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Groups > sci.logic > #164770 > unrolled thread
| Started by | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2017-10-11 05:37 -0700 |
| Last post | 2017-10-21 00:04 -0700 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 265 — 16 participants |
Back to article view | Back to sci.logic
Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 05:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 10:49 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 09:49 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 14:08 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 12:23 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 15:50 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 18:01 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 21:46 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 20:03 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-11 22:48 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-11 21:06 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-12 04:33 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-10-12 06:58 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-13 05:34 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-12 11:36 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-14 18:48 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-14 19:13 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 11:35 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-20 11:53 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:33 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 08:57 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 08:59 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 09:07 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:36 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 09:08 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 09:13 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 23:28 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-12 05:08 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-12 04:36 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-13 19:29 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-14 01:27 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 03:14 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 08:48 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 10:32 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 14:04 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:25 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:43 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 20:17 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 18:59 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 20:14 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 18:58 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 21:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-25 20:47 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-01 19:36 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:35 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 21:00 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 12:39 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 21:22 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:27 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 22:33 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 19:28 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-14 22:39 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-15 14:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice grahamcooper7@gmail.com - 2017-10-16 14:42 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-02 22:11 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-03 20:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-04 10:24 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-05 18:19 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Rupert <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-06 04:03 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-07 22:12 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-11-13 19:51 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-15 20:37 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-03 20:49 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-04 06:48 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-04 08:45 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 12:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 13:01 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-11 09:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 09:31 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-11 10:00 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-11 23:15 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 11:24 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-12 04:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-12 20:08 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 02:33 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-13 21:41 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-14 00:32 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-14 21:27 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-16 00:35 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-16 16:53 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-17 02:01 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 03:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-18 01:30 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:35 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-18 16:04 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-19 18:10 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 03:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-21 00:01 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 23:12 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-21 15:31 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-22 04:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-22 21:41 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-23 02:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-23 16:43 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-26 00:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-26 23:32 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-27 02:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-27 03:07 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-27 08:45 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-27 14:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-28 05:00 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-27 22:11 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-28 04:59 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-28 18:24 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-29 07:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-29 15:10 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-30 04:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-30 08:18 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-01 17:43 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-02 18:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-03 03:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-03 11:41 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-17 12:31 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-17 23:29 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-17 17:04 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-17 19:19 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2017-11-18 01:56 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-19 15:04 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2017-11-19 22:56 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-18 02:04 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 08:42 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:30 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 02:08 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-19 09:41 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 13:38 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-20 09:28 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-20 09:33 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Alan Smaill <smaill@SPAMinf.ed.ac.uk> - 2017-11-20 19:47 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-21 05:56 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-21 06:03 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-21 06:18 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-21 07:34 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-21 07:53 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-27 21:10 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:04 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 02:11 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-19 09:43 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 13:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-11-19 15:14 -0600
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 08:36 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-18 08:38 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-18 08:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 08:51 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-18 09:30 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:31 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:19 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-17 21:05 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-19 07:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 04:37 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-19 02:14 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 02:03 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-11-20 01:18 +0000
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-19 01:22 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-18 04:38 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Zeit Geist <Tucsondrew@me.com> - 2017-11-18 15:09 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-19 01:24 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 01:56 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-19 03:18 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-11-19 13:39 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice bursejan@gmail.com - 2017-11-19 15:16 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-11-19 16:24 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-07 16:57 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-11-07 16:57 -0800
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-24 16:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 22:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-26 23:40 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-27 01:07 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-27 11:15 -0400
