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Groups > sci.logic > #172303 > unrolled thread

What is the deal with the Halting Theorem?

Started byNewberry <newberryxy@gmail.com>
First post2018-02-09 16:19 -0800
Last post2018-02-10 16:32 +0000
Articles 20 on this page of 99 — 9 participants

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Contents

  What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-09 16:19 -0800
    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 02:05 +0000
    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-10 00:31 -0600
      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 12:19 +0000
      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-10 18:26 -0800
        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-12 09:19 -0800
    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-10 00:15 -0800
      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-10 06:49 -0800
        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 18:23 +0000
          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-10 15:37 -0800
          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-12 09:16 -0800
            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-12 17:40 +0000
              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-12 20:48 -0600
                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-13 04:46 +0000
                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 14:16 -0600
                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-13 20:46 +0000
                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 19:26 -0600
                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 13:54 +0000
                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 15:24 +0000
                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 00:21 +0000
                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 19:36 -0600
                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 18:05 -0800
                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 22:12 -0600
                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 21:10 -0800
                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 21:35 -0800
                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-13 23:36 -0800
                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 14:54 +0000
                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 09:00 -0600
                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Newberry <newberryxy@gmail.com> - 2018-02-14 08:29 -0800
                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 10:46 -0600
                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-14 21:37 -0800
                                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-14 21:49 -0800
                                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-16 11:52 -0800
                                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-16 11:54 -0800
                                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 12:52 -0800
                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 14:05 +0000
                                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-15 07:02 -0800
                                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-15 07:09 -0800
                                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 10:41 -0600
                                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 15:20 +0000
                                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 10:56 -0600
                                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:05 +0000
                                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 11:29 -0600
                                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:35 +0000
                                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 11:55 -0600
                                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 13:44 +0000
                                                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 07:21 -0800
                                                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-16 15:39 +0000
                                                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 09:08 -0800
                                                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 17:25 +0000
                                                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-16 11:38 -0600
                                                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 17:49 +0000
                                                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-16 12:03 -0600
                                                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 18:23 +0000
                                                                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 10:33 -0800
                                                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-16 16:49 -0800
                                                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-16 18:20 +0000
                                                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 10:28 -0800
                                                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 18:55 +0000
                                                                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 12:46 -0800
                                                                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-16 20:53 +0000
                                                                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-16 13:36 -0800
                                                                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-28 13:22 -0800
                                                                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-28 15:46 -0600
                                                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-16 20:44 +0000
                                                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-16 15:53 -0600
                                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:29 +0000
                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-14 08:42 -0500
                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 09:35 -0600
                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 20:14 +0000
                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 17:10 -0600
                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 13:39 +0000
                                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-15 06:47 -0800
                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2018-02-14 20:55 -0500
                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-14 08:27 -0800
                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 14:52 +0000
                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 09:47 -0600
                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 20:12 +0000
                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 17:05 -0600
                                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 13:53 +0000
                                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> - 2018-02-15 06:51 -0800
                                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 15:16 +0000
                                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-15 08:36 -0800
                                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 11:14 -0600
                                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 17:19 +0000
                                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-15 10:43 -0600
                                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-15 16:57 +0000
                                                  Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? bursejan@gmail.com - 2018-02-15 09:24 -0800
                                      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-16 11:58 -0800
                                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2018-02-14 21:33 -0800
                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2018-02-14 14:45 +0000
                        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 02:24 +0000
                          Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-13 22:18 -0600
                            Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 05:32 +0000
                              Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-14 00:30 -0600
                                Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-14 14:07 +0000
                    Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2018-02-13 18:04 -0800
      Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> - 2018-02-10 09:06 -0600
        Re: What is the deal with the Halting Theorem? Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2018-02-10 16:32 +0000

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#172801

FromPete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address>
Date2018-02-15 10:56 -0600
Message-ID<A7adnb821ccxJhjHnZ2dnUU7-U_NnZ2d@giganews.com>
In reply to#172788
On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> peteolcott wrote:
>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever
>>>> did that before that I am aware of.
>>>
>>> You're not aware of much.
>>
>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of?
> 
> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever calculus is presented.  What could be clearer than that?

So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here
counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly
what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process
will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S
belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)?

