>>> did that before that I am aware of. >>>> >>>> You're not aware of much. >>> >>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of? >> >> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of >> that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever >> calculus is presented. What could be clearer than that? > > So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here > counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly > what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process > will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S > belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)? Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise. One wishes to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not. Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to recognize axioms as such. > An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been > defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018). Unfortunately truth isn't decidable so your definition falls at the first hurdle. > A BasicFact can express how the rule-of-inference works: > > In this case: > A > A -> B > ------ > B > > Has free variables yet still expresses the BasicFact of how A -> B works. > So a BasicFact would seem to be analogous to a Prolog fact and a Prolog > Rule. > > Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott > >> >>> It seems that Mendelson gets confused and conflates the term Theorem >>> with the term Axiom. >> >> Mendelson does what I say in my first paragraph a number of times >> (because he discusses a number of calculi). >> >> >>> In section 1.4 he specifies that a Theorem has >>> the empty set as its formal proof. >>> >>> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html >>> A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be true by >>> accepted mathematical operations and arguments. In general, a theorem >>> is an embodiment of some general principle that makes it part of a >>> larger theory. The process of showing a theorem to be correct is >>> called a proof. >>> >>> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Axiom.html >>> An axiom is a proposition regarded as self-evidently true without >>> proof. The word "axiom" is a slightly archaic synonym for postulate. >>> Compare conjecture or hypothesis, both of which connote apparently >>> true but not self-evident statements. >>> >>> Across different authors an Axiom is anything from an assumption to >>> a self-evident truth. I ended this nonsense and simply define BaseFact >>> as an expression X of language L that has been defined to have the >>> semantic property of True. >>> >> > >
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-15 11:29 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <koOdndT6t9b4XhjHnZ2dnUU7-Q_NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #172805 |
On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>> peteolcott wrote: >>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: >>>>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever >>>>>> did that before that I am aware of. >>>>> >>>>> You're not aware of much. >>>> >>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of? >>> >>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever calculus is presented. What could be clearer than that? >> >> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here >> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly >> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process >> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S >> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)? > > Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise. One wishes to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not. Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to recognize axioms as such. So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of axiom such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not. > >> An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been >> defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018). > > Unfortunately truth isn't decidable so your definition falls at the first hurdle. > It is not that Truth is undecidable it is that pre-existing half-baked notions of axiom were insufficient to provide a correct True(L, X) predicate for all languages L and all finite strings X. Now that I have formalized the notion of Axiom, it is easy to provide a True(L, X) predicate and a False(L, X) predicate for every formal and natural language L and finite string X. -- *∀X True(L, X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms(L) Provable(Γ, X) *
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-15 17:35 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p64gcs$5mk$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #172816 |
Pete Olcott wrote: > On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >> Pete Olcott wrote: >>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>>> peteolcott wrote: >>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever >>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of. >>>>>> >>>>>> You're not aware of much. >>>>> >>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of? >>>> >>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of >>>> that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever >>>> calculus is presented. What could be clearer than that? >>> >>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here >>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly >>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process >>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S >>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: >>> Axiom(S)? >> >> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. >> The concept would be next to worthless otherwise. One wishes to know >> if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not. Since >> the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to >> recognize axioms as such. > > So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of axiom > such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L > can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not. You have Mendelson. He defines a number of language/axiom pairs. For each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language is an axioms or not? I can. If you can't, what specifically are you having a problem with? >>> An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been >>> defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018). >> >> Unfortunately truth isn't decidable so your definition falls at the >> first hurdle. >> > > It is not that Truth is undecidable it is that pre-existing half-baked > notions of axiom were insufficient to provide a correct True(L, X) > predicate for all languages L and all finite strings X. > > Now that I have formalized the notion of Axiom, it is easy to provide > a True(L, X) predicate and a False(L, X) predicate for every formal > and natural language L and finite string X. > > >
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-15 11:55 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <KoidnVzvPLAFVBjHnZ2dnUU7-d3NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #172823 |
On 2/15/2018 11:35 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>>>> peteolcott wrote: >>>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: >>>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever >>>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You're not aware of much. >>>>>> >>>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of? >>>>> >>>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever calculus is presented. What could be clearer than that? >>>> >>>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here >>>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly >>>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process >>>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S >>>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)? >>> >>> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise. One wishes to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not. Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to recognize axioms as such. >> >> So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of axiom >> such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L >> can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not. > > You have Mendelson. He defines a number of language/axiom pairs. For each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language is an axioms or not? I can. If you can't, what specifically are you having a problem with? > Olcott conjecture no one has ever previously provided a formal specification of the term of the art: Axiom such that an automated system could always decide whether or not a finite string X is an element of the collection of axioms T in language L or not an element of the collection T of axioms in language L. I have just provided a formal specification of the term of the art axiom, such that an automated system can always decide whether or not a finite string X is an Axiom of language L. A finite string X is an axiom of language L if and only if finite string X has been defined to have the semantic property of True in language L. Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 13:44 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p66n78$2kl$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #172830 |