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-27 16:48 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-22 12:23 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 13:11 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-25 20:38 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-26 00:22 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-13 02:08 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 02:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-13 02:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 03:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-13 03:50 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-13 13:20 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-14 08:02 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-14 11:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-14 11:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-14 12:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-14 12:50 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-10-14 21:29 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 13:06 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice "Shobe, Martin" <martin.shobe@yahoo.com> - 2017-10-16 20:32 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 02:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-17 07:57 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 12:56 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-17 13:20 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-17 20:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-17 21:06 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-17 22:14 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-18 02:53 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice khongdongphong@gmail.com - 2017-10-17 22:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-18 02:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:19 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-19 04:43 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-19 05:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-24 22:40 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 22:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice shionoro@googlemail.com - 2017-10-25 10:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 03:14 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 12:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-15 15:19 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:44 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-16 16:50 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 02:45 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 13:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:52 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-17 13:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:53 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-18 21:04 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:15 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 12:59 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-15 15:23 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-15 15:25 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-15 23:54 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Peter Percival <peterxpercival@hotmail.com> - 2017-10-17 22:05 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-17 22:40 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-18 19:59 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-18 23:25 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-19 20:10 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-19 20:30 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-19 20:36 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-22 13:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 13:27 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 15:09 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 10:58 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:12 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:17 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 14:59 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Alan Smaill <smaill@SPAMinf.ed.ac.uk> - 2017-10-23 17:32 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:47 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 09:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 16:10 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 15:39 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 10:27 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-23 15:17 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-23 15:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 05:23 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 08:33 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 14:43 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-24 22:40 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-24 14:58 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> - 2017-10-25 13:33 -0400
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-25 20:11 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-11-02 22:40 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-25 20:31 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice mitch <mitch@dev.null> - 2017-10-26 05:35 -0500
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 15:05 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> - 2017-10-20 17:51 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-20 23:16 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-20 23:55 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-21 15:14 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> - 2017-10-22 04:37 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2017-10-22 21:42 +0100
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-22 13:48 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-20 23:46 -0700
Re: Some axioms like the axiom of choice Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> - 2017-10-21 00:04 -0700
Page 13 of 14 — ← Prev page 1 … 11 12 [13] 14 Next page →
| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-23 16:10 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <qPednYdRP6FYx3PEnZ2dnUU7-b3NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165582 |
On 10/23/2017 11:51 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 6:47:33 PM UTC+2, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >> On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 6:35:02 PM UTC+2, Alan Smaill wrote: >>> Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> writes: >>>> On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 5:59:16 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: >>>>> On 10/22/2017 03:27 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>>>>> On Sunday, October 22, 2017 at 10:17:35 PM UTC+2, George Greene wrote: >>>>>>> On Thursday, October 19, 2017 at 11:37:00 PM UTC-4, >>>>>>> Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>>>>>>> On Friday, October 20, 2017 at 5:30:02 AM UTC+2, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>>>>>>>> Great, to which I'd retort that the construction in question is >>>>>>>>> impossible just because only the finitary subset of ZF is in >>>>>>>>> fact valid. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Because we can give a construction, but it is properly infinite and in >>>>>>>> essence just countable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You are replying to yourself almost nonsensically here. >>>>>>> If you can construct something that is properly infinite then that >>>>>>> REFUTTES, NOT affirms, your contention that "only the finitary subset >>>>>>> of ZF is in fact valid". >>>>>> >>>>>> You have a point there: I still cannot nail it down, but mind you, >>>>>> I only have troubles with the *terminology*, but as soon as I just >>>>>> crack *that* fucking code, you'll be definitely done. >>>>> >>>>> You will find that that to be much easier said than done. >>>> >>>> Yet I already did: >>>> << You call ZF your "theory", that's the problem... >> >>>> >>>>> One of the most ambiguous words in the foundations of >>>>> mathematics is "foundation". >>>> >>>> No, on the contrary! >>>> >>>>> At that juncture, he will simply point out >>>>> that you are doing nothing more than has been done for >>>>> the received view and, thus, can claim no more secure >>>>> "foundation" than the received view. >>>> >>>> *You* just don't know the meaning of the words you use, *you* are not >>>> able to discern: the problem with the received view is *not* that >>>> foundations are impossible, just that the received view is broken. >>> >>> But mitch is not saying that foundations are impossible. >> >> But I think he is. >> >>> He is talking >>> about the difficulty of convincing George Greene that alternative >>> foundations could make more sense that the standard view. >> >> The difficulty of convincing GG I think is subordinate to having a theory >> to actually submit to his attention. Namely, this kind of socio- >> psychological questions are the last problem and then I'd even contend are >> a false problem. Anyway these questions are just beside the point until >> there is a point to be taken. It's the very methodology that I am >> criticising, and the whole systematic mainstream red herring, which is >> (no personal reference meant, i am talking of the "paradigm") just a >> systematic way of lying. -- It's just a red herring: comment on the >> fucking maths! > > Indeed, I am claiming that the standard is broken, I am not just claiming > that there is an alternative theory. Deal with it. > > Julio > The difficulty of convincing Mr. Greene reflects a difference in the ways by which logic can and is used. Some time ago a religious devotee crossposted sci.logic and sci.math with alt.atheist. The exchanges had been somewhat interesting since at least one of the professors on sci.math engage a lawyer on alt.atheist. What became clear is that there are very different views on logic. If I view rhetorical logic benignly, it is excellent training for studying both sides of a question. But, if I view rhetorical logic in its capacity for adversarial debate, it is a tool for any skeptic. In between his many expletives, Mr. Greene is extremely adept in the application of rhetorical logic. And, in the past when this newsgroup had more mainstream participants, it had not been uncommon to read posts by Mr. Greene exploring a subject from both sides of the question. By no means is Mr. Greene special in this regard. And, if you are going to claim that something is "broken" with the received view, you will find numerous critics, as you did when you had tried to formalize a notion of fundamental indexes using set-theoretic language. Moreover, they will claim that the burden of proof lies with you. But, why should that be? Does the burden of proof lie with you simply because a poll would show how many people believe in a "received view"? Assuming that none of us can "know" truth, your views could be true by mere accident. The truth of your views will not change the demands of rhetorical argumentation, however. By admitting this, how am I saying that foundations are impossible? Actually, I am conceding to applications of logic different from how I understand logic and its uses in mathematics. And, to the best that I can tell, my surest recourse is to make demands that "mathematical logic" is grounded in mathematical structure. I say this is the surest recourse since I certainly cannot justify my views on the paraphrasing of natural language statements. My recent discovery of how apartness has been studied in intuitionistic mathematics has led me to knowledge of a mathematician who held a similar view in that arena. His name had been Griss. Whereas I have studied "negationless logic" because of the eliminability of unary negation with respect to complete connectives, Griss held that negative existentials were constructively impossible and ought not be entertained in constructive mathematics. So, he rejected negation as a legitimate constructive notion. Brouwer's views were not restrictive enough for his taste. I have not found much, and, I have not taken the time to read 68 pages (I am reading a proof theory book right now), but, I did find this link, http://www.numdam.org/article/CM_1953__11__204_0.pdf to a paper developing the view. My point with regard to Mr. Greene is that you can never meet a rhetorical burden of proof if your interlocutor is unwilling to let you. But, that does not change the obligation of producing an affirmative defense of how something is broken and what must be done, if anything can be done, to fix it. It is in developing such a case that I think you will find more complexity than you expect. mitch