An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been
defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018).

A BasicFact can express how the rule-of-inference works:

In this case:
A
A -> B
------
B

Has free variables yet still expresses the BasicFact of how A -> B works.
So a BasicFact would seem to be analogous to a Prolog fact and a Prolog Rule.

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott

> 
>> It seems that Mendelson gets confused and conflates the term Theorem
>> with the term Axiom.
> 
> Mendelson does what I say in my first paragraph a number of times (because he discusses a number of calculi).
> 
> 
>> In section 1.4 he specifies that a Theorem has
>> the empty set as its formal proof.
>>
>> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
>> A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be true by accepted mathematical operations and arguments. In general, a theorem is an embodiment of some general principle that makes it part of a larger theory. The process of showing a theorem to be correct is called a proof.
>>
>> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Axiom.html
>> An axiom is a proposition regarded as self-evidently true without proof. The word "axiom" is a slightly archaic synonym for postulate. Compare conjecture or hypothesis, both of which connote apparently true but not self-evident statements.
>>
>> Across different authors an Axiom is anything from an assumption to
>> a self-evident truth. I ended this nonsense and simply define BaseFact
>> as an expression X of language L that has been defined to have the
>> semantic property of True.
>>
> 


-- 
*∀X True(X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms Provable(Γ, X) *

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#172805

FromPeter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com>
Date2018-02-15 17:05 +0000
Message-ID<p64ekq$a8j$1@news.albasani.net>
In reply to#172801
Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>> peteolcott wrote:
>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival 
>>> wrote:
>>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever
>>>>> did that before that I am aware of.
>>>>
>>>> You're not aware of much.
>>>
>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of?
>>
>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of 
>> that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever 
>> calculus is presented.  What could be clearer than that?
> 
> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here
> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly
> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process
> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S
> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)?

Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. 
The concept would be next to worthless otherwise.  One wishes to know if 
an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not.  Since the 
definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to 
recognize axioms as such.

> An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been
> defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018).

Unfortunately truth isn't decidable so your definition falls at the 
first hurdle.

> A BasicFact can express how the rule-of-inference works:
> 
> In this case:
> A
> A -> B
> ------
> B
> 
> Has free variables yet still expresses the BasicFact of how A -> B works.
> So a BasicFact would seem to be analogous to a Prolog fact and a Prolog 
> Rule.
> 
> Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott
> 
>>
>>> It seems that Mendelson gets confused and conflates the term Theorem
>>> with the term Axiom.
>>
>> Mendelson does what I say in my first paragraph a number of times 
>> (because he discusses a number of calculi).
>>
>>
>>> In section 1.4 he specifies that a Theorem has
>>> the empty set as its formal proof.
>>>
>>> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Theorem.html
>>> A theorem is a statement that can be demonstrated to be true by 
>>> accepted mathematical operations and arguments. In general, a theorem 
>>> is an embodiment of some general principle that makes it part of a 
>>> larger theory. The process of showing a theorem to be correct is 
>>> called a proof.
>>>
>>> http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Axiom.html
>>> An axiom is a proposition regarded as self-evidently true without 
>>> proof. The word "axiom" is a slightly archaic synonym for postulate. 
>>> Compare conjecture or hypothesis, both of which connote apparently 
>>> true but not self-evident statements.
>>>
>>> Across different authors an Axiom is anything from an assumption to
>>> a self-evident truth. I ended this nonsense and simply define BaseFact
>>> as an expression X of language L that has been defined to have the
>>> semantic property of True.
>>>
>>
> 
> 

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#172816

FromPete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address>
Date2018-02-15 11:29 -0600
Message-ID<koOdndT6t9b4XhjHnZ2dnUU7-Q_NnZ2d@giganews.com>
In reply to#172805
On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> Pete Olcott wrote:
>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>>> peteolcott wrote:
>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever
>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of.
>>>>>
>>>>> You're not aware of much.
>>>>
>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of?
>>>
>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever calculus is presented.  What could be clearer than that?
>>
>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here
>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly
>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process
>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S
>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)?
> 
> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise.  One wishes to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not.  Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to recognize axioms as such.

So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of axiom
such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L
can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not.