Pete Olcott wrote: > On 2/15/2018 11:35 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >> Pete Olcott wrote: >>> On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>>>>> peteolcott wrote: >>>>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter >>>>>>> Percival wrote: >>>>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever >>>>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You're not aware of much. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of? >>>>>> >>>>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae >>>>>> of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever >>>>>> calculus is presented. What could be clearer than that? >>>>> >>>>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here >>>>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly >>>>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated >>>>> process >>>>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite >>>>> string S >>>>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: >>>>> Axiom(S)? >>>> >>>> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of >>>> not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise. One wishes >>>> to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or >>>> not. Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one >>>> must be able to recognize axioms as such. >>> >>> So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of >>> axiom >>> such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L >>> can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not. >> >> You have Mendelson. He defines a number of language/axiom pairs. For >> each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language >> is an axioms or not? I can. If you can't, what specifically are you >> having a problem with? >> > > Olcott conjecture no one has ever previously provided a formal > specification of the term of the art: Axiom such that an automated > system could always decide whether or not a finite string X is an > element of the collection of axioms T in language L or not an element > of the collection T of axioms in language L. Mendelson's axioms, and others, are recognizable by TMs. > > I have just provided a formal specification of the term of the art > axiom, such that an automated system can always decide whether or > not a finite string X is an Axiom of language L. > > A finite string X is an axiom of language L if and only if finite > string X has been defined to have the semantic property of True > in language L. True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. > > Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 07:21 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <7dec621c-19ee-4ae6-96a7-e5800be2497b@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #172897 |
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: > Pete Olcott wrote: > > On 2/15/2018 11:35 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > >> Pete Olcott wrote: > >>> On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > >>>> Pete Olcott wrote: > >>>>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > >>>>>> peteolcott wrote: > >>>>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter > >>>>>>> Percival wrote: > >>>>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever > >>>>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> You're not aware of much. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae > >>>>>> of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever > >>>>>> calculus is presented. What could be clearer than that? > >>>>> > >>>>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here > >>>>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly > >>>>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated > >>>>> process > >>>>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite > >>>>> string S > >>>>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: > >>>>> Axiom(S)? > >>>> > >>>> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of > >>>> not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise. One wishes > >>>> to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or > >>>> not. Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one > >>>> must be able to recognize axioms as such. > >>> > >>> So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of > >>> axiom > >>> such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L > >>> can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not. > >> > >> You have Mendelson. He defines a number of language/axiom pairs. For > >> each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language > >> is an axioms or not? I can. If you can't, what specifically are you > >> having a problem with? > >> > > > > Olcott conjecture no one has ever previously provided a formal > > specification of the term of the art: Axiom such that an automated > > system could always decide whether or not a finite string X is an > > element of the collection of axioms T in language L or not an element > > of the collection T of axioms in language L. > > Mendelson's axioms, and others, are recognizable by TMs. > > > > I have just provided a formal specification of the term of the art > > axiom, such that an automated system can always decide whether or > > not a finite string X is an Axiom of language L. > > > > A finite string X is an axiom of language L if and only if finite > > string X has been defined to have the semantic property of True > > in language L. > > True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. > Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. > > > > Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 15:39 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <87lgft2bbf.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #172904 |
peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> writes: > On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: <snip> >> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. > > Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson arithmetic. -- Ben.
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 09:08 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <c892c008-5b59-4c6a-bb12-39b0087c9149@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #172905 |
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > peteolcott writes: > > > On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: > <snip> > >> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. > > > > Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. > > Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical > consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are > not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson > arithmetic. > > -- > Ben. Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 17:25 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p6746a$1ik$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #172919 |
peteolcott wrote: > On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >> peteolcott writes: >> >>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: >> <snip> >>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. >>> >>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. >> >> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical >> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are >> not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson >> arithmetic. >> >> -- >> Ben. > > Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed. > "They" being what? The set of formulas closed under logical consequence? They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other things) the definition of "formula". Why are you so determined to make yourself look stupid?