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| From | Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-23 15:39 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <d096d113-3010-4a28-8e3d-b3239b9078fa@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165601 |
On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 11:10:37 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: > My point with regard to Mr. Greene is that you can > never meet a rhetorical burden of proof if your > interlocutor is unwilling to let you. And my point is that that's bullshit. And I certainly will *not* read 3 pages of that: you simply cannot stay on the point, nor address any actual questioning, nor indeed you can argue anything at all that is not still borrowed, ultimately, from the global reality show. > It is in developing such a case that I > think you will find more complexity than you > expect. Yet I've already done it and you simply keep going out on a tangent: what's difficult is to convince *you* to rather look at the arguments instead of insisting on this bullshit of a line of reasoning. GG is more honest than you are: at least he is *not even* trying to fake any actual interest or good suggestion. *Plonk* Julio
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-24 10:27 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <FIqdndi5EtSVwXLEnZ2dnUU7-Q3NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165608 |
On 10/23/2017 05:39 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 11:10:37 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: > >> My point with regard to Mr. Greene is that you can >> never meet a rhetorical burden of proof if your >> interlocutor is unwilling to let you. > > And my point is that that's bullshit. "Pyrrhonism's objective is principally psychological, although it is best known for its epistemological arguments, particularly the problem of the criterion." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrhonism "Finally, Howard Sankey (2010, 2011, and 2012) argues that the Problem of the Criterion provides one of the primary, if not the primary, argument in support of epistemic relativism. Relativists take the Problem of the Criterion to show that it is not possible to provide a justification for choosing one criterion over another. However, rather than opting for skepticism, which claims that no criterion is justified, relativists respond to the Problem of the Criterion by holding that all criteria are equally rational to adopt—one’s choice is determined simply by the context in which one finds oneself." http://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/ You should note that Mr. Greene is not an epistemic relativist. He holds to a foundationalism grounded in the paradigm of first-order logic and applies the problem of the criterion by shifting the burden of proof to his interlocutors. "The question is this: Supposing that the dogmatist assents to something, say p, on the basis of a reason, say q, and gives r as his reason for q, etc., how should the Pyrrhonian react in order to avoid the snares of dogmatism? The suggestion in this passage appears to be to force the dogmatist into either an apparently never ending regress or an arbitrary assertion or begging the question. "This strategy is apparently based upon the claim that there are (only) three possible patterns which any instance of reasoning can take. Today we call the first pattern 'infinitism'; the second 'foundationalism'; and the third 'coherentism.' I will follow that nomenclature. "The so-called 'regress problem,' can be stated briefly in this way: There are only three possible patterns of reasoning. Either the process of producing reasons stops at a number of purported foundational propositions or it doesn't. If it does, then the reasoner is employing a foundationalist pattern. If it doesn't, then either the reasoning is circular, or it is infinite and non-repeating. There are no other significant possibilities. Thus, if none of these forms of reasoning can properly lead to assent, then no form can." [...] "Once again, it is crucial to recall that Pyrrhonians are not claiming that foundationalism is false. They could grant that some propositions do have autonomous warrant which is truth-conducive and that all other propositions depend for some of their warrant upon those basic propositions. What seems to lie at the heart of their view is that there is a deep irrationality in being a practicing self-conscious foundationalist. The question to Fred can be put this way: On the assumption that you cannot appeal to any other proposition, do you have any reason for thinking that b is true? Fred not only won't have any such reason for thinking b is true, given that assumption, he cannot have one (if he remains true to his foundationalism). Arbitrariness seems inevitable. Of course, foundationalists typically realize this and, in order to avoid arbitrariness, tell some story (for example, about privileged access) that provides a reason for thinking what Fred has called basic propositions are at least somewhat likely to be true. But, then, the regress of reasons has continued." Mr. Greene's "story" is that his views correspond with "the received view" -- what is taught and believed among the community of experts. And, that justifies (to audiences) why he can shift the burden of proof despite being a foundationalist in his own right. Good luck winning that argument. mitch
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-23 15:17 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <SpKdnTt9uJrt03PEnZ2dnUU7-ffNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165568 |
On 10/23/2017 11:12 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 5:59:16 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: >> On 10/22/2017 03:27 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>> On Sunday, October 22, 2017 at 10:17:35 PM UTC+2, George Greene wrote: >>>> On Thursday, October 19, 2017 at 11:37:00 PM UTC-4, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>>>> On Friday, October 20, 2017 at 5:30:02 AM UTC+2, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>>>>> Great, to which I'd retort that the construction in question is impossible >>>>>> just because only the finitary subset of ZF is in fact valid. >>>>> >>>>> Because we can give a construction, but it is properly infinite and in >>>>> essence just countable. >>>> >>>> You are replying to yourself almost nonsensically here. >>>> If you can construct something that is properly infinite then that >>>> REFUTTES, NOT affirms, your contention that "only the finitary subset >>>> of ZF is in fact valid". >>> >>> You have a point there: I still cannot nail it down, but mind you, I only >>> have troubles with the *terminology*, but as soon as I just crack *that* >>> fucking code, you'll be definitely done. >> >> You will find that that to be much easier said than done. > > Yet I already did: > << You call ZF your "theory", that's the problem... >> > Ok. First, there are two notions of "theory". In semantics, a theory can be any collection of formulas. Logical consequence is understood with respect to classes of models in which the collection is satisfied. Any statement which is true in that class of models is a logical consequence of the given formulas. In proof theory, one usually speaks of a theory as a deductive closure. This depends upon the rules of inference. I am assuming you have a problem with what is taken as a theory. So, I assume you have some criticism and some basis for that criticism. Would you care to share? mitch
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| From | Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-23 15:51 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <de8ba69f-6e97-4288-8470-9d660c28dd7c@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165597 |
On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 10:17:58 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: > On 10/23/2017 11:12 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: <snip> > > Yet I already did: > > << You call ZF your "theory", that's the problem... >> > > Ok. > > First, there are two notions of "theory". First and only. And then think what it means when they say "ZFC is the foundation of mathematics" and how that must be either a metonymy or it is a fallacy. And now think again, I do not need quick feedback. Julio
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-24 05:23 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <A5adnZGH_MJfiXLEnZ2dnUU7-fPNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165609 |
On 10/23/2017 05:51 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 10:17:58 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: >> On 10/23/2017 11:12 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > <snip> >>> Yet I already did: >>> << You call ZF your "theory", that's the problem... >> >> >> Ok. >> >> First, there are two notions of "theory". > > First and only. And then think what it means when they say "ZFC is the > foundation of mathematics" and how that must be either a metonymy or it > is a fallacy. And now think again, I do not need quick feedback. > That is short and sweet. But, you need to explain yourself more fully. There are at least four principal authors whose views significantly impact your quoted phrase -- Cantor, Frege, Skolem, and Goedel. In addition, there is von Neumann, Zermelo, and Tarski. And, then there is the very problem of answering the question of "What is mathematics?" before even speaking of its foundation. I have no problem taking all of mathematics as fallacious because I view the discussion of "abstract objects" outside of space and time as utterly nonsensical. And, many of mathematics' historical figures are on record for viewing mathematical objects as "logical fictions". One may speak of truth within a fiction, but it is not material truth. Hence, all propositions within mathematics are fallacious in a strict sense. Being correct in that sense, however, is not explanatory or useful. Whether or not Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory is foundational in any respect next depends on a determination of which statement, "mathematics is extensional" "mathematics is intensional" is correct. With exception for the category-theoretic notion of set (which is clearly intensional because of the nature of category theory), I would like to see the critics of set theory develop their mathematics without mention of sets. If mathematics is not extensional, there is no reason for sets. I specifically switched from the consideration of sets because of how Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory defers to the account of identity in predicate logic. I find the shift to be generally idiotic because the arguments about "self-identity" and "the necessity of identity" to be entirely the kind of metaphysical nonsense which ought not be part of mathematics (on the view that one need not "believe" in mathematical objects to competently use mathematical methods). Nevertheless, sets are implicit to the semantic conception of truth arising from an extensional view of mathematics. So, one must arrive at questions about the semantics of identity statements. That is where things stand. At best, the options you propose as choices are useless toward making any account of mathematics that reflect what mathematicians do or what they study. If you are claiming that set theory is a metonym, propose an account that remedies the situation. You will find it difficult to do so without "sets" or "collections". mitch