> 
>> An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been
>> defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018).
> 
> Unfortunately truth isn't decidable so your definition falls at the first hurdle.
> 

It is not that Truth is undecidable it is that pre-existing half-baked
notions of axiom were insufficient to provide a correct True(L, X)
predicate for all languages L and all finite strings X.

Now that I have formalized the notion of Axiom, it is easy to provide
a True(L, X) predicate and a False(L, X) predicate for every formal
and natural language L and finite string X.



-- 
*∀X True(L, X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms(L) Provable(Γ, X) *

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]


#172823

FromPeter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com>
Date2018-02-15 17:35 +0000
Message-ID<p64gcs$5mk$1@news.albasani.net>
In reply to#172816
Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>> peteolcott wrote:
>>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever
>>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You're not aware of much.
>>>>>
>>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of?
>>>>
>>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of 
>>>> that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever 
>>>> calculus is presented.  What could be clearer than that?
>>>
>>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here
>>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly
>>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process
>>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S
>>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: 
>>> Axiom(S)?
>>
>> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. 
>> The concept would be next to worthless otherwise.  One wishes to know 
>> if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not.  Since 
>> the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to 
>> recognize axioms as such.
> 
> So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of axiom
> such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L
> can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not.

You have Mendelson.  He defines a number of language/axiom pairs.  For 
each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language is 
an axioms or not?  I can.  If you can't, what specifically are you 
having a problem with?

>>> An Axiom X of language L is an expression of L such that X has been
>>> defined to have the semantic property of True. (Olcott 2018).
>>
>> Unfortunately truth isn't decidable so your definition falls at the 
>> first hurdle.
>>
> 
> It is not that Truth is undecidable it is that pre-existing half-baked
> notions of axiom were insufficient to provide a correct True(L, X)
> predicate for all languages L and all finite strings X.
> 
> Now that I have formalized the notion of Axiom, it is easy to provide
> a True(L, X) predicate and a False(L, X) predicate for every formal
> and natural language L and finite string X.
> 
> 
> 

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]


#172830

FromPete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address>
Date2018-02-15 11:55 -0600
Message-ID<KoidnVzvPLAFVBjHnZ2dnUU7-d3NnZ2d@giganews.com>
In reply to#172823
On 2/15/2018 11:35 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> Pete Olcott wrote:
>> On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>>> peteolcott wrote:
>>>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever
>>>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You're not aware of much.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of?
>>>>>
>>>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever calculus is presented.  What could be clearer than that?
>>>>
>>>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here
>>>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly
>>>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated process
>>>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite string S
>>>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: Axiom(S)?
>>>
>>> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise.  One wishes to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or not.  Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one must be able to recognize axioms as such.
>>
>> So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of axiom
>> such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L
>> can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not.
> 
> You have Mendelson.  He defines a number of language/axiom pairs.  For each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language is an axioms or not?  I can.  If you can't, what specifically are you having a problem with?
> 

Olcott conjecture no one has ever previously provided a formal
specification of the term of the art: Axiom such that an automated
system could always decide whether or not a finite string X is an
element of the collection of axioms T in language L or not an element
of the collection T of axioms in language L.

I have just provided a formal specification of the term of the art
axiom, such that an automated system can always decide whether or
not a finite string X is an Axiom of language L.

A finite string X is an axiom of language L if and only if finite
string X has been defined to have the semantic property of True
in language L.

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott

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#172897

FromPeter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 13:44 +0000
Message-ID<p66n78$2kl$1@news.albasani.net>
In reply to#172830
Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 2/15/2018 11:35 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>> On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>>>> peteolcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter 
>>>>>>> Percival wrote:
>>>>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever
>>>>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You're not aware of much.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae 
>>>>>> of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever 
>>>>>> calculus is presented.  What could be clearer than that?
>>>>>
>>>>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here
>>>>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly
>>>>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated 
>>>>> process
>>>>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite 
>>>>> string S
>>>>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: 
>>>>> Axiom(S)?
>>>>
>>>> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of 
>>>> not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise.  One wishes 
>>>> to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or 
>>>> not.  Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one 
>>>> must be able to recognize axioms as such.
>>>
>>> So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of 
>>> axiom
>>> such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L
>>> can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not.
>>
>> You have Mendelson.  He defines a number of language/axiom pairs.  For 
>> each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language 
>> is an axioms or not?  I can.  If you can't, what specifically are you 
>> having a problem with?
>>
> 
> Olcott conjecture no one has ever previously provided a formal
> specification of the term of the art: Axiom such that an automated
> system could always decide whether or not a finite string X is an
> element of the collection of axioms T in language L or not an element
> of the collection T of axioms in language L.