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 11:38 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <sdidnWMhkdG5ihrHnZ2dnUU7-YXNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #172923 |
On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > peteolcott wrote: >> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >>> peteolcott writes: >>> >>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: >>> <snip> >>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. >>>> >>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. >>> >>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical >>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are >>> not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson >>> arithmetic. >>> >>> -- >>> Ben. >> >> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed. >> > "They" being what? The set of formulas closed under logical consequence? They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other things) the definition of "formula". Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or incorrect(X). Those people that have a religious conviction against the notion of semantic error have undetected incoherence in their reasoning. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously -- *∀L ∈ Formal_Systems ∀X True(L, X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms(L) Provable(Γ, X) *
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 17:49 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p675ij$v2b$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #172926 |
Pete Olcott wrote: > On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >> peteolcott wrote: >>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >>>> peteolcott writes: >>>> >>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival >>>>> wrote: >>>> <snip> >>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. >>>>> >>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. >>>> >>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical >>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are >>>> not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is >>>> Robinson >>>> arithmetic. >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Ben. >>> >>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed. >>> >> "They" being what? The set of formulas closed under logical >> consequence? They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among >> other things) the definition of "formula". > > Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or > incorrect(X). Prove it. The set of first order theorems is already undecidable. May I ask if this strange habit of yours (denying familiar facts) extends to other areas of knowledge? Do you, for example, tell chemists that water isn't aitch-two-oh? Because that is analogous to what you do in this newsgroup.
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| From | Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 12:03 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <48SdnclWavxngRrHnZ2dnUU7-fnNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #172927 |
On 2/16/2018 11:49 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > Pete Olcott wrote: >> On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >>> peteolcott wrote: >>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >>>>> peteolcott writes: >>>>> >>>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: >>>>> <snip> >>>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. >>>>>> >>>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. >>>>> >>>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical >>>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are >>>>> not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson >>>>> arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Ben. >>>> >>>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed. >>>> >>> "They" being what? The set of formulas closed under logical consequence? They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other things) the definition of "formula". >> >> Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or incorrect(X). > > Prove it. The set of first order theorems is already undecidable. > > May I ask if this strange habit of yours (denying familiar facts) extends to other areas of knowledge? Do you, for example, tell chemists that water isn't aitch-two-oh? Because that is analogous to what you do in this newsgroup. > > The "Fact" that "The set of first order theorems is already undecidable" is actually many of the misconceptions that I am refuting. I am not bothered to go through the tedium and monotony of pointing out every little error in every little proof at each level of logic. Instead I am showing a single error that simultaneously applies to the formal conclusions of all of these cases at every logic level. When-so-ever pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) occurs the only correct decision is PSR rejection of semantically incorrect WFF. Copyright 2018 and many other years since 1997 as documented on USENET. -- *∀L ∈ Formal_Systems ∀X True(L, X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms(L) Provable(Γ, X) *
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 18:23 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p677i6$p1e$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #172930 |
Pete Olcott wrote: > > When-so-ever pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) occurs the only > correct decision is PSR rejection of semantically incorrect WFF. Semantics has got nothing to do with what constitutes a wff. If may be that there is such a thing as a POwff (yet to be defined) but if that's what you're talking about your remarks have nothing to do with the limitative theorems of logic.
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 10:33 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <b9251475-9fa7-45da-bb8f-6be12b2ab72e@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #172932 |
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 12:23:04 PM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: > Pete Olcott wrote: > > > > > When-so-ever pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) occurs the only > > correct decision is PSR rejection of semantically incorrect WFF. > > Semantics has got nothing to do with what constitutes a wff. If may be > that there is such a thing as a POwff (yet to be defined) but if that's > what you're talking about your remarks have nothing to do with the > limitative theorems of logic. As already provided: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously If an expression X of (formal or natural) language L is not both syntactically correct WFF(L, X) and Semantically_Correct(L, X) then it is Incorrect(L, X).
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| From | grahamcooper7@gmail.com |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 16:49 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <b48954a6-042a-464b-ad0b-5a4be02693c8@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #172930 |
On Saturday, February 17, 2018 at 4:03:45 AM UTC+10, Pete Olcott wrote: > On 2/16/2018 11:49 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > > Pete Olcott wrote: > >> On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote: > >>> peteolcott wrote: > >>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote: > >>>>> peteolcott writes: > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: > >>>>> <snip> > >>>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. > >>>>> > >>>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical > >>>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are > >>>>> not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson > >>>>> arithmetic. > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Ben. > >>>> > >>>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed. > >>>> > >>> "They" being what? The set of formulas closed under logical consequence? They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other things) the definition of "formula". > >> > >> Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or incorrect(X). > > > > Prove it. The set of first order theorems is already undecidable. > > > > May I ask if this strange habit of yours (denying familiar facts) extends to other areas of knowledge? Do you, for example, tell chemists that water isn't aitch-two-oh? Because that is analogous to what you do in this newsgroup. > > > > > > The "Fact" that "The set of first order theorems is already undecidable" > is actually many of the misconceptions that I am refuting. > > I am not bothered to go through the tedium and monotony of pointing > out every little error in every little proof at each level of logic. > > Instead I am showing a single error that simultaneously applies to the > formal conclusions of all of these cases at every logic level. IMO.... the set of un-decidable problems show SELF REFERENCE When ASKED for some example of TRUE-BUT-UNPROVABLE formula... APART FROM the deliriously funny... G.... NOT(PROOF(G)) There is LITTLE EVIDENCE of TRUE-BUT-UNPROVALBE FORMULA IN FACT ... the Godel Proof has been ENTIRELY REWRITTEN in the last 10 years to hide this. ASK MARTIN SHOBE ..... he states the 20TH C Wording of GODELS PROOF, a TRUE G 1 EXAMPLE of TRUE-BUT-UNPROVABLE that was a POPULAR EXAMPLE supporting GODELS PROOF was DIAPHANTINE EQUATIONS A cursory look at Diaphantine Equations showed a method for representing 0-solution in the formula!