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| From | Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-24 08:33 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <cc48b090-cc01-4b6c-bae4-4b554f2f88be@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165626 |
On Tuesday, October 24, 2017 at 12:24:09 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: > On 10/23/2017 05:51 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > > On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 10:17:58 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: > >> On 10/23/2017 11:12 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > > <snip> > >>> Yet I already did: > >>> << You call ZF your "theory", that's the problem... >> > >> > >> Ok. > >> > >> First, there are two notions of "theory". > > > > First and only. And then think what it means when they say "ZFC is the > > foundation of mathematics" and how that must be either a metonymy or it > > is a fallacy. And now think again, I do not need quick feedback. > > That is short and sweet. But, you need to explain yourself > more fully. <snip> I need to explain it more fully to you. Assuming you now understand what kind of /abuse of language/ is happening there (which I must take you in fact *do not*, see at the bottom), you can go back to where that was said and the context (i.e. to my earlier post) and see if you now get what I meant *there*. (Not even there the context is complete, GG has this habit of snipping what one is directly replying to, so you might need at least one more hop back if you still cannot see the point of that post.) > And, then there is the very problem of answering the question of > "What is mathematics?" before even speaking of its foundation. With all due respect, you are smarter than you think: posting a definition of /number/ is the *first* thing I have done in sci.math (*). And since the beginning I have also been quite explicit about what there is to "doing maths". (*) Before that I had just posted a question and I shall forever be thankful to the two mathematicians who at the time replied to that question, as what came out of that was really key for me to enter the discipline... > I have no problem taking all of mathematics as fallacious because > I view the discussion of "abstract objects" outside of space and > time as utterly nonsensical. You are utterly nonsensical, space and time are abstractions already: indeed, "discussion" per se is all about making abstractions. Because you take Kant to the letter... Mathematics is magic in that it is the opposite of fallacious, it is fully abstract and yet it works. Still it is fully abstract. > With exception for the category-theoretic notion > of set (which is clearly intensional because of the nature of > category theory), I would like to see the critics of set theory > develop their mathematics without mention of sets. If mathematics > is not extensional, there is no reason for sets. Do look up Univalent Foundations!! That said, there is rather no reason why we cannot have mathematics for both extensional and intensional settings. You make up a conflict that in principle (meaning, to begin with) does no exist. > I specifically switched from the consideration of sets because > of how Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory defers to the account of > identity in predicate logic. I find the shift to be generally > idiotic because the arguments about "self-identity" and "the > necessity of identity" to be entirely the kind of metaphysical > nonsense which ought not be part of mathematics (on the view > that one need not "believe" in mathematical objects to competently > use mathematical methods). You do have to believe in mathematics, as a whole. > If you are claiming that set theory is > a metonym, propose an account that remedies the situation. That is not even meaningful, the metonymical *statement* is "ZFC is the/a foundation of mathematics": because ZFC is only a bunch of formulae and the symbolic rules used in that statement to name the whole endeavour, which rather includes models/interpretations and so on, again up to the logic of mathematics. The metonymy becomes an abuse of language when one forgets about it. Now reread my initial "the finitary subset of ZF" which caused all the scandal: that too is a metonymy, and now mine was a valid argument. Julio
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-24 14:43 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <UtCdnZJAV899CnLEnZ2dnUU7-RvNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165640 |
On 10/24/2017 10:33 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > On Tuesday, October 24, 2017 at 12:24:09 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: > >> With exception for the category-theoretic notion >> of set (which is clearly intensional because of the nature of >> category theory), I would like to see the critics of set theory >> develop their mathematics without mention of sets. If mathematics >> is not extensional, there is no reason for sets. > > Do look up Univalent Foundations!! That said, there is rather no reason > why we cannot have mathematics for both extensional and intensional > settings. You make up a conflict that in principle (meaning, to begin > with) does no exist. > Of course there is a conflict. And, to say that I have made it up is ludicrous since the Andrej Bauer's very public condemnation of the FOM mailing list had led to postings all over the internet. Goedel's incompleteness suggests that truth and provability are distinct. This is to be expected in relation to a semantic conception of truth. Univalent foundations is using an epistemic conception of truth by which truth and provability coincide. This would seem to be something that needs to be reconciled if one is to speak of a foundation for mathematics. The problem lies exactly where I explained it to WM. If truth is intended to govern the syntactic derivations of a proof, then one requires a notion of truth for the intermediate statements of a proof which contain free variables. This, in turn, requires a semantic conception of truth whereby free variables may be understood as denoting in a model. Can one rationally deny the role of truth -- or at least belief -- in what constitutes a proof? Dressing up such a denial in layers and layers of notation may hide the question. It does not eliminate it. Since you can find a number of views I have expressed through the years in the HOTT book (FredJeffries pointed this out to me), your statement shows your inability to recognize relationships between mathematical discussions. In what you ignored elsewhere, I stated quite clearly that my investigations had been motivated by identifying the negation of identity with the topological separation of points. In the introduction of the HOTT book you will find, < begin quote > "To briefly explain this perspective, consider first the basic concept of type theory, namely that the term a is of type A, which is written a:A This expression is traditionally thought of as akin to "a is an element of the set A" However, in homotopy type theory we think of it instead as "a is a point in the space A" < end quote > The reason I began reformulating axioms of set theory from a topological perspective is that the transitive closure operation satisfies Kuratowski's axioms for a topological space. It is true that the HOTT book goes on to explain how they are emphasizing homotopy and not topology. But, they also go on to point out that it is appropriate to use certain notions from topology such as "space" and "path". Obviously, from the remarks above, one may also speak of a "point". Where I differ immediately with HOTT is that they wish to use their version of homotopy equivalence to ground a notion that may be used much like equivalence relations. I had been looking at topological separation in relation to individuation. Indeed, the motivation for the formula AxAy( x =/= y <-> ( ~( x =/= x ) /\ ( ( ~( x =/= x ) -> y =/= x ) /\ ( y =/= x -> x =/= y ) ) ) had been the idea that a path described by a linear function in a convex set separates endpoints. You should think more carefully about accusing me of "making up" a conflict that had been dramatically played out in public venues. Go learn something. mitch
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| From | Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-24 22:40 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <89537a1f-be82-4889-a8d0-43dbd1a86fa3@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165662 |
On Tuesday, October 24, 2017 at 9:43:35 PM UTC+2, mitch wrote: > On 10/24/2017 10:33 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: <snip> > > there is rather no reason > > why we cannot have mathematics for both extensional and intensional > > settings. You make up a conflict that in principle (meaning, to begin > > with) does no exist. > > Of course there is a conflict. Did you get offended because I said "make up"? You still just miss the point, which is that *theoretically* there is no such conflict: of course there is conflict all over the place in this world, but that is just because people are utterly stupid, generally. -- I might later go through some more of your *theoretical* objections: the rest, my friend, is essentially your problem. Julio
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-24 14:58 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <HLudnUaM5d7hBnLEnZ2dnUU7-WXNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165640 |
On 10/24/2017 10:33 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > > You are utterly nonsensical, space and time are abstractions already: > indeed, "discussion" per se is all about making abstractions. And, while denying that there can be any meaning to words upon which people may agree, you accuse me of denying the possibility of foundations because I concede to the power of skeptical argument to defeat any statement. Hypocrite. I am well aware of many of the arguments that arose against Kant. But, in the twentieth century the "miracles" of science led to philosophers speaking once again of "abstract objects" outside of space and time because they wanted to be "contemporary". When they had been criticizing Kant, they made a point that the ideal objects of geometry could not be substantiated on the basis of sense data. Now our best science may require us to believe in phantasms. Don't forget. I already told you that your notions of argument are meaningless because your words are meaningless. That is because you habitually make statements with rhetorical goals such as the one above. I have no problem with the tables being turned. However, when I read statements such as yours, I ask myself if it is the case that some people literally have no conception of their personal existence in a spatiotemporal continuum. Are you nothing more than a brain in a vat? mitch
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| From | Jim Burns <james.g.burns@att.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-25 13:33 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <11adee86-b163-11be-d7c9-4e074b35947d@att.net> |
| In reply to | #165626 |
On 10/24/2017 6:23 AM, mitch wrote:
> And, then there is the very problem of answering the question of
> "What is mathematics?" before even speaking of its foundation.