Mendelson's axioms, and others, are recognizable by TMs.
> 
> I have just provided a formal specification of the term of the art
> axiom, such that an automated system can always decide whether or
> not a finite string X is an Axiom of language L.
> 
> A finite string X is an axiom of language L if and only if finite
> string X has been defined to have the semantic property of True
> in language L.

True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.

> 
> Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott

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#172904

Frompeteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 07:21 -0800
Message-ID<7dec621c-19ee-4ae6-96a7-e5800be2497b@googlegroups.com>
In reply to#172897
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> Pete Olcott wrote:
> > On 2/15/2018 11:35 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> >> Pete Olcott wrote:
> >>> On 2/15/2018 11:05 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> >>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
> >>>>> On 2/15/2018 9:20 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> >>>>>> peteolcott wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Thursday, February 15, 2018 at 8:05:21 AM UTC-6, Peter 
> >>>>>>> Percival wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Pete Olcott wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I formally defined exactly what an axiom is, no one ever
> >>>>>>>>> did that before that I am aware of.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> You're not aware of much.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> What is the best formal specification of an axiom that you know of?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Numerous books on logic specify a language and list some formulae 
> >>>>>> of that language and announce that they are the axioms of whatever 
> >>>>>> calculus is presented.  What could be clearer than that?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> So you are saying that when a book shows that this kind of stuff here
> >>>>> counts as an axiom, is a formal specification of the notion of exactly
> >>>>> what an axiom is and what an axiom is not such that an automated 
> >>>>> process
> >>>>> will always be able to correctly decide whether or not a finite 
> >>>>> string S
> >>>>> belongs to the collection of finite strings with the property of: 
> >>>>> Axiom(S)?
> >>>>
> >>>> Certainly it should be decidable whether something is an axiom of 
> >>>> not. The concept would be next to worthless otherwise.  One wishes 
> >>>> to know if an alleged proof of a statement really is a proof or 
> >>>> not.  Since the definition of proof makes reference to axioms, one 
> >>>> must be able to recognize axioms as such.
> >>>
> >>> So then point me to a reference that formally defines the notion of 
> >>> axiom
> >>> such that every finite string X of any formal or natural language L
> >>> can be decided to have the property of Axiom(L, X) or not.
> >>
> >> You have Mendelson.  He defines a number of language/axiom pairs.  For 
> >> each pair can you tell if a finite string of symbols in the language 
> >> is an axioms or not?  I can.  If you can't, what specifically are you 
> >> having a problem with?
> >>
> > 
> > Olcott conjecture no one has ever previously provided a formal
> > specification of the term of the art: Axiom such that an automated
> > system could always decide whether or not a finite string X is an
> > element of the collection of axioms T in language L or not an element
> > of the collection T of axioms in language L.
> 
> Mendelson's axioms, and others, are recognizable by TMs.
> > 
> > I have just provided a formal specification of the term of the art
> > axiom, such that an automated system can always decide whether or
> > not a finite string X is an Axiom of language L.
> > 
> > A finite string X is an axiom of language L if and only if finite
> > string X has been defined to have the semantic property of True
> > in language L.
> 
> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
> 

Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong. 

> > 
> > Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott

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#172905

FromBen Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk>
Date2018-02-16 15:39 +0000
Message-ID<87lgft2bbf.fsf@bsb.me.uk>
In reply to#172904
peteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com> writes:

> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
<snip>
>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
>
> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.

Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
arithmetic.

-- 
Ben.

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#172919

Frompeteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 09:08 -0800
Message-ID<c892c008-5b59-4c6a-bb12-39b0087c9149@googlegroups.com>
In reply to#172905
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> peteolcott writes:
> 
> > On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> <snip>
> >> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
> >
> > Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
> 
> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
> arithmetic.
> 
> -- 
> Ben.

Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed. 

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#172923

FromPeter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 17:25 +0000
Message-ID<p6746a$1ik$1@news.albasani.net>
In reply to#172919
peteolcott wrote:
> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>> peteolcott writes:
>>
>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
>> <snip>
>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
>>>
>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
>>
>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
>> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> -- 
>> Ben.
> 
> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
> 
"They" being what?  The set of formulas closed under logical 
consequence?  They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other 
things) the definition of "formula".  Why are you so determined to make 
yourself look stupid?

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#172926

FromPete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address>
Date2018-02-16 11:38 -0600
Message-ID<sdidnWMhkdG5ihrHnZ2dnUU7-YXNnZ2d@giganews.com>
In reply to#172923
On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> peteolcott wrote:
>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>> peteolcott writes:
>>>
>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
>>> <snip>
>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
>>>>
>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
>>>
>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
>>> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
>>> arithmetic.
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Ben.
>>
>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
>>
> "They" being what?  The set of formulas closed under logical consequence?  They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other things) the definition of "formula".  

Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or incorrect(X).

Those people that have a religious conviction against the notion of semantic
error have undetected incoherence in their reasoning.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously


-- 
*∀L ∈ Formal_Systems
∀X
True(L, X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms(L) Provable(Γ, X) *

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#172927

FromPeter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 17:49 +0000
Message-ID<p675ij$v2b$1@news.albasani.net>
In reply to#172926
Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>> peteolcott wrote:
>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>> peteolcott writes:
>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>> <snip>
>>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
>>>>
>>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
>>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
>>>> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is 
>>>> Robinson
>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>> -- 
>>>> Ben.
>>>
>>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
>>>
>> "They" being what?  The set of formulas closed under logical 
>> consequence?  They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among 
>> other things) the definition of "formula". 
> 
> Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or 
> incorrect(X).

Prove it.  The set of first order theorems is already undecidable.

May I ask if this strange habit of yours (denying familiar facts) 
extends to other areas of knowledge?  Do you, for example, tell chemists 
that water isn't aitch-two-oh?  Because that is analogous to what you do 
in this newsgroup.

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#172930

FromPete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address>
Date2018-02-16 12:03 -0600
Message-ID<48SdnclWavxngRrHnZ2dnUU7-fnNnZ2d@giganews.com>
In reply to#172927
On 2/16/2018 11:49 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> Pete Olcott wrote:
>> On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>>> peteolcott wrote:
>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>> peteolcott writes:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
>>>>>
>>>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
>>>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
>>>>> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>> -- 
>>>>> Ben.
>>>>
>>>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
>>>>
>>> "They" being what?  The set of formulas closed under logical consequence?  They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other things) the definition of "formula". 
>>
>> Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or incorrect(X).
> 
> Prove it.  The set of first order theorems is already undecidable.
> 
> May I ask if this strange habit of yours (denying familiar facts) extends to other areas of knowledge?  Do you, for example, tell chemists that water isn't aitch-two-oh?  Because that is analogous to what you do in this newsgroup.
> 
> 

The "Fact" that "The set of first order theorems is already undecidable"
is actually many of the misconceptions that I am refuting.

I am not bothered to go through the tedium and monotony of pointing
out every little error in every little proof at each level of logic.

Instead I am showing a single error that simultaneously applies to the
formal conclusions of all of these cases at every logic level.

When-so-ever pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) occurs the only
correct decision is PSR rejection of semantically incorrect WFF.

Copyright 2018 and many other years since 1997 as documented on USENET.

-- 
*∀L ∈ Formal_Systems
∀X
True(L, X) ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ Axioms(L) Provable(Γ, X) *

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#172932

FromPeter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 18:23 +0000
Message-ID<p677i6$p1e$1@news.albasani.net>
In reply to#172930
Pete Olcott wrote:

> 
> When-so-ever pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) occurs the only
> correct decision is PSR rejection of semantically incorrect WFF.

Semantics has got nothing to do with what constitutes a wff.  If may be 
that there is such a thing as a POwff (yet to be defined) but if that's 
what you're talking about your remarks have nothing to do with the 
limitative theorems of logic.