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 18:20 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <87606w3ig4.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #172926 |
Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> writes: > On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote: >> peteolcott wrote: >>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote: >>>> peteolcott writes: >>>> >>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote: >>>> <snip> >>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM. >>>>> >>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. >>>> >>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical >>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are >>>> not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson >>>> arithmetic. >>> >>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed. >>> >> "They" being what? The set of formulas closed under logical >> consequence? They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among >> other things) the definition of "formula". > > Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or > incorrect(X). Writing English(words) with brackets as if predicates(they are) makes it look all sciencey does not made it any more formal or correct. (Decidability is a property of sets, by the way.) -- Ben.
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 10:28 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <3a662ae6-e7b1-477b-9fb4-48e9b0c708ad@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #172931 |
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 12:20:18 PM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> writes:
>
> > On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> >> peteolcott wrote:
> >>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> >>>> peteolcott writes:
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> >>>> <snip>
> >>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
> >>>>
> >>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
> >>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
> >>>> not decidable. Even group theory is not decidable. Neither is Robinson
> >>>> arithmetic.
> >>>
> >>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
> >>>
> >> "They" being what? The set of formulas closed under logical
> >> consequence? They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among
> >> other things) the definition of "formula".
> >
> > Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or
> > incorrect(X).
>
> Writing English(words) with brackets as if predicates(they are) makes it
> look all sciencey does not made it any more formal or correct.
>
> (Decidability is a property of sets, by the way.)
>
> --
> Ben.
Yes that seems to make sense.
What is the formal specification of the term {Mathematical Axiom} such that every David Hilbert finite string can be decided to be an element of the Axioms of L or not an element of the Axioms of L?
∀L ∈ Formal_Systems
∀X ∈ WFF(L)
( Axiom(L, X) ∨ ~Axiom(L, X) )
So far I have not found any specification from any source that answers
this question as well as my own specification:
An BaseFact is an expression X of (natural or formal) language L that has been assigned the semantic property of True. (Similar to a math Axiom).
Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
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| From | Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 18:55 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <p679fv$kqs$1@news.albasani.net> |
| In reply to | #172933 |
peteolcott wrote:
> What is the formal specification of the term {Mathematical Axiom}
> such that every David Hilbert finite string can be decided to be an
> element of the Axioms of L or not an element of the Axioms of L?
Can you describe your problem in terms of an actual formal system?
Consider Mendelson's definition of axiom of (his formulation of)
propositional calculus. Why would you struggle to say of some random
string whether or not it is such an axiom? (Your use of the term "David
Hilbert" is just so much noise.)
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| From | peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2018-02-16 12:46 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <6c2cc455-419c-41d2-b228-3bbfbcb2f1c1@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #172935 |
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 12:56:01 PM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> peteolcott wrote:
>
> > What is the formal specification of the term {Mathematical Axiom}
> > such that every David Hilbert finite string can be decided to be an
> > element of the Axioms of L or not an element of the Axioms of L?
>
> Can you describe your problem in terms of an actual formal system?
> Consider Mendelson's definition of axiom of (his formulation of)
> propositional calculus.
He never actually defines what an axiom is he just starts using
them as if they have already been defined.
> Why would you struggle to say of some random
> string whether or not it is such an axiom? (Your use of the term "David
> Hilbert" is just so much noise.)
It is not that I struggle with it. It is that the field of mathematics
has undetected errors because math never bothered to formalize the
notion of an axiom.
If math had ever formalized the notion of an axiom then math would
already know that Tarski's undefinability theorem is necessarily
incorrect because math would know how to define the undefinable part
of Tarski undefinability.
I always use David Hilbert formalisms for two reasons:
(1) It eliminates all presumptions if we know we are
dealing with finite strings that may simply be gibberish.
(2) It forms a bridge between Math and computer science
because finite strings can be directly processed by algorithms.
(3) A formal proof from finite strings to the semantic values
of True and False can be exhautively elaborated by the precise
algorithm required to reach these semantic values from finite
strings without the most infinitesimal gap in the inference
chain slipping through the cracks undetected.
For all formal language L by what precise formal criterion measure
do we decide that expression X of L is a member of Axioms of L?
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