I don't remember ever having a lecture on the topic
"What is physics?" or "What is mathematics?" in any physics
or math course. Perhaps there was too much physics and math
that needed to be covered to spend time on that.
I do remember the introduction to a course in educational
psychology telling us what educational psychology was.
That turned me against becoming a teacher -- professionally,
though I enjoy explaining things without the benefit of
educational psychology. I suspect I am better off without it.
> I have no problem taking all of mathematics as fallacious
> because I view the discussion of "abstract objects" outside
> of space and time as utterly nonsensical. And, many of
> mathematics' historical figures are on record for viewing
> mathematical objects as "logical fictions". One may speak of
> truth within a fiction, but it is not material truth. Hence,
> all propositions within mathematics are fallacious in a
> strict sense.
>
> Being correct in that sense, however, is not explanatory or
> useful.
I think you miss very close to all of the human experience
when you dismiss the discussion of abstract objects.
Discussion itself -- that is, language -- is in the kingdom
of Abstracta.
----
I'd like to make a modest proposal, with regard to foundations.
I suggest that we split our ontology, our Universe, into two
kingdoms, Abstracta and Concreta. We have language that
describes abstract objects and language that describes
concrete objects, but they are not necessarily the same language.
There _might not be_ One Tongue to Rule Them All
(and in the darkness bind them).
Expand our language describing Concreta from first-order
predicate logic to FOPL with plural quantification.
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plural-quant/>
Expand our notion of truth for our language describing Abstracta
to encompass Anil Gupta's (and others') revision theory of truth.
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-revision/>
Plurals are not expressive enough to describe abstract
objects generally, it seems to me, but they are nonetheless
very useful, and they seem to be unobjectionable so far as
they go. They're just not able to go as far as one might want
(not as far as sets or categories go -- I think).
Revision theory lets go of the assumption that a sentence
must be exactly one of true or false -- which is a reasonable
_sounding_ assumption, but which turns out not to be always true.
We tried to fix that problem by avoiding abstracta that
contradict our _assumption_ -- but, really, we only _see_ how
reasonableness that assumption is for concreta. For abstracta,
we are just analogizing to concreta. We don't have another
reason to declare all sentences exactly one of true or false,
it seems to me. So, let it go.
(Another reason I would like to see Concreta split off from
Abstract is that I would like to see _another_ kingdom,
Quanta, described by language from the kingdom of Abstract,
but with fundamental properties contradicting Concreta
in some cases -- as I believe quantum physics contradicts
classical physics in some cases. But that's more a blue-sky
proposal, not at all "modest".)
----
I don't see any of this, including today's conventions, as in
some final form. That might be because of a youth spent hanging
around physicists, who I blame for my corruption.
Foundationally, I would put myself in the Spherical Cow school.[1]
We have something we want to describe. Let's simplify the
description until it is as simple as possible, but no simpler.
Along the way, we will drop many features that are really, truly
part of what we are describing, but that we don't need. (Or,
if it turns out that we do need them, then we'll add them back.)
Syntactic truth is not Truth. It is a useful part of Truth.
Syntactic meaning is not Meaning. And so on.
(An aside: "meaning" for Shoenfield is being used
syntactically. See p18ff, "Structures". A _meaning_ for
a language L is some structure M for language L. A _meaning_
_in M_ for a sentence P(x) is P(b), where each free variable
in P(x) is substituted for a constant referring to some
individual in the universe of M. (Constants are added to
the language L so that all individuals have constants.)
That's all a syntactic _approximation_ to meaning, but
that approximation gets us quite a distance.)
[1]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_cow>
<wiki>
The phrase comes from a joke that spoofs the simplifying
assumptions that are sometimes used in theoretical physics.
Milk production at a dairy farm was low, so the farmer
wrote to the local university, asking for help from
academia. A multidisciplinary team of professors was
assembled, headed by a theoretical physicist, and two
weeks of intensive on-site investigation took place.
The scholars then returned to the university, notebooks
crammed with data, where the task of writing the report
was left to the team leader. Shortly thereafter the
physicist returned to the farm, saying to the farmer,
"I have the solution, but it works only in the case of
spherical cows in a vacuum".