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#172934

Frompeteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 10:33 -0800
Message-ID<b9251475-9fa7-45da-bb8f-6be12b2ab72e@googlegroups.com>
In reply to#172932
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 12:23:04 PM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> Pete Olcott wrote:
> 
> > 
> > When-so-ever pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) occurs the only
> > correct decision is PSR rejection of semantically incorrect WFF.
> 
> Semantics has got nothing to do with what constitutes a wff.  If may be 
> that there is such a thing as a POwff (yet to be defined) but if that's 
> what you're talking about your remarks have nothing to do with the 
> limitative theorems of logic.

As already provided:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously

If an expression X of (formal or natural) language L is not both syntactically correct WFF(L, X) and Semantically_Correct(L, X) then it is Incorrect(L, X).

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#172977

Fromgrahamcooper7@gmail.com
Date2018-02-16 16:49 -0800
Message-ID<b48954a6-042a-464b-ad0b-5a4be02693c8@googlegroups.com>
In reply to#172930
On Saturday, February 17, 2018 at 4:03:45 AM UTC+10, Pete Olcott wrote:
> On 2/16/2018 11:49 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> > Pete Olcott wrote:
> >> On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> >>> peteolcott wrote:
> >>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> >>>>> peteolcott writes:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> >>>>> <snip>
> >>>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
> >>>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
> >>>>> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
> >>>>> arithmetic.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -- 
> >>>>> Ben.
> >>>>
> >>>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
> >>>>
> >>> "They" being what?  The set of formulas closed under logical consequence?  They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among other things) the definition of "formula". 
> >>
> >> Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or incorrect(X).
> > 
> > Prove it.  The set of first order theorems is already undecidable.
> > 
> > May I ask if this strange habit of yours (denying familiar facts) extends to other areas of knowledge?  Do you, for example, tell chemists that water isn't aitch-two-oh?  Because that is analogous to what you do in this newsgroup.
> > 
> > 
> 
> The "Fact" that "The set of first order theorems is already undecidable"
> is actually many of the misconceptions that I am refuting.
> 
> I am not bothered to go through the tedium and monotony of pointing
> out every little error in every little proof at each level of logic.
> 
> Instead I am showing a single error that simultaneously applies to the
> formal conclusions of all of these cases at every logic level.



IMO.... the set of un-decidable problems show SELF REFERENCE


When ASKED for some example of TRUE-BUT-UNPROVABLE formula...


APART FROM the deliriously funny...


G.... NOT(PROOF(G))





There is LITTLE EVIDENCE of TRUE-BUT-UNPROVALBE FORMULA




IN FACT ... the Godel Proof has been ENTIRELY REWRITTEN in the last 10 years to hide this.


ASK MARTIN SHOBE ..... he states the 20TH C Wording of GODELS PROOF, a TRUE G



1 EXAMPLE of TRUE-BUT-UNPROVABLE that was a POPULAR EXAMPLE supporting GODELS PROOF



was DIAPHANTINE EQUATIONS





A cursory look at Diaphantine Equations showed a method for representing 0-solution in the formula!

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#172931

FromBen Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk>
Date2018-02-16 18:20 +0000
Message-ID<87606w3ig4.fsf@bsb.me.uk>
In reply to#172926
Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> writes:

> On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
>> peteolcott wrote:
>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>> peteolcott writes:
>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
>>>> <snip>
>>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
>>>>>
>>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
>>>>
>>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
>>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
>>>> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
>>>> arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
>>>
>> "They" being what?  The set of formulas closed under logical
>> consequence?  They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among
>> other things) the definition of "formula".
>
> Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or
> incorrect(X).

Writing English(words) with brackets as if predicates(they are) makes it
look all sciencey does not made it any more formal or correct.

(Decidability is a property of sets, by the way.)

-- 
Ben.