</wiki>
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| From | Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-25 20:11 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <d16c5764-d12a-4c5f-ab91-091940d0b710@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165736 |
On Wednesday, October 25, 2017 at 7:33:26 PM UTC+2, Jim Burns wrote: > On 10/24/2017 6:23 AM, mitch wrote: > > > And, then there is the very problem of answering the question of > > "What is mathematics?" before even speaking of its foundation. > > I don't remember ever having a lecture on the topic That's right, you only had lectures on pushing levers and lying. Julio
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-11-02 22:40 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <zYudneKJgOG4eGbEnZ2dnUU7-fPNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165736 |
On 10/25/2017 12:33 PM, Jim Burns wrote: > On 10/24/2017 6:23 AM, mitch wrote: > >> And, then there is the very problem of answering the question of >> "What is mathematics?" before even speaking of its foundation. > > I don't remember ever having a lecture on the topic > "What is physics?" or "What is mathematics?" in any physics > or math course. Perhaps there was too much physics and math > that needed to be covered to spend time on that. > I agree with that. Then I discovered that philosophy departments were teaching more mathematics than mathematics departments. Who knew? > I do remember the introduction to a course in educational > psychology telling us what educational psychology was. > That turned me against becoming a teacher -- professionally, > though I enjoy explaining things without the benefit of > educational psychology. I suspect I am better off without it. > But, if you took the course, are you certain you are not using what you learned subconsciously? There is nothing quite as imaginative as an unverifiable theory of mind. >> I have no problem taking all of mathematics as fallacious >> because I view the discussion of "abstract objects" outside >> of space and time as utterly nonsensical. And, many of >> mathematics' historical figures are on record for viewing >> mathematical objects as "logical fictions". One may speak of >> truth within a fiction, but it is not material truth. Hence, >> all propositions within mathematics are fallacious in a >> strict sense. >> >> Being correct in that sense, however, is not explanatory or >> useful. > > I think you miss very close to all of the human experience > when you dismiss the discussion of abstract objects. No doubt. But, I am not the minimalist who has reduced human experience to death and taxes! > Discussion itself -- that is, language -- is in the kingdom > of Abstracta. > > ---- > I'd like to make a modest proposal, with regard to foundations. > > I suggest that we split our ontology, our Universe, into two > kingdoms, Abstracta and Concreta. We have language that > describes abstract objects and language that describes > concrete objects, but they are not necessarily the same language. > There _might not be_ One Tongue to Rule Them All > (and in the darkness bind them). > > Expand our language describing Concreta from first-order > predicate logic to FOPL with plural quantification. > <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plural-quant/> > > Expand our notion of truth for our language describing Abstracta > to encompass Anil Gupta's (and others') revision theory of truth. > <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-revision/> > > Plurals are not expressive enough to describe abstract > objects generally, it seems to me, but they are nonetheless > very useful, and they seem to be unobjectionable so far as > they go. They're just not able to go as far as one might want > (not as far as sets or categories go -- I think). > > Revision theory lets go of the assumption that a sentence > must be exactly one of true or false -- which is a reasonable > _sounding_ assumption, but which turns out not to be always true. > We tried to fix that problem by avoiding abstracta that > contradict our _assumption_ -- but, really, we only _see_ how > reasonableness that assumption is for concreta. For abstracta, > we are just analogizing to concreta. We don't have another > reason to declare all sentences exactly one of true or false, > it seems to me. So, let it go. > > (Another reason I would like to see Concreta split off from > Abstract is that I would like to see _another_ kingdom, > Quanta, described by language from the kingdom of Abstract, > but with fundamental properties contradicting Concreta > in some cases -- as I believe quantum physics contradicts > classical physics in some cases. But that's more a blue-sky > proposal, not at all "modest".) > > ---- > I don't see any of this, including today's conventions, as in > some final form. That might be because of a youth spent hanging > around physicists, who I blame for my corruption. > > Foundationally, I would put myself in the Spherical Cow school.[1] > We have something we want to describe. Let's simplify the > description until it is as simple as possible, but no simpler. > Along the way, we will drop many features that are really, truly > part of what we are describing, but that we don't need. (Or, > if it turns out that we do need them, then we'll add them back.) > > Syntactic truth is not Truth. It is a useful part of Truth. > Syntactic meaning is not Meaning. And so on. > > (An aside: "meaning" for Shoenfield is being used > syntactically. See p18ff, "Structures". A _meaning_ for > a language L is some structure M for language L. A _meaning_ > _in M_ for a sentence P(x) is P(b), where each free variable > in P(x) is substituted for a constant referring to some > individual in the universe of M. (Constants are added to > the language L so that all individuals have constants.) > That's all a syntactic _approximation_ to meaning, but > that approximation gets us quite a distance.) > This is actually the truth-condition basis of meaning. Note that the substitution refers to "reference". It is denotational. It is Tarskian semantics. The language expansion, however, is not. It has taken me a great deal of effort to separate this artifact of atomism from other elements of model theory. It is, however, necessary to "represent" denotation. When Russell first wrote, such naming had been viewed as extralogical. But, these constants "stand in" for individuals. When languages are expanded in this way, one should actually treat these constants as a separate syntactic category. > [1] > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spherical_cow> > <wiki> > The phrase comes from a joke that spoofs the simplifying > assumptions that are sometimes used in theoretical physics. > > Milk production at a dairy farm was low, so the farmer > wrote to the local university, asking for help from > academia. A multidisciplinary team of professors was > assembled, headed by a theoretical physicist, and two > weeks of intensive on-site investigation took place. > The scholars then returned to the university, notebooks > crammed with data, where the task of writing the report > was left to the team leader. Shortly thereafter the > physicist returned to the farm, saying to the farmer, > "I have the solution, but it works only in the case of > spherical cows in a vacuum". > </wiki> > I go through this almost daily at work. mitch
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| From | George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-25 20:31 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <28c28ad1-7023-4d76-83fe-53b531771e05@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165562 |
On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 11:59:16 AM UTC-4, mitch wrote: > The most obvious inaccuracies among > his statements It is not clear that you know enough to know what is accurate and what isn't. > are when he invokes semantic results while largely ignoring semantics. I *DON'T* invoke *ANY* results EXCEPT via PROOF! And since we are proving things IN FIRST-ORDER LOGIC, *BY*THE*COMPLETENESS*THEOREM*, semantics CAN be ignored, at least under the standard semantics of the paradigm (that's the one for which the completeness theorem is proved, although analogues may be provable for other semantics and/or other slightly different logics). Furthermore, this is *NOT*MY* result! The completeness theorem was proved BY *GODEL*, for crying out loud! AT LEAST have your argument vs. AN ACTUAL authority and NOT just ME! > So, he sometimes makes statements > that are at odds with the received view for first-order > logic. I don't immediately concede that. *I*HAVE*RECEIVED* the received view -- it is not clear that YOU have. > Given that, he accurately portrays a great deal of the > received view. Well, that's a relevant concession. I stand ethically obligated to relent, concomitantly. I would ask you to consider context. The context of this newsgroup, presently, is that the received viewis now being strongly attacked from ignorance by the likes of WM, Nam, P.O., graham, ad naus. I *NEVER* thought I would be trying to defend the status quo! I used to lead with, AGAINST the Godelian paradigm, the contention that the provability predicates in that paradigm are NOT ACCURATE because they only "correspond to what we really mean" by proof when they are interpreted in THE STANDARD model (of PA or something like it, since "Principia Mathematica and related theories" are what Godel's Thm. was originally proved about). There was a time when I was willing to be just as iconoclastic as the menace we face now. But THESE idiots are SO idiotic that we are REDUCED to just trying to defend THE BASICS!! Have you really not seen me arguing with Nam over something as silly as whether a tautology can or cannot be PRESENTED AS ONE OF YOUR AXIOMS when you are trying to present a first- order theory of something?? Have you really not seen Peter Olcott read one new phrase out of one new (to him) book and suddenly start posting like he's an expert on it and like it confirms his favorite crackpot theories of the last 20 years?? This is STRANGE territory! > As you attempt to catch up with the "terminology", you > will find that it becomes harder and harder to defend > alternative views. THANK YOU!! THAT is a MAJOR concession! Our point vs. 80% of these people is that they DID NOT learn the "terminology"! If they understood it then they would have almost nothing left TO say! Maybe that is some deep reason why they REFUSE to understand it!! > My guess is that you will have to > attack the notion of "foundation" in the end. Oh, come ON! That is impossible NOT because we are so committed to "our foundations" but because we ARE NOT committed to any particular foundation! We are using ZFC as a foundation but that is just a first-order theory for constructing models of first-order theories! It's also the prime example of something that falls UNDER THE *TITLE* of this group! That doesn't mean that everybody here is committed to ZFC as a foundation! It DOES mean that whatEVER your foundation may be (unless it's 2nd-order logic), we are entitled TO ASK you to present SOME FIRST-ORDER AXIOMS about it! Even in the 2OL case, we AND YOU could choose the Henkin semantics to get a first-order approximation! > Should you reach that point, you will find yourself in > a position which Mr. Greene will gladly exploit. You > will have to stipulate a system which you claim to be > "foundational". Oh, wow, you predicted me!! Wow, you are growing! I am just relieved to learn that SOMEbody has actually LEARNED something here over these years!! > At that juncture, he will simply point out > that you are doing nothing more than has been done for > the received view and, thus, can claim no more secure > "foundation" than the received view. Wow. Seriously, thank you. Seriously, this is why I read this group. Not because this happens often but because it happens sometimes. Somebody actually presents a well-reasoned argument. Some of us *appreciate* that sort of thing. That's why WE BOTHERED to get degrees in it. > I certainly could not find it. But, I also view it as > an application of skeptical reasoning and rhetoric. And, > there is no response to skepticism except to observe > that it makes all reasoning fruitless. I don't know just how alternative you want your foundation to be. You have a large capacity for BREADTH of investigation. You have looked at enough different ways of doing things that it is hard to stay focused on one long enough to understand why we need to switch.
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| From | mitch <mitch@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-26 05:35 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <0fSdnRFK0uYVJ2zEnZ2dnUU7-VPNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #165763 |
On 10/25/2017 10:31 PM, George Greene wrote: > On Monday, October 23, 2017 at 11:59:16 AM UTC-4, mitch wrote: >> The most obvious inaccuracies among >> his statements > > It is not clear that you know enough to know what is accurate and what isn't. > >> are when he invokes semantic results while largely ignoring semantics. > > I *DON'T* invoke *ANY* results EXCEPT via PROOF! > And since we are proving things IN FIRST-ORDER LOGIC, > *BY*THE*COMPLETENESS*THEOREM*, semantics CAN be ignored, > at least under the standard semantics of the paradigm (that's the one > for which the completeness theorem is proved, although analogues may > be provable for other semantics and/or other slightly different logics). > Furthermore, this is *NOT*MY* result! The completeness theorem was > proved BY *GODEL*, for crying out loud! AT LEAST have your argument > vs. AN ACTUAL authority and NOT just ME! While I concede that you can make the claim that you need not discuss semantics because of completeness, your mentions often involve constructive theorems following along the lines of Herbrand semantics. We've been through this before. So, your denial here has no force. > >> So, he sometimes makes statements >> that are at odds with the received view for first-order >> logic. > > I don't immediately concede that. > *I*HAVE*RECEIVED* the received view -- it is not clear that YOU have. Yet, you have regularly made claims as if you have. > > >> Given that, he accurately portrays a great deal of the >> received view. > > Well, that's a relevant concession. A very relevant one. I spend a great deal of time "fact-checking". It has actually made me question whether or not statements about "received views" are even sensible. But, they are a common rhetorical device -- you are not the only one who has used it. > I stand ethically obligated to relent, concomitantly. > I would ask you to consider context. I have. But, you and I have a long history. Today's context is different from before. > The context of this newsgroup, presently, is that the received viewis now being > strongly attacked from ignorance by the likes of WM, Nam, P.O., graham, ad naus. > I *NEVER* thought I would be trying to defend the status quo! > Yes. Even more disturbing is the fact that attempts to divert them to paradigms more concomitant with their views is to no avail as well. > I used to lead with, AGAINST the Godelian paradigm, the contention that the > provability predicates in that paradigm are NOT ACCURATE because they only > "correspond to what we really mean" by proof when they are interpreted in > THE STANDARD model (of PA or something like it, since "Principia Mathematica > and related theories" are what Godel's Thm. was originally proved about). > There was a time when I was willing to be just as iconoclastic as the > menace we face now. But THESE idiots are SO idiotic that we are REDUCED > to just trying to defend THE BASICS!! Have you really not seen me > arguing with Nam over something as silly as whether a tautology can or cannot > be PRESENTED AS ONE OF YOUR AXIOMS when you are trying to present a first- > order theory of something?? > Yes. But, since I try to write axioms in order to understand why I see matters differently from others, I can tell you that it is easy to make such errors. Generally, however, I concede mistakes of that nature. > Have you really not seen Peter Olcott read one new phrase out of one new > (to him) book and suddenly start posting like he's an expert on it and > like it confirms his favorite crackpot theories of the last 20 years?? > When I let myself fall into the trap of flaming him I thought of how you must have perceived my initial postings three years ago. That has not necessarily changed much. I may simply be less contemptible. > This is STRANGE territory! Yes. > > > >> As you attempt to catch up with the "terminology", you >> will find that it becomes harder and harder to defend >> alternative views. > > THANK YOU!! > THAT is a MAJOR concession! When I first posted, I did not know what was being taught as mathematics in philosophy departments. On the other hand, univalent foundations is symptomatic of how what is being taught in mathematics departments is different from what is being taught in philosophy departments. What one has is a large community of intelligent people speaking past one another and, sometimes, behaving impolitely to one another because of it. > Our point vs. 80% of these people is that they DID NOT learn the "terminology"! > If they understood it then they would have almost nothing left TO say! > Maybe that is some deep reason why they REFUSE to understand it!! > Well, the people in history who have exposed it had been extremely bright. The subject is difficult. >> My guess is that you will have to >> attack the notion of "foundation" in the end. > > Oh, come ON! That is impossible NOT because we are so committed to > "our foundations" but because we ARE NOT committed to any particular > foundation! Yes. And, I found an online source pointing out that exact problem with respect to foundationalism. > We are using ZFC as a foundation but that is just a first-order > theory for constructing models of first-order theories! You might not feel quite that way if you had learned mathematics in a mathematics department. This is a particular view of yours with which I do not necessarily agree. Cantor had intended set theory to be a theory of collections. Logicism morphed it. > It's also the prime > example of something that falls UNDER THE *TITLE* of this group! > That doesn't mean that everybody here is committed to ZFC as a foundation! No. And that is one of the things I had to learn. But, then, using the word "foundation" without a clear account of how you are using it is unfair to interlocutors. I have tried to explain exactly what motivates my non-standard approaches. And, I have tried to explain that the issue of "truth" motivates the received view to the best that I can tell. I also do not think that Hilbert's view of "formalism" corresponds to what is called "formalism" today. So, when speaking of "foundation" one must be clear. This is why I will often be critical of textbook authors or presentations like the HOTT book. > It DOES mean that whatEVER your foundation may be (unless it's 2nd-order > logic), we are entitled TO ASK you to present SOME FIRST-ORDER AXIOMS > about it! Even in the 2OL case, we AND YOU could choose the Henkin semantics > to get a first-order approximation! > > >> Should you reach that point, you will find yourself in >> a position which Mr. Greene will gladly exploit. You >> will have to stipulate a system which you claim to be >> "foundational". > > Oh, wow, you predicted me!! > Wow, you are growing! > I am just relieved to learn that SOMEbody has actually LEARNED something > here over these years!! Your flame of me had been very painful. But, I have thanked you for it in the past and I do so again now. > > >> At that juncture, he will simply