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#172933

Frompeteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 10:28 -0800
Message-ID<3a662ae6-e7b1-477b-9fb4-48e9b0c708ad@googlegroups.com>
In reply to#172931
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 12:20:18 PM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> Pete Olcott <Pete@NoEmail.address> writes:
> 
> > On 2/16/2018 11:25 AM, Peter Percival wrote:
> >> peteolcott wrote:
> >>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 9:39:36 AM UTC-6, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> >>>> peteolcott writes:
> >>>>
> >>>>> On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 7:44:10 AM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> >>>> <snip>
> >>>>>> True statements, on the other hand, are not recognizable by a TM.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Since knowledge is a directed acyclic graph you are wrong.
> >>>>
> >>>> Even if you limit yourself to the set of formulas closed under logical
> >>>> consequence -- the "provable" formulas -- most interesting theories are
> >>>> not decidable.  Even group theory is not decidable.  Neither is Robinson
> >>>> arithmetic.
> >>>
> >>> Then Olcott's conjecture: They are necessarily ill-formed.
> >>>
> >> "They" being what?  The set of formulas closed under logical
> >> consequence?  They can't be ill-formed because they satisfy (among
> >> other things) the definition of "formula".
> >
> > Every WFF closed under logical consequence X is decidable(X) or
> > incorrect(X).
> 
> Writing English(words) with brackets as if predicates(they are) makes it
> look all sciencey does not made it any more formal or correct.
> 
> (Decidability is a property of sets, by the way.)
> 
> -- 
> Ben.

Yes that seems to make sense.

What is the formal specification of the term {Mathematical Axiom} such that every David Hilbert finite string can be decided to be an element of the Axioms of L or not an element of the Axioms of L? 

∀L ∈ Formal_Systems 
∀X ∈ WFF(L) 
( Axiom(L, X) ∨ ~Axiom(L, X) ) 

So far I have not found any specification from any source that answers
this question as well as my own specification: 

An BaseFact is an expression X of (natural or formal) language L that has been assigned the semantic property of True. (Similar to a math Axiom).

Copyright 2018 Pete Olcott

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#172935

FromPeter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 18:55 +0000
Message-ID<p679fv$kqs$1@news.albasani.net>
In reply to#172933
peteolcott wrote:

> What is the formal specification of the term {Mathematical Axiom}
> such that every David Hilbert finite string can be decided to be an
> element of the Axioms of L or not an element of the Axioms of L?

Can you describe your problem in terms of an actual formal system? 
Consider Mendelson's definition of axiom of (his formulation of) 
propositional calculus.  Why would you struggle to say of some random 
string whether or not it is such an axiom?  (Your use of the term "David 
Hilbert" is just so much noise.)



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#172950

Frompeteolcott <peterolcott2@gmail.com>
Date2018-02-16 12:46 -0800
Message-ID<6c2cc455-419c-41d2-b228-3bbfbcb2f1c1@googlegroups.com>
In reply to#172935
On Friday, February 16, 2018 at 12:56:01 PM UTC-6, Peter Percival wrote:
> peteolcott wrote:
> 
> > What is the formal specification of the term {Mathematical Axiom}
> > such that every David Hilbert finite string can be decided to be an
> > element of the Axioms of L or not an element of the Axioms of L?
> 
> Can you describe your problem in terms of an actual formal system? 
> Consider Mendelson's definition of axiom of (his formulation of) 
> propositional calculus.  

He never actually defines what an axiom is he just starts using
them as if they have already been defined. 

> Why would you struggle to say of some random 
> string whether or not it is such an axiom?  (Your use of the term "David 
> Hilbert" is just so much noise.)

It is not that I struggle with it. It is that the field of mathematics
has undetected errors because math never bothered to formalize the
notion of an axiom. 

If math had ever formalized the notion of an axiom then math would
already know that Tarski's undefinability theorem is necessarily 
incorrect because math would know how to define the undefinable part 
of Tarski undefinability. 

I always use David Hilbert formalisms for two reasons:
(1) It eliminates all presumptions if we know we are
dealing with finite strings that may simply be gibberish. 

(2) It forms a bridge between Math and computer science 
because finite strings can be directly processed by algorithms. 

(3) A formal proof from finite strings to the semantic values 
of True and False can be exhautively elaborated by the precise 
algorithm required to reach these semantic values from finite
strings without the most infinitesimal gap in the inference
chain slipping through the cracks undetected. 

For all formal language L by what precise formal criterion measure 
do we decide that expression X of L is a member of Axioms of L? 

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