point out >> that you are doing nothing more than has been done for >> the received view and, thus, can claim no more secure >> "foundation" than the received view. > > Wow. > Seriously, thank you. > > Seriously, this is why I read this group. > Not because this happens often but because it happens sometimes. > Somebody actually presents a well-reasoned argument. > Some of us *appreciate* that sort of thing. > That's why WE BOTHERED to get degrees in it. > > >> I certainly could not find it. But, I also view it as >> an application of skeptical reasoning and rhetoric. And, >> there is no response to skepticism except to observe >> that it makes all reasoning fruitless. > > > I don't know just how alternative you want your foundation to be. > You have a large capacity for BREADTH of investigation. You have > looked at enough different ways of doing things that it is hard to > stay focused on one long enough to understand why we need to switch. > When you are searching, it is hard to explain what you are searching for. Logic needs "truth" in order for proofs to make sense. But, mathematical objects cannot be said to be substantive (except through belief). So, if mathematics is a fiction, one needs to warrant existence in the fiction as if it is material existence. Then logic can be applied. That warrant happens through identity statements. I could not have said that years ago. But, the relationship of Tarski's axiom, constructive mathematics, and my use of implicit definitions (inductively instantiated) come together to make that so. In addition, Morris' proposal in "Understanding Identity Statements" is precisely that of understanding identity statements as a warrant. At present, that is the basic idea of where my studies have landed me. I will be presenting some sentences again soon. But then I need to focus on rules of inference. If I can't get that to work, that will be that. mitch
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| From | Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-22 15:05 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <21f5050b-ced6-4197-a704-8168692c872c@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165523 |
On Sunday, October 22, 2017 at 10:17:35 PM UTC+2, George Greene wrote: > On Thursday, October 19, 2017 at 11:37:00 PM UTC-4, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > > On Friday, October 20, 2017 at 5:30:02 AM UTC+2, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > > > Great, to which I'd retort that the construction in question is impossible > > > just because only the finitary subset of ZF is in fact valid. > > > > Because we can give a construction, but it is properly infinite and in > > essence just countable. > > You are replying to yourself almost nonsensically here. Is that your stupid way to ask whether I mean the two to be equivalent formulations? The second is direct, the first relates to my contention to you. The first I wrote to you, the second I wrote for the passing reader who might wonder what the heck I am talking about: you are supposed to know that, as I have tried and told you so many times already. Fuck you, George, and your double standards. Julio
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| From | George Greene <greeneg@email.unc.edu> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-20 17:51 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <0e28432c-05fe-433f-acea-d18ec9c81220@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165341 |
On Thursday, October 19, 2017 at 11:30:02 PM UTC-4, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > Great, to which I'd retort that the construction in question is impossible > just because only the finitary subset of ZF is in fact valid. Which would make you so ignorant of logic in general that you don't even know what "valid" means. Again, THE ONLY thing that entitles anybody to object TO ANYthing around here IS DERIVING A CONTRADICTION from it. Z and its axiom of infinity AND EVERYTHING ELSE around HERE is LEGITIMATELY PRESUMED -- not "valid" but CONSISTENT was the word you were looking for -- UNTIL YOU prove otherwise. The burden of proof IS ALWAYS ON you because if it in fact IS inconsistent, YOU CAN ALWAYS prove that. If it's consistent, we actually CAN'T prove that (except by going to a different system which would then have ITS OWN consistency problem), so it is NOT legitimate TO EVEN ASK.
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| From | WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-20 23:16 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <610656e4-e4c2-4592-8023-24a8c539e8f1@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165425 |
Am Samstag, 21. Oktober 2017 02:52:00 UTC+2 schrieb George Greene: > Again, THE ONLY thing that entitles anybody to object TO ANYthing around here IS DERIVING A CONTRADICTION from it. That has been done, applying mathematics: If a sequence (a_n) is always larger than a sequence (b_n), then the limit of (b_n) cannot be larger than the limit of (a_n). In mathematics that's simply enough. It contradicts the existence of uncountably many paths in the Binary Tree: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/sci.math/OqoiblnJEwc Regards, WM
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| From | Julio Di Egidio <julio@diegidio.name> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-20 23:55 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <0df64f50-47cb-400c-b697-f2298c4ea320@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #165446 |
On Saturday, October 21, 2017 at 8:16:48 AM UTC+2, WM wrote: > Am Samstag, 21. Oktober 2017 02:52:00 UTC+2 schrieb George Greene: > > > Again, THE ONLY thing that entitles anybody to object TO ANYthing around > > here IS DERIVING A CONTRADICTION from it. > > That has been done, applying mathematics: If a sequence (a_n) is always > larger than a sequence (b_n), then the limit of (b_n) cannot be larger > than the limit of (a_n). In mathematics that's simply enough. +1 Julio > It contradicts the existence of uncountably many paths in the Binary Tree: > https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/sci.math/OqoiblnJEwc
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2017-10-21 15:14 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87efpwoaew.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #165446 |
WM <wolfgang.mueckenheim@hs-augsburg.de> writes:
> Am Samstag, 21. Oktober 2017 02:52:00 UTC+2 schrieb George Greene:
>
>> Again, THE ONLY thing that entitles anybody to object TO ANYthing
>> around here IS DERIVING A CONTRADICTION from it.
>
> That has been done, applying mathematics: If a sequence (a_n) is
> always larger than a sequence (b_n), then the limit of (b_n) cannot be
> larger than the limit of (a_n). In mathematics that's simply enough.
So far, no contradiction show or even stated (as usual). You have
vaguely stated a theorem in real analysis, and you are inviting people
to import that, naively, into set theory. It's the same old shtick: you
object to the fact that
B_n = [0, n)
has lim_{n->oo} B_n = R+, but
A_n = [n, 3n)
has lim_{n->oo} A_n = {} because the A_n are "larger" than the B_n.
<snip>
--
Ben